2 The Government's approach to non-proliferation
8. The Government's non-proliferation policy addresses
two distinct threats. First, there is a threat from states, although
the National Security Strategy asserts that "no state currently
has both the intent and the capability to pose a direct nuclear
threat to the United Kingdom", and that whilst "a number
of states retain the ability to produce chemical and biological
weapons we do not judge that they currently pose a direct threat
to the United Kingdom".[9]
Second, the Strategy asserts that terrorists have aspirations
to acquire nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons.[10]
9. The National Security Strategy's approach to counter-proliferation
comprises four strands, referred to as the 'four D's':
i. dissuade states from acquiring, developing,
and contributing to the spread of WMD, and related materials and
expertise;
ii. detect attempts by states, and terrorists,
to develop or acquire this capability;
iii. deny access to WMD and the necessary
materials, equipment, technology, and expertise to develop them,
while promoting commerce and technological development for peaceful
purposes;
iv. defend our country, our citizens,
our Armed Forces and our strategic interests from the threats
posed by proliferation.[11]
10. Work to counter WMD proliferation has consistently
been identified as a Government, and specifically an FCO, objective.
In the 2004 Spending Review, the FCO was set a Public Service
Agreement (PSA) target "to deter, check and roll back programmes
for the development of WMD and related delivery systems in countries
of concern, and to reduce the supply of, and demand for, such
weapons worldwide."[12]
According to the 2008 FCO Departmental Annual Report, this was
the only FCO PSA target which was "not met".[13]
The threat from proliferation was subsequently incorporated into
PSA target 30 set by the Comprehensive Spending Review 2007, which
is to "reduce the impact of conflict through enhanced UK
and international efforts".[14]
The FCO is the lead department for delivery of this PSA target.
Meanwhile, the FCO's new Strategic Framework, announced in February
2008, makes counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism one of
the FCO's four policy goals, translating into the Department's
Strategic Objective 5, agreed with the Treasury, "to counter
terrorism, weapons proliferation and their causes".[15]
11. There are planned increases in the funding from
the FCO's Strategic Programme Fund for the strategic objectives
set out in the FCO's counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism
policy goal, from £300,000 in 2008/2009 to £2 million
in 2009/10 and £3 million in 2010/11. These funds are used
to finance, among other activities, a series of direct legislative
assistance visits to help 30 states to fulfil their obligations
under a number of treaties. In addition, the Government is spending
£36 million a year through the Global Partnership Against
the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction established
at the G8 summit at Kananaskis in 2002. This is now part of the
Government's Global Threat Reduction Programme, which aims to
establish co-operative projects against the diversion of WMD materials,
mainly in the former Soviet Union.[16]
12. Whilst overall responsibility for the Government's
counter-proliferation strategy rests with the Cabinet Office,
a number of Government departments collaborate in this area, including
the FCO, Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Home Office, the security
and intelligence agencies, the Department for Business, Enterprise
and Regulatory Reform (BERR) and Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs
(HMRC).[17]
13. The National Security Strategy reaffirms the
Government's support for a "rules-based approach to international
affairs".[18] The
FCO told us that it:
consider[s] that collective action, in international
bodies including the UN, the EU, NATO, the IAEA, treaty-specific
and export control groups remains the most effective way of managing
and reducing the threats and the only prospect of eliminating
them completely. A multilateral approach, in particular a rules-based
approach led by international institutions, legally-binding and
verifiable where possible, brings not only greater effectiveness
but also, crucially, greater legitimacy.[19]
We discuss the treaties and multilateral agreements
that comprise the 'rules-based approach' in our chapters below
which consider particular weapons types, and return to the overall
theme in Chapter 8.
The EU
14. In 2003 the European Council agreed a European
Security Strategy (ESS) which emphasised "effective multilateralism"
through a policy of promoting multilateral treaties and bodies,
including those underpinning the non-proliferation and disarmament
regimes. This policy has been pursued through a number of Joint
Actions, Common Positions, Council Decisions and Action Plans,
for example in relation to Iran, India and Pakistan.[20]
In December 2008 the European Council endorsed a report by Dr
Javier Solana, the High Representative for the Common Foreign
and Security Policy, which updated the ESS. The report judged
that the risk of WMD proliferation had increased since 2003, and
reaffirmed the EU's commitment to non-proliferation objectives.[21]
Also in 2003 the EU published a Strategy Against Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction,[22]
and Dr Solana appointed Annalisa Giannella, a long-serving EU
official, as his Personal Representative for non-proliferation.
The FCO told us that:
On the basis of the EU WMD Strategy, adopted
in 2003, the EU has been active and at the forefront of international
efforts to address proliferation concerns; is a key donor to multilateral
initiatives, including the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund; and by
working with third countries and regional organisations makes
an important contribution to building national and regional capacities
to prevent proliferation.[23]
These strategies have increased the profile of the
EU in this area.[24]
15. Daniel Feakes of the Harvard-Sussex Programme
on Chemical and Biological Weapons described the positive and
negative aspects of an EU common position. Whilst adopting a 'lowest
common denominator' approach means that the UK might be restrained
if it wanted to take a stronger position, he told us that "the
other side is that the 27 states negotiating a position together
are already a fairly sizeable number of CWC [Chemical Weapons
Convention] or BWC [Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention] states
parties."[25] Overall
he concluded that "the EU is playing a positive role, but
it needs to do more, and it needs more financial resources behind
it".[26]
16. One way in which the EU acts is to build commitments
on arms control into other agreements, via what the FCO referred
to as "WMD clauses".[27]
Daniel Feakes explained that:
One thing that the EU has being doing recently
is trying to link arms control—these kinds of issue—more
to other issues such as trade. The EU holds a very big soft power
weapon. It has come up with a non-proliferation clause in its
recent agreements with third countries, so that the EU is saying,
"We will meet you on trade as long as you do something on
arms control".[28]
The role of the US and NATO
17. During the course of our inquiry Barack Obama
was sworn in as the 44th US President. There has been widespread
expectation that his election will be positive for arms control
efforts. Nicholas Sims of the LSE told us that:
the coming-in of the new Administration in the
United States gives the UK and other NATO countries an enormous,
almost unprecedented opportunity to re-engage the United States
in a much more wholehearted, reinvigorated multilateralism in
this field, as in others.[29]
[…] Within the Democrat camp, there have been encouraging
signs that the US would be much more engaged in multilateral endeavours
generally.[30]
Bill Rammell, Minister of State at the FCO, was similarly
confident:
The prospects for disarmament under President
Obama are much greater and stronger than they were under President
Bush. How do I adduce that in evidence? You can look, for example,
at [Secretary of State] Hillary Clinton's confirmation hearings,
when she talked about the importance of rebuilding staffing and
financing the relevant bureaus within the State Department. Obama
has made it clear that he wants to ratify, and have negotiations
on, the fissile material cut-off treaty. All that I see and hear
is very positive and I have belief in President Obama.[31]
There is speculation that a change of attitude in
the US might lead other states to alter their positions, with
Bill Rammell telling us that when he was recently in Beijing "interesting
discussions were taking place and there was a desire to know what
the intentions of the Obama Administration were."[32]
However, in relation to treaties, as Mr Rammell pointed out:
There is a caveat: in the American system, you
have to get those treaties through the Senate as well. I think
that with the degree of support that the President has and the
political make-up of the Senate at the moment, the grounds for
that are optimistic, but it is not as simple as saying that the
President decrees and it happens.[33]
18. In early 2009, President Obama appointed Gary
Samore, previously of the Council on Foreign Relations, as coordinator
for policy on weapons of mass destruction (including non-proliferation),
based in the National Security Council.[34]
NATO
19. The FCO highlighted the "significant role"
of NATO in the area of non-proliferation and disarmament:
The NATO summit of Heads of State and Government
in Bucharest last year [2008] saw the approval of a paper on 'Raising
NATO's profile in the field of arms control, disarmament and non
proliferation'. NATO has several groups that meet regularly to
discuss non-proliferation and disarmament issues and the Alliance
continues to ensure that—as an important part of its broad
approach to security—defence and arms control, disarmament,
and non-proliferation objectives remain in harmony. There has
been a 90% reduction in the nuclear forces attributed to NATO
since the end of the Cold War and the Alliance seeks to enhance
security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces
consistent with the ability to provide for collective defence
and to fulfil the full range of its missions.[35]
20. Independent analyst Martin Butcher emphasised
in written evidence to us that whilst NATO had given significant
support to arms control measures during the 1990s, its stance
changed dramatically following the election of George W. Bush
as US President:
From this high point in late 2000, NATO's public
commitment to threat reduction through multilateral agreement
has steadily diminished [...] It appears that NATO has abandoned
any attempt at threat reduction through arms control, non-proliferation
and disarmament, in favour of a purely military response to potential
WMD-armed adversaries […] European nations have submitted
to the Bush administration's global outlook, and allowed it to
become the policy of the entire Alliance. This despite the fact
that it is clear that European nations do not share the bleak
world view emanating from Washington DC. Both the European Security
Strategy and the Strategy Against the Proliferation of WMD adopted
by the EU place much more emphasis on multilateral diplomacy to
construct security from WMD threats than is now the case for NATO—and
yet, because of NATO's consensus rule Europeans have been overridden
by the United States.[36]
Mr Butcher believed that the new US Administration
would reverse this trend, for example by being "more receptive
to reviving NATO's traditional role in arms control and disarmament
initiatives." He told us that "The British government
is well-placed to take a lead in the Alliance in ensuring a positive
outcome in this vital policy area."[37]
Dr Dan Plesch of the School of Oriental and African Studies highlighted
the role that NATO could play, including in the control of conventional
weapons, particularly by supporting an Arms Trade Treaty. However,
he noted that "NATO is not a trading organisation; there
are limits to what it can do in that respect."[38]
Giving evidence on the control of conventional weapons, Roy Isbister
of the UK Working Group on Arms questioned whether NATO involvement
was positive, explaining that "some states consider [the
Alliance], rightly or wrongly, to be actively threatening […]
you have to be careful about having NATO in the lead."[39]
Restricting the resources required
for proliferation
21. Restricting the availability of the materials,
expertise and finance necessary to make and use of all types of
weapon is an effective way to help achieve non-proliferation aims.
EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES
22. The UK operates a regime of national arms export
licensing regulations, based on the commitments which it has made
by virtue of its membership of a number of voluntary export control
regimes that cover individual weapons types. UK national regulations
currently include the Biological Weapons Act 1974, the Chemical
Weapons Act 1996, the Export Control Act 2002 and the relevant
sections of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.[40]
British export controls are the central and ongoing focus of the
Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC), of which the Foreign
Affairs Committee is a member.[41]
We therefore do not discuss export controls in detail in this
report, but outline the relevant regimes below.
23. Daniel Feakes judged that "enforcement is
improving", noting for example that in July 2007, Avocado
Research Chemicals was fined £600 plus costs for exports
to Egypt in July 2005 of a chemical precursor to VX nerve gas
and a chemical used in the production of nuclear control rods.[42]
Dual-use items which have legitimate non-military use are particularly
difficult to control.
Nuclear weapons (Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger
Committee)
24. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was created
in 1975 following India's first nuclear test in 1974. It has 45
members who co-ordinate their licensing of nuclear exports using
two sets of guidelines which list nuclear and dual-use goods that
are controlled. The NSG has no budget or staff and has a rotating
chair. Annual Consultative Group meetings are held in Vienna at
the Permanent Mission of Japan which provides a secretariat.
25. The Zangger Committee (ZC) was formed in 1971
immediately after the NPT came into force. It has 37 members and
is chaired by the Czech Republic. It does not operate an export
control regime as such, but is a technical group which maintains
a trigger list of nuclear-related goods which trigger International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as a condition of supply.
Members report yearly on any items from the list that are transferred
to a non-nuclear weapons state that is not party to the NPT. The
UK provides the secretariat for the ZC, which the FCO told us
incurred minimal expense.[43]
Biological and chemical weapons (Australia Group)
26. The Australia Group was formed in 1985 with the
aim of harmonising export controls on materials which could be
used to produce chemical and biological weapons. Membership allows
the UK to fulfil its obligations under both the Chemical and the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Conventions.[44]
There are 40 participating states, including all EU members, with
the European Commission additionally taking part in proceedings.[45]
Russia is not a member but since the collapse of the Soviet Union
it has introduced its own export controls with lists of controlled
biological and chemical materials.[46]
Daniel Feakes told us that:
A further significant expansion of the Group
seems unlikely as its main function is to bring together the world's
primary manufacturers, exporters and transshippers of controlled
items. There are of course countries in these categories not in
the Australia Group (e.g. China and India) but these are members
of the Non-Aligned Movement and have been strident critics of
the Group since its inception […] The most likely scenario
is therefore an incremental geographical expansion in the Group,
coupled with more extensive outreach activities to non-participants.[47]
Missiles (Missile Technology Control Regime and
Hague Code of Conduct)
27. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),
of which the UK is a founder member, is an arrangement between
34 states formed in 1987 with the aim of preventing proliferation
of what the FCO termed "unmanned delivery systems capable
of delivering weapons of mass destruction".[48]
This aim is pursued through co-ordination of national export licensing
based on control lists. The regime has no formal budget or staff.
Individual members are responsible for its website (Canada) and
act as a point of contact (France).[49]
28. The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation is not an export control regime but, the FCO told
us, "is intended to supplement" the MTCR.[50]
States which subscribe to the Code of Conduct commit to a voluntary
set of principles and confidence-building measures aimed at strengthening
the effort against ballistic missile proliferation, such as annual
declarations on ballistic missile policies and notifications prior
to missile launches. As of January 2009, 130 countries had subscribed
to the Code. The Hague Code of Conduct does not have a staff or
budget, but Austria serves as the central contact country coordinating
the relevant information exchange.
Conventional weapons (Wassenaar Arrangement)
29. With 40 participating states, the Wassenaar Arrangement
maintains lists of goods to which export controls should apply
in the area of conventional weapons. Lists for arms and dual-use
goods are maintained separately. States are required to notify
each other if they deny an export license. The Wassenaar Arrangement
has a small secretariat in Vienna with a total budget for 2009
of £1,524,177, of which the UK is providing £113,549.
30. There are also an expanding number of regional
frameworks intended to counter the proliferation of conventional
weapons. In 1993 principles governing arms transfers were agreed
by the Forum for Security Cooperation of the Conference for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (later the Organisation for Security
and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]). In addition, the UK has observed
the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports since 1998. The Code provides
guidelines for arms exports by EU Member States which are intended
to prevent sales of equipment that could be used in human rights
abuses or which may obstruct sustainable development. A revised
and legally binding version of the EU Code of Conduct was introduced
in December 2008.[51]
It has been renamed the Rules Governing the Control of Exports
of Military Technology and Equipment. There is a strong correspondence
between the EU's regulations and the voluntary arrangements that
apply under the Wassenaar Arrangement.
THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE
(PSI)
31. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),
launched by the US in 2003, aims to combat trafficking of WMD
materials by committing its members to a Statement of Interdiction
Principles aimed at disrupting or preventing the transfer of materials
and weapons, as well as their delivery systems. The PSI is not
treaty-based, nor does it have a secretariat or collect subscriptions.
Instead, the FCO told us that "nations meet in a number of
formats and take part in an exercise programme intended to test
national capabilities and decision-making structures. PSI is best
characterised as an activity rather than an organisation and remains
an open and flexible mechanism."[52]
The FCO told us that "the UK plays an active role in PSI,
hosting and participating in exercises, outreach events and meetings
of the Operational Experts Group, the PSI 'steering committee'",
but it noted that key states remain outside the initiative, such
as China and Malaysia, although South Korea announced its full
participation in May 2009, following North Korea's latest nuclear
test.[53] In response
to South Korea's decision to participate in the PSI, North Korea
threatened military action if any of its ships were stopped, and
said that it no longer regarded itself as bound by the 1953 armistice
which ended the Korean War.[54]
32. The Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC)
examined the PSI and interdiction in its latest Report, in which
it noted:
At present the UK has no powers to seize goods
subject to export controls on the high seas, or to interdict ships
on the grounds that they are carrying such goods. The 2005 Protocol
to the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation (the SUA Protocol) will strengthen
the international legal basis to impede and prosecute the trafficking
of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials on the high
seas in commercial ships by requiring state parties to criminalise
such transport. The Protocol also establishes a mechanism to facilitate
the boarding in international waters of vessels suspected of engaging
in these activities. The SUA Protocol will only come into force
after ratification by 12 countries. The Government said that currently
only three countries—Spain, Cook Islands and St Kitts and
Nevis—had ratified it.[55]
UK ratification will be facilitated by provisions
of the Transport Security Bill, part of the 2008/09 Draft Legislative
Programme and due to be introduced in the 2009/10 Parliamentary
Session.[56]
33. We conclude that the UK's failure so far to
ratify the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation is
regrettable, given the way in which the Protocol will strengthen
the UK's ability to impede the trafficking by sea of WMD-related
materials. We further conclude that the provisions of the planned
Transport Security Bill which will facilitate UK ratification
are to be welcomed, and look forward to their early passage. We
recommend that the Government should work actively to secure ratifications
of the Protocol by other states so that it may rapidly enter into
force.
PERSONNEL: THE UK'S ATAS SCHEME
34. Another important element in the development
of a WMD capability is the availability of staff with the required
technical expertise. There are hundreds of laboratories in the
UK from which staff could remove relevant materials,[57]
and there are historical cases of weapons scientists being trained
in the UK. For example Rihab Taha, or 'Dr Germ', who studied for
her PhD in plant toxins at the School of Biological Sciences of
the University of East Anglia, went on to work on Iraq's biological
weapons programme.[58]
Dr A Q Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist who helped to supply
the illicit nuclear weapons programmes of Iran, Libya, North Korea
and possibly other states, worked at the uranium enrichment facility
at Almelo in the Netherlands at an early stage in his career.
In the US, the 2001 anthrax attacks which killed five people have
been attributed by the authorities to a researcher at a US Army
research laboratory, Bruce Ivins, who committed suicide in July
2008.[59] This attack
demonstrated the threat from individuals with malicious intent.
The Sixth Review Conference of the BTWC in December 2006 agreed
an Inter-sessional Work Programme for 2007-2010 which includes
work on oversight of science and codes of conduct.[60]
Our predecessor Committee's Report on the Biological Weapons Green
Paper in 2002 recommended that the Government should take steps
towards an international code of conduct for scientists working
with dangerous pathogens.[61]
35. In November 2007 the Government introduced the
Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS), a new system for overseeing
security clearance for research students entering the UK from
outside the European Economic Area. ATAS applies to those studying
certain sensitive subjects in the fields of science and engineering
at postgraduate (mainly research) level. It is administered by
the FCO and replaced the previous Voluntary Vetting Scheme (VVS),
under which universities decided which applicants were referred
for vetting.[62] Universities
UK told us that a review of the VVS "was initiated following
concerns about the effectiveness of the scheme as a counter-proliferation
measure raised both by Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) and
the Foreign Affairs Select Committee."[63]
Under ATAS, students are required to complete a free, online application
form once they receive an offer of a place from their Higher Education
Institution. The information provided is assessed by officials
from the FCO and advisers from the MOD, Defence Intelligence Staff
and intelligence agencies, with the aim that this will take place
within three weeks, with most answered in 5-10 days. An ATAS certificate
is specific to the institution and course but multiple certificates
can be held by any one individual. A certificate is a prerequisite
for an application from a relevant individual to enter or remain
in the UK.[64] 2008 was
the first year in which ATAS operated over the busy autumn universities
admission period. The FCO reported that:
An interim review of ATAS has already taken place
and made several suggestions on funding and upgrading, including
developing ATAS IT capacity. We will shortly be undertaking a
full review of the Scheme, with input from Partners across Government,
Posts and academia.[65]
Universities UK described ATAS as "a proportionate
response to an important national security issue" and points
out that it "has not received any significant concerns from
HEIs about the new scheme."[66]
A recent press report suggested that up to 100 students have been
prevented from studying in the UK by the ATAS scheme.[67]
36. In addition to measures dealing with foreign
students, there have been press reports that MI5 and the National
Counter Terrorism Security Office have been vetting scientists
without their knowledge, where they have access to incurable viruses
which it is believed terrorists might be seeking to acquire.[68]
37. We conclude that the Government is to be commended
for introducing the Academic Technology Approval Scheme regarding
security clearance for foreign students in sensitive fields, which
is a significant improvement on the previous Voluntary Vetting
Scheme. We recommend that the Government should take swift action
to address any shortcomings in this relatively new scheme which
are identified in its imminent review of the scheme's operation,
of which we expect to receive a copy. We further recommend that
the Government should set out in its response to this Report the
progress made on oversight of science and codes of conduct for
scientists as part of the current Inter-sessional Work Programme
of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
FINANCE
38. The Government is committed to restricting the
supply of finance to states, groups or individuals intending to
proliferate relevant weapons or materials. Both the EU and the
UN have asset-freezing regimes in place.[69]
The FCO told us that:
HM Treasury leads on work within the international
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to identify future methods
of tackling the financing of proliferation activity. They are
also working closely with HM Revenue and Customs, the Serious
and Organised Crime Agency and the Financial Services Authority
on the UK domestic/legal response to this issue. We await an expected
FATF report on Proliferation Finance and aim to build on its recommendations
and to assist states which do not have capacity to enforce the
recommendations themselves.[70]
Recently, Iran has been subject to financial restrictions.
Bill Rammell told us that "in the UK, Iranian banks no longer
have access to sterling clearing facilities" since "about
18 months or two years ago."[71]
However, we are concerned that this may not have been as early
as possible. Lloyds TSB has recently paid $350 million to US authorities
following a breach of the US International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, principally in relation to Iran. The bank removed
payment originator information from some inter-bank payments instructions
so that they could not be identified as originating from countries
under US sanctions. The Treasury informed us that Lloyds TSB broke
only US and not UK or EU law because EU regulations outlawing
such payments only took effect in January 2007, whilst the transactions
in question ceased in 2003. HM Treasury added that:
HMG continues to ensure UN and EU sanctions regimes
are implemented robustly in the UK. We are the only country so
far to be graded fully compliant with international standards
on asset freezing by the Financial Action Task Force.[72]
39. We conclude that restricting the finance available
to those intending to proliferate nuclear, chemical or biological
weapons and their delivery systems is a potentially effective
mechanism to achieve non-proliferation aims. We recommend that
the Government should consider how this can be done as quickly
as possible when proliferation risks are identified. We further
recommend that in its response to this Report, or earlier if possible,
the Government should send us a copy of the imminent report of
the international Financial Action Task Force, with an accompanying
memorandum indicating whether, when and how it will implement
its recommendations.
Scope for rationalisation of
the non-proliferation architecture
40. A striking feature of the non-proliferation and
disarmament landscape is the involvement of a large number of
organisations whose work often overlaps. These include the UN
(and organisations under its aegis such as the International Atomic
Energy Agency), the EU, NATO, the G8 and the OSCE. A number of
agreements have also been pursued in multilateral forums outside
these structures, particularly in the field of conventional weapons,
whilst other negotiations have proceeded on a purely bilateral
basis, most notably between the US and Russia. Multilateral agreements
are commonly supported by an organisation which oversees implementation
of the relevant instrument, such as the Organisation for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons, set up in support of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, or the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organisation, set up to support the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In addition, as outlined above, there
are a number of voluntary export control regimes in place covering
different weapons types. This multiplicity of organisations prompted
us to ask the FCO to provide us with details of the organisations
involved in this field and its assessment of areas of overlap.[73]
41. Two of these organisations, the Zangger Committee
(ZC) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), both focussed on exports
of nuclear materials, have membership lists which overlap considerably.
The FCO acknowledged that "the issue of disbanding the ZC
has occasionally arisen over the past few years" but argued
that "the technical work of the ZC is entirely complementary
to the NSG" since "it is not a political forum, and
has a different membership", emphasising the value of its
system of annual reporting. The FCO also stressed that "ZC
meetings often take place the day before NSG Consultative Group
meetings, so as to reduce travel costs for members."[74]
42. The Government further described the discussions
that occurred over whether the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation
Preparatory Commission should be located within the IAEA or outside
it. It was decided that:
the Secretariat for a treaty whose technical
and operation functions are distinct from those of the IAEA were
more appropriately housed separately. But co-location in Vienna
allows for close coordination between the two organisations—and
promotes efficiency in the way in which Member States/State Signatories
interact with them.[75]
43. There are multiple proposed mechanisms for internationalising
the nuclear fuel cycle, as outlined in Chapter 3 below. In Chapter
7 we examine the support that the Government has given to securing
a protocol on cluster munitions as part of the UN framework of
the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, when it would
appear to duplicate, or undermine its ratification of, the Convention
on Cluster Munitions. An Arms Trade Treaty would also be likely
to have implications for work already being carried out regarding
the control of conventional weapons. When we asked Bill Rammell
whether it would be possible to rationalise some of the effort
in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament he told us that:
What you need to ensure is that there is not
competitive overlap between the different approaches and not friction
between them, and you have to spend and work a lot to ensure that
that is the case. Take the example of the nuclear fuel cycle and
how we can ensure that civil nuclear power is not being diverted
into nuclear weapons. There are about 12 different international
initiatives at the moment. On one level you might say that is
too much […] In an ideal world, you would probably say you
need one initiative that everybody agrees on, and you pull together
on. However, the world is not quite like that. What you need to
ensure is that initiatives do not detract from each other, and
I do not believe they do. If different states are working in different
areas and actually make progress, I do not think that is necessarily
a bad thing.[76]
44. We conclude that the sheer number of organisations
and initiatives in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament
may lead to a lack of focussed progress. We recommend that the
Government should press for the rationalisation of international
efforts in this area and set out in its response to this Report
where it believes such rationalisation could occur.
9 Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy
of the United Kingdom, Cm 7291, March 2008, paras 3.11-3.13 Back
10
Ibid., paras 3.5, 3.12 Back
11
Ibid., para 4.17 Back
12
PSA 1, via www.hm-treasury.gov.uk Back
13
FCO, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental Report, 1
April 2007 - 31 March 2008, Cm 7398, May 2009, p 143 Back
14
PSA Delivery Agreement 30, October 2007, via www.hm-treasury.gov.uk Back
15
FCO, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental Report, 1
April 2007 - 31 March 2008, Cm 7398, May 2009, pp 15-16, 84-85;
Ev 171 Back
16
Ev 172; see paras 266-269 below. Back
17
Ev 172 Back
18
Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of the United
Kingdom, Cm 7291, March 2008, para 2.1 Back
19
Ev 172 Back
20
Ev 174; Dr Gerrard Quille, "The EU's approach to tackling
the proliferation of materials and weapons of mass destruction
and prospects for cooperation on the eve of a new US Administration",
European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies
of the Union, November 2008 Back
21
Secretary General/High Representative of the Council of the European
Union, "Report on the Implementation of the European Security
Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World", Brussels,
10 December 2008, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st17/st17104.en08.pdf Back
22
Council of the European Union, "EU Strategy against Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction", Brussels, 10 December 2003,
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/st15/st15708.en03.pdf Back
23
Ev 301; for the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, see paras 292-293. Back
24
Q 74 Back
25
Q 74; for these two Conventions see Chapter 4. Back
26
Q 74 Back
27
Ev 173 Back
28
Q 77 Back
29
Q 70 Back
30
Q 73 Back
31
Q 269 Back
32
Q 270 Back
33
Q 269 Back
34
"President Names First Government-wide Coordinator of WMD
Policy", CQ Today, 29 January 2009 Back
35
Ev 301 Back
36
Ev 148, 150 Back
37
Ev 154 Back
38
Q 171 Back
39
Q 171 Back
40
Ev 290 Back
41
See Business and Enterprise, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International
Development Committees, First Joint Report of Session 2007-08,
Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2008): UK Strategic Export
Controls Annual Report 2006, Quarterly Reports for 2007, licensing
policy and review of export control legislation, HC 254. Back
42
Ev 287 Back
43
Ev 297 Back
44
Ev 186 Back
45
http://www.australiagroup.net/en/participants.html Back
46
Ev 220 Back
47
Ev 291 Back
48
Ev 296 Back
49
Ev 296 Back
50
Ev 187, 296 Back
51
Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing
the control of exports of military technology and equipment, 8
December 2008 Back
52
Ev 173, 298 Back
53
Ev 175; "North Korean Nuclear Blast Draws Global Condemnation",
Washington Post, 26 May 2009 Back
54
"North Korea abandons armistice agreement", Wall
Street Journal Asia, 28 May 2009 Back
55
Business and Enterprise, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International
Development Committees, First Joint Report of Session 2007-08,
Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2008): UK Strategic Export
Controls Annual Report 2006, Quarterly Reports for 2007, licensing
policy and review of export control legislation, HC 254, para
139 Back
56
Government Response to Business and Enterprise, Defence, Foreign
Affairs and International Development Committees, First Joint
Report of Session 2007-08, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls
(2008): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2006, Quarterly
Reports for 2007, licensing policy and review of export control
legislation, HC 254, page 21 Back
57
Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee, Sixth
Report of Session 2007-08, Biosecurity in UK Research Laboratories,
HC 360, para 56 Back
58
"Terrorists try to infiltrate UK's top labs", The
Observer, 2 November 2008 Back
59
"Bioterrorism: a mystery unravelled", The Economist,
9 August 2008 Back
60
Ev 185 Back
61
Foreign Affairs Committee, First Report of Session 2002-03, The
Biological Weapons Green Paper, HC 150, para 37 Back
62
Ev 176, 261 Back
63
Ev 261 Back
64
Business and Enterprise, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International
Development Committees, First Joint Report of Session 2007-08,
Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2008): UK Strategic Export
Controls Annual Report 2006, Quarterly Reports for 2007, licensing
policy and review of export control legislation, HC 254; Ev
69, 261 Back
65
Ev 176 Back
66
Ev 261 Back
67
"Terrorists try to infiltrate UK's top labs", The
Observer, 2 November 2008 Back
68
"MI5 fears virus theft from labs", Daily Telegraph,
31 March 2008 Back
69
HM Government, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare: The United Kingdom's
Strategy for Countering International Terrorism, Cm 7547,
March 2009, p 74 Back
70
Ev 176 Back
71
Qq 237-238 Back
72
Letter to the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee from the
Economic Secretary to the Treasury, 23 February 2009, MISC 89,
published online at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/memo/miscmatt/ucmi8902.htm Back
73
Ev 297 Back
74
Ev 297 Back
75
Ev 293 Back
76
Q 226 Back
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