Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2007-08 - Foreign Affairs Committee Contents


Letter to the Second Clerk of the Committee from the Head, Parliamentary Relations Team, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

  Thank you for your letter of 18 August raising questions on the FCO 2007-08 Departmental Report and the 2008-09 Main Estimate. Your questions are answered in order, with your original questions shown in italics:

STRATEGIC PRIORITIES/DSOS

1.  The FCO's Departmental Report for 2007-08 shows that the new strategic framework consists of three core elements and that "these [core elements] are the basis on which the FCO—like all government departments receives its funding from the taxpayer, and against which its performance is judged" (p.16). How will the FCO objectively measure its performance against these three core elements? Will these core elements have targets and indicators against which progress could be measured?

Answer:

  FCO performance during the CSR07 period will be measured against the eight agreed Departmental Strategic Objectives (DSOs) which make up the three core elements. Each of the eight DSOs is underpinned by a set of outcomes. The outcomes are in turn underpinned by a set of key indicators/measurements. Performance against the eight DSOs will be based on an assessment of the outcomes as measured by the key indicators. See below on what will be published in the Departmental Report.

2.  In the 2007-08 Departmental Report, it is stated (p 85) that "each of our DSO owners produced a `DSO plan' to identify the key outputs that they expect to deliver during the next three years." Are these plans publicly available? Could you provide the committee with summary of the key outputs for each DSO?

Answer:

  Our DSO plans are internal management documents and have not been made publicly available. However, the DSOs and outcomes that underpin them, are on the FCO website and will be included in future Departmental and Autumn Performance Reports, so that the public is aware of the targets the FCO is working toward during the CSR period.

  The DSOs and outcomes can be found at:

  http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf1/CSR-07

3.  The Departmental Report also states that "each of these outputs [in the DSO plan] is in turn supported by a series of achievable outcomes, and by delivering these outcomes we will be able to measure our performance during the reporting period" (p.85). Could you provide the committee with details of these "achievable outcomes" including how they are to be measured and the timescale over which they are to be achieved?

Answer:

  The Technical Note mentioned in question 2, provides a full list of the DSOs, outcomes, and target indicators that make up our CSR07 Performance measurement framework. The outcomes span the entirety of the CSR period. Progress against each DSO will be reported in the Autumn Performance Report and Departmental Report along with information about the data used to measure each outcome.

4.  The eight constituent parts of the three core elements represent the new DSOs and replace the existing framework of ten priorities. Given the emphasis on achieving outcomes, why was it felt that one of the new priorities should be input-based: "a flexible global network of staff and offices servicing the whole of the British Government"?

Answer:

  The FCO's Strategic Framework will ensure that the FCO delivers more effectively for HMG and the UK as a whole. While our policy and public service goals reflect our assessment of where the FCO can add the greatest value on the issues that are most important to the UK and British people, DSO 1 ("A flexible global network serving the whole of the British Government") makes it clear that we deliver for the Government as a whole. This recognises that our network of Embassies is an asset for the FCO, for Government and for the UK. The network needs to be flexible because UK priorities, and the world, will continue to change. So the network needs to be able to adapt its footprint in response.

  Our Ambassadors and Posts abroad will continue to work not just to deliver the new FCO policy goals and services, but all of the Government's international priorities. Our Posts will operate as a base for all Whitehall departments on which they can put their own people and resources to deliver their own priorities in the countries concerned. Our business plan for DSO 1 measures how the network is delivering on behalf of the rest of Government, not least through a stakeholder survey of Whitehall partners. The first survey, conducted in the first quarter of this financial year, revealed that our Whitehall partners thought that we provided a good service that generally met or exceeded their needs. We believe this represents an outcome, of benefit to HMG as a whole.

5.  Of the 10 strategic priorities, three appear not to be reflected in the new DSOs; these are SP2 (reducing harm to the UK from international crime), SP7 (promoting sustainable development and poverty reduction) and SP10 (ensuring the security and good governance of the UK's overseas territories). How is the department's work in these areas reflected in the DSOs and why was it felt these areas were not significant enough to warrant their own DSO?

Answer:

  In order to sharpen our strategic focus and put more resources into our new policy goals, there was a need to reduce some of the work that was seen as lower priority for the FCO because other government departments were better placed to develop the UK's international strategy on these issues, to lead Whitehall co-ordination on them, and to provide the resource and expertise needed abroad to deliver them.

  We have reduced the provision of FCO resources at home and abroad for some areas of work that appeared in the old Strategic Priorities. That doesn't mean we will end all work on these issues. The new strategic framework makes explicit (for the first time) that the job of our overseas network of posts is to work for the Government as a whole (DSO 1). Our posts overseas will continue to operate as a platform for the rest of Government, on which they can put their own people and resources to deliver their own priorities. Our Ambassadors will continue to offer advice on how best to achieve their objectives in-country and will continue to lobby on their behalf to achieve HMG's international objectives.

ON SPECIFIC AREAS THAT DON'T FEATURE IN THE NEW STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

Overseas Territories (OTs)

  We remain committed to fulfilling our obligations and partnership with the Territories. As the PUS told Overseas Territories leaders at the Overseas Territories Consultative Council meeting in London in December 2007, although there is no specific mention of the Overseas Territories in the new strategic framework, this in no way diminishes the importance we attach to the Overseas Territories. He emphasised that there would be no change in our approach or level of commitment to the Territories. The Overseas Territories remain a core responsibility for the FCO and we intend to keep the resources allocated to this important work both in London and in post broadly constant.

Drugs and crime

  The FCO carries out valuable international work to tackle drugs and crime, eg in Afghanistan, Colombia, and the Caribbean. We will continue to do this. But we have discussed with our Whitehall partners how international drugs and crime work is best co-ordinated in London, and have reduced our programme spend on drugs and crime as we align those funds to our new priority policy goals.

Sustainable development

  Sustainable development is an important concept and much of the work in the new policy goals will contribute to the Government's overall sustainable goals eg on climate change and conflict prevention. DEFRA now leads on this area of work.

PSA TARGETS

6.  Please can you provide an explanation as to why the ratings of the following targets have changed since the time of the Autumn Performance Report:


Change in rating from the Autumn Performance Report

PSA 1 WMD
D. Threat reduction schemes
Amber to green
PSA 2 Terrorism
A. Awareness of terrorist threat
Amber to green
PSA 2 Terrorism
B. Preventative action
Amber to green
PSA 2 Terrorism
E. Reduction in Vulnerability
Amber to green
PSA 2 Terrorism
F. Capacity to deal with consequences
Amber to green
PSA 3 Conflict prevention
A4. Iraq?
Red to amber
PSA 3 Conflict prevention
A8. Sierra Leone?
Amber to green
PSA 4 Effective EU
I. Stronger relationship with Russia
Red to amber
PSA 7 Islamic countries
B1 political pluralism
Red to amber
PSA 7 Islamic countries
B6 Removal of barriers to investment
Red to amber
PSA 8 Sustainable development
A Access to information?
Amber to green
PSA 8 Sustainable development
B Natural resource management?
Amber to green
PSA 8 Sustainable development
C Tackling illegal logging
Amber to green
PSA 8 sustainable development
D Environment charters in OTs
Amber to green
Answer:
PSA 1 WMD, Indicator D (Threat reduction schemes)—Amber to Green


  The change of rating from amber to green was based on the resolution of operational issues which had previously been impeding the implementation of our programme portfolio in full; for example all of the projects relating to the Shchuch'ye site had been placed under contract by the end February. Beyond this, following the release of the Autumn Performance report, the nuclear programme received a positive report from the NAO and at the end of the financial year, expenditure was on budget. Prior to the release of the Department Report, agreement was achieved, in principle, amongst global partnership members to the geographical expansion of the Partnership.

PSA 2 Terrorism, Indicator A (Awareness of Terrorist threat)—Amber to Green

  During the period under review we were proactive in using multilateral institutions to inform international partners about UK perspective of the threat. In particular, we made significant efforts to focus attention on the long-term threat from radicalisation. This led to a better understanding amongst our partners about the nature of the threat, and greater willingness to look at practical ways of working together to counter it. To this end we worked closely with the EU's Counter Terrorism (COTER) group, the UN Security Council and General Assembly, and within the G8's Roma Lyon Group. We also maintained an extensive programme of CT-focused bilateral contacts (at all levels) with key partners, including the US, France and Canada. This resulted in a better shared understanding of the threat (eg in the FATA region of Pakistan) and better co-ordination of our efforts.

PSA 2 Terrorism, Indicator B (Preventative action)—Amber to Green

  We continued to make progress on this indicator during the period of review, including: ongoing communications with OGDs/Stakeholders on roles and responsibilities, including capability—improving activity. Therefore, it was felt that a final rating of "green—met (ongoing)" was justified.

PSA 2 Terrorism, Indicator E (Reduction in vulnerability)—Amber to Green and PSA 2 Terrorism, Indicator F (Capacity to deal with consequences)—Amber to Green

  We continued to make progress on these indicators during the period under review, through: providing timely and credible travel advice on the terrorist threat overseas; improving our own crisis response mechanisms and capabilities; and supporting an extensive capacity building programme in priority countries (eg helping to improve aviation security and crisis management capabilities of host governments). This work is very much ongoing, and we continue this year to intensify our efforts in these areas. Revised indicators for the year ahead will make it easier to measure progress on our Protect and Prepare efforts overseas.

PSA 3 Conflict Prevention, Indicator A4 (Iraq)—Red to Amber

  As stated in the Departmental Report, there have been key advances in Iraq which warranted a re-assessment of the rating and the change to Amber. The key changes underpinning this decision are set out below.

  The security environment in Iraq has, and is, continuing to improve. As a consequence of several factors/actions, including the US "surge" tactic, security has improved across the country. Increased capacity within Iraq's own security forces and their clear capability to instil and maintain good order has also contributed to the positive developments in security.

  In March 2008, the Iraqi Security Forces began Operation Charge of the Knights to clear Basra City of criminal elements to improve the security situation for the people of Basra. By bringing security to Basra, Iraq's second largest city will have a chance to prosper and realise its enormous economic potential. More generally, it showed that the Iraqi government was prepared to take responsibility for security, and that its own security forces had the capability to deliver it, and did more than almost anything else to establish the authority of Prime Minister Maliki's government.

  Political reconciliation is key to Iraq's development as a secure and stable country. There has been an overall improvement in the political atmosphere reflected by the passage of important legislation such as the Amnesty and De'Baathification Laws, which lay the foundation for greater Sunni reintegration in Iraqi politics. Since the passage of these laws, the Sunni political bloc Tawafuq has also announced its return to Government. The Provincial Powers Law moved Iraq closer to a new round of provincial elections, so important in providing a new opportunity to those who have now turned away from violence. Important now that the elections law is passed soon, in order to allow these elections to take place later this year. However, substantial challenges remain.

  The successes against al-Qaida—Iraq in al-Anbar and other provinces clearly demonstrates that ordinary Iraqis have no interest in extremist ideologies espoused by al-Qaida and other extremists, and the recent transfer of responsibility for security in Anbar to Provincial Iraqi control, though after the publication of the Departmental report, confirms this welcome trend.

PSA 3 Conflict Prevention, Indicator A8 (Sierra Leone)—Amber to Green

  The final assessment against the target indicators at the end of review period 1 April 2007 to 31 March 2008 was green for the following reasons:

  Presidential and parliamentary elections in August and September 2007 resulted in a democratic and peaceful transition of power from an incumbent government to an opposition party. The close co-operation between the National Electoral Commission, Office of National Security and Central Intelligence and Security Unit was vital in ensuring that the elections were free and fair. The Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) task in support of the Sierra Leone Police was evidence of the growing maturity of the security sector.

  The government remained stable for the rest of the review period. There were no militia operating in the country. Ongoing UK support helped improve civilian oversight of the security sector through a National Security Council chaired by the President and further improve the effectiveness and sustainability of the security services. The National Electoral Commission also turned its focus to preparations for local elections in July 2008.

  At the time of the 2007 Autumn Performance Report we judged it was too early to make a final assessment of the performance of the new government and that an amber (on course) rating was more appropriate.

  HMG continues to provide support and assistance to further increase the effectiveness, accountability and sustainability of the security sector. Progress in Sierra Leone has also been reflected in the changing UN presence in country. The UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) will draw down on 30 September and will be replaced by a smaller political office, the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) on 1 October.

PSA 4 Effective EU, Indicator I (Stronger relationship with Russia)—Red to Amber

  The indicator specifically judged us on whether joint activity had led to improved security in third countries. It was therefore appropriate to cite the intensive co-operation with Russia over Iran which was not necessarily guaranteed, particularly in the run up to a UNSCR. Also, despite the failure in that period to launch PCA successor talks, the EU extended links (by holding eg a first ever Culture Ministerial), while maintaining a principled approach (using that meeting to complain to Russia about its threats against the British Council). We therefore felt, at the time the Departmental Report was drafted, that significant progress had been made since the Autumn Performance Report to warrant an "amber" rating.

PSA 7 Islamic Countries, Indicator B1 (Political pluralism)—Red to Amber PSA 7 Islamic Countries, Indicator B6 (Removal of barriers to investment)—Red to Amber

  For Indicator B1 and B6, the reason for these two indicators turning red to amber was that at the Autumn Performance Report, they were deemed to be borderline between red and amber and it was felt by the end of the year, the inclusion of some new initiatives not present at the six-month assessment was enough to tip them into the amber category, thus justifying the final rating. These initiatives included a project to develop and strengthen an apolitical women councillors' network in Pakistan in B1 and "Regional Centres for Entrepreneurship" in Morocco and Bahrain for B6.

PSA 8 Sustainable Development, Indicator A (Access to information)—Amber to Green

  As acknowledged in the Departmental Report, Sustainable Development is not at an end state in itself but a continuing process of behaviour change—in that sense we will never "achieve" sustainable development. However, in the Departmental Report we did not claim to have "solved" problems such as Access to Information in Environmental Matters or Illegal Logging. These issues will take decades to resolve, if ever, and the UK cannot do it on its own. What the indicators do show is that the FCO made progress towards departmental objectives under those subject headings.

  The FCO contribution to Environmental Democracy has been through an organisation called the Partnership for Principle 10 (of the Rio Declaration). The FCO had been part of the Advisory Board of PP10 since the beginning (the only "developed" country to do so). The FCO had set itself target indicators based around recruiting a number of other countries to join the Partnership. We also wanted the organisation to be more representative and to become self-sustaining. We achieved the objective of recruiting more, diverse member countries. We also assisted with the transition of the Secretariat from Washington-based WRI to organisations based in Latin America. We met our internal targets and thus, the indicator was rated as green—ongoing.

PSA 8 Sustainable Development, Indicator B (Natural resource management)—Amber to Green

  The FCO's objectives here had been based around helping DEFRA to set up the Sustainable Development Dialogues with the Gleneagles +5 countries. This we achieved through Posts and our small team within the FCO. The SDDs exist and are, to a greater or lesser extent, modestly successful and the baton has been passed fully to DEFRA. We listed examples of specifics to show how progress towards meeting our objectives had been made—the Travel Foundation, for example, continues to function (thus we judged the objectives to be green on-going).

PSA 8 Sustainable Development, Indicator C (Tackling illegal logging)—Amber to Green

  The FCO achieved what it has set out to do which was to support DfID on the Voluntary Partnership Agreements negotiations. This we did through our overseas network. Progress on the VPAs has been good (if a little slow) and continues (hence green—ongoing). We also list other deliverables such as the UK-China Sustainable Forestry Working Group which we helped set up and support.

PSA 8 Sustainable Development, Indicator D (Environmental charters in OTs)—Amber to Green

  We moved the indicator to green—met/on going, as the Overseas Territories Environment Programme (OTEP), an FCO and DFID funded programme, held another successful bidding round in February which resulted in 11 new projects being approved for the Overseas Territories. The projects included the eradication of rodents on Gough and Henderson Islands; support to implement environmental legislation on Montserrat; an invasive species action plan for Bermuda; an education project in the British Virgin Islands; and plant conservation on Ascension Island. A clear increase in the implementation of environmental charters had been achieved during the SR04 period, and the OTEP will continue to support the Overseas Territories to safeguard their environment.

7.  The assessments under the sub-targets for PSA9a (entry clearance) were based on provisional figures. Have they now been finalised? If not, when will they be finalised? If they have been finalised, has the assessment of any of the indicators changed from that shown in the Departmental Report?

Answer:

  The figures provided in the assessments under the sub-targets for PSA9a remain provisional and will not be finalised until early 2009. Collecting and processing the annual statistics inevitably takes time. The final figures will appear in the 2009 Departmental Report.

SHARED SERVICES

8.  The 2007-08 FCO Departmental Report states: "By April 2011, the programme aims to put in place shared service centres to cover the UK, Europe, Asia/Pacific and Americas with an initial focus on finance and procurement processes, a number of regional facilities management contracts and procurement optimisation to achieve better value for money through regional and global deals" (p.108). Where will the shared services centres be located? How many staff numbers will be cut as a result of shared services?

Answer to Questions 8, 9 and 11:

  See after Q 11

9.  In your response to our questions on the 2006-07 Departmental Report last year, you estimated that "that by the end of CSR07 the individual projects in the Shared Services Programme could potentially reduce the FCO's baseline spend on corporate services by a net total of approximately £22 million" (letter of 13 June 2007, Response 12iv). The FCO's Value for Money Delivery Agreement indicates that shared services will generate efficiency savings of £16 million. Does this mean that you have revised the figure of £22 million down to £16 million? Please could you provide a breakdown of the £16 million, showing what components will make it up?

Answer to Questions 8, 9 and 11:

  See after Q 11

CO-LOCATION WITH DFID

10.  In your response to our questions on the 2006-07 Departmental Report last year you stated "The FCO-DfID Shared Service Delivery plan seeks to increase the proportion of co-located offices by over 10% and the proportion of DfID staff in co-located offices by over 25% by the end of the CSR07 period" (letter of 13 June 2007, Response 12ii). In your response to our questions on the Autumn Performance Report you stated that under current planning assumptions, the following offices of Abuja, Bridgetown, Dhaka, Harare, Jerusalem, Kampala, New Delhi, and Pretoria will become co-located by the end of the CSR07 period and that proposals for co-locating in Beijing are being considered (Letter of 3 April 2008—Response 15). What progress have you made in co-locating these offices? What efficiency savings will this generate?

Answer:

  Of the posts identified, we and DfID are currently co-located in Kampala and we will both move into our new Embassy building in Harare in early 2009. We are working with DfID on plans for co-locating in Dhaka, New Delhi, and Jerusalem. Plans for co-locating in Abuja, Beijing, Bridgetown and Pretoria are in hand but at a less advanced stage.

  Our plan to increase the proportion of co-located offices with DfID is one strand of a larger programme of change involving Whitehall partners. The savings generated by co-locating with Whitehall partners are often dependant on the size and extent of the facilities shared. In cases where DfID can occupy space in an FCO building that would otherwise be underused, the primary saving to HMG is the rent that DfID might otherwise have paid, which may not be easily quantifiable. Other typical savings are generated around shared facilities (eg meeting and reception facilities), maintenance (equipment and costs), and staff (security guards). In addition to the potential for financial savings, decisions to co-locate are often driven by other factors such as providing a common platform for HMG or spare capacity in our network.

11.  The 2007-08 FCO Departmental Report states that the FCO has set up a UK process centre at Hanslope Park which has resulted in reduced staff numbers and invoices being paid more quickly (p.82). How many staff numbers have been cut?

Answer to Questions 8, 9 and 11:

  The Committee will be aware that following an OGC Gateway 0 Review of the Programme in April 2008 which gave the programme a red rating the FCO Board asked Andrew Lloyd, the incoming Programme Director, to look carefully at how the FCO should deliver improvement in its corporate services.

  The Board had a detailed discussion of this issue at its September meeting. The Permanent Under-Secretary, Peter Ricketts, will be writing shortly to the Chairman with the Board's conclusions.

INTERNATIONAL SUBSCRIPTIONS

12.  In the Government's Response to the Committee's Report on the 2006-07 Departmental Report (CM 7302), you stated "The FCO's CSR Settlement recognised the growing burden of international organisation subscriptions and adjusted the balance of the existing cost-sharing agreement with the Treasury so that in future the FCO budget will only be required to meet 40% of costs above the £102,000,000 baseline set in SR2002. However, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury did not agree to an increase in this baseline". (para 5) Is the arrangement between you and the Treasury on international subscriptions satisfactory or do you forsee having to curtail activities due to cost pressures arising from higher international subscription charges?

Answer:

  The increased contribution from the Treasury to expenditure on international subscriptions above the £102 million baseline should enable the FCO to meet commitments this financial year. However, the position for FYs 09/10 and 10/11 is less certain. We are currently forecasting additional pressures of around £3 million in each of these FYs, and a likely increase in the UN Regular Budget and other international subscriptions will push this figure higher. That being the case, we will have to curtail activities in other programmes in order to meet these non-discretionary costs.

13.  In your response to our questions on the Spring Supplementary Estimate, you informed us that claims arising from the normal operation the Overseas Pricing Mechanism (OPM) and the International Subscriptions Cost Sharing Agreement (both in RFR1) were exempt from being paid back until the time of the 2007 CSR. You stated that the 2007 CSR "abolished the OPM and removed the recoup exemption from the cost sharing agreement" (letter of 16 May 2008, Response 4). What has replaced the OPM? Will the FCO now have to pay back Reserve Claims that arise from having to comply with the International Subscriptions Cost Sharing Agreements?

Answer:

  The OPM has been replaced by an internally managed mechanism. We have signed forward currency contracts with the Bank of England to mitigate the risks of exposure to currency fluctuations. We monitor the impact of exchange rates on our Posts' budgets and adjust their Sterling allocations accordingly. This is funded from a contingency that we set aside during the Resource Allocation Round.

  EYF entitlements will be adjusted for Reserve Claims that arise from compliance with the International Subscriptions Cost Sharing Agreements.

CIVILIAN COSTS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

14.  In the Government's response to the Committee's Report on the FCO Annual Report 2006-07 (CM 7302), you stated that the Stabilisation Aid Fund will be established to cover activity alongside military activity in "hot conflict zones" but that you "remain concerned that these proposals do not fully solve the problem of resourcing civilian deployments alongside the military, as there is no new money for activity which does not qualify as overseas Development assistance" and that "there should be access to the Reserve for the additional costs of civilian deployments"(para 10). What arrangements are there with the Treasury for access to the Reserve for the additional costs of civilian deployments? How could these arrangements be improved from the FCO perspective?

Answer:

  As foreshadowed in our response to the Committee's Report on the FCO Annual Report 2006-07, the Government announced in the CSR White Paper the reform of the tridepartmental arrangements for coordinating and funding conflict prevention and stabilisation activity, including the creation of the new Stabilisation Aid Fund (SAF), which came into operation in April 2008 to fund civil conflict stabilisation activities in volatile or hostile areas where the security situation does not yet permit the roll-out of programmes such as the Pools have traditionally funded. The SAF, which focuses currently on Iraq and Afghanistan, will make available some £269 million over the three year CSR period. Alongside this the Government merged the Global and Africa Conflict Prevention Pools into the single Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP) to reduce bureaucracy, focus effort on where it can deliver best returns and ensure that the new single Pool remains an effective instrument for long term conflict prevention.

  The new CSR arrangements have provided a more robust framework that has strengthened the Government's ability to deliver an integrated response to preventing, managing and resolving conflict. Public Service Agreement on preventing and resolving conflict (PSA 30), for which the FCO has the lead, sets out the Government's objectives for this area for the CSR period and with our Whitehall partners we are working to ensure that our policy and resourcing priorities support the delivery of the PSA.

FIVE STAR FINANCE

15.  The 2008 Departmental Report states that the FCO is on course to achieve four stars in Finance by autumn 2008 (p.104). Are you still on course to achieve this?

Answer:

  We had an intermediate milestone of three and a half stars to check on progress between three and four stars. We reached three and a half stars at the end of August 2008. An important step was to lay our 2007-08 accounts before Parliament by the end of June, which was achieved ahead of all other main Whitehall Departments. We have reviewed our programme of milestones for four to five stars and identified additional requirements for the four star definition. In particular, we have reviewed the purchasing and payment processes and identified opportunities to share the UK best practice across the network. This may delay the achievement of four stars until February 2009. We are currently completing the CIPFA FM review to validate the achievement of 3.5 stars.

EXTERNAL CONSULTANTS

16.  In the Government response to the Report on the FCO Annual Report 2006-07,you stated that "the FCO operates a devolved system for the contracting of management consultants and no central record is yet maintained of the exact areas in which it is currently being assisted by outside expertise" and "to address this issue, the FCO's Corporate Procurement Group is in the process of creating a central database that will contain complete and accurate information on engaged consultants" (para 23). Has the FCO now completed this central database of engaged consultants?

Answer:

  The process of creating the central database has not been completed yet due to resource constraints. We have now allocated a member of staff for this task. The FCO recognises this as a top priority task both in terms of clearly identifying its consultancy spend and in meeting its obligations around financial reporting. The task is also key to the FCO delivering its targets under the OGCs Consultancy Value Programme in which the FCO is participating. The work is now programmed to be fully completed by 31 December 2008 although the initial paper based (as opposed to IT system based) database should be available by the middle of November 2008.

THE STRATEGIC PROGRAMME FUND (FORMER GLOBAL OPPORTUNITIES FUND)

17.  Are you intending to contribute more funds to the renamed Strategic Programme Fund? How are you going to meet your aim of making the projects within the Fund more ambitious and focused on the FCO's new policy priorities?

Answer:

  Funding for the Countering Terrorism and Radicalisation SPF will increase from £35.3 million in 08/09 to £56.0 million in 10/11. Funding for the Low Carbon/High Growth Global Economy SPF will increase from £13.7 million in 08/09 to £24.7 million in 10/11.

  Programme teams are encouraging posts to work up large, high impact, multi-year projects and to ensure that project work is fully integrated into the Country Business Planning process, to ensure the right focus in each country. Other initiatives include strengthening evaluation procedures to identify where follow-up projects might consolidate the change we are looking to promote and encouraging posts to develop their own thematic strategies.

UKTI

18.  How much does the UKTI want to increase its revenue by over the 2007 CSR period?

Answer:

  UKTI's plans are to raise revenue as agreed with Treasury over the CSR07 settlement period as follows:

    2008-09 = £3.7 million

    2009-10 = £4.7 million

    2010-11 = £5.2 million

19.  The UKTI target related to research and development activity in UK is to help at least 1,000 businesses increase their R&D activity in the UK. Why is the target focussed at raising the number of businesses that invest in R&D rather than raising the overall level of R&D?

Answer:

  The target in question, which is part of UKTI's agreed SR2007 performance management framework, is:

    "Target 3: Increase the quality of R&D activity in the UK through business internationalisation

    Annually, over the 2008-09 spending review period, at least 1,000 businesses increase their R&D activity in the UK as a result of UKTI support, including at least 70 foreign direct investment (FDI) R&D projects."

  This target was informed by the increasing body of research evidence which identifies links between business internationalisation, innovation and investment in R&D, as well as productivity. Recent research strengthens the evidence underpinning the economic rationale for UKTI objectives and targets, which was set out in DTI Economics Paper No 18: International Trade and Investment—the Economic Rationale for Government Support, published in 2006, alongside the UKTI strategy "Prosperity in a Changing World".

  UKTI's independently conducted business surveys also provide evidence that UKTI's trade and investment services can help to increase the level of R&D activity carried out in the UK by its customers, both in terms of time and expenditure.

  By helping more innovative and R&D active companies to internationalise, and attracting R&D intensive companies to the UK, UKTI also contributes to the Government target of increasing UK R&D investment as a proportion of national income from 1.9% (2004 level) to 2.5% over a 10-year period by 2014.

MANAGED MIGRATION

20.  What is the FCO's role in the Returns and Re-integration Fund?

Answer:

  The FCO coordinates and manages the Returns and Reintegration Fund in partnership with UKBorders Agency, Ministry of Justice and the Department for International Development. The Returns Fund's main aim is to work together with overseas governments to increase the numbers of foreign national prisoners and failed asylum seekers who are removed from the UK to their countries of origin. It delivers projects in countries which face challenges in accepting back and reintegrating their nationals, drawing on its network of posts around the world. The Returns Fund provides rehabilitation and reintegration assistance which aims to ensure people's return is a successful one and it also helps to speed up the process of removal in the UK. In addition it delivers projects in-country which help to tackle illegal immigration to the UK.

FINANCE

21.  (p.121, Table 5) Why has the resource budget for FCO programme declined by 12.0% from £167 million in 2007-08 to £147 million in 2008-09?

Answer:

  The FCO spending profile on strategic and bi-lateral programmes reflects the CSR 2007 Settlement. The FCO Programme budget reflects the allocative efficiencies mentioned in the answer to Q27 below.

MAIN ESTIMATES

22.  The Main Estimates Memorandum states that the management of the Global Conflict Prevention programme has transferred to DFID from 1 April 2008, except for those elements that have been incorporated into the new Stabilisation Aid Fund, which has been placed in the MoD baseline (para 5). Given that the FCO is the lead Department on CSR 2007 PSA 30 (Reduce the impact of conflict through enhanced UK and international efforts) why has management of the Global Conflict Prevention programme transferred to DFID? What impact has this had on FCO staff and administration? What role does the FCO play in the Stabilisation Aid Fund?

Answer:

  The Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP), established on the 1 April 2008, was formed from a merger of the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) and Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP). A separate Stabilisation Aid Fund (SAF) was established to support stabilisation and reconstruction activity in `hot' conflict zones. The SAF took on responsibility for all Iraq and Afghanistan activity funded by the Pools.

  The CPP sits on DfID's financial baseline and SAF on MoD's, however, they are subject to joint management and decision making by FCO, DfID and MoD. Funding is transferred from HMT to DfID and from DfID to the respective departments during the Winter and Spring supplementaries. The FCO participates in all relevant decision-making forums, including the Cabinet level Committee responsible for determining CPP and SAF allocations and approving programme strategies—NSID (OD).

  Each CPP programme (of which there are eight) has a Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) at Director level, six of which are in the FCO. The SROs are accountable to NSID (OD) for the overall management and delivery of CPP strategies. We are extending the Regional Conflict Advisory (RCA) network in line with the CSR settlement. All RCAs will be tri-departmental resources but will be seconded to the FCO for the duration of that role.

  The SAF currently focuses on Iraq and Afghanistan. Each country programme has a Programme Board which comprises the Senior Responsible Owner and their counterpart from the other two departments. The Senior Responsible Owners for the programmes are at present the Head of Iraq Group in the FCO and the Ambassador in Kabul. Senior Responsible Owners are supported by Programme teams and a Programme Office at the British Embassy Kabul which include FCO staff.

  The above changes have had no significant impact on the FCO staffing levels or administration costs.

23.  The Main Estimates Memorandum notes that the Treasury has agreed an initial amount of £200 million applied to the Main Estimate for peace support and that the Chief Secretary to the Treasury has not yet agreed the total amount for which parliamentary approval should be sought for peacekeeping expenditure in 2008-09. What will the £200 million be used for? What additional amount is the FCO requesting from the Treasury in 2008-09?

—  The £200 million will be a Reserve Claim. The Treasury's Consolidated Budgeting Guidance indicates that when Reserve Claims are made, any future under-spends would be used to pay back Reserve Claims, rather than being rolled forward as is normal practice to next year's budget through the End-Year Flexibility (EYF) mechanism: (HM Treasury, Consolidated Budgeting Guidance, para 15.4) Is the Treasury expecting the Department to use any future under-spends to pay back its Reserve Claim for peace support? If so, what impact will this have on other projects or programmes of the Department, which could potentially under-spend, given that they can not roll-forward under-spends in the normal way through EYF?

Answer:

  The total Peacekeeping Budget for 08/09 will be £374 million.

  Of the £200 million transferred at Main Estimates, roughly 82% will be used to meet the UK's share of assessed (obligatory) costs for UN, EU and OSCE peacekeeping operations. The balance will be spent on the secondments of UK military, policing and civilian personnel to a range of international peacekeeping operations.

  FCO's non-Peacekeeping End Year Flexibility (EYF) has not been reduced to pay back the Peacekeeping Reserve claim.

24.  The Main Estimates Memorandum states that "final administration cost outturn was £15.8 million higher than provision forecast after apportionment of visa and consular overheads to other current was taken into account". Why were visa and consular overheads higher than expected? What measures are the FCO taking to ensure that administration costs are maintained within the budget?

Answer:

  At the end of the 2006-07 financial year an exercise was undertaken to remove the net administration costs of consular and visa services from the FCO's administration budget in-line with their reclassification by the Treasury as programme costs. The £15.8 million revision represents a decrease in the remaining administration costs underspend rather than an increase in consular and visa costs.

25.  The Main Estimates Memorandum gives the End Year Flexibility carried forward into 2008-09 as £104.78 million (table in para 14). However the Public Expenditure Outturn paper (Vm7419) gives the FCO EYF as £171.9 million (p14). Why are the figures different?

Answer:

  The Balance of accumulated End Year Flexibility given in the Main Estimate Memorandum was an early estimate that was revised upwards for the Public Expenditure Outturn White Paper to take account of near-final 2007-08 outturn figures.

EFFICIENCY TARGETS

26.  In your response to our written questions on the APR and CSR 07 Value for Money Delivery Agreement (VfMDA), you provided us with a table of all the current FCO VfM projects. Of the 17 projects listed, only five were included in the VfMDA. Why were so few projects included in the VfMDA?

Answer:

  The CSR07 VfM DA sets out at the start of the programme, a clear summary of the major reforms, changes and initiatives that the FCO intend to undertake over the CSR period to deliver vfm savings. The five projects listed are high priority for the FCO and will deliver the bulk of the savings that will contribute toward delivering vfm savings of at least £144 million by end of March 2011. Whilst it was proportionate and in line with HM Treasury guidance to focus on the more substantial initiatives, we are additionally taking forward a range of smaller programmes to ensure that VFM is maximised.

  The FCO will report fully on all gains achieved to date in the Autumn Performance Report later this year.

27.  The response also includes a note on "allocative efficiencies" stating that these "are efficiencies obtained by prioritising work in order to achieve maximum impact of our resources". In what areas of the FCO's work would these "allocative efficiencies" feature? Could you provide us with a real-world example of an allocative efficiency and explain how it would be "cash releasing", as well as how these efficiencies are "cash releasing" in general?

Answer:

  The significant shifts in resources flowing from the new FCO Strategic Framework generated allocative efficiencies in areas such as Chevening Scholarships, Public Diplomacy, Bilateral, Drugs and International Crime and Sustainable Development.

  Allocative efficiencies in CSR07 are generated from moving resources from lower priority areas allowing savings to be released and invested in higher priority areas. During 2007 Resources Allocation Round (RAR) budget were adjusted accordingly to release "cash" from these areas to be used in priority areas as outlined in the Strategic Framework. For example investment in the Chevening Scholarships programme was reduced in order to release resource for policies identified in the new Strategic Framework as high priorities, such as Counter terrorism and promoting a low carbon, high growth, global economy, enabling the FCO as a department to operate more effectively at a lower cost to the taxpayer.

  For example, allocative efficiencies for Chevening Scholarships are calculated as follows:


Baseline
Counterfactual Baseline
2007-08
2008-09
2009-10
2010-11

Baseline Spend
£36.1m
£37.07m
£38.08m
£39.10m
Post vfm initiative spend (RAR budget)
£27.91m
£25.60m
£25.60m
Efficiency Gains
£9.16m
£12.48m
£13.5m


28.  In the VfMDA you set out how benefits will be measured against a counterfactual baseline using the Treasury GDP deflator on 2007-08 spend. How will benefits be measured for "allocative efficiencies" when the efficiency will be achieved through achieving maximum impact rather than reducing expenditure?

Answer:

  The same principle will be applied to calculate allocative efficiencies ie savings are calculated from a counterfactual baseline using the Treasury GDP deflator (example above—Q.27).

THEFT OF PASSPORTS AND VISA VIGNETTES

29.  Further to your letter of 1 August 2008, the Committee would like to receive copies of the most recent reviews carried out by the FCO into the arrangements with 3MSPSL. If these reviews did not include a security threat assessment, the Committee would like to know when the last such assessment was carried out, and by whom, and to receive a copy of this assessment. In particular the Committee would like to know whether the FCO was advised at any time previously that armoured vans should be used for this transport operation.

Answer:

  The Permanent Under-secretary, Peter Ricketts, is writing separately to the Committee about this issue.

30 November 2008





 
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