Examination of Witness (Questions 63-79)
MR OLIVER
SPRAGUE, MS
MARILYN CROSER
AND MR
ROY ISBISTER
11 MARCH 2009
Chairman: Good morning. Before I ask
our witnesses to introduce themselves for the record, I will ask
a new member of the Committee, Adam Holloway, to declare any relevant
interests.
Mr Holloway: As a reporter on News
at Ten I worked in the so-called Investigative Unit and did
a number of pieces which included working with or getting stuff
from independent, London-based arms dealers and also dealing with
the anti arms trade campaigners, Omega, in Manchester. Also, I
plan at some point to do an interview for the Parliament Trust
Fellowship with BAE Systems in order to learn about UAVs.
Q63 Chairman: Thank you very much
indeed. Roy, would you like to introduce yourselves and your colleagues
for the record, please?
Mr Isbister: Sure. I am Roy Isbister
from Saferworld. I am joined by Marilyn Croser from Oxfam GB and
Oliver Sprague from Amnesty UK.
Q64 Chairman: Welcome and thank you
for your written submission to the Committee. Adam has mentioned
UAVs. Perhaps I could start with an issue that arose in our last
evidence session with the Minister, and it was an issue to which
you referred in your submission, about whether unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) operated by the Israeli Defence Force contain
engines manufactured in the UK. Can we try to bottom this one
out. In your submission you say, "In January 2009, evidence
was published suggesting that UAVs (piloted drones) operated by
the Israeli Defence Forces and manufactured by Israeli company
Elbit Systems may contain engines manufactured in the UK."
You went on to say, "UAV Engines (UEL) based in Lichfield
has stated that it manufactures the engines for Hermes 450 UAVs
produced by its parent company, Elbit Systems of Israel."
In the letter we received from Ian Pearson, the Economics and
Business Minister, dated 19 February, he made two comments. First,
he confirmed that export licences have only been granted on the
UK company mentioned to supply UAV Engines to Israel for incorporation
into complete UAVs which were then re-exported to other countries,
and he went on to say, "The UK exporter has advised us that
Elbit, its parent company, the Israeli defence manufacturer, attached
prestige to the engines supplied from the UK and for those reasons
the term UEL has become a designator of a type of engine rather
than an indicator that it was UK manufactured. It is therefore
possible that engines used by the Israeli armed forces would be
referred to as UEL even though they would have been made in Israel
itself." My question is—forgive me for the long background
but it is to clarify this, given your submission—Do you
accept that the Government is right to say there is some confusion
over terminology here in relation to what is a UEL engine? Given
that, do you believe there is any evidence that UK manufactured
engines were supplied to Elbit for use in UAVs in the occupied
territories?
Mr Sprague: I will start off with
that because the case is most closely associated with us, Amnesty.
I think it is important to say, first, that we have never said
that we have categorical proof that UK engines or parts or components
from UK sources are in UAVs operated by the Israeli Defence Forces.
We have pointed to established, we would say credible, sources
suggesting that the engines used in these drones, even from the
company themselves, are of UK origin. For us, the onus now is
on the UK Government to ascertain the origin of engines, components,
and all technology in the UAVs operated by Israel, because the
credible sources suggest there may well be the UK connection.
I can go on to all the reasons why that might be. There still
is no other listed engine supplier for the Hermes 450, the particular
variant of the UAV. The engine itself is a specialised Wankel-designed
rotary engine. I have heard comments that there are a significant
number of manufacturers of UAV engines that could be used in drones.
Whilst that is true, and I am not the fount of all wisdom on UAVs,
it would appear that the engine manufacturers of this particular
variant, the specific rotary engines listed as UEL engines, are
made by a very small handful of companies. I think I could find
eight companies, none of which are based in Israel, and there
is no public record citing source of any other manufacturer. Of
course it is entirely possible that we are talking about transfers,
and it is a supplementary point to our evidence submission that
examples may well go back a long time in history. The Israeli
Defence Force first acquired the Hermes 450 in 1997 and it was
at that time that the experts from Jane's Defence reported the
first-reported use of UEL type engines, so it is entirely possible
that the original batch of engines may well have been exported
more than ten years ago and they may well have been exported by
the previous administration, for example. The question is now,
therefore, not just about whether or not whole engines have been
supplied by this Government but have UK engines at any stage in
the development of the Hermes 450 been supplied and have we supplied
any follow-up components, parts, spares or technology since then?
I looked through the UK companies' annual reports prior to coming
here and in both 1997 and 1999 they made technology transfers
for know-how and related technology for their engine designs:
one of £200,000 to the Israeli parent company who owns the
engine supplier and, in 1999, a further £376,000 to an unspecified
supplier. That does give some indication that technology has been
supplied for these engines, which raises the possibility that
they could be manufactured in other countries, which would obviously
raise concerns around licensed production issues or technology
transfer issues.
Q65 Sir John Stanley: I would like
to ask each of you to respond to this question, if you would.
It has been the policy of successive British governments that
there should be no approval of military exports from this country
of offensive weapons—and I stress "offensive"
not defensive—into areas of conflict or potential conflict.
The question I would like to ask each of you: Do you consider
against that criterion that there are any breaches of that policy
that have been taking place in respect of any particular weapon
or weapon component to any particular country?[1]
1
Mr Isbister: Any particular country?
It is quite difficult to think about such a general question and
then think about specific instances. I certainly would say that
we have concerns on "balance of risk" questions; that
is, the Government is making its decision not on the basis of
certainty but on the basis of risk. Regarding the consolidated
criteria, there will be occasions where on the balance of risk,
on imperfect information/less information than the Government
has, I may well have come to a different decision.
Q66 Sir John Stanley: That is all
very generalised. I am asking each of you whether you wish to
cite any particular weapon or weapon component which you consider
the Government is approving of an offensive nature that is going
to a country which is either in conflict or is in an area of potential
conflict.
Mr Sprague: I would to back to
what Roy said that this is a risk-based system. We are not the
end-use monitoring agency. It is very difficult for us, especially
when we are talking about component parts. The drone example is
a classic example. The answer to the question lies in the drones
operated by the IDF, all we can do is point to a reasonable risk
and evidence to suggest that somebody needs to check the origin
of the engines. In the Israeli example, because it is current
and topical—the Committee has raised it, we have raised
it in the past—the decision to change the incorporation
guidelines in 2002 did allow, specifically stated, components
for offensive weaponry—not just the F16s, but the same rules
probably apply to things like Apache helicopter—there probably
are other technologies that have been licensed using a similar
policy—to go to Israel.
Q67 Member of the Committees: Via
the United States?[2]
2
Mr Sprague: Yes. We have not found
the UK component in equipment used in Israel because that is something
we cannot know. Just as a matter of interest, Amnesty has just
done an assessment mission in Gaza. We went to view some of the
damage from the military shelling and bombing. We did look at
components that were in wreckage from things like the hellfire
missiles on the ground that had been used in indiscriminate attacks.
Whilst there is not a UK connection, it does show the international
connection. Whilst this is an American missile system, one of
the electronic components had a "Made in France" insignia
on it, so one of the components for hellfire missiles used in
indiscriminate attacks in Gaza had come from France. The possibility—and
I say possibility—exists, because UK manufacturers are also
involved in similar kinds of transactions via the United States,
for that to have happened. There are also numerous examples that
we have cited in evidence, that the Committee has raised itself,
going back through history. I could cite Indonesia, for example,
and military vehicles. We might well come onto this but there
are issues around the re-export from licensed production facilities.
All of these issues would lead us to believe that there are some
instances where UK policy has directly contributed to violations.
Mr Isbister: I suppose there is
more than that as well. We had issues a number of years ago with
some of the decisions that would be taken on the promotion of
sales of equipment into India at a time, I would say, of heightened
risk of conflict—conflict did not break out but, again,
we are talking about the basis of risk and the possibility of
conflict. There is also some of the supply of equipment into Iraq,
and that is obviously complicated because it is a conflict that
involves the UK but there is a concern over the end use of equipment
that is going into conflict situations where there are doubts
about the quality of end-use control—where equipment may
find its way into the hands of those who are not the intended
recipients.
Ms Croser: I do not really have
a great deal to add to what has already been said.
Q68 Malcolm Bruce: You have kind
of identified the problem. This Committee was obviously very unhappy
about suggestions that British equipment might have been used
in the recent conflict. The question really is would an arms embargo
solve that problem. Your difficulty in answering these questions
gets to the heart of that. Do you have a view as to whether there
should be a UK arms embargo towards Israel and, if so, how it
might operate? In that context, the Palestinian human rights group
Al-Haq is looking for a judicial review, effectively arguing that
the Government has an obligation not to assist Israel in doing
that kind of thing. It is under judicial review and you cannot
determine that, but do you think they are justified in making
that call?
Mr Sprague: There are two parts
to that question. First, Amnesty International is on public record
as calling for an international arms embargo on all sides of the
current conflict, given the tremendous devastation that has been
unfolding in Gaza. Also, we need to factor in the 18-month blockades
that have been going on and the use of naval equipment, for example,
in that blockade, basically collectively punishing up to 1.5 million
Palestinian civilians. The situation in Gaza is very serious.
There are credible reports of very serious violations of international
human rights and humanitarian law and indiscriminate attacks on
civilians. In those circumstances, we feel it is wholly appropriate
for the international community to place an embargo on all sides.
Q69 Malcolm Bruce: I personally have
no difficulty with that, but our concern is with the UK Government's
policy and the extent to which a UK arms embargo is going to make
a difference or whether it would, perhaps alternatively, be an
indicator that might apply pressure to the international community.
Mr Sprague: Obviously that is
true. Any government signal of that nature has a political and
diplomatic lever and would hopefully cause the various protagonists
in the conflict to think differently about how it might conduct
its operations. Israel does have its own defence industry. We
know that: it is an established industry, it does make its own
munitions. But our evidence also suggests that it is very reliant
on a whole range of international suppliers, including some EU
governments, for its military equipment, and therefore it seems
reasonable that those suppliers should seek to put very tight
restrictions in the current circumstances. Just to go back to
your point about the judicial view, it is something on which we
cannot specifically comment because it is not our judicial review,
but on the general point of whether or not government policy should
be scrutinised through the courts on legal challenges, of course
we wholly support that. Any system needs to be tested. On that
particular issue, I would like maybe for the focus to be on specific
types of equipment, where there is risk that they have been used.
Because of the way that the annual reports present information
on end users and because we do know that a significant number
of licenses are not licensed for use by the Israeli military,
I think it might be a mistake to assume that every single licence
issued over a specific period would automatically facilitate human
rights violations. It would be better maybe to focus on specific
examples; for example, the incorporation licences, and look at
head-up displays, look at specific weapon systems that we know
have been used (the Apache, the F16) and look at the licensing
decisions around those, and maybe the drones as well. There still
is a case to answer for the origins of engine components and the
technology for the drones.
Mr Isbister: The impact of a unilateral
UK embargo is clearly limited. We know, as Ollie said, that Israel
is one of Israel's main suppliers and the other is the US, so
the practical impact of a UK decision is clearly limited but it
has a symbolic value and it has the value of example as well.
Q70 Mr Holloway: I have just been
in Gaza and I am under no illusions about the incubator of mass
radicalisation that has been created there, but our troops are
in conflict too and the whole UAV sector is racing ahead and the
Israelis are at the front of it. Is there not a real point about
us needing them in order to protect our own troops?
Mr Sprague: That is a valid point
but it is something that Amnesty I think would be unwilling to
comment about because, essentially, we are a humanitarian organisation
dealing with human rights violations and for us the absolute bottom
line on these things is that you should not licence any equipment
where there is a reasonable risk that that equipment will be used
in the commission of a human rights violations. That, in our view,
is a fundamental golden rule that cuts across export controls,
and other considerations cannot break that fundamental golden
rule.
Q71 Mr Holloway: Therefore there
is a limitation to your view.
Mr Sprague: In what respect?
Q72 Mr Holloway: You are not looking
at the complete picture, you are looking at it from a very specific
angle.
Mr Sprague: It is beyond our mandate
to talk about industrial defence considerations which I understand
that others would say would be important, yes.
Q73 John Bercow: Is it realistic
to think that the Government will ever be able fully to regulate
non controlled goods on a military end-use basis outside of this,
given the variety of items that this will cover and the ingenuity
of those who would seek to avoid controls?
Mr Sprague: The Government is
now on record of working to enhance military end use. It has perceived
there to be a need, which we fully support, to try to enhance
controls in this area. The controls are not the magic solution,
so they are never going to control all situations where a variety
of components or other civilian items may be used. It is like
the arguments around the torture end-use control. It does allow
control to be applied when evidence comes to light that such things
are being used. At the moment it is simply not possible to do
that, outside the fairly limited scope of the current dual-use
controls, the military end-use catch-all clause that specifies
that the goods have to go into a military system in an embargo
destination. We fully support the Government's view that there
is a case to be made to extending that beyond embargo destinations
to sensitive destinations and, also, to introduce an end-user
provision that is not just about listed military equipment. It
is also about unlisted military equipment. The classic example
here is utility vehicles that have been used in the commission
of human rights violations and other violations in a number of
different countries. I guess our supplementary point here is that
we are concerned that that process will not involve the component
parts and we might be in danger of creating a control that does
not address the main example that was brought to light about why
these things are important. Would the proposals cover the export
of assembly kits of vehicles which will be assembled in what is
essentially a NATO country? That is a question for the Government
to answer. The other supplementary point I would like to add is
that we had these discussions in 2007, and we are now in 2009,
and I think these are really, really important discussions for
how we view export controls because, like the torture end-use
control, they change the emphasis onto the use of equipment rather
than just a technical specification of equipment and it is the
use that we should be really, really concerned with. There are
very difficult discussions currently ongoing within the ATT process—we
will probably come on to that later—about what types of
equipment should be covered. The issue of military end use is
pretty important in the discussion around dual-use goods and whether
to include dual-use goods. It is going to be extremely difficult
and slow to get agreement on this within the EU Dual-Use Regulation,
and we have not even started that yet, so I would urge a sense
of speed from the Government to start introducing this at the
EU level and, if possible, get something at the UK level first.
Q74 John Bercow: In the light of
what you have just said, which implies perhaps a degree of frustration
at the snail's pace of progress—my language, admittedly,
not yours—do you have any indication that the Government
is planning any action, even if it has not got around to the action
itself. Is it planning any action in the EU to initiate discussions
on military end-use control?
Mr Sprague: It is a question you
would have to ask colleagues in government. I do not know if Roy
knows any better, but my impression is that discussions have not
yet happened at an EU level, either via the Council of Ministers,
the COARM grouping, or within the dual-use working group.
Q75 John Bercow: That is quite an
interesting, though arguably disturbing, reply, because if you
had read the report of the last meeting of this Committee, which
you may very well, for all I know, have done, you will see that
there was one particular substance that featured in the minutes
and that was grass, and in particular long grass, in relation
to a particular subject about which we were quizzing ministers.
You, of course, have all the notable courtesy for which most of
our witnesses are renowned, but I have a hunch that you are fearful
that this subject might be headed in a similar direction.
Mr Isbister: Yes, long grass features
in my thinking of it as well. I get no sense of urgency—I
will use similar language. Also, the Dual-Use Regulation is under
review at the moment to bring it into line with the UN Security
Council Resolution 1540. The timing is unfortunate in that the
Government has announced that it is willing to look at this just
after quite a lot of work has been done on the Dual-Use Regulation
already. The line we get is that it is very difficult to do this
now because you are going to revisit something which has only
just been worked on. It feels like there is very little urgency
at the moment. The Government have said, if I recall correctly,
that if there was no progress at the EU they would look at doing
this at the UK level, so if they believe there is no likelihood
of progress at the EU level then it is perhaps time they did move
unilaterally.
Q76 John Bercow: Could I be clear,
because I am just a humble lay person—or at any rate a lay
person who ought to be humble—if we are talking about improvised
explosive devices, our understanding, as a Committee, is that
because these are improvised non-standard weapons they may not
be covered by the UK Military List which covers only devices associated
with IEDs for handling, operating, detonating or jamming which
are specifically designed for military use. Exporting unlisted
components for improvised IEDs, however sophisticated and deadly
their consequences, may therefore not be controlled, even with
intelligence that the components were destined for IED production.
That presumably, am I right, is the nub of your concern on the
matter.
Mr Sprague: Yes. It is an extremely
complex area and there may well be other bits of law to do with
terrorism controls and things that would apply. We do not have
an end-use control on goods that you would want to control for
very real security grounds. These devices are regularly used to
attack UK forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere. Our understanding
of the current controls is that—we use an example of a thing
called an inclinometer, which in a US case has recently been successfully
prosecuted on because of its potential use in Iraq for improvised
explosive devices. In the UK system that kind of equipment would
not be controlled. An end-use control that we would like to see
would allow the ability to put controls on that technology where
the exporter or the Government had reasonable knowledge to suggest
that it was going to be used for those purposes.
Mr Isbister: There is a slight
additional element here. It is about the change in technology
and the change in the use of technology. A few years ago IEDs
were not quite the issue they are now. By having an end-use control,
you allow flexibility of response rather than having to go through
a potentially laborious process of updating from law.[3]
3
Q77 John Bercow: Forgive me saying so,
but I was rather foxed and befuddled by your answers to Sir John,
because Sir John asked a very, very, very specific question, deliberately
so, I am sure, and I was slightly surprised that you either did
not want or felt unable to specify an offensive weapon that you
thought was being wrongly exported to an area of actual or potential
conflict. The reason that surprised me is that I would have had
the general sense that there would be quite a number of examples
that could be adduced by campaigners in this field.
Mr Isbister: The danger of being
asked such a specific question and being on the record is that
if we do not have our facts exactly right then it can come back
to bite us. Could I suggest that we send you something written
afterwards?[4]
4
John Bercow: That would be very helpful.
Thank you.
Chairman: That would be very helpful.
Thank you very much indeed.
Q78 Mr Hamilton: Could I move us
on to extra-territorial trade controls. I know the NGOs have broadly
welcomed the new three-tier trade control system and I know that
you are currently in the process of trying to widen some of the
category B controls in your discussions with EGAD. Has the Government
indicated to you that they are considering moving anti-vehicle
landmines into Category B at any time in the near future?
Ms Croser: No, we have not had
that indication, but we feel that AVMs should be included into
category B as a matter of urgency. The decision not to include
them in category B runs counter to the UK's existing commitments
in that area, as AVMs have clearly been identified as items of
heightened concern and the UK Government is at the forefront of
efforts to reduce the risk of their proliferation. Following the
third Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons in November 2006, the UK was committed to preventing the
transfer of AVMs to certain end users and those commitments should
be implemented immediately. The Government have argued that AVMs
have not been identified through a process of international consensus
as being as of heightened concern, and, as such, that is the decision
not to include them in Category B. But we do not accept that,
because if you look at cluster munitions, there is now an international
prohibition on cluster munitions, although a number of notable
governments do not accept that prohibition, and yet cluster munitions
are still included in Category A. Obviously there are a number
of humanitarian security concerns around AVMs: the way that they
prevent the movement of civilian vehicles, including, for instance,
ambulances, aid vehicles; the fact that they can be triggered
by civilians on foot, not just people in vehicles; the ease with
which they can be transferred, similarly to small arms light weapons;
and, also, as people have discussed this morning, the potential
risk of the use of parts of AVMs in the IEDs (improvised explosive
devices). We would like to see AVMs included in Category B as
a matter of urgency.
Mr Isbister: I think it is bizarre.
I just do not get it, I just do not understand, and I would hope
that the Government could move very quickly to change this.
Q79 Mr Hamilton: It is quite baffling.
Can you please let us know where you have got to in your discussions
with EGAD over widening Category B controls?
Mr Isbister: We have been in discussions
for some time, and we have probably got as far as we can together,
talking about the way that you could possibly use registration
and flexible record keeping as a way of extending the scope of
extraterritorial control to allay business concerns about bureaucratic
burden, et cetera. So we have some ideas that we have thrown around
but it now needs to go back to government. I do not really think
we are in that position to go public with what we have come up
with. We now need to get back together with Government, because
obviously it is not for us to make the decision and there are
some questions that only Government can answer.
1 1 Ev 84 Back
2
2 This question was asked by one of the Members of the Committees
on Arms Export Controls but on the uncorrected transcript was
incorrectly attributed to one of the witnesses. It is not possible
to identify the questioner from the sound and video recordings. Back
3
3 Note from witness: the potentially laborious process
would be to update a list of equipment and amend the law. Back
4
4 Ev 84 Back
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