1 Introduction
1. The control of arms, by means of non-proliferation
and disarmament, is one of the most important aims of Government
foreign policy. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) told
us that it considers that the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD)
poses one of the gravest threats to UK and to
global security and that [it is] firmly committed to the goal
of the global elimination of all such weapons. Driving forward
more urgent and robust international action on both counter-proliferation
and nuclear disarmament is a personal priority for the Foreign
Secretary.[1]
We and our predecessor Committees in previous Parliaments
have taken a longstanding interest in these issues. Our predecessor
Committee produced reports on Weapons of Mass Destruction in 2000
and on the Government's Biological Weapons Green Paper in 2003.[2]
The Committee reported on related issues in a series of Reports
on Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism between
2001 and 2006. We have also considered issues related to weapons
proliferation in a number of the Reports dealing with specific
regions and countries produced as part of our overarching inquiry
into "Global Security": in particular, those relating
to the Middle East, Russia, Iran, and Japan and Korea.[3]
Background
2. We were prompted to conduct the present inquiry
by recent developments relating in particular to nuclear weapons.
We have produced Reports commenting on the two most serious actual
or potential cases of nuclear weapons proliferation, Iran and
North Korea, and we felt that it would be useful to integrate
our conclusions on those countries into a wider perspective. The
key international instrument in the field of nuclear non-proliferation,
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), faces its next five-yearly
Review Conference in 2010, an event which is currently a focus
of activity for the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament
community. In advance of that conference, there is what The
Economist has called a new "buzz" about the idea
of a nuclear-free world,[4]
triggered primarily by an initiative launched in January 2007
by US statesmen Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, Bill Perry and George
Shultz.[5] In the same
year, Parliament endorsed the Government's decision to renew the
UK's Trident nuclear weapons system.[6]
Beyond specifically nuclear issues, we were aware that the Government
regards WMD proliferation generally as a key security challenge,
and that it is also taking a leading role in diplomatic initiatives
on the control of conventional arms. In 2008, agreement was reached
at the UN to move forward with a proposed Arms Trade Treaty (ATT),
with significant backing from the UK; and agreement was reached
on the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
Terms of reference
3. We announced our inquiry on 14 July 2008. We subsequently,
on 20 October, announced that we had extended the terms of reference
to include conventional as well as nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons. Those submitting written evidence were invited to address
the following issues:
- the British Government's non-proliferation
approach, as set out in the National Security Strategy;
- the effectiveness of the current rules-based
international system in curbing current weapons proliferation;
- the potential merit of current diplomatic initiatives
on non-proliferation, for instance the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Review Conference and the proposed Arms Trade Treaty;
- the role of arms control and disarmament, including
nuclear disarmament, in non-proliferation efforts.
Conduct of inquiry
4. We received 77 memoranda and held five oral evidence
sessions. In January 2009 we visited Geneva, Vienna, Prague and
Warsaw, to discuss matters relevant to our inquiry as well as
to other areas of our work. We are grateful to the British missions
in those cities and to our interlocutors there for their assistance,
and to all those who provided written and oral evidence to our
inquiry. We would particularly like to pay tribute to the late
Sir Michael Quinlan, former Permanent Under-Secretary at the Ministry
of Defence, who gave oral evidence to us; we note with sadness
that Sir Michael died on 26 February 2009, after a lifetime of
distinguished service to his country.
5. In the next chapter of our Report, we address
some institutional and policy issues relevant to the approach
of the Government and its major international partners (the US,
NATO and the EU) to non-proliferation and disarmament. In three
subsequent chapters, we consider in turn proliferation issues
relating to the two main types of WMD—nuclear, and chemical
and biological weapons—and the ballistic missiles which
may be used to deliver them. In Chapter 6, we consider issues
relating to terrorism and the physical security of WMD, and in
Chapter 7 we discuss the control of conventional weapons. In Chapter
8 we return to consider some overarching themes of the Government's
approach.
National Security Strategy
6. In March 2008 the Government published the United
Kingdom's first formal National Security Strategy.[7]
In July 2008 the Prime Minister announced that he would engage
in consultations over the setting up of a parliamentary Joint
Committee, "to consider and report on the annual update to
the Strategy". He intended that this would comprise "the
Chairs of the key departmental Select Committees with an interest
in national security, and other Members of Parliament and Peers
with particular interests or experience".[8]
Subsequent correspondence between the Liaison Committee and the
Prime Minister has clarified the likely remit and role of this
Joint Committee.
7. We note that it is proposed that the Chairman
of the Foreign Affairs Committee will be an ex officio
member of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy
and that we will therefore have an input into its deliberations
and activities. We wish to put on record our firm view that the
existence of the Joint Committee, if the House approves the Government's
proposals, will not in any way restrict or curtail the Foreign
Affairs Committee's responsibility to examine aspects of national
security insofar as they relate to the work of the FCO. We take
our responsibilities in this regard very seriously and will continue
to exercise them as an integral part of our work. We recommend
that in its response to this Report the Government should confirm
that it accepts our view of the Foreign Affairs Committee's continuing
responsibilities as regards national security matters relating
to the work of the FCO.
1 Ev 171 Back
2
Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 1999-2000,
Weapons of Mass Destruction, HC 407; First Report of Session
2002-03, The Biological Weapons Green Paper, HC 150 Back
3
Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2006-07, Global
Security: The Middle East, HC 363; Second Report of Session
2007-08, Global Security: Russia, HC 52; Fifth Report of
Session 2007-08, Global Security: Iran, HC 142; Tenth Report
of Session 2007-08, Global Security: Japan and Korea, HC
449 Back
4
"What to do with a vision of zero", The Economist,
13 November 2008 Back
5
George Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn, "A
World Free of Nuclear Weapons", Wall Street Journal,
4 January 2007; see para 139 below. Back
6
HC Deb, 14 March 2007, col 298-407; see para 125 below. Back
7
Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of the United
Kingdom, Cm 7291, March 2008 Back
8
HC Deb, 22 July 2008, col 112WS Back
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