Examination of Witness (Question 180-199)
BILL RAMMELL
MP, MS JO
ADAMSON AND
MR ANDREW
MASSEY
22 APRIL 2009
Q180 Peter Luff: One NGO has said
to us that they think at present given that the constituent elements
of a so-called dirty bomb are most likely found on the dual use
control list, the greatest important effort has to be focused
on the greatest perceived threat. Do you think that is a fair
comment?
Bill Rammell: No, I do not.
Q181 Peter Luff: Actually, you are
making it easier to ask my second question, which becomes less
mutually contradictory in this circumstance, because I have the
opposite concern. We had an interesting letter from Ian Pearson
telling us about tighter policies towards Iran, and saying that
with regard to specific companies it can be seen from the Iran
list on the ECO web site that licences have been refused to end
users in Iran where previously they have been granted, and a further
tranche of companies was added to the Iran list on 26 February
this year. What concerns me—I have a constituency case,
as you may guess, behind this—is a company in the petrochemical
sector, which has traditionally supplied to Iran. Interestingly,
it has had problems getting to Iraq as well, which is rather strange—but
that is another matter and that is not for this list today. It
is now finding that there is a long period over which the export
licences are being considered—they are taking too long to
get the answer "no", in a way getting "no"
quickly—but that is more a question for BERR than for you,
I appreciate. What really concerns me is that they are very clear
that they are getting "no" to all this equipment and
they are basically giving up on the Iran market, where there are
huge gas and oilfields waiting there to be exploited. That would
be all right if European competitors were taking a similar policy,
but it is quite clear that Iran will instead get its equipment
from Germany. That really does rather upset me. Are you really
sure there is a coherence of European policy specifically in relation
to dual-use equipment for Iran?
Bill Rammell: We are certainly
seeking to achieve that. It is a two-way street. I have certainly
been lobbied by ambassadors of other European states saying that
in respect of their manufacturers we are not doing enough. I do
not believe that that is the case, and I make no apology for saying
that in respect of Iran's intentions to develop a nuclear weapons
capability, that that is an extraordinary concern. That is why
I welcome the commitment that President Obama has made to engage
directly with the Iranian regime, but to maximise our chances
of that proving successful we need to be much tougher on the sanctions
front. I put my hands up: the United Kingdom has been at the forefront
of making that case.
Q182 Peter Luff: I feel slightly
aggrieved that my constituents lose their jobs, and people in
Stuttgart will get them instead.
Bill Rammell: I, and other Ministers,
have lobbied very hard elsewhere in Europe to ensure that we have
a level playing-field. If you look at the way we apply, right
the way across the board on these issues, where we can get it
we want co-ordinated European action, so you do not get under-cutting
with other states coming in and taking a competitive advantage.
Q183 Peter Luff: I may write to you
about this.
Bill Rammell: I would be happy
to talk about it.
Q184 Malcolm Bruce: My constituency
interest is with the oil and gas industry, with major suppliers
there. In the downturn in the North Sea, it is quite likely that
suppliers of equipment will be looking for export markets, and
as you will be well aware, a lot of those are in somewhat volatile
places. What assurance can we have—and it is a two-way process—that
they will be properly monitored but at the same time they will
not be disrupted, because very often that is how they are going
to fill the gap during a downturn? It is equally clear that they
need to be aware that if they are moving into newer markets, they
may not be fully aware of all the dual use implications.
Bill Rammell: Sure. In respect
of Iran, we are talking about a particular case. What I think
is incumbent upon us across departments within Government is to
ensure that we get the message out very clearly about what is
acceptable and what is not acceptable, and that as far as possible
we are giving accurate information to exporters so that they know
where and how they can go about doing their business.
Q185 Richard Burden: In December
of last year the EU agreed its Directive for the simplification
of defence product transfers within the EU. That is due to come
in this year. Do you see problems for the UK in the implementation
of that harmonised licensing regime?
Bill Rammell: No. I think it has
been a very positive outcome. There were concerns, and certainly
the European Scrutiny Committee flagged this up to us and we took
on board those concerns about potential loss for national discretion,
the extension of Community competence and potential for limitations
of inter-governmental co-operation through the negotiations that
took place particularly in December. We managed to resolve those
and the European Parliament adopted the directive on 16 December,
and that will proceed for adoption at a future Council of Ministers
meeting very shortly.
Q186 Richard Burden: For it to work
from now on, though, it will obviously require all EU states involved
to handle the regulations in a consistent way. Are you confident
that that will be the case? Are there any areas of concern, and
how will that be monitored?
Bill Rammell: It will certainly
be monitored by the Commission and nationally by individual governments.
The Directive certainly permits us to operate the regime very
close to the current one because, for example, we have long moved
towards a simplified licensing system within our operations, so
I do not think we have anything to fear from this. We need to
ensure—and the Commission will take a role in that—that
that is the way it is applied across the European Union.
Q187 Sir John Stanley: Minister,
I am sure that you would be as appalled as all members of the
Committee would be if it were the case that IEDs being used by
the Taliban in Afghanistan, resulting in the killing and maiming
of our service personnel were found to contain British-made components.
I trust it was drawn to your attention an article that appeared
in the Independent on 21 February under the heading Taliban
using British devices to make bombs. The article read as follows:
"Explosive devices made in Britain are being used by the
Taliban to carry out bomb attacks on UK forces in Afghanistan,
it emerged yesterday. A British explosives officer is said to
have made the startling claim during a briefing to Foreign Secretary,
David Miliband, as he was on a visit to Afghanistan this week.
The officer informed the minister that British-made components
had been discovered in the remnants of bombs used by the Taliban."
Minister, will you confirm to the Committee that a British explosives
officer did indeed brief the Foreign Secretary, as reported?
Bill Rammell: No, I am not able
to do that. I am genuinely not aware of the report that you are
referring to. I would just add the caveat that there are, on a
weekly basis, reports that end up in newspapers, particularly
relating to foreign affairs, where you delve beneath the surface,
and they are not accurate. Nevertheless, I am not aware. I will
go away from this meeting and find out the facts and figures and
come back to you in writing as quickly as possible. 4[4]
Q188 Sir John Stanley: We would certainly
like to know whether such a briefing was given to the Foreign
Secretary, and in the terms referred to in the report. Assuming
that this report is not totally fictional, and that it has basically
a reasonable degree of factual accuracy, could you also tell the
Committee, Minister, what action the British Government will be
taking, what steps it has taken since the briefing the Foreign
Secretary was given to identify the British company or the British
individuals that have been responsible for manufacturing these
parts; how these parts came to be exported out of the UK and by
what route; and what steps the British Government is taking to
ensure as far as it possibly can, using all the resources available
to it, that British manufactured parts under no circumstances
ever end up in Taliban IEDs, killing and maiming our service personnel?
Bill Rammell: With respect, Chair,
there is a whole series of premises there that I am not going
to affirm to today. I will get to the bottom of this and I will
write to you with a detailed response. However, were it to be
the case—and I do not know whether it is—that British
components had been exported to arm the Taliban, that would be
totally and utterly unacceptable. It would be a breach of our
arms exports criteria, and we would need in those circumstances
to do everything in our power to stop it reoccurring. As I say,
I have not seen the article. It would not be the first time that
an article had appeared that was not accurate, but nevertheless
I will get to the bottom of it and I will write back to you.
Q189 Sir John Stanley: Minister,
I have to say that if I had been doing your ministerial job and
such an article turned up in my daily press cuttings, my goodness
I would expect my officials to make certain it did turn up—this
was on February 21, and on that day say I want the full background
to this briefing and exactly what the Foreign Secretary was told
and what we are going to do about it. I am disturbed, frankly,
that this article has not been brought to your attention.
Bill Rammell: I am being frank
with you. The press cuttings are like that on a daily basis. I
have not seen it and it was not drawn to my attention. Nevertheless
you have raised it with me and I will get to the bottom of it
and get back to you urgently.
Q190 John Battle: Can I ask you about
the restrictions on re-exports because there was a case in 2007,
a classic case of India and Burma and helicopters from the EU.
At that time, the Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett, said she
was minded to consider adding a re-export clause to contracts,
but since that time the Minister in person in January before this
Committee said he was not minded to, and refused to consider a
policy of re-export conditions on licences; yet the impression
we would get is that where the EU has put in "no re-export
without permission conditions", they get a better hearing
from India than we do. Would it not be wise for us to reconsider
this position to see if we could do something to get a grip on
re-exporting of equipment that we sell to people, which then they
pass on?
Bill Rammell: Firstly, on the
facts of the case with respect to India, my understanding is that
in the first instance there were two British Norman Islander aircraft
that were over 25 years old, and had reached the end of their
effective life—
Q191 John Battle: Ours?
Bill Rammell: Yes. They were gifted
to Burma. The second and more serious allegation involved a potential
export of a military helicopter, including UK components from
India to Burma. We were extraordinarily concerned about that and
approached the Indians who provided us with categorical assurances
that there was no intention to supply to Burma, and I do not believe
there has been any subsequent suggestion that that took place.
The way that our system works is that you take account of the
risk of re-export at the time of the application. That is one
of the factors that is taken account of. If there is a risk that
it will end up through re-export where it should not, then the
sale is not approved. I know there is a long-standing argument,
and I know this Committee has made the case for it in the past
in terms of a re-export clause in export licences. I think the
fundamental difficulty with that is determining to whom that would
apply and against whom any action would be taken. If it is the
exporter, then you are asking the exporters to do something that
is beyond their control. If it is the overseas customer, then
we have a real problem with legal jurisdiction.
Q192 John Battle: How do we reconcile
that with the EU position, because the EU is actually putting
on that condition of "no export" in fact without conditions?
Bill Rammell: That is not my understanding.
Mr Massey: No, that is not the
case. I think that is a misunderstanding. There are certain states
within the EU that have a "no re-export" clause placed
in their legislation. When I talk to my colleagues sitting around
the COARM table in Brussels and say to any of them, "Okay,
guys, this is all very well—when was the last time you tested
it?" they all said, "We have never actually put it to
the test". Then I ask them, "Do you think it is enforceable?"
and there is then much staring at their toecaps. The reality is
that they have this legislation there, but in my experience none
of them have any confidence that if they went to apply it, it
would make any difference. They do not believe that it is enforceable—so
it is fine words. This is the problem we have.
Q193 John Battle: It is individual
states.
Mr Massey: Yes, individual states,
not the EU. I think the problem we also have with the Indian helicopters
is that when the story ran it gave the impression that this export
had already taken place, and that was not the case. When we inquired,
the Indians said: "Quite categorically, we have not made
any exports, and we have no intention to do so." From our
perspective that was the end of the story.
Q194 John Battle: It is not the individual
case so much as the principle of controlling the re-exports, but
you are suggesting the EU has not got the position—it is
individual states. However, you are still not minded to sharpen
up our procedures?
Bill Rammell: If it would really
sharpen up, then I would be prepared to look at it, but I am just
not convinced, particularly because of the issue of legal jurisdiction.
Let us take your example. Say the Indian case to Burma had taken
place; we would not have a cat in hell's chance of legally enforcing
that within Burma. It would be there as a fig leaf, and I do not
think it would make a material difference.
Q195 Chairman: If the contract specified
that India, for example, could not re-export to a country subject
to sanctions, I accept that enforcing that decision might be problematic,
but if India understood perfectly well that no further arms export
licences would be granted if they breached that contract with
us, do you not think that would provide a significant deterrent
to re-export to a country subject to an embargo?
Bill Rammell: But we have that
deterrent implicit within our own controls at the moment, in that
if a country engages in that practice, that will be taken down
and used in evidence in any future arms sale to that country;
so I think you achieve the same end without having—the absence
of jurisdictional capability to deal with it.
Q196 Chairman: So your phrase "used
in evidence" means it would have that effect? People realise
this, do they? Is it absolutely clear? Are there any cases where
you have had to remind countries that if they were to re-export
they would be in breach of our expectations?
Bill Rammell: No, but it is absolutely
part of the assessment process that is undertaken that when you
make a judgment about the sale to that country, you also take
into account the potential for re-export.
Q197 Chairman: Is it UK policy that
if a country to which we exported arms were to re-export to another
country subject to a UN or EU arms embargo, that that would be
the last time an export licence was granted to them?
Bill Rammell: Again, because it
is judged—I am not ducking it—on a case-by-case basis,
I am not sure I can be that emphatic. It would certainly be assessed
as part of the process. I can check back and write to you, but
it would be very difficult for a sale to go ahead once that had
been identified. 5[5]
Q198 Mr Jenkin: In regard to extraterritorial
trade controls and the representations that the Committee has
received from NGOs regarding anti-vehicle land mines, rather topically
following Sir John's point: the third review conference included
a joint declaration, which the United Kingdom signed in 2006,
aimed at preventing the transfer of AVMs to certain end-users.
But the FCO website suggests that the export of AVMs is only under
the heading of policy restriction rather than under the category
B controls. Why is that the case?
Bill Rammell: Cock-up, not conspiracy.
It should not have been on the FCO website, and that has been
amended. It was a genuine mistake. I think you are right in describing,
because there was not an international consensus on this issue
in terms of reclassification—we went ahead with 19 other
states and made a series of commitments, for example for preventing
transfers other than to authorised agents, to prevent transfers
that do not need stated detectability and active life standards,
and to put in place tighter verification and documentation requirements.
That is what we are proceeding to try and undertake, but I take
it on the chin, that that should not have been described on the
FCO website in the way that it was, and it has been removed.
Q199 Mr Jenkin: It is in category
B, is it?
Bill Rammell: No, it is not. The
reason for that is that category B occurs where there is an international
consensus about the degree of concern. Not only does that not
exist; but explicitly we did not achieve that. That is why we
have gone down the road of trying to take individual actions in
concert with 19 other states. However, I do not shut the door
on category B listing, if we could achieve it at a later stage;
but because there is not that international consensus, we have
not achieved it.
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