Conclusions
and recommendations
National Security Strategy
1. We
note that it is proposed that the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs
Committee will be an ex officio member of the Joint Committee
on the National Security Strategy and that we will therefore have
an input into its deliberations and activities. We wish to put
on record our firm view that the existence of the Joint Committee,
if the House approves the Government's proposals, will not in
any way restrict or curtail the Foreign Affairs Committee's responsibility
to examine aspects of national security insofar as they relate
to the work of the FCO. We take our responsibilities in this regard
very seriously and will continue to exercise them as an integral
part of our work. We recommend that in its response to this Report
the Government should confirm that it accepts our view of the
Foreign Affairs Committee's continuing responsibilities as regards
national security matters relating to the work of the FCO. (Paragraph
7)
Restricting the resources required for proliferation
2. We
conclude that the UK's failure so far to ratify the 2005 Protocol
to the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation is regrettable, given the way
in which the Protocol will strengthen the UK's ability to impede
the trafficking by sea of WMD-related materials. We further conclude
that the provisions of the planned Transport Security Bill which
will facilitate UK ratification are to be welcomed, and look forward
to their early passage. We recommend that the Government should
work actively to secure ratifications of the Protocol by other
states so that it may rapidly enter into force. (Paragraph 33)
3. We conclude that
the Government is to be commended for introducing the Academic
Technology Approval Scheme regarding security clearance for foreign
students in sensitive fields, which is a significant improvement
on the previous Voluntary Vetting Scheme. We recommend that the
Government should take swift action to address any shortcomings
in this relatively new scheme which are identified in its imminent
review of the scheme's operation, of which we expect to receive
a copy. We further recommend that the Government should set out
in its response to this Report the progress made on oversight
of science and codes of conduct for scientists as part of the
current Inter-sessional Work Programme of the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention. (Paragraph 37)
4. We conclude that
restricting the finance available to those intending to proliferate
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems
is a potentially effective mechanism to achieve non-proliferation
aims. We recommend that the Government should consider how this
can be done as quickly as possible when proliferation risks are
identified. We further recommend that in its response to this
Report, or earlier if possible, the Government should send us
a copy of the imminent report of the international Financial Action
Task Force, with an accompanying memorandum indicating whether,
when and how it will implement its recommendations. (Paragraph
39)
Scope for rationalisation of the non-proliferation
architecture
5. We
conclude that the sheer number of organisations and initiatives
in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament may lead to
a lack of focussed progress. We recommend that the Government
should press for the rationalisation of international efforts
in this area and set out in its response to this Report where
it believes such rationalisation could occur. (Paragraph 44)
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
6. We
conclude that the Government is correct to identify the international
nuclear non-proliferation regime as being under severe strain.
We further conclude that the Government is correct to identify
the 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
as critical for the future of that regime. We further conclude
that the Government's proposal for a "Road to 2010 Plan"
is to be welcomed. We recommend that the Government should keep
Parliament fully informed and engaged as it develops the Plan
by summer 2009 and pursues it in the run-up to the Review Conference.
We further recommend that the Government should make a full report
to Parliament on the results of the Conference. (Paragraph 57)
7. We conclude that
the Government is correct to identify the universalisation of
the International Atomic Energy Agency's Additional Protocol,
to all States Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), to be an important means of strengthening verification
of the NPT, and thus also to be a vital nuclear non-proliferation
objective. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the
Government should set out the institutional mechanisms by which
it envisages that universalisation may be achieved. We further
recommend that the Government should update us on its efforts
in this direction, in particular with respect to its work through
the Nuclear Suppliers Group and as part of the preparations for
the 2010 NPT Review Conference. (Paragraph 69)
8. We conclude that
the United States' failure to pass to the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA)—if necessary in confidence—the
information it had about Syria's al-Kibar facility, before the
facility was destroyed in September 2007, undermined the Agency's
credibility as the verification agency for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. We recommend that the Government should press both Israel
and Syria to provide the IAEA with the information it requires
about the al-Kibar site, and update us on its progress in this
respect in its response to this Report. (Paragraph 72)
9. We conclude that
the UK provides significant financial and other resources to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We welcome in particular
the Prime Minister's announcement of a doubling in the Government's
voluntary contribution to the Agency's Nuclear Security Fund.
However, we further conclude that it is incongruous for the Government
to wish to see an expansion of IAEA verification work while ruling
out an increase in UK funding for the Agency's regular budget.
We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government
should update us on the IAEA Budget Committee discussions which
were due to commence in February 2009. We further recommend that
the Government should set out how it expects the IAEA to meet
the increased demand for its verification work given the anticipated
scale of its resources. (Paragraph 81)
10. We conclude that
the UK is making a valuable contribution in kind to the work of
the International Atomic Energy Agency through the provision of
inspectors and of training for them. We welcome this, and recommend
that the Government should seek every opportunity to contribute
further in this way. (Paragraph 82)
11. We conclude that
the Government is correct to identify a need to strengthen generic
enforcement mechanisms for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), in the face of states which violate and/or withdraw from
it. However, we note that the Minister told us that this objective
was unachievable at present. We recommend that in its response
to this Report, the Government should set out the specific legal
and institutional mechanisms for strengthened NPT enforcement
which it will be advocating at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
In particular, we recommend that the Government should outline
how it envisages that pre-announced penalties for NPT withdrawal
might be strengthened. (Paragraph 89)
12. We conclude that
the issue of Israel's nuclear weapons could become an obstacle
to the achievement of Government goals at the 2010 Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. We recommend that in its response
to this Report, the Government should consider whether encouraging
greater transparency and nuclear disarmament measures by Israel,
in public or in private, might improve the regional security situation,
and begin to move Israel towards the Government's stated goals
of Israeli accession to the NPT and the establishment of a WMD-free
Middle East. We further recommend that the Government should update
us on steps taken within the EU's Union for the Mediterranean
towards a WMD-free Middle East and set out the ways in which it
sees this new vehicle contributing towards that objective. (Paragraph
94)
13. We welcome India's
granting of greater international access to its civilian nuclear
facilities. However, we reiterate our 2006 conclusion that the
US-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement undermines one of
the central bargains of the international non-proliferation regime,
namely that access to nuclear power for civil purposes is due
only to states which do not develop nuclear weapons and place
all their declared nuclear facilities under international safeguards.
We conclude that, given its stated commitment to the international
non-proliferation regime, the Government's support for the US-India
deal is thus regrettable. We recommend that in its response to
this Report, the Government should set out how it foresees the
US-India agreement being used to secure further disarmament and
non-proliferation steps by India, such as ratification of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. (Paragraph 99)
Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation
14. We
conclude that the five recognised nuclear weapons states have
widely varying records as regards nuclear disarmament and arms
control over the last decade. We welcome the fact that of the
five the record of the UK has been the best. However, we also
conclude that, owing to the way in which the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) enshrines a distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear
weapons States Parties, the five recognised nuclear powers are
often perceived as a group by the non-nuclear weapons states,
and that, as such, the group is seen collectively to have failed
to live up to the nuclear disarmament commitments made at the
1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences. As a result, we further
conclude that without decisive movement by the five recognised
nuclear weapons states as a whole on nuclear disarmament measures,
there is a risk that the 2010 Review Conference will fail, like
its 2005 predecessor—during a critical period for dealing
with North Korea and attempting to constrain Iran's nuclear programme.
We therefore commend the Government on its public recognition
of the link between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
We conclude that the Government is correct to identify a vital
need to reinvigorate multilateral nuclear disarmament, ideally
before and certainly at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. (Paragraph
114)
15. We conclude that
there is a relatively well-defined agenda of nuclear disarmament
steps around which there is a considerable degree of international
consensus, such as entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty, the start of negotiations on a Fissile Material
Cut-off Treaty, and measures to scale down, de-alert and make
more transparent existing nuclear arsenals. We recommend that
the Government should aim to come away from the 2010 NPT Review
Conference with agreement on a concrete plan to take the multilateral
nuclear disarmament process forward, with target dates for specific
steps, and with the political commitment from all nuclear and
non-nuclear weapons States Parties to ensure implementation. (Paragraph
115)
16. We conclude that
the strengthened commitment of the US and Russia, under Presidents
Obama and Medvedev, to negotiate a legally-binding nuclear arms
reduction treaty to succeed START I, by the end of 2009, as part
of a deeper process of nuclear arms cuts, will contribute significantly
to the fulfilment of their disarmament obligations under the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, and is thus greatly to be welcomed.
We recommend that the Government should offer every assistance
to facilitate a speedy and productive conclusion to the negotiations.
(Paragraph 121)
17. We conclude that
reductions in the operational readiness of the world's nuclear
arsenals could make a significant contribution to enhancing international
security. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the
Government should set out the steps which it is taking to encourage
international action in this area, and explain its stance regarding
the UN General Assembly resolution on this issue. (Paragraph 124)
18. We conclude that
the decision to renew the UK's Trident system is perceived by
some foreign states and some among the British public as appearing
to contradict the Government's declared commitment to strengthening
the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. We recommend
that the Government should intensify its public diplomacy work
better to explain the reasons for the Trident renewal decision
and to give greater prominence to its work for multilateral nuclear
disarmament and arms control. We further recommend that in its
response to this Report, the Government should update us on the
progress of the timetable for renewal of the Trident submarines.
We recommend that the Government should not take any decision
at the Initial Gate stage until Parliament has had the chance
to scrutinise the matter in a debate. (Paragraph 133)
19. We conclude that
the steps which the Government has taken to scale down and de-escalate
the UK's nuclear arsenal are to be commended. We welcome in particular
the Prime Minister's announcement that the new Trident submarines
are to carry fewer missiles than the current boats. We recommend
that the Government should do more to highlight these steps, internationally
and at home. However, we note that it is difficult to assess the
Government's claim that it retains only a minimum nuclear deterrent
in the absence of further information about the process by which
it judges this minimum. We therefore recommend that the Government
should accede to the Defence Committee's call for it to explain
in greater detail the process by which it determines that the
current scale and operational arrangements of the Trident force
constitute the UK's minimum nuclear deterrent. (Paragraph 136)
20. We conclude that
the Government's confirmation of its willingness to include the
UK's nuclear force in multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations
is to be welcomed, as likely to strengthen its non-proliferation
efforts. We recommend that the Government should give greater
prominence to this commitment in its public diplomacy. We further
recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government
should specify—in the light of international disarmament
developments by that time—the state of a multilateral nuclear
disarmament process that would trigger UK participation. We further
recommend that the Government should specify whether there are
circumstances under which the UK would be prepared to suspend
the Trident renewal programme. (Paragraph 138)
21. We conclude that
the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world is gathering more serious
international political support than at any time since the end
of the Cold War. We conclude that the Government's leadership
on this issue is to be commended. In particular, we conclude that
the Government is correct to recognise the scale of the technical
and confidence-building work that will be required for the goal
to be realisable, and in particular the importance of verification.
We recommend that the Government should continue and expand its
work in this area. (Paragraph 145)
22. We recommend that
in its response to this Report, the FCO should set out its attitude
to a possible Nuclear Weapons Convention banning such weapons,
including the relationship which it sees between such a Convention,
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its stated goal of the
elimination of all nuclear weapons. (Paragraph 147)
23. We conclude that
the Government is correct to identify the speedy entry into force
of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as a key early step
towards reviving multilateral nuclear disarmament. We recommend
that the Government should do everything possible to facilitate
US ratification, and to maximise prospects that this will be followed
by other especially politically important ratifications, such
as those of China, India, Israel and Pakistan, even if these are
still too few to bring the Treaty into force. (Paragraph 152)
24. We conclude that
the Government is correct to identify the start of negotiations
on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) as a step which would
significantly strengthen the international nuclear disarmament
and non-proliferation process. In that context, we strongly welcome
the agreement reached at the UN Conference on Disarmament in May
2009 on a Programme of Work which includes the negotiation of
a FMCT. We recommend that the Government should do all it can
to ensure that the negotiations get underway in a speedy and productive
fashion and to maximise the prospects that they will result in
the coming into force of a verified FMCT. We further recommend
that in its response to this Report, the Government should set
out its view of the most serious difficulties that are likely
to arise in the negotiations, the most likely timetable for the
conclusion of the talks, the most likely coverage of the proposed
FMCT in terms of signatories and non-signatories, and any implications
of the proposed FMCT for the UK. (Paragraph 157)
25. We conclude that
the agreement reached in May 2009 on a Programme of Work for the
UN Conference on Disarmament, after over twelve years of deadlock,
is an important signal of the renewed prospects for multilateral
arms control which appear to have followed the election of President
Obama and, as such, is greatly to be welcomed. (Paragraph 158)
Internationalising the nuclear fuel cycle
26. We
conclude that the Government is correct to identify a need to
ensure access for non-nuclear weapons states to civil nuclear
power under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, notwithstanding
the existence of a heightened proliferation risk arising from
the spread of civil nuclear power. We further conclude that, unless
pursued with political sensitivity, the effort to limit non-nuclear
weapons states' access to the full nuclear fuel cycle risks reproducing
the discrimination which it is claimed exists in relation to the
possession of nuclear weapons. As such, this aim risks undermining
other elements of the nuclear non-proliferation effort. We recommend
that in its response to this Report, the Government should provide
further details as to the steps it is taking to mitigate this
risk. (Paragraph 165)
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
27. We
conclude that the fact that the UK has no chemical weapons, and
that the process of destroying its past stocks of such weapons
was completed in 2007, is to be welcomed. (Paragraph 181)
28. We conclude that
the Government has correctly identified further progress towards
universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention as a priority,
given that a number of key states of concern remain outside the
Convention, some of which are thought to possess chemical weapons.
We recommend that the Government should set out in its response
to this Report what it believes to be the obstacles to the accession
of each of these states and how it assesses the likelihood of
overcoming these obstacles. (Paragraph 182)
29. We conclude that
the relatively small number of States Parties which have comprehensively
implemented the Chemical Weapons Convention is a matter of concern.
We recommend that the Government should continue to put pressure
on those states which have not implemented the Convention in full
to do so. We further recommend that the Government should take
positive steps to promote the Department for Business, Enterprise
and Regulatory Reform's National Authority Advisory Committee
as an example of good practice that might usefully be adopted
by other countries, and that it should maintain its current programmes
of bilateral assistance. (Paragraph 186)
30. We conclude that
the likely failure to meet the global 2012 deadline for destruction
of chemical weapons stockpiles could erode the credibility of
the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and undermine
progress towards elimination of chemical weapons. We further conclude
that the Government is to be commended for the measures it has
taken to assist other states, such as Russia and Libya, with their
destruction of chemical weapons. We recommend that the Government
should step up its assistance activities in this area, and that
it should encourage the US and Russia in particular to devote
greater resources to the task of destroying their chemical weapons
stockpiles. We further recommend that the Government should set
out in its response to this Report what its position will be at
the next Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Conference in relation
to the failure of any state to destroy its stocks of chemical
weapons and in relation to the future priorities for the CWC once
stockpiles have been eradicated. (Paragraph 190)
31. We conclude that
the enforcement mechanisms of the Chemical Weapons Convention
are yet to be fully tested. We recommend that the Government should
continue to make representations to the new US Administration
to rescind the Presidential veto over challenge inspections. We
further recommend that the Government should commit to press for
a new convention criminalising chemical and biological weapons
at the individual level. (Paragraph 194)
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
32. We
recommend that the Government should set out in its response to
this Report what efforts it is making to persuade other states
to join the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and outline
what it believes to be the obstacles to universality. We further
recommend that the Government should seek to persuade those members
of the Commonwealth who are yet to sign or ratify the Convention
to do so. (Paragraph 199)
33. We conclude that
securing a verification protocol for the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention should remain a key objective for the Government.
We recommend that the Government should work to persuade the new
US Administration that such a protocol for the Convention is essential.
We further recommend that the Government should, in conjunction
with other States Parties, explore ways in which the Convention
can be strengthened by other means until such time as a verification
protocol can be achieved. (Paragraph 205)
34. We conclude that
strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should
be a priority for the Government in the absence of a verification
protocol. We recommend that in its response to this Report the
Government should comment on the specific suggestions aimed at
achieving this end, set out in previous paragraphs, and outline
what measures it intends to pursue further at the Seventh Review
Conference in 2011. The suggested measures include an Accountability
Framework, Action Plan for Comprehensive Implementation, better
collective scrutiny of developments in technology, an expansion
of the role and staff of the Implementation Support Unit, formal
annual meetings, work to refine and improve the Confidence-Building
Measures, a consolidation agenda of politically-binding commitments
agreed at earlier Review Conferences and criminalisation of biological
weapons activities at the individual level. (Paragraph 211)
The BTWC and CWC and new technologies
35. We
conclude that whilst general purpose criteria provide the means
by which the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Chemical
Weapons Convention can keep pace with advances in technology,
this is still an area which requires close attention. We recommend
that the Government should set out its proposals for ensuring
that the Conventions are able to keep pace adequately with future
technologies, particularly in areas of overlap. (Paragraph 217)
36. We recommend that
in its response to this Report the Government should set out its
view on non-lethal agents such as herbicides, defoliants and incapacitating
biochemical weapons and the status of such agents under the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapons Convention.
We conclude that there is a case for certain biological and chemical
agents which are non-lethal or which target plants, including
crops and vegetation, to be prohibited from use as weapons for
the purposes of these Conventions. We further recommend that the
Government should press for negotiations on an unambiguous prohibition
of their use as weapons to commence at the next Review Conferences.
(Paragraph 218)
Action against ballistic missile proliferation
37. We
conclude that the proliferation of ballistic missile technology
is a significant security concern. We further conclude that the
Government is correct to acknowledge that stronger action is required
to curb the international transfer of ballistic missile technology.
We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government
should set out specific steps which it plans to take to this end.
(Paragraph 228)
Ballistic missile defence (BMD)
38. We
are not convinced that, as they are currently envisaged and under
current circumstances, the United States' planned ballistic missile
defence (BMD) deployments in the Czech Republic and Poland represent
a net gain for European security. We conclude that if the deployments
are carried out in the face of opposition from Russia, this could
be highly detrimental to NATO's overall security interests. We
reaffirm our 2007 recommendation that BMD in Europe should be
developed, if at all, as a joint system between the US, NATO and
Russia. Given the Government's stated commitment to a rules-based
international system, we further conclude that its early agreement
to the inclusion of RAF Fylingdales and Menwith Hill in the US
BMD system was regrettable, given that the United States' development
of its system involved its abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the
Government should update us on the NATO element of European BMD
developments, in the light of the April 2009 NATO summit. We further
recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government
should state whether any changes made to the planned US BMD deployments
in the Czech Republic and Poland would affect RAF Fylingdales
or Menwith Hill. We further conclude that the uncertainty surrounding
prospects for the US European BMD system has made a Parliamentary
debate on this issue all the more necessary, and we recommend
that the Government should schedule one before the end of this
Parliament. (Paragraph 241)
The threat posed by terrorists and weapons of
mass destruction (WMD)
39. We
conclude that, although it would appear to be difficult for terrorists
acting independently of state agencies to build a nuclear bomb,
there is a genuine risk that terrorists could acquire nuclear
or radiological material, which might be used as an instrument
of terror in various ways. We further conclude that, in addition
to inadequate levels of physical security which might allow terrorists
to seize nuclear or radiological material directly, 'rogue' individuals
or groups in states possessing nuclear weapons or material represent
an important but particularly hard-to-address means by which terrorists
might acquire such material. We recommend that the Government
should press its counterparts in countries that are potential
sources of nuclear and radiological materials to treat this issue
with the highest priority. We further recommend that the Government
in its response to this Report should set out what action it is
taking overseas to minimise the 'dirty bomb' threat to the UK.
(Paragraph 252)
40. We conclude that
the Government is correct in its claim that the UK faces a significant
threat arising from terrorist use of chemical or biological weapons,
and to argue that at present this threat is greater than the threat
that such weapons might be used against the UK by hostile states.
We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government
should set out what action it is taking to mitigate this threat.
(Paragraph 261)
Initiatives against terrorist acquisition of WMD
41. We
conclude that the G8 Global Partnership, and the UK's contribution
to it through the Global Threat Reduction Programme, are continuing
to deliver important results in reducing the risks of a security
breach occurring in relation to WMD. We recommend that, despite
the current strains on its budgetary position, the Government
should maintain its strong political and financial support for
the Global Partnership, including the programme's geographical
expansion and continuation beyond 2012. We further recommend that
in its response to this Report, the Government should provide
an update on plans for the Global Partnership beyond 2012, following
the July 2009 G8 summit in Italy. (Paragraph 269)
42. We conclude that
UN Security Council Resolution 1540 is a vital part of the international
non-proliferation regime. We commend the work that the British
Government has done in support of UNSCR 1540. We recommend that
the Government should work actively to ensure that the Resolution
is implemented successfully by all UN Member States, providing
practical assistance and resources where required. (Paragraph
273)
43. We recommend that
the UK should ratify the International Convention on the Suppression
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible. We look forward
to the Government taking the steps necessary to allow this to
happen in line with its anticipated September 2009 timeframe,
and we recommend that in its response to this Report the Government
should update us on this process. (Paragraph 278)
Physical security
44. We
conclude that the physical security of nuclear and radiological
materials around the world is far from assured, and should remain
a prime Government concern. We recommend that the Government should
continue to give a high priority to ensuring the security of nuclear
and radiological materials, at academic, industrial and military
locations in the UK, and to encourage its international partners
to do likewise. (Paragraph 286)
45. We conclude that
the legally-binding Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material is an important and helpful measure, even though it covers
only civil nuclear material. We look forward to the Government
taking the steps necessary for UK ratification of the 2005 amendment
strengthening the Convention. We recommend that the Government
should actively promote the negotiation of legally-binding international
instruments covering the physical security of nuclear and radiological
materials not currently covered by the Convention. (Paragraph
290)
46. We conclude that
the funding provided for international work on the physical security
of nuclear material through mechanisms such as the International
Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) is vital. We
welcome the Prime Minister's announcement of a doubling of the
UK's contribution to the NSF, and we recommend that the UK should
continue to provide strong financial and practical support for
this work. (Paragraph 293)
47. We conclude that,
given the real risk that terrorists may acquire and use chemical
or biological weapons, the security of biological and chemical
materials is of paramount concern. We therefore recommend that
in its response to this Report, the Government should set out
the action that it is taking in this area, including its efforts
to secure international co-operation, particularly to reduce biological
and chemical security risks. (Paragraph 297)
Impact on global security
48. We
conclude that, while it may not be straightforward to define what
a conventional weapon is, more effective efforts to counter their
proliferation would have a significant positive impact on global
security. Accordingly, we conclude that the Government is to be
commended for taking the view that countering the proliferation
of conventional weapons is one of its top foreign policy goals,
and for seeking to pursue this goal through the promotion of bans
on certain kinds of weapon and, as a longer-term aspiration, through
the establishment of global rules and standards for the regulation
of the conventional arms trade. (Paragraph 300)
Success outside the UN framework: cluster munitions
and landmines
49. We
conclude that the Government is to be commended for the role it
played in helping to bring the negotiations on a Convention on
Cluster Munitions to a successful conclusion. We recommend that
the Government should continue to do everything it can to persuade
other states, especially all EU Member States, to sign and ratify
the Convention without delay. We recommend that in its response
to this Report, the Government should set out what steps it is
taking to achieve this. (Paragraph 304)
50. We conclude that
the negotiation of a Protocol on cluster munitions under the Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons might not be an appropriate foreign
policy objective for the UK. We recommend that, if it decides
to continue arguing for such a Protocol, the Government should
ensure that any such Protocol is as strong in its provisions as
the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It should withdraw its support
for such a Protocol if it appears that this will not be the case.
(Paragraph 306)
51. We conclude that
the Government has been correct to identify as a priority the
clearance of mines worldwide which threaten human life. We conclude
that there are understandable reasons for the failure to clear
landmines on the Falkland Islands over the last decade. However,
the failure to de-mine the Falklands risks damaging the UK's reputation
and credibility in this area. We therefore conclude that the Government's
intention to move ahead with de-mining in three areas to fulfil
its international obligations is a positive step forward, and
recommend that this should proceed provided this can be achieved
without risk to human life. (Paragraph 310)
The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
52. We
conclude that the Government is to be commended for the energy
and commitment which it has displayed in seeking to achieve a
comprehensive and effective international Arms Trade Treaty. We
recommend that in its response to this Report the Government should
provide an update on the status of the negotiations on the Treaty.
(Paragraph 315)
53. We conclude that
whilst there are inherent dangers in adopting a lowest common
denominator approach to an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), a treaty that
is both inclusive and credible can be achieved. We further conclude,
however, that if in the future, the Government is forced to choose
between giving priority to the strength of the treaty or achieving
the widest possible ratification, it should give priority to securing
the strongest possible treaty. (Paragraph 319)
54. We conclude that
effective enforcement will be crucial to the credibility and effectiveness
of an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), and we recommend that the Government
does all it can to make this issue a high priority in future negotiations.
We further recommend that, in its response to this Report, the
Government should set out its current position with regard to
the ways in which an ATT would ideally be enforceable. (Paragraph
321)
55. We recommend basing
an Arms Trade Treaty on a detailed list of the weapons to be covered
rather than on a set of simple generic descriptions of the categories
of arms covered. We conclude that the Government should take this
position in future negotiations. We further recommend that a broad
range of activities and/or transactions should be brought within
the scope of the treaty, including dual-use items, brokering and
trans-shipment. (Paragraph 326)
56. We recommend that
an Arms Trade Treaty should fully incorporate the protections
provided by international human rights law and international humanitarian
law. We conclude that the inclusion within its ambit of human
rights protections should be viewed as a key test of the likely
credibility and effectiveness of such a treaty. (Paragraph 329)
57. We conclude that
it is to be welcomed that negotiations on an Arms Trade Treaty
are proceeding on an 'overwhelming majority' basis rather than
by consensus, and we recommend that this continues. We further
recommend, however, that in order to secure a treaty that is as
widely supported as possible, all the parties to the negotiations
should seek to keep them within the UN framework. We conclude
that much depends on how effectively the Open Ended Working Group
advances negotiations during 2009. (Paragraph 332)
58. We conclude that
securing the support of the new US Administration for an Arms
Trade Treaty should be a priority for the Government. We recommend
that the Government should intensify its efforts to persuade those
states that are as yet not persuaded of the merits of a treaty
to change their mind. (Paragraph 337)
59. We conclude that
the co-operation between the Government and key NGOs involved
in the campaign for a credible and effective Arms Trade Treaty,
which has included providing official funding for NGO activities
on transfer control issues, has been productive. We recommend
that the Government should continue to foster these productive
relationships. (Paragraph 339)
60. We conclude that
the wholehearted support of the defence industry for an Arms Trade
Treaty (ATT) will help significantly in pursuit of an effective
treaty and in its successful implementation. We recommend that
the Government should swiftly draw up plans for greater co-operation
with the UK Export Group for Aerospace and Defence on lobbying
and outreach over the coming period, particularly with the aim
of persuading the US defence industry of the merits of an ATT.
(Paragraph 343)
61. We conclude that
it is desirable that the new US Administration takes a more positive
attitude to the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light
Weapons. We recommend that the Government should encourage such
a shift. We further recommend that due care be taken by all stakeholders
to ensure that the Arms Trade Treaty process and the UN Programme
of Action remain complementary and mutually reinforcing. (Paragraph
348)
62. We conclude that,
while the Wassenaar Arrangement may in due course be superseded
wholly or in part by an Arms Trade Treaty, the positive gains
made under the Arrangement should, as far as is possible, be incorporated
into the Arms Trade Treaty and built upon. (Paragraph 350)
The rules-based approach
63. We
conclude that the rules-based approach to counter-proliferation
taken by the Government has been moderately successful thus far
and has greater prospects of being so than any alternative approach.
However, we further conclude that more priority must be given
to the enforcement of rules-based regimes. We recommend that the
Government should continue to press for national implementation
of treaty obligations, and strongly support verification mechanisms.
We further recommend that the Government should advocate the inclusion
in future international agreements of a defined set of 'disagreeable
consequences' that would act as a deterrent to states flouting
their commitments or withdrawing. (Paragraph 358)
The treatment of different weapons types
64. We
conclude that the term 'weapons of mass destruction' will continue
to be used, as it is written into multilateral treaties and is
an accepted international term. However, we further conclude that
whilst nuclear, biological and chemical weapons cannot be considered
entirely in isolation, particularly in regions such as the Middle
East where the linkages are clear, the three weapons types pose
very different threats which require specific solutions. They
can and should not be tackled in the same way. We therefore recommend
that whilst the Government may use the term 'weapons of mass destruction'
as a useful shorthand in documents such as the National Security
Strategy, it should devote greater attention to outlining the
different approaches which it takes to the three weapons types.
(Paragraph 363)
A holistic approach to disarmament and non-proliferation
65. We
conclude that there is a balance to be struck between addressing
the specific threats posed by individual categories of weapons,
and considering general disarmament in a more holistic fashion.
We recommend that the Government should consider whether it can
better build such considerations into its policies. (Paragraph
365)
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