House of Commons - Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2007-08

Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2007-08 - Foreign Affairs Committee Contents

7 PERSONNEL ISSUES

Staffing and human resource management

150. In our last Report we welcomed the FCO's commitment to improving its management capabilities, and considered the impact that large-scale change within the FCO was having upon staff.[210] In our present inquiry we have reviewed progress since last year.

151. We were informed of the findings of a follow-up to the Capability Review of the FCO which was originally carried out in 2007.[211] The reviewers returned to the FCO in April 2008, and assessed that it had made good progress in three of the four areas which, according to the original Capability Review, required attention: the FCO's role, strengthened business planning processes, and strengthening change management capability.[212]

152. With regard to change management, as a response to the findings of the Capability Review the FCO appointed a Director of Change and Delivery, James Bevan, who leads a new Change Unit and a Change Committee which aims to ensure that the FCO's major change activities are coherent, achievable and focused. In December 2007 it also published 'More Foreign Less Office' which summarised the change programme for staff.[213]

153. An FCO staff survey published in February 2008 found that staff satisfaction with change management had improved by 11% since 2006, although they remained relatively low overall at 36%. The survey also found that staff felt the reasons behind change, and the consequences of change, were not being communicated or managed effectively. We were told that Mr Bevan had set himself a personal target in relation to the FCO's staff survey to be conducted in December 2008; he wanted at least 50% of respondents to indicate that change is well managed.[214] We asked Mr Bevan what he would do if his self-imposed target was not achieved. Mr Bevan said that he would "keep going and learn the lessons".[215] He added:

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154. Although the follow-up to the Capability Review, carried out in April 2008, welcomed the publication of the FCO's Strategic Workforce Plan, first published in December 2007, it also warned that that much remained to be done, particularly on issues relating to local staff, diversity, talent management and a long term 'deal' for staff.[217] It noted that there had been limited progress in developing human resources as a strategic management function.[218]

155. These concerns were partially mirrored in an independent "Cultural Audit", which was commissioned by the FCO, based on interviews with staff, and published in August 2008. The Audit found that the FCO was an extremely well-intentioned employer, that most staff loved working for the FCO and that it was a genuine meritocracy and equal opportunities employer. However, it also reached more negative conclusions. For instance, FCO culture was criticised for being "too conformist, consensual, bureaucratic and risk averse", and for over-emphasising what the Audit described as "ideas over execution"[219]. Disquiet was also expressed about the lack of operational experience at board or director level.[220]

156. In the bleakest of its findings, the Cultural Audit drew attention to "the extent of the vitriol reserved for operational HR".[221] The report concluded that the policies and processes of HR should be urgently and thoroughly audited, alongside the individuals charged with dispensing HR at a "retail" level".[222]

157. Further misgivings about human resources appeared in the FCO's own staff survey which was published in February 2008 and which found low levels of satisfaction with the promotion process: only 35% believed that it was fair and objective, although this was a significant improvement on the 2006 figure of 24%.[223] Feelings of job security had also dropped by 14% to 42%.[224]

158. In October 2008 we asked Sir Peter Ricketts during our evidence session whether, in the light of the findings of the Cultural Audit and the FCO's own Staff Survey, he thought that FCO Human Resources were fit for purpose. Sir Peter denied there was a systemic problem with the FCO's HR function, and he rejected the Cultural Audit's recommendation that a thorough human resources audit be carried out.[225] He told us that there are "a lot of good people doing very good work in HR", but acknowledged that "things must be improved in the way that some staff work in HR."[226] Sir Peter also said:

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159. We accept that sometimes HR departments are a target for staff anger for no other reason than that they dispense bad news or implement unpopular policies. However, we conclude that the sheer scale of dissatisfaction revealed by the recent Cultural Audit of the FCO, as well as in other FCO-commissioned reports, suggests that something is genuinely amiss. It would appear that FCO that staff have substantive and deep-rooted concerns about the HR support they receive. We recommend that the FCO should reconsider its decision not to undertake the urgent and thorough review of HR that was recommended by the 2008 Cultural Audit.

160. During our inquiry we were told privately about unhappiness on the part of some FCO staff over the way in which overseas staff postings are handled by Human Resources. One example, mentioned in the FCO's internal publication News + Views, was that of an individual who was given only a month's notice that his first overseas posting had been withdrawn. It is alleged that he incurred financial hardship and was left without accommodation after giving notice to his landlord in anticipation of his move. [228] We also learned of another case where a posting was cancelled at short notice, where the news was conveyed without prior warning in a curtly drafted email.

161. We asked the FCO about its general policy on these matters. We were told that although staff sign up to a universal mobility commitment when they join the diplomatic service, the FCO tries to act sensitively where an individual is 'short-toured' because of new operational needs that the FCO has not anticipated.[229] James Bevan added:

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162. We understand that operational needs can necessitate changes to staff postings, often at short notice. However, the evidence we have received suggests that these may sometimes be poorly handled, and that staff and their dependents can occasionally be insensitively treated and materially inconvenienced. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO should set out the action it is taking, as a good employer, to minimise the likelihood of these unfortunate situations arising.

Local staff strategy review

163. The FCO is currently conducting a review of its strategy for local staffing. During our visit to Paris in July, we were told that increasing "localisation" of staff was causing difficulties, often because the terms and conditions offered to local staff were not as good as those for UK-based staff. The recent Cultural Audit also warned that there was a risk of local staff becoming easily disengaged and de-motivated.[231]

164. In October 2008, the FCO told the Committee that it had been unable to go into too much detail about local staff in its new Strategic Workforce Plan because it was "harder to plan for a workforce which is recruited in-country and according to rapidly changing local needs".[232] It added that it was "doing more to harness the skills and talents of our local staff" and that it was reviewing its local staff strategy with the aim of "putting in place concrete recommendations to help all FCO staff work as 'one team'".[233] James Bevan told us, "We have made a lot of progress, […] in getting closer to that one-team ideal but we still have a way to go."[234] Mr Bevan told us that he did not expect there would be a complete alignment in the terms offered to local staff and those for UK-based staff who are members of the home civil service or diplomatic service. However, he added that. "in some areas we might see them coming much closer together."[235]

165. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should set out where greater alignment in the conditions offered to local staff and those for UK-based staff may be likely to occur, and what progress is being made towards achieving this.

Rt Hon Jack McConnell MSP

166. In August 2007, the Government announced that it intended to appoint Rt Hon Jack McConnell MSP, former First Minister of Scotland, as British High Commissioner to Malawi when the current High Commissioner's posting ends in early 2009. In April 2008 we took oral evidence from Mr McConnell about his expected appointment. In June 2008 we published a Report, in which we concluded that the undertakings Mr McConnell gave, if he was appointed as High Commissioner to Malawi were to be welcomed, as was his past experience of promoting Scottish and UK relations with Malawi, and his evident personal commitment to this process. We further concluded that it is right that questions should be asked when a politician is appointed to a senior diplomatic post, and we noted that such appointments should continue to be made only in exceptional circumstances, and that they should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny.

167. We also expressed our surprise that Mr McConnell raised the possibility that a lengthy period might arise between the departure of his predecessor as High Commissioner in January 2009 and his own starting date, and that he would not rule out his continuing to be a member of the Scottish Parliament for an extended period. We concluded that it would be very unsatisfactory for there to be a lengthy interregnum in which no High Commissioner is in post. We further concluded it would be equally unsatisfactory for Mr McConnell to continue to perform the duties of a Member of the Scottish Parliament, at the same time that he is preparing to undertake the politically impartial duties of a British diplomat. We recommended that the FCO and Mr McConnell should resolve this issue swiftly, and make a public announcement that Mr McConnell would take up post on a specified date within the first half of 2009. [236]

168. Events subsequently overtook our conclusions. On 24 September, Sir Peter Ricketts wrote to inform us that the Prime Minister had appointed Mr McConnell as his Special Representative for Conflict Resolution Mechanisms, based in the FCO. We were told that this two-year appointment meant that Mr McConnell would not be able to take up the post of High Commissioner to Malawi in 2009. Sir Peter informed us that the FCO was seeking a new candidate to replace the current High Commissioner when his tour ends in 2009.[237]

169. In October 2008 we questioned Sir Peter in oral evidence about Mr McConnell's new appointment and its implications. Sir Peter told us that Mr McConnell's post was an unpaid, advisory role, that he would be based in the FCO for "[o]ne or two days a week",[238] that he would travel "perhaps once a month",[239] that the FCO would support him and that his actions were unlikely to be subject to the provisions of the Ministerial Code.[240] He added that while Mr McConnell would have a "reporting line to the Foreign Secretary", his appointment was not as a member of FCO staff but as a prime ministerial special envoy.[241] We asked Sir Peter whether he was concerned about an individual carrying out work that impinged directly upon the FCO's responsibilities, even though the person in question would report directly to the Prime Minister. Sir Peter said that he welcomed Mr McConnell's assistance and added:

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170. Sir Peter also informed us that the Prime Minister had expressed the hope that Mr McConnell might still be available to serve as High Commissioner in Malawi at a future date. In the meantime, a new representative would be selected from a group of FCO candidates through the normal internal procedures.[243]

171. We conclude that the affair of Mr McConnell's two appointments has not been well handled by the Government. We further conclude that it is likely that the uncertainty and delay over the timing of Mr McConnell's appointment as High Commissioner to Malawi, followed by the abrupt announcement that the appointment would not after all proceed, is regrettable, and is likely to have caused concern or even offence in Malawi.

172. In our June 2008 Report on Mr McConnell's appointment to Malawi, we expressed concern that the Government, in its recent proposals to encourage select committees to hold 'pre-appointment hearings' on a more systematic basis, did not accept that "major diplomatic or consular appointments of a person from outside the diplomatic service" should be one of the categories of appointment it recognises as suitable for this kind of scrutiny.[244] Both the Liaison Committee and the Select Committee on Public Administration have also expressed concern about the Government's stance on this matter.[245]

173. We conclude that the appointment of non-diplomats to diplomatic posts is a matter which requires public and parliamentary scrutiny. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should accept that "major diplomatic or consular appointments of a person from outside the diplomatic service" should in principle be subject to 'pre-appointment hearings' by this Committee. We further conclude that, irrespective of the Government's response, such appointments undeniably fall within our area of responsibility, and we shall continue to exercise that responsibility.

Allegations of abuse at the British Embassy in Iraq

174. In April 2008 we received a complaint from a member of the public that female staff at the British Embassy in Baghdad had been abused by managers working for KBR, a defence services provider contracted to the FCO. The complainant alleged that:

Basically, British KBR managers were abusing their Iraqi female staff. One of these women was fired after she did not perform sexual favours. The Embassy conducted an initial investigation and interviewed that woman along with two other local KBR employees. They were all credible, their statements were consistent and they had no motive to lie. The Deputy Ambassador believed them and concluded that there were significant grounds to warrant a further investigation.

175. The complainant claimed that the FCO had subsequently failed to carry out an independent investigation into the allegations, instead entrusting the task to KBR itself, and that Iraqis who had spoken about the incident had lost their jobs with KBR.[246]

176. We wrote to the Foreign Secretary seeking his comments on this matter. In reply, the Foreign Secretary set out the FCO's understanding of the relevant background, and stated that he was satisfied that the FCO had reacted promptly and correctly to the initial allegations and to subsequent concerns. He argued that since the allegations related to staff employed by KBR it was correct to ask KBR to take forward the investigation and that the investigation was as thorough and professional as circumstances in Baghdad allowed.[247]

177. We later wrote back to the Foreign Secretary seeking a response to further allegations,[248] in particular: why suspended members of the KBR management team had been permitted to continue having access to KBR local staff; why the complainant and three key personnel had not been interviewed by the KBR investigatory team; and what the grounds were for dismissal of two of the principal witnesses.[249]

178. In his reply to us of 23 July 2008, the Foreign Secretary indicated that, "There is […] nothing more of any substance that I can add to the account of FCO investigations into the KBR enquiry that I detailed in my letter of 19 May."[250]

179. We pursued this matter with Sir Peter Ricketts when he appeared before the Committee in October 2008, and sought assurances that in the event of any future allegations, either in the Baghdad mission, or in comparable situations, the FCO would not delegate the duty to investigate to the very contractors who were the subject of complaint. Sir Peter Ricketts responded:

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180. We conclude that although the FCO feels it has acted conscientiously and effectively in its handling of recent allegations relating to the British Embassy in Baghdad, we do not believe that it is appropriate in such circumstances for the investigation of complaints against contractors' staff to be entrusted solely to the contractors. We recommend that the Government should introduce more effective means of monitoring the behaviour of Embassy contractors including through the inclusion of relevant provisions in its contractual agreements with future suppliers of services.

210 Foreign Affairs Committee, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2006-07, para 105 Back

211 A Whitehall-wide review whose findings, together with the FCO's response, were published in March 2007. The review identified "bringing change programmes into a coordinated and integrated programme monitored by the Board" as one of its four key areas for action. Back

212 Ev 132 Back

213 Not printed Back

214 Q 181 Back

215 Q 182 Back

216 Q 182 Back

217 Ev 132 Back

218 Ev 132 Back

219 Couraud, Cultural Audit, August 2008, pp 6-7 Back

220 Ibid., p 10 Back

221 Ibid., p 39 Back