Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2009): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2007, Quarterly Reports for 2008, licensing policy and review of export control legislation - Foreign Affairs Committee Contents


Examination of Witness (Questions 20-39)

IAN PEARSON MP, MR JOHN DODDRELL AND MS JAYNE CARPENTER

21 JANUARY 2009

  

  Q20  Mike Gapes: Perhaps you could give us more information, if you have it. That takes me to my second question. On 7 October, our then Clerk wrote to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on the Quarterly Report on Arms Exports requesting a reply and received a reply from the parliamentary team dated 20 November. The question we asked, and this was in October and the reply came on 20 November, was: We would be grateful for a note on the Israeli naval and land blockade of Gaza and whether the Government is prepared to export arms that can be used to enforce the blockade. The reply said: We would be grateful for further time to formulate a detailed response. We will aim to respond to the Committee by 8 December. We are still waiting; seven weeks after 8 December this Committee has still not received the information that was requested at that time. That information is very pertinent because the upsurge of the conflict began in December. Clearly the blockade and the naval aspects of it are a very important part of what has been happening over the recent weeks. When are we going to get that reply? More importantly, will we have a more prompt response to our request for information about what has been happening during the actual conflict than waiting several weeks or perhaps months before we get that information?

  Ian Pearson: Mike, you have made your point. It is up to the Foreign Office to reply. You are Chairman of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Select Committee. I am sure you are taking it up with them.

  

  Q21  Mike Gapes: Minister, that is not good enough. The Foreign Office does not reply just in and of itself; there are government departments involved. They have to get the information from the Ministry of Defence and from your own department and they need to co-ordinate the response. You know very well that they respond on behalf of the Government collectively, so it is no good trying to pass the buck on to another government department. This is a serious issue.

  Ian Pearson: If I had a chance to finish what I was saying, it is that it is the Foreign Office's responsibility to lead in producing a reply on this. I will personally chase it up with them and see that you get a reply as quickly as possible.

  Mike Gapes: We would like a response on the other issue quickly as well, please.

  

  Q22  Linda Gilroy: This is a general point following on from what Mike has just raised. You said in response to the first question on this series of questions that apart from the fact that there were some obvious ways in which you would be proactively monitoring what has been happening in a very distressing conflict of recent times, you were not prepared to share openly with the Committee exactly what the nature of that would be. Clearly we all need a very high level of confidence that that is going to be done on almost a case-by-case audit of every licence that has been issued in recent times under the consolidated criteria. Would you be prepared to share with the Committee more detail of how that will be done on a private basis, if necessary?

  Ian Pearson: We always seek to be as open and transparent as we can in providing information, in particular information to the Committee. We do have a number of sources, including intelligence sources, where it might be difficult to actually put that information into the public domain, but we will do as much as we sensibly can to make sure that information is available to the Committee. Certainly I can guarantee that we will look at all the sources at our disposal and make sure that we factor those into licensing decisions and that those licensing decisions remain consistent with the consolidated criteria.

  

  Q23  Richard Burden: Minister, could you clarify something that has been bothering me. The argument you have been advancing is that whilst Israel has the right to self-defence and it would be perfectly acceptable within the consolidated criteria to supply arms equipment for self-defence purposes, on a case-by-case basis you want to be assured that those arms are not being used for internal repression or external aggression. What I do not understand is that if that is the position in relation to Israel, why is it that in relation to the Palestinians there is an arms embargo and that this week the Prime Minister has said that without exception any arms going into Gaza should be intercepted even with the use of the Royal Navy to help with that. Why is it not said in relation to the Palestinians that arms that might be used for self-defence, for example small arms or maybe something to stop a tank coming into Gaza, might be licensed but arms that could involve rockets being fired into Israel would not be licensed? Why the difference? Surely if there is an arms embargo on one side, there should be one on both sides, should there not?

  Ian Pearson: The difference, as I understand it, is that there is a UN resolution which has been agreed upon and the UK acts in accordance with supporting UN resolutions. You will be aware of that. It is something that the FCO lead on rather than my department. There is a difference. I understand how we might have difficulties with this but I do not think anybody is suggesting that the UK Government as a matter of policy should be arming Hamas.

  Richard Burden: I am not suggesting that. I am just suggesting that if there is an arms embargo on one side, should there not be an arms embargo on both sides?

  Chairman: We have had quite a lot of discussion on this issue. I think the concerns of members of the Committee of all parties have been clearly expressed. The only other thing I would say is that obviously we would appreciate as quick a response as possible to the specific questions that have been asked.

  

  Q24  Mike Gapes: I want to switch the focus to broker registration. Mr Doddrell, in evidence to our Committee, said that the Government was not yet fully convinced at that stage of the benefits of a registration system and that although in principle you are not objecting to it, there is still no proposal for such a register. Why are you not yet convinced, or was that last year and are you now convinced?

  Ian Pearson: There are a number of things I want to say on this, and John can obviously speak for himself. The first thing I want to say is that the responses to the consultation document for the 2007 Review of Export Controls were quite mixed—some strongly in favour of a scheme and others opposed or cynical about the value of actually having a register. The second thing I want to do is to make a distinction between a register and a pre-licensing registration system. In practice, we already have a register of traders because we have a comprehensive database and can use it at any time to show who is using trade control licences. We can use this information to direct our awareness-raising or compliance-visiting activity. What we do not have is a pre-licensing registration system under which traders have to be vetted before they can be registered. I have looked at this. At the moment, I am not fully convinced that a pre-licensing registration scheme at this stage would be the right way to go and whether it would justify the additional bureaucratic burdens that would be involved in doing this, particularly in view of some of the other steps we are taking at the moment. I would prefer us to look at how well the initiatives that we are currently pursuing are working, such as clamping down on those who misuse open licences and focusing our awareness activity on traders at work, before considering this further. I am not saying that I would rule it out but at the moment I am not convinced that it is absolutely necessary.

  

  Q25  Mike Gapes: You mentioned bureaucratic burdens. Are these bureaucratic burdens on the Department because you would have to have more people monitoring this or is it business burdens?

  Ian Pearson: It would be both but there certainly would be burdens on legitimate businesses that would have to comply with this, and we would have to see whether we think it is proportionate or not to place those additional burdens on them.

  

  Q26  Mike Gapes: Have you done any assessment of what kind of burdens you are talking about or is this just some unquantified fear which has not really been assessed?

  Ian Pearson: John Doddrell might want to say something on that in detail. If you are going to have some sort of pre-licensing registration system, it clearly is going to involve some additional burden on companies. I would really like to see how some of the other measures that we have announced and are taking forward are going to work out before deciding whether it is important.

  Mr Doddrell: The difficulty about a register is that it is another hoop which an exporter has to go through before they can apply for a licence. There are detailed questions that need to be worked out about what the registration process involved, what the requirements would be on information to be provided by the trader or the exporter in order to become registered. All of those sorts of things would need to be looked at very carefully. There is a question of how far you draw the register. Is the register to be limited to traders and brokers or is it to be extended to exporters as well? Even if you limit it to traders and brokers, you are not only catching the people who are doing the illicit arms dealing or are verging on the edge of the grey arms market; you are catching a lot of very legitimate businesses with rather big names like potentially Rolls-Royce or British Aerospace who are involved in moving arms equipment around from one country to another. So potentially you are talking about a significant burden here on business. We as a department would need to be absolutely convinced that that was justified before going ahead with the register.

  Ian Pearson: Just to labour the point, we do have a de facto registration scheme at the moment for companies that have applied for licences.

  

  Q27  Mike Gapes: If you have that, then surely you just need to add some kind of vetting system on to your existing SPIRE system, and that therefore does not put extra burdens necessarily on business; it just requires you to put some more resources up to carry out this necessary process.

  Ian Pearson: In effect, we assess every licence application anyway, do we not?

  

  Q28  Mike Gapes: The question is how rigorously?

  Ian Pearson: I would maintain that we have a thorough examination of each and every licence application. We should not forget here that in the UK we have one of the best and strictest export control licensing arrangements that would be found anywhere in the world. While it is absolutely right for the Committee to want to probe us and to press us to strengthen it, we should not underestimate the very real strengths of the UK system at the moment. We can hold our heads up high compared with other countries.

  

  Q29  Chairman: Given that the Department has said in the past that it can see clear advantages into such a system, this is still under consideration, is it not?

  Ian Pearson: It is under consideration. As I have said, we have not ruled it out but officials would need to convince me that it is a proportionate thing to do and that the advantages of doing it would exceed the disadvantages in terms of the burdens that would be imposed on businesses.

  

  Q30  Chairman: Officials recognised that there is the case here some months ago. They are still looking at it?

  Ian Pearson: Yes.

  

  Q31  John Bercow: I listened to Mr Doddrell's response to Mike a moment ago and it did strike me as an absolutely impeccably Sir Humphrey response, if I may say so, and I do not mean that discourteously. It did strike me as a response in which the only words not stated but were implicit were "long grass". I gained the very distinct impression that any such idea was heading for or had already arrived at the long grass. My concern is just for a degree of clarity and specificity. If the situation is that quite frankly you think the whole thing is not worth it, that it is too expensive and it is going to upset business and it is not worth the candle, that may well dissatisfy the Committee but a blunt statement to that effect would at least have the advantage of candour. If the reality is that you want to preserve the fiction that the matter is under review, you are always open to persuasion and you are listening to the arguments, what I really want to know is this, Minister or from Mr Doddrell: is active work on the complexities being undertaken? Is work being done by officials looking at what Mr Doddrell described as the range of operational details that would need to be covered in order to draw a full model of how such a system might work in practice? Is such work going on or not?

  Ian Pearson: Yes, it is going on. My understanding is that officials will, at the appropriate time, produce a submission to me and I will take a view as to whether I think it is worthwhile pursuing or, as you say, can it and say that we are not going to do it.

  

  Q32  John Bercow: Therefore at a subsequent meeting if the same question were posed, we would be advised of some more detailed work that had been undertaken and precisely what conclusions could be drawn from it? We would get the impression at that point, would we, that the decision was not in abeyance or relegated to the long grass but distinctive and probably final?

  Ian Pearson: Yes, work is going on. As I have indicated, I would like to see how some of the other things that we are doing actually pan out because that would affect our decision as to whether we think that there is a balance of advantage in having a pre-licensing registration scheme or not. If we think that there are other policy instruments that can obviate the need for something like this, then obviously you would expect us to take those into consideration.

  

  Q33  John Bercow: The work currently under way, and I am quoting Mr Doddrell, has been under way since 2007 but it is so immensely onerous and burdensome and long term that in 2009 a conclusion has not been reached. Will a conclusion have been reached by this time next year?

  Ian Pearson: Possibly.

  

  Q34  John Bercow: I said "long grass", Minister. It is extremely long grass!

  Ian Pearson: Can I explain why I say "possibly"? I do want to ensure that there is sufficient time for us to assess the impact of us putting some small additional resources into this area so that we can clamp down on those who misuse open licences and those sorts of areas will have effect as a policy. You cannot simply say: we will assess this in one month or two months. You need to give it a time period.

  

  Q35  John Bercow: You are in no danger, Minister, of being accused of excessive haste in this.

  Ian Pearson: Thank you for that, John, but, as you know, I have always believed in confronting decisions and making them and I will be perfectly prepared to make a decision in this area. Some of these things have a natural timescale in which it is appropriate to make a decision. When it is the appropriate time, I will not shirk it; I will make it.

  Chairman: We have had to wait in some other areas for decisions. We prefer the right decision and a little waiting than to have the wrong decision tomorrow morning. Thank you for that.

  

  Q36  John Battle: I am afraid mine is that question: is work going on, and I am tempted to say is real work going on, to quote the Prime Minister, and, rather than just looking at an in-tray, are things moving on? The reason is that as a Committee in our last report we have welcomed the Government's intention to introduce end-use controls through the EU if possible. I gather that has not proved possible. The Government did suggest that they could be introduced independently in the UK. Could you update us on the EU negotiations? Have they fallen fallow now and are you making preparations to introduce a system into the UK? Are you looking at it and are people working on another monitoring system and preparing industry for it? How far has all that shifted?

  Ian Pearson: As a Government, we have always taken the view that the best thing to do is to go down the EU route because that ensures there is a level playing field and that we have other countries involved in doing the same thing. We do need to get this right. We have been working on a proposal to extend the scope of the EU military end-use control that was introduced in 2000. Once finalised, this will be put to the Commission and other Member States. John or Jayne may want to say something about how the particular work that we have been doing internally has been taken forward. I would say that getting agreement in Europe is not a simple or straightforward process in many of these areas, but it is our preferred route. We would certainly consider introducing a national control if we were convinced that going down the EU route was very unlikely to be able to produce the sorts of results that we would want to see in the short to medium term, but for the moment I think our view is that this is still worth engaging on. Jayne will say more about the detail of this.

  Ms Carpenter: There are two potential end-use controls that we are pursuing in Europe: one is the military end-use control and the other is the torture end-use control, as you know. The position on each is slightly different. On the torture end-use control, we have actually had some discussions within Europe which have been generally supported. In fact, there was a meeting in Brussels last week where we raised this with other Member States. We have begun the process of trying to get support within Europe. Initial indications are that there is a good deal of support but, as you know, the European process is fairly slow-moving, so we need to let that run for at least some time before we take a decision as to whether to consider an alternative. On the military end-use control, again we are pursuing that in Europe but we are less far forward with the specific proposal on that than we are with the torture end-use control. That is really because in looking at the ways in which we might propose enhancing the military end-use control, it has become evident that there is quite a lot of complexity in terms of the sorts of goods that we would need to cover, the sorts of destinations that we would need to cover and the sorts of end-use we would need to cover. Broadly speaking, what we are proposing to do is to put forward a proposal which builds on the current military end-use control by including whole pieces of equipment, whereas the current military end-use control only covers components and production equipment for military items. That would, for example, enable us to catch whole vehicles, which would not otherwise be controlled. The current control does not cover police and paramilitary use or use by security forces, so we would be seeking to extend its coverage to those end-users as well. We are also looking at the possibility of extending the use of end-use control beyond embargoed countries to which it is limited at the moment. 201[1] That is, very broadly speaking, the sort of proposal we are looking at.

  

  Ian Pearson: May I add one point to this in that I think there has been a significant amount of focus on this since the issue arose of Land Rovers that were then militarised and exported from Turkey to Uzbekistan. We are all familiar with that. I was asking officials if they could tell us about other instances that we need to be aware of. In general, I believe that we ought to be looking at where the problem is and how do we provide a solution, rather than providing theoretical solutions to problems we are not sure exist. I have agreed to give the Committee information. If the Committee has information about where it thinks that there are particular problem areas, I think that would be very helpful to us because we are not aware, as far as I understand it, of significant problems that have been raised since that episode. We would welcome any information that is available, whether it is from the Committee directly or from others who hear our proceedings.

  

  Q37  John Battle: Just to follow that through, we were promised information on Europe, for example, which we now have, by the end of 2008. I think the information you have given is helpful and it creates a little bit of a sense of a conversation of things moving on a bit. I appreciate the difficulties involved in Europe but we need the updates; we need a better feed-back to create a sense of dynamism in the whole thing. As a last point, you mentioned the military, you mentioned torture, but there was also going to be a report back to us on end-use controls of non-military goods. You were going to have a consultation on it and report back to the Committee before the end of the year and again suggest a system for those as well. I know there is consultation in progress. How is that going?

  Jane Carpenter: What we are proposing under the military end-use control would actually cover non-military goods i.e. goods not on the military list or dual-use list.

  

  Q38  Mr Bailey: Could we cover the issue of re-exports. Basically the position in this Committee, as you know, has been in favour of such restrictions. I think it is fair to describe the attitude of the ministers and former ministers as being that they have genuflected in the direction of that but will not make a decision to alter current policy. The former foreign secretary said that it might have been desirable and another minister said, "I am seriously thinking about the practicalities of this," but it has not happened. What are the legal or practical difficulties that have prevented them from taking this decision? Why are those practical or legal difficulties not relevant to the other 11 EU countries that to a greater or lesser degree do have restrictions on re-exports?

  Ian Pearson: First let me say something in terms of the Government's view and then address directly the problems that you raise in terms of answering the question what are the legal difficulties. The Government's view has always tended to be that any risks posed by a country of ultimate disposal or end user will be factored into our risk assessment under the licence application. We have not necessarily believed that we need specific re-export clauses because we can and do, in fact, refuse applications because of concerns about re-export. Our view has always been as a government that the introduction of a no re-export clause on licences is not necessary or feasible and would be onerous to operate and virtually impossible to enforce. The comments that you quote from some government ministers reflect that there is I think a commonsense view that this would be a desirable thing to do but in practice there are some very serious practical legal barriers. You mentioned a number of countries that do have a no re-export clause. I would say in response that I would be interested to see any assessment about how legally effective they think they are and how operationally useful they think they are as policy instruments compared with the sort of policies that we have at the moment. Our view is that the key difficulty in including a no re-export clause as a licence condition is determining, first, to whom it would apply and, second, against whom any action would be taken. If it is to the exporter, then it would be wholly exporters responsible for events outside their control. If it was to the overseas customer, then the obligation would be unenforceable as it would be beyond the UK's legal jurisdiction. Both those instances present really quite difficult obstacles to having an enforceable clause. If the Committee thinks those difficulties could be overcome, we would be interested to hear the practical ways in which they think it would be possible to do so.

  

  Q39  Mr Bailey: I accept that it would be quite an interesting exercise to see how, if you like, this process works with other countries, but I do not want to be sidetracked down that particular path. As of this moment it might be interesting to know, given the fact that you have said these issues are factored into the granting of an export licence, what monitoring is done to ensure that once that export licence has been granted there has not been, if you like, re-export of the items in question. Can you give any sort of figures or at least outline what process is carried out to ensure that this does not happen?

  Ian Pearson: On the first point, we do pay particular attention to some countries where we have strong concerns of the possibility of re-export. Indonesia might be one example we would cite as a country where if we were to export goods to a company in that country we would have concerns.2[2] That is why, where we have those sorts of heightened concerns, we have to factor them very closely into account in terms of the decisions that we take. We will also use the information that we have available on the nature of the company and the past practices of the company in question to which export is being made, and, I repeat, we can and do refuse applications because of concerns about export. On the second point in terms of monitoring previous decisions, perhaps I could ask Jayne or John to say something about the detail.

  

  Ms Carpenter: Before the licence is issued, it is part of the assessment process to ask UK diplomatic posts overseas to comment on the applications. That can include asking them to check the accuracy of the information in the application, looking at the documentation, and physically going to see where the end-user entity is and what sort of operation they have set up. All those checks are already done as part of the assessment process. The use of military equipment overseas in destinations of concern is also monitored by UK diplomatic posts, so people from the embassy keep an eye on the equipment that is being supplied from the UK and how it is being used in that destination and they report back to the FCO on that. We also take account of a variety of different reporting mechanisms on end use which include NGOs, human rights organisation reports, media reporting, intelligence reports. Posts overseas have standing instructions to report to us or to the FCO any misuse of UK-supplied equipment, so there is a certain amount of end-user monitoring being done. Given that we issue 10,000 or 12,000 licences a year, there is a limit in practical terms to the extent to which we can monitor the end use of every exported item, but there is some end-use monitoring already being done.


1   1 Clarification from witness: This statement refers to the military end-use control. Back

2   2 Note from witness: This statement should refer to Malaysia rather than Indonesia. Back


 
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