House of Commons - Global Security: Non-Proliferation

Global Security: Non-Proliferation - Foreign Affairs Committee Contents

3 Nuclear weapons

45. In its 2008 National Security Strategy, the Government stated that "nuclear weapons remain potentially the most destructive threat to global security".[77] As in the cases of chemical and biological weapons, the Government identifies two types of potential threat to the UK from nuclear weapons: the threat of use by another state, and "the possibility of nuclear weapons or material or technology […] falling into the hands of terrorists, who we know have ambitions to acquire it".[78] We discuss matters related to the possible terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons in Chapter 6. As regards the potential nuclear weapons threat from states, in the National Security Strategy the Government judged that "no state currently has both the intent and capability to pose a direct nuclear threat to the United Kingdom or its vital interests. But we cannot rule out the risk that such a threat will re-emerge over future decades."[79] Dr Jones of Southampton University told us that "the National Security Strategy is probably right to recognise the possibility of a direct nuclear threat to the UK re-emerging in the next 50 years."[80]

46. The Government opposes the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states, as part of its overall non-proliferation goal. Professor Chalmers of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) told us that the Government was right to do so. Apart from the fact that non-proliferation is a legal obligation on States Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), such as the UK, Professor Chalmers and Mr Fitzpatrick added that the existence of any nuclear weapons carried the risk that they might be used, by accident or design, and that the spread of nuclear weapons to further countries was therefore one of the ways in which this risk was heightened.[81] Mr Fitzpatrick said that there was a particular risk when a country acquires nuclear weapons for the first time, as it typically lacks well-established systems for their security.[82]

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

47. The Government regards the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the "cornerstone" of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.[83] Under the Government's 'four-Ds' non-proliferation strategy, which we outlined in paragraph 9, the NPT is at the heart of the Government's effort to "dissuade" further states from acquiring nuclear weapons.[84]

48. The NPT was signed in 1968 and came into force in 1970. When its initial 25-year lifespan expired in 1995, its States Parties extended it indefinitely. The number of NPT States Parties has continued to rise steadily. A particular milestone was reached in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, when China and France both acceded, placing all five recognised nuclear powers and members of the UN Security Council inside the NPT regime. To date, all UN Member States have acceded to the Treaty bar three: India, Israel and Pakistan. This makes the reach of the NPT among the most extensive of all international treaties. North Korea acceded to the NPT in 1985 but announced its withdrawal in 2003. Whether or not Pyongyang met the procedural requirements for withdrawal is disputed, and there is no definitive legal position on whether North Korea remains an NPT State Party. The British Government continues to regard it as such.[85]

49. The NPT enshrined a distinction between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states. It recognised as nuclear weapons states those five which had manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon before 1967, namely China, France, the UK, the USSR (now Russia) and the US. The NPT is often said to rest on a 'grand bargain' between these states and their non-nuclear weapons counterparts.[86] Under the NPT, non-nuclear weapons States Parties agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons, and the nuclear weapons states agreed not to assist or encourage them to do so. This is the core element of the NPT that is intended to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to further states. For their part, under the Treaty's Article VI, the NPT's nuclear weapons States Parties undertook to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Finally, the NPT recognises the right of all States Parties to nuclear power for civil purposes. The structure of the NPT's 'grand bargain' generates what are often referred to as the Treaty's 'three pillars': non-proliferation, disarmament, and access to civil nuclear power. We consider each of these in further sections below.

THE NPT'S SUCCESSES

50. Our witnesses largely commended the NPT's role in limiting nuclear weapons proliferation. For example, Dr James Acton of the Carnegie Endowment told us that "the non-proliferation regime has functioned remarkably effectively so far to curtail proliferation".[87] Professor Chalmers noted that there were far fewer nuclear weapons states now than had at one time been expected,[88] and attributed the fact that several states had abandoned nuclear weapons programmes "in large part […] [to] the norm created by the NPT."[89] The apartheid regime in South Africa was known to have had a covert nuclear weapons programme, allegedly receiving technical assistance from Israel, and there was unconfirmed speculation that it carried out a nuclear test in the Indian Ocean in 1979.[90] However, in the early 1990s, South Africa gave up its nuclear weapons programme and acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state, as did Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which had inherited nuclear arsenals on their territory after the break-up of the Soviet Union.[91] Libya abandoned its covert nuclear weapons programme in 2003 and returned to NPT compliance.[92] Argentina, Brazil and a number of other states also abandoned nuclear weapons-relevant programmes.[93] Professor Chalmers noted that South Korea and Taiwan had also not developed nuclear weapons, despite having the technological capacity to do so and despite regarding nuclear-armed China as one of their principle security threats.[94] In our "Global Security: Japan and Korea" Report in 2008 we noted that Japan had taken the same position.[95] Overall, Bill Rammell told us that "the NPT has worked."[96]

NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

51. Despite the NPT's successes, nuclear weapons proliferation has occurred. While the NPT recognised the existence of five nuclear weapons states, the number of countries to have exploded nuclear devices is now widely accepted to be at least nine, possibly ten. The first new nuclear power was Israel, which is believed to have developed its first nuclear weapon shortly before the NPT was signed in 1968.[97] Israel has never confirmed that it possesses nuclear weapons. However, it has also never denied the claims that it does so, which the International Institute for Strategic Studies says are "accepted as fact throughout the world."[98] The second new nuclear power was India, which tested nuclear devices in 1974 and 1998. Pakistan did likewise in 1998, and North Korea tested nuclear devices in 2006 and 2009. Three of the new nuclear states—Israel, India and Pakistan—never acceded to the NPT, whereas North Korea—whatever its NPT status now—started to develop its nuclear weapons while it was a Party to the Treaty and in violation of it.

IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

52. Professor Chalmers said that Iran's nuclear programme represented "the biggest current threat to the global non-proliferation regime."[99] We considered the Iranian case in detail in our Report on "Global Security: Iran" in 2008.[100] As of April 2009, there was no publicly available evidence that Iran was engaged in weaponisation activities, which US intelligence concluded Tehran had halted in 2003;[101] and in its most recent report, from February 2009, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) affirmed that it had been "able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran," as a result of inspection activities carried out under Iran's safeguards agreement.[102] However, a lack of full Iranian cooperation with the IAEA meant that the Agency was not "in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran."[103] Meanwhile, Iran had failed to comply with the UN Security Council's call, made in five resolutions since July 2006, for it to halt uranium enrichment until confidence was restored in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. As a result of Iran's uranium enrichment, the IAEA reported in February 2009 that it had produced around a tonne of low-enriched uranium, which the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, said would be enough, if further enriched, to make a nuclear weapon—although the extent of Iran's further enrichment capabilities is not certain.[104] In April 2009, Iran also opened a fuel fabrication plant to feed a heavy-water reactor being built at Arak which would give Tehran a potential alternative plutonium-based route to weapons-grade nuclear material, although Iran is not known to have the required reprocessing capability. Giving evidence in November 2008, Professor Chalmers told us that "there is a real possibility that Iran will become the world's ninth (or tenth) nuclear weapons state within the next decade."[105] There is particular concern about the possibility of Iran gaining a nuclear weapon because of the risk that, in a context of regional geopolitical and Sunni-Shia rivalry, this might prompt further states to acquire a nuclear weapon, most notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

OTHER CHALLENGES TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION SYSTEM

53. The FCO told us that "the international counter-proliferation system is facing serious challenges."[106] In addition to the emergence of new nuclear weapons states, and breaches of their international legal obligations by Iran and North Korea, the FCO listed these challenges as including the refusal of India, Israel and Pakistan to join the NPT, the continuing existence of large nuclear arsenals, a major expected increase in the use of civil nuclear power around the world, and what the FCO called "stalled" efforts to "expand the international legal framework essential to contain nuclear weapons technology and numbers".[107] The FCO also referred to the challenge represented by terrorist efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, which we consider in Chapter 6. Our witnesses agreed that the international nuclear non-proliferation system was under serious strain. For example, the United Nations Association of the UK (UNA-UK) told us that the NPT "has been brought to near breaking point in recent years."[108]

54. The FCO places a strengthening of the NPT regime at the centre of its effort to address the challenges facing the international nuclear non-proliferation system. According to the FCO, there is a "need to remake the bargain between the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and […] defend the Treaty aggressively on both the non-proliferation and the disarmament fronts."[109] We consider some of the specific challenges facing the NPT regime and possible responses in further sections below.

55. NPT Review Conferences, at which its States Parties review the Treaty's implementation, have been held every five years since the Treaty came into force. The next one will be held in April-May 2010. This is currently the focus of attention in the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament community—especially as the previous, 2005, Conference is widely seen to have failed.[110] The FCO has framed several of its aims regarding the NPT regime in terms of objectives for the 2010 gathering.[111]

56. At the 2008 Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference, the five recognised nuclear powers made a joint statement in the NPT framework for the first time since 2000.[112] They committed to many of the objectives set by the British Government. The FCO told us that this "created a new P5 dynamic on which [it could] build."[113] However, the FCO also noted that "considerable work [is] still required to build the support necessary to achieve a positive outcome" at the 2010 Conference.[114] At the 2009 Preparatory Committee, in May 2009, the States Parties agreed an agenda for the next Review Conference by consensus, for the first time in 15 years. The UK's Ambassador for Arms Control and Disarmament, John Duncan, suggested that the meeting had brought the States Parties "out of the foothills of endless procedural wrangling and into the open grassland of the real debate."[115] The Prime Minister has said that the Government will in summer 2009 set out a "Road to 2010 Plan" with detailed proposals on all three main elements of the NPT.[116]

57. We conclude that the Government is correct to identify the international nuclear non-proliferation regime as being under severe strain. We further conclude that the Government is correct to identify the 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as critical for the future of that regime. We further conclude that the Government's proposal for a "Road to 2010 Plan" is to be welcomed. We recommend that the Government should keep Parliament fully informed and engaged as it develops the Plan by summer 2009 and pursues it in the run-up to the Review Conference. We further recommend that the Government should make a full report to Parliament on the results of the Conference.

VERIFICATION OF THE NPT AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs)

58. The NPT gave the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) responsibility for verifying that the Treaty's non-nuclear weapons States Parties are adhering to their core non-proliferation commitment not to divert civil nuclear material and facilities to develop nuclear weapons. The IAEA polices this aspect of the NPT by implementing 'safeguards agreements', which it concludes with states with civil nuclear sectors and which allow it to verify the information which they provide regarding their nuclear activities—for example, by conducting inspections. Before the NPT came into force, the IAEA implemented 'limited-scope' safeguards agreements, each of which covered only individual nuclear facilities, shipments or supply agreements declared by the state in question. The IAEA continues to implement such agreements with states which remain outside the NPT—that is, India, Israel and Pakistan.[117] However, once they sign up to the NPT, non-nuclear weapons states are obliged under its Article III to conclude so-called 'full-scope' or 'comprehensive' safeguards agreements (CSAs). These cover all declared nuclear material on a state's territory or under its control or jurisdiction.

59. One problem with CSAs is that not all the NPT's non-nuclear weapons States Parties have concluded them. As of March 2009, 27 of the non-nuclear weapons States Parties did not have a CSA in force. Of these, nine were only waiting for their agreements to come into effect, six had had agreements approved by the IAEA Board of Governors but had not signed them, and twelve had not submitted agreements to the Board for consideration.[118] None of the States Parties without a CSA is among those which are believed to have significant civil nuclear programmes.

60. A second problem with CSAs is the lack of mechanisms for their enforcement, if states decline to comply with their provisions. Enforcement is a general problem facing the NPT, which we discuss below. As outlined above, the most urgent current case of non-compliance with a CSA is Iran. That country has had such an agreement in force since 1974, but the IAEA Board has judged since 2005 that it has been violating it, because of its failure to provide all required information.[119] Mr Fitzpatrick told us that Iran had violated its safeguards agreement "over 18 years in 14 different ways".[120]

61. A third problem with CSAs is that, even when implemented, they have been shown to be inadequate for preventing nuclear weapons proliferation. Iraq had a CSA in place when it was revealed in 1991 to be running a clandestine nuclear weapons programme.[121] The central weakness of CSAs, as revealed by the Iraqi case, is that they only cover nuclear materials and facilities which have been declared by the state in question, leaving a problem of undeclared activities.

Additional Protocols (APs)

62. In response to the Iraqi case, and to further verification weaknesses revealed by its work in North Korea and South Africa, the IAEA introduced stronger verification measures under its existing CSAs, such as environmental sampling, no-notice inspections and remote monitoring.[122] The IAEA also developed a new model Additional Protocol to its CSAs. The Additional Protocol was designed to overcome the 'undeclared activities' problem to at least some extent. Although each agreed Additional Protocol is specific to the state concerned, in general terms it expands the nuclear-related information which states are obliged to provide to the IAEA—for example, to cover more facilities and include information on some nuclear trade. It also allows the IAEA to conduct pre-arranged inspections of any facilities, including ones not declared by the state in question.[123]

63. One weakness of the Additional Protocol is that it remains a voluntary commitment. As of March 2009, only 90 NPT States Parties had such protocols in force. A further 29 were waiting for them to come into effect, and twelve had had them approved by the IAEA Board but were yet to sign them.[124]

64. The cases of Iran and Syria suggest the potential value of the Additional Protocol in reducing the risk that states are running clandestine nuclear programmes. Iran did not have an Additional Protocol in force when the National Council of Resistance of Iran, an opposition group, made public in 2002 that the country had an undeclared nuclear weapons programme.[125] Iran subsequently signed an Additional Protocol, in December 2003, but stopped implementing it in 2006.[126] The UN Security Council has been calling since then for Iran to implement its Additional Protocol.[127] In his latest statement on the matter to the IAEA Board, in March 2009, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said that "unless Iran implements […] the Additional Protocol, as required by the Security Council, the Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran."[128]

65. Syria has had a CSA in force since 1992, but it does not have an Additional Protocol.[129] In April 2008, the US charged publicly that Syria had been constructing—with North Korean assistance—a covert nuclear reactor at al-Kibar which could have been used to produce plutonium suitable for use in nuclear weapons, although there was no evidence of the reprocessing plant which would be required for this, or of weaponisation activity. The al-Kibar facility was destroyed by Israel in an airstrike in September 2007. Syria denies that al-Kibar was a nuclear reactor. The IAEA has subsequently investigated the site, with the aim of establishing the nature of the facility. In March 2009, IAEA Director General ElBaradei reported that the Agency had found traces of uranium at the site which were of unknown origin, and that the Agency regarded Syria's claim that the traces originated in the Israeli airstrike as being of "low probability". Dr ElBaradei also reported that Syria continued to deny the IAEA access to material from al-Kibar for sampling and to additional sites which he said were "essential for the Agency to complete its assessment."[130]

66. Describing as "compelling" the evidence that al-Kibar was a nuclear reactor intended to produce plutonium, Mr Fitzpatrick told us that the Syrian case gave him "cause for concern".[131] While he acknowledged that there was no evidence of a reprocessing facility, Mr Fitzpatrick said that it was "logical" to conclude that there must have been a nuclear weapons purpose to Syria's plutonium production.[132] As such, he suggested, Syria might have to be classed alongside Iran and North Korea as NPT non-nuclear weapons States Parties which have sought to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities.[133] If Syria received assistance for a nuclear weapons programme from North Korea, it would additionally be in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which banned trade in WMD goods and technologies with that country.

67. The FCO told us that it was "working for recognition" that both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol are needed to satisfy the safeguards requirement of the NPT.[134] Witnesses including Sir Michael Quinlan and UNA-UK agreed on the need to universalise the Additional Protocol.[135] Sir Michael saw this step as a means of addressing the NPT's verification weaknesses, which he in turn identified as one of his three priorities for the 2010 Review Conference.[136]

68. One means by which the FCO is pursuing the wider application of the Additional Protocol is by using the lever of nuclear trade, through the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) (see paragraph 24). Whereas the NPT obliges States Parties which are nuclear suppliers to ensure that each nuclear export is under at least a limited-scope safeguards agreement, the NSG requires that its members make nuclear exports only to states which have a CSA.[137] The FCO told us that it was working to strengthen the NSG requirement, so that receiving states must be implementing an Additional Protocol.[138]

69. We conclude that the Government is correct to identify the universalisation of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Additional Protocol, to all States Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to be an important means of strengthening verification of the NPT, and thus also to be a vital nuclear non-proliferation objective. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should set out the institutional mechanisms by which it envisages that universalisation may be achieved. We further recommend that the Government should update us on its efforts in this direction, in particular with respect to its work through the Nuclear Suppliers Group and as part of the preparations for the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

70. In the absence of an Additional Protocol with Syria, the case of the al-Kibar facility highlighted the IAEA's continuing reliance on third states for intelligence and cooperation. The US only made the IAEA aware of the information which it had about al-Kibar at the same time as it made the information public in April 2008, after the facility had already been destroyed. The then US Administration acknowledged that it had had the relevant intelligence material by the time of the Israeli airstrike but had decided not to make it public, for fear of escalating tension both in the Middle East and vis-à-vis North Korea.[139]In his statement to the June 2008 IAEA Board meeting, IAEA Director General ElBaradei said that it was:

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Dr ElBaradei told the Board in November 2008 that the IAEA had been "severely hampered in its assessment [of the al-Kibar site] by the unilateral use of force and by the late provision of information about the destroyed building."[141]

71. When we asked Bill Rammell about this aspect of the al-Kibar case, he said that the IAEA "has argued that states should make available the intelligence information that they have about Syria. We have done that and other states have done that. […] Undoubtedly we want positive interaction between states that are party to the NPT and the IAEA."[142] The Minister urged Syria and Israel to cooperate with the IAEA's further investigations, but made no direct criticism of the US for its original behaviour. In its memorandum, the FCO also made no reference to this aspect of the Syrian case.

72. We conclude that the United States' failure to pass to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—if necessary in confidence—the information it had about Syria's al-Kibar facility, before the facility was destroyed in September 2007, undermined the Agency's credibility as the verification agency for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We recommend that the Government should press both Israel and Syria to provide the IAEA with the information it requires about the al-Kibar site, and update us on its progress in this respect in its response to this Report.

Resourcing of the IAEA

73. Sir Michael Quinlan told us that if—as the FCO wishes—all states were to conclude Additional Protocols, the IAEA would require more resources in order to carry out the more extensive verification tasks which these agreements involve.[143] Baroness Williams, UNA-UK and the British American Security International Council (BASIC) also urged that the IAEA's capacities and resources should be increased.[144]

74. The IAEA will face further increased demand for its verification work if, as expected, non-nuclear weapons states commence or expand civil nuclear power programmes, in order to meet energy security and climate change objectives. In a report published in February 2009, the IAEA stated that of the 30 states currently using nuclear power for electricity generation, 24 intend to allow construction of further nuclear plants.[145] A further 12 states are "actively preparing for nuclear power", and 38 have "indicated an interest in the possible introduction of a nuclear power plant".[146] The one country which is currently constructing a new nuclear power plant, Iran, tested the reactor—at Bushehr—in February 2009.[147] In its February 2009 report, the IAEA made a "low projection" that five new countries might be operating nuclear power plants by 2030 and a "high projection" that 20 might be doing so.[148]

75. In the face of the prospective increased demands for the IAEA's verification work, Baroness Williams told us that the Agency "is now pushed to its limits".[149] When we visited the IAEA in 2007 and 2009, we similarly gained the impression that its resources were stretched. The IAEA's verification work is funded out of its regular budget, which is €293.7 million in 2009.[150] A commission of international experts requested by IAEA Director General ElBaradei to report on the future of the IAEA to 2020 noted in 2008 that "the amount of nuclear material under safeguards increased more than tenfold" between 1984 and 2007, while the Agency had been subject to zero real growth in funding except for a "modest" increase in 2003.[151] The commission commented that the IAEA's safeguards budget, "which is meant to safeguard hundreds of tons of nuclear material in hundreds of facilities in scores of countries, is not more than the budget of the police department of the city in which it is located."[152] It concluded that "a substantial increase in IAEA resources for safeguards is urgently required".[153] It recommended that IAEA members should provide a one-off boost to the Agency's budget of €80 million, agree to "consistent annual increases in the regular budget" of perhaps €50 million annually in real terms over several years, and envisage an IAEA budget perhaps double its current size by 2020.[154]

76. We asked Bill Rammell about the British Government's willingness to provide further funding to the IAEA. He told us:

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77. British funding for the IAEA is provided through the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC). DECC confirmed that the UK is the fourth-largest contributor to the IAEA regular budget, in line with the normal UN scale for states' budgetary contributions; the British contribution in 2009 is €15.2 million plus $3.75 million, equivalent to 6.64% of the total.[156] DECC told us that the Government was "looking closely at future Agency funding, in preparation for Budget Committee discussions commencing in mid-February."[157]

78. Some IAEA activities are funded through voluntary extra-budgetary contributions from Member States. DECC told us that the UK is "one of the largest" contributors to IAEA voluntary funds. UK contributions to IAEA voluntary funds included $5.1 million to the Technical Cooperation Fund in 2008 and around £2 million to the Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) in 2007.[158] In his speech to an international conference on the nuclear fuel cycle in London in March 2009, the Prime Minister announced that the UK would be doubling its contribution to the NSF, to £4 million.[159]

79. In our Report on the FCO's 2007-08 Departmental Annual Report, we highlighted the pressures which the fall in the value of sterling is placing on the UK's ability to pay foreign currency-denominated dues to international organisations.[160] As regards the UK's contribution to the IAEA, DECC told us that sterling's fall "present[ed] difficulties".[161] DECC noted that there was:

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80. Both Mr Rammell and DECC highlighted what the latter called the UK's "major contribution-in-kind" to the work of the IAEA, through the provision both of safeguards inspectors and of training for them.[163] Baroness Williams suggested that the UK's contribution in this field was very valuable and could usefully be expanded, particularly given the prospect of civil nuclear reactors coming into operation "in countries that have never had anything to do with nuclear technology [and that have] virtually no knowledge, let alone people who would be capable of inspecting."[164]

81. We conclude that the UK provides significant financial and other resources to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We welcome in particular the Prime Minister's announcement of a doubling in the Government's voluntary contribution to the Agency's Nuclear Security Fund. However, we further conclude that it is incongruous for the Government to wish to see an expansion of IAEA verification work while ruling out an increase in UK funding for the Agency's regular budget. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should update us on the IAEA Budget Committee discussions which were due to commence in February 2009. We further recommend that the Government should set out how it expects the IAEA to meet the increased demand for its verification work given the anticipated scale of its resources.

82. We conclude that the UK is making a valuable contribution in kind to the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency through the provision of inspectors and of training for them. We welcome this, and recommend that the Government should seek every opportunity to contribute further in this way.

ENFORCEMENT OF THE NPT

83. There have been several cases in which NPT non-nuclear weapons States Parties have violated the Treaty, by running programmes to develop nuclear weapons, and/or by failing to implement compulsory comprehensive safeguards agreements so as to allow the IAEA to be confident that that they are not doing so.

84. North Korea violated the NPT by developing nuclear weapons. It then withdrew from the Treaty.[165] The issue of the treatment of NPT withdrawal is especially significant because, as regards the development of a nuclear weapon, only the final stages of the process violate the NPT. Many of the steps which are necessary to develop a nuclear weapon may legitimately be taken while remaining in compliance with the Treaty. This raises the prospect that a state may reach a nuclear weapons threshold while remaining inside the NPT, before withdrawing from the Treaty without sanction and rapidly completing the production of a nuclear bomb, using material developed while inside the NPT regime.[166] Professor Chalmers judged the prospect that Iran might go "as far as they can within the constraints of the NPT, but not actually […] over that final stage" to be "perhaps rather more likely than complete weaponisation". He also said that "a situation in which Iran pulls out of the NPT in the way North Korea did" was "one of the things that [he] worr[ied] about".[167]

85. The NPT does not specify steps to be taken when States Parties violate or withdraw from it. Under its own statute, rather than the NPT, the IAEA is charged with determining non-compliance with a safeguards agreement, which its Board must report to the UN Security Council, as it did in the case of Iran. If non-compliance persists, the IAEA Board may curtail or suspend Agency assistance to the state in question, and suspend it from the rights of Agency membership.[168] The IAEA is also obliged to notify the UN Security Council "if in connection with the activities of the Agency there should arise questions that are within the competence of the Security Council";[169] this provision was invoked as a second basis for Iran's Security Council referral.[170] In practice, international political action aimed at securing NPT compliance has been taken on a case-by-case basis:

Iraq. Iraq's original WMD programmes were only fully revealed after its defeat in the first Gulf War in 1991. The UN Security Council charged the IAEA and specially-created UN inspection bodies with destroying Iraq's WMD, but a lack of Iraqi cooperation led to the withdrawal of international inspectors between 1998 and 2002. A US-led coalition launched military action against Iraq in 2003, claiming that it retained WMD programmes which posed a security threat. Following the war and change of regime, the International Institute for Strategic Studies now judges that Iraq "is complying with international non-proliferation norms" and that "any further nuclear proliferation risk from Iraq is highly unlikely for the foreseeable future."[171] The UN Security Council terminated the special inspection mandates for Iraq in 2007.[172]
Libya. According to the FCO, "the case of Libya demonstrates what can be achieved by concerted joint diplomatic efforts."[173] From the mid-1990s, the UK, later joined by the US, worked in secret with Libya to address its clandestine nuclear weapons programme, which remained little known until the 2003 interdiction of a Tripoli-bound ship carrying centrifuge technology. Under the impact of that seizure, plus the war in Iraq, the talks accelerated through that year. In December 2003, Libya announced that it would give up all its covert WMD programmes, declare all its nuclear activities to the IAEA, and submit to IAEA inspections in accordance with its comprehensive safeguards agreement. Tripoli has subsequently brought into force an Additional Protocol. In combination with other actions, Libya's steps have led to its de-listing by the US as a state sponsor of terror and to the lifting of EU sanctions.[174]
North Korea. After IAEA inspections revealed the existence of a clandestine plutonium-based nuclear weapons programme in 1992, the issue has been handled in a stop-start diplomatic process, initially bilaterally between North Korea and the US, and latterly in Six-Party Talks involving all North Korea's neighbours. North Korea has been offered political and civil energy concessions, but since it tested a nuclear device in 2006 it has also been subject to UN sanctions. After North Korea took nuclear dismantling and transparency steps in 2008 the US de-listed it as a state sponsor of terrorism, but the process again stalled in December 2008 over verification issues, and in April 2009 Pyongyang said that it was withdrawing altogether. In May 2009, North Korea tested a nuclear device for a second time. The UN Security Council immediately issued a statement condemning the test. As we completed our Report at the beginning of June, the Security Council was discussing a draft resolution put forward by the US and Japan which could authorise the interdiction of suspect North Korean shipping, including by force, and require much tougher restrictions on financial, weapons and weapons-related transfers into and out of North Korea.[175] We considered the North Korean case in detail in our Report on "Global Security: Japan and Korea" in November 2008.[176]
Iran. The international community is pursuing a 'dual-track' strategy to try to persuade Tehran to comply with its safeguards agreement and halt uranium enrichment, comprising UN sanctions coupled with offers of an enhanced economic and political relationship, including assistance in the development of civil nuclear power. We considered the Iranian case in detail in our Report on "Global Security: Iran" in 2008.[177]

86. Mr Fitzpatrick told us that "bringing countries to account for their violations is one of the major weaknesses" of the NPT.[178] He referred to "the insufficient will and ability of the rest of the world to take measures […] to penalise and to stop" states which violate their NPT obligations.[179] UNA-UK urged the Government to try to establish a standard response to be triggered when a state breaches or leaves the NPT.[180] As regards specific possible sanctions, Jonathan Granoff of the Global Security Institute suggested that states violating their safeguards reporting requirements should forfeit their right to nuclear fuel for civil purposes.[181]

87. The FCO told us that establishing agreement on the need for "meaningful and valuable incentives for all states which [abide by their legally-binding obligations], complemented by robust and swift costs imposed on those states which do not", "needs to be a key outcome of the NPT Review Conference in 2010".[182] Mr Rammell said that "In an ideal world, in advance of a particular cause for concern in respect of a specific state, I would want an agreement through the UN Security Council and certainly through the NPT for generic sanctions in respect of a generic breach."[183] In March 2009 the Prime Minister said that "any material failure to cooperate with inspections, and any material breach or withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, should automatically lead to reference to the United Nations Security Council, and indeed it should be assumed that sanctions will be imposed in response to anything other than the most minor of breaches."[184] However, in his evidence to us, Bill Rammell admitted that the UK could not secure agreement on the establishment of generic sanctions for generic breaches of the NPT at present, "so we have to approach it on a case-by-case basis".[185]

88. As regards NPT withdrawal, Mr Fitzpatrick advocated "strengthening the withdrawal clause, so that we do not have another situation like North Korea, where a country violates, pulls out and still retains the capabilities it acquired while it was supposedly a member."[186] Sir Michael Quinlan similarly identified "the need to do something about the right of withdrawal" as one of his three suggested priorities for the 2010 NPT Review Conference,[187] noting that withdrawal "can be done too cheaply and easily."[188] Sir Michael said that "it would be good if international agreement could be reached on a package of rather disagreeable consequences, well displayed in advance, which any country seeking to withdraw without a very compelling reason must expect to undergo."[189]

89. We conclude that the Government is correct to identify a need to strengthen generic enforcement mechanisms for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in the face of states which violate and/or withdraw from it. However, we note that the Minister told us that this objective was unachievable at present. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should set out the specific legal and institutional mechanisms for strengthened NPT enforcement which it will be advocating at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. In particular, we recommend that the Government should outline how it envisages that pre-announced penalties for NPT withdrawal might be strengthened.

UNIVERSALISATION OF THE NPT

90. As noted above, three UN Member States—India, Israel and Pakistan—have never acceded to the NPT. All three are known or believed to have nuclear weapons. The FCO wishes to see Israel, India and Pakistan accede to the NPT—that is, to achieve the Treaty's 'universalisation'.[190]

91. Professor Chalmers told us that the prospects of bringing India, Israel and Pakistan into the NPT were "very limited".[191] Sir Michael Quinlan stated that these states "will not come in as non-nuclear weapons states, and they cannot be added to the list of nuclear weapons states."[192]

Israel

92. As regards Israel, the FCO told us that "while never wholly rejecting the possibility of eventually acceding to the NPT, [Israel] has made clear that it will not do so before a comprehensive peace settlement is in place."[193] As such, Bill Rammell told us that he did not think that the prospects for Israeli NPT adherence were good.[194] The FCO judged that the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, which the Government supports and which the 1995 NPT Review Conference concluded should be a goal, would probably also have to await a Middle East peace settlement. However, BASIC reminded us that Israel, as well as Arab states, reaffirmed the goal of a WMD-free Middle East in July 2008, in the founding statement of the EU's new Union for the Mediterranean.[195]

93. The FCO told us that the UK "has consistently urged Israel to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state."[196] However, giving evidence, FCO witnesses admitted that the Government did not in fact raise the issue of the country's nuclear weapons in its contacts with Israel.[197] BASIC said that Egypt had a position of resistance to strengthened non-proliferation measures such as universal application of the IAEA Additional Protocol "until the international community deals directly with the issue of Israel's nuclear weapons" and that this "casts doubt over the possibilities of a breakthrough at the [NPT] Review Conference in 2010".[198]

94. We conclude that the issue of Israel's nuclear weapons could become an obstacle to the achievement of Government goals at the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should consider whether encouraging greater transparency and nuclear disarmament measures by Israel, in public or in private, might improve the regional security situation, and begin to move Israel towards the Government's stated goals of Israeli accession to the NPT and the establishment of a WMD-free Middle East. We further recommend that the Government should update us on steps taken within the EU's Union for the Mediterranean towards a WMD-free Middle East and set out the ways in which it sees this new vehicle contributing towards that objective.

India

95. A major recent controversy in the nuclear non-proliferation field has surrounded the agreement on civil nuclear cooperation which was outlined by the United States and India in 2005 and signed in 2007. Reversing the previous US policy, the agreement allows US civil nuclear trade with India, despite the fact that India is a non-signatory to the NPT. In return, India is to implement a safeguards agreement with the IAEA that covers declared civilian nuclear facilities but not military ones. The safeguards agreement was approved by the IAEA Board in August 2008 and signed in February 2009. In September 2008, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) agreed to make India an exception to its guidelines, which—as noted above[199]—normally require a state receiving nuclear supplies to implement a comprehensive safeguards agreement. NSG approval was required before the US—or any other NSG member—could proceed with civil nuclear transfers to India. In addition to its limited IAEA safeguards agreement, in the course of securing the US deal India has reiterated its commitments to the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons, a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing, the conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, and national export controls.[200]

96. The British Government supported the US-India deal, and agreed to the NSG making an exception to its guidelines for India. One of the principal arguments made by the Government and other supporters of the US-India deal potentially has a wider application. Supporters argue that, in the absence of the country's NPT adherence, or any short-term prospect of it, the deal offers a means of bringing India into some elements of the NPT's wider regime.[201] Lord Robertson and Sir Michael Quinlan both recognised the potential value and practicability of such an approach,[202] which the FCO suggested might also be applicable in general terms to Pakistan.[203]

97. All our witnesses who addressed the topic regretted the original US-India package itself. Mr Fitzpatrick told us that "the deal weakens the NPT regime for a number of reasons."[204] Baroness Williams said that she "rather agree[d]" with the view that the US-India deal was a "coach and horses going right through the middle of the NPT".[205] She judged that the US could have extracted a greater price from India in return for civil nuclear cooperation, such as across-the-board implementation of IAEA safeguards.[206] Jonathan Granoff suggested that the trade-off could have been an Indian commitment to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), something also highlighted by BASIC.[207]

98. In our Report on "South Asia" in 2006, we welcomed "the fact that the Indo-US nuclear deal will bring India's civilian facilities further within the broader non-proliferation framework." However, we also concluded that "the political significance of the US offering civilian nuclear cooperation to a non-signatory of the NPT has seriously undermined the NPT."[208]

99. We welcome India's granting of greater international access to its civilian nuclear facilities. However, we reiterate our 2006 conclusion that the US-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement undermines one of the central bargains of the international non-proliferation regime, namely that access to nuclear power for civil purposes is due only to states which do not develop nuclear weapons and place all their declared nuclear facilities under international safeguards. We conclude that, given its stated commitment to the international non-proliferation regime, the Government's support for the US-India deal is thus regrettable. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should set out how it foresees the US-India agreement being used to secure further disarmament and non-proliferation steps by India, such as ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

100. Article VI of the NPT commits its nuclear weapons States Parties to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." The FCO noted that this "represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty by the nuclear weapons states to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon states".[209] The commitment by the nuclear weapons States Parties to nuclear disarmament is typically seen as a central element in the NPT's 'grand bargain' between the nuclear weapons states and the non-nuclear weapons states (see paragraph 49 above).

101. At the 1995 NPT Review Conference, States Parties agreed a Statement of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament which included a commitment to the "determined pursuit by the nuclear weapon states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons".[210] In the statement, the nuclear weapons states pledged, among other things, to complete a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the end of 1996 and start negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).[211] At the 2000 NPT Review conference, States Parties agreed a Final Document which "interpret[ed] Article VI of the NPT in an abolitionist direction", in the words of Nicolas Sims.[212] The Final Document included '13 steps' intended to implement the disarmament element of the Treaty, including entry into force of the CTBT (which had by then been opened for signature), a moratorium on nuclear testing in the meantime, implementation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty,[213] steps by the nuclear weapons states to reduce, de-alert and make more transparent their nuclear arsenals, negotiations on nuclear disarmament, an "unequivocal undertaking" by the nuclear weapons states to achieve total nuclear disarmament, and, again, the negotiation of a FMCT.[214] A summary table submitted to us by BASIC highlighted the extent to which there is agreement on an international nuclear disarmament agenda, based on convergence between the '13 steps' from the 2000 NPT Review Conference and the proposals put forward by a number of international commissions and NGOs.[215]

102. By the time of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, few of the disarmament steps outlined in 1995 and 2000 had been implemented. The Conference—which the Acronym Institute described as a "political disaster"[216]—did not reaffirm the disarmament commitments which had been undertaken in 1995 and 2000, and was, indeed, unable to agree on a substantive final document. Although witnesses referred to several more specific difficulties, UNA-UK told us that the "primary obstacle to progress [in 2005] was essentially that nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states could not agree whether to emphasise non-proliferation or disarmament."[217] Mr Butcher and Mr Granoff attributed the failure to make greater progress on the nuclear disarmament agenda by 2005 primarily to the approach adopted by the Bush Administration in the US.[218] In evidence dated October 2008, Dr Acton told us that "France and the United States (tacitly supported by Russia and China) have effectively renounced the ['13 steps'] agreement."[219]

103. The question of nuclear weapons retention or disarmament engages numerous strategic, doctrinal, legal, political, budgetary and industrial considerations. In this disarmament section of our Report, we consider only the relationship between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. (We discuss the specific question of the UK's renewal of its Trident nuclear weapons system in a separate section below.)

104. According to Dr Nick Ritchie of Bradford University, the nuclear weapons states have tended to argue that their continued possession of nuclear weapons does not violate the NPT, and, as such, does not weaken the Treaty's non-proliferation element.[220] With respect to the first part of this argument, several of our witnesses stressed that—despite Article VI—the NPT is not a disarmament treaty, at least not in the same way as are the main instruments governing chemical and biological weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Unlike those instruments, the NPT does not ban nuclear weapons or place requirements on States Parties possessing them to reduce them to specific levels, or eliminate them, by a particular deadline. Among WMD types, Mr Sims called nuclear "the odd one out" in this respect.[221] Compared to the CWC and BTWC, the nature of the disarmament obligation placed on its States Parties by the NPT is thus much more open to argument. In Professor Chalmers' words, the "meantime" under the NPT, during which the five recognised nuclear powers continue to possess nuclear weapons, "could be a long one".[222]

105. The FCO drew our attention to disarmament steps which it said had been taken by the recognised nuclear powers. In addition to steps taken by the UK, which we outline in the following section, the FCO said that the US had reduced its total nuclear arsenal by over a half since the end of the Cold War, and planned a further 15% cut by 2012. Russia had made, and France had announced, significant cuts. Overall, the FCO said, over 40,000 nuclear warheads have been destroyed since the end of the Cold War.[223]

106. Other witnesses argued that the nuclear weapons states had failed to fulfil their NPT disarmament obligations, and that this threatened to undermine the non-proliferation element of the Treaty. Equally, Dr Acton told us that "there are, on balance, good reasons to believe that a policy of trading disarmament for non-proliferation will be successful."[224]

107. Dr Acton stressed that disarmament by the recognised nuclear powers would be unlikely to cause other states which possess or seek nuclear weapons to abandon them or relevant nuclear weapons programmes.[225] Nevertheless, our witnesses referred to a number of other mechanisms by which the nuclear weapons policies of the recognised nuclear weapons states might affect nuclear weapons proliferation. First, witnesses including Dr Plesch, Dr Ritchie, Dr Hudson of CND, and the Quakers argued that the grounds on which the nuclear weapons states say that they retain their nuclear arsenals, namely that nuclear weapons are needed for deterrence in an uncertain world, are equally applicable to all states. As such, this claimed justification for the retention of nuclear weapons inherently undermines any effort to persuade other states not to acquire them.[226] We have found in several parts of the world that this argument resonates powerfully.

108. Second, Sir Michael Quinlan and Dr Plesch, among others, argued that disarmament steps by the nuclear weapons states were part of the NPT's 'grand bargain', and that failure to take them weakened the NPT regime overall, including its non-proliferation element.[227] BASIC said that there was a "crisis of confidence" in the NPT for this reason.[228] Witnesses presented the relationship between disarmament and non-proliferation in a variety of ways. Mr Granoff characterised the status quo as "perpetual nuclear apartheid", which would unavoidably render the NPT regime unsustainable.[229] Dr Ritchie argued that the notion of equality between states bound up in the prospect of disarmament by the nuclear weapons powers was vital to the NPT's legitimacy and therefore its effectiveness.[230]

109. Witnesses pointed to specific examples of the 'disarmament for non-proliferation' relationship. Dr Plesch and Mr Granoff said that India only decided to become a nuclear weapons state because it did not see the original negotiations on the NPT in the 1960s as likely to lead to the global elimination of nuclear weapons.[231] Mr Granoff, Dr Acton and BASIC all said that the non-nuclear weapons states had only accepted the indefinite extension of the NPT at the 1995 Review Conference because of the nuclear weapons states' simultaneous commitment to disarmament under the Conference's Statement of Principles.[232] Professor Chalmers suggested that, by enhancing the country's ability to claim that it was complying with the NPT, further disarmament steps by the UK would also enhance its ability to rally opinion against Iranian non-compliance.[233]

110. Third, it has been argued that disarmament steps by the recognised nuclear weapons powers would help to win goodwill and cooperation among particular non-nuclear weapons states which are needed as key partners in any effort to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime. Baroness Williams told us that there was by now "quite considerable anger, or certainly irritation" among the non-nuclear weapons states. She identified countries such as Australia, Egypt, Germany and Indonesia as among those which were increasingly speaking out about their sense of frustration.[234] Dr Ritchie highlighted Brazil in similar terms,[235] and Dr Acton referred also to Argentina and South Africa—three states which have given up nuclear weapons or weapons-relevant programmes but which appear to feel that they gained little in return.[236]

111. Baroness Williams told us that part of the purpose of the new International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) was to "create something of a pressure group on the part of the non-nuclear powers to, in their view, very much strengthen the NPT when the next Review Conference is held in 2010".[237] The ICNND was initiated by Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and created jointly with the Japanese Government in July 2008. The ICNND is chaired by former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, outgoing President of the International Crisis Group, and former Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi. Baroness Williams has been appointed as one of the Commissioners, in a personal capacity. The Commission is expected to report ahead of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

112. Fourth, Baroness Williams and Dr Ritchie both suggested that the states prioritising the nuclear non-proliferation agenda, such as the UK, were effectively now increasing their demands on other states, for example by seeking more intrusive international verification, and decisions not to develop the full nuclear fuel cycle. As such, these witnesses implied that it was even more incumbent on the nuclear weapons states to deliver on disarmament.[238]

113. The FCO recognises a link between disarmament and non-proliferation. Bill Rammell told us that he was "not sure" that the view that the five nuclear powers had failed to keep their side of the NPT bargain was justified,[239] but he acknowledged that "there is a concern among some non-nuclear weapons states that there has not been sufficient progress in terms of disarmament by the nuclear weapons states."[240] The FCO said that "counter-proliferation efforts risk being undermined if other states perceive, rightly or wrongly, that the nuclear weapons states are not delivering on their side of the bargain and actively pursuing nuclear disarmament."[241] The FCO also said that it wanted "a clear forward plan put into practice, to demonstrate that the nuclear weapons states are serious about their obligations", as its priority for the disarmament pillar of the NPT.[242]

114. We conclude that the five recognised nuclear weapons states have widely varying records as regards nuclear disarmament and arms control over the last decade. We welcome the fact that of the five the record of the UK has been the best. However, we also conclude that, owing to the way in which the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) enshrines a distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons States Parties, the five recognised nuclear powers are often perceived as a group by the non-nuclear weapons states, and that, as such, the group is seen collectively to have failed to live up to the nuclear disarmament commitments made at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences. As a result, we further conclude that without decisive movement by the five recognised nuclear weapons states as a whole on nuclear disarmament measures, there is a risk that the 2010 Review Conference will fail, like its 2005 predecessor—during a critical period for dealing with North Korea and attempting to constrain Iran's nuclear programme. We therefore commend the Government on its public recognition of the link between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We conclude that the Government is correct to identify a vital need to reinvigorate multilateral nuclear disarmament, ideally before and certainly at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

115. We conclude that there is a relatively well-defined agenda of nuclear disarmament steps around which there is a considerable degree of international consensus, such as entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the start of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, and measures to scale down, de-alert and make more transparent existing nuclear arsenals. We recommend that the Government should aim to come away from the 2010 NPT Review Conference with agreement on a concrete plan to take the multilateral nuclear disarmament process forward, with target dates for specific steps, and with the political commitment from all nuclear and non-nuclear weapons States Parties to ensure implementation.

US-RUSSIA NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONTROL

116. Baroness Williams and Dr Acton told us that, if there were to be renewed steps towards nuclear disarmament, they would have to be taken in the first instance by the US and Russia.[243] Between them, the US and Russia hold 95-96% of the world's nuclear weapons;[244] Baroness Williams put the number of US nuclear warheads at around 10,000 and Russian at around 16,000.[245]

117. Lord Robertson told us that these numbers are "quite significantly greater than would be necessitated by current deterrence theory."[246] Baroness Williams said that current warhead numbers are "so far beyond the deterrent required that […] it would not be difficult to get towards the point at which you could have major reductions".[247]

118. US and Russian nuclear warhead numbers are currently limited by two main treaties:[248]

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I). This came into force in 1994 and is the focus of current attention because it expires in December 2009. The US and Russia completed the required cuts to their active stockpiles of strategic nuclear warheads—to 6,000 each—by the 2001 deadline, but the Treaty also establishes an extensive ongoing verification regime.
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). Also known as the Moscow Treaty, this was signed in 2002. SORT stipulates that by the time it expires in December 2012, the number of strategic nuclear warheads deployed by each of the two parties will not exceed 1,700-2,200. Neither the US nor Russia has yet completed the required reductions. Unlike START I, SORT does not include verification provisions.

119. The British Government would like to see the negotiation of a START successor agreement.[249] Sir Michael Quinlan agreed that a new US-Russian nuclear arms treaty would be "perhaps the most crucial single part of the nuclear powers being seen to do their stuff in accordance with Article VI [of the NPT]."[250]

120. At their Sochi summit in April 2008, former Presidents Bush and Putin said that they would "continue development of a legally binding post-START arrangement."[251] At their first meeting, in London a year later, new Presidents Obama and Medvedev announced that they were beginning negotiations on "new and verifiable reductions" in their strategic offensive nuclear arsenals, beginning with a "new, legally-binding treaty" to replace START I.[252] In his 5 April Prague speech, President Obama confirmed that the new treaty should be negotiated by the end of 2009.[253] The US-Russian negotiations got underway in May 2009.

121. We conclude that the strengthened commitment of the US and Russia, under Presidents Obama and Medvedev, to negotiate a legally-binding nuclear arms reduction treaty to succeed START I, by the end of 2009, as part of a deeper process of nuclear arms cuts, will contribute significantly to the fulfilment of their disarmament obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and is thus greatly to be welcomed. We recommend that the Government should offer every assistance to facilitate a speedy and productive conclusion to the negotiations.

122. It has been argued that not only the quantity of US and Russian nuclear weapons but also their current targeting and state of readiness are inappropriate. Professor Chalmers told us that:

254

Professor Chalmers said that he thought that "quite significant progress could be made rather rapidly" in terms of lengthening alert times, "without creating extra vulnerabilities." As well as raising the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons by the relevant states, Professor Chalmers noted that such de-alerting would also reduce the risk of nuclear weapons being launched as a result of cyber-attack by non-state groups.[255] The removal of US and Russian nuclear arsenals from hair-trigger alert has been one of the main initiatives pursued by the non-governmental Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) founded by former US Senator Sam Nunn. For example, Senator Nunn told the Defence and Security Committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in January 2008 that:

the United States and Russia continue to deploy thousands of nuclear weapons on ballistic missiles that can hit their targets in less than 30 minutes—a short warning time, prompt launch capability that carries with it an increasingly unacceptable risk of an accidental, mistaken or unauthorised launch.

He went on to say:

256

123. Among our witnesses, UNA-UK made a broader call for all the recognised nuclear weapons states to reduce their weapons' state of readiness, as did Mr Granoff.[257] The UK's de-alerting steps with respect to its own arsenal are referred to below,[258] but the Government has not so far supported a UN General Assembly resolution introduced for the first time in 2007 which calls for further reductions in the operational readiness of nuclear weapons, with a view to the removal of all such weapons from high alert status.[259]

124. We conclude that reductions in the operational readiness of the world's nuclear arsenals could make a significant contribution to enhancing international security. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should set out the steps which it is taking to encourage international action in this area, and explain its stance regarding the UN General Assembly resolution on this issue.

UK NUCLEAR ARSENAL

125. The largest share of written submissions to our inquiry relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation focused on the Government's decision to renew the UK's Trident system. In the White Paper "The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent", published in December 2006, the Government announced that it intended to commission a new fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to carry the UK's Trident nuclear weapons system, replacing the four existing Vanguard-class boats.[260] The first of the new boats is scheduled to enter service in 2024. The Government also said that the UK would participate in the US programme to develop a new generation of missiles to replace the Trident D5 missiles currently carried by the submarines.[261] In March 2007, the House of Commons voted to back these decisions.[262]

126. The Government's policy regarding Trident has been examined in a series of Reports by the Defence Committee, most notably "The Future of the UK's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the White Paper", published in March 2007 ahead of the debate in the House.[263] In the present Report we do not seek to reiterate the Defence Committee's analysis, but rather to focus on the implications of the UK's continuing possession of nuclear weapons for the non-proliferation agenda.

127. As with the nuclear policies of the recognised nuclear weapons states more generally, the Government's Trident renewal decision has generated argument about its compatibility with the NPT, and therefore about its potential impact on the non-proliferation element of the Treaty.[264] Sir Michael Quinlan told us that the UK was "still operating entirely within what [it is] entitled to do, within [its] commitments under the Treaty." Provided that the Government adhered to these commitments, Sir Michael said that he did not see that the White Paper "need in any way diminish our credibility in the reinforcement of the non-proliferation regime as a whole", although he said that the Trident decision "perhaps makes it all the more necessary" that the UK does everything possible to strengthen the regime.[265] Professor Chalmers argued along similar lines.[266]

128. The UK has abandoned all its nuclear weapons systems other than Trident, leaving it as the only recognised nuclear weapons state with only one nuclear weapons system. Professor Chalmers drew our attention to what might be seen as a paradox of the UK's single system, namely that it had to be renewed if the UK was to retain a nuclear arsenal at all.[267] Sir Michael Quinlan similarly argued that "those who say that we should not renew are saying that we have an obligation to abandon, which is plainly not what the Treaty says, or suggests."[268] However, whether the Government needed to decide in 2007 to start the Trident renewal process remains disputed. The issue of timing fell outside the scope of our inquiry.[269]

129. In addition to the decision to scale back to only one nuclear system, the FCO drew our attention to other Government steps which it said represented "significant progress" on nuclear disarmament.[270] The 1998 Strategic Defence Review capped at three the number of nuclear warheads carried by each Trident missile, a reduction from the previous maximum of six, which itself had earlier been reduced from 12. This means that, with each submarine carrying 16 missiles, each boat now carries 48 warheads. The missiles are not targeted at any country, and require several days' notice to fire. The number of the UK's operationally available warheads was reduced from 300 to below 200 by the Strategic Defence Review, and to "fewer than 160" by the 2006 White Paper, making for what the FCO said was a cut of nearly half since the end of the Cold War, and an overall reduction in the explosive power of the UK's nuclear arsenal of 75% during that period.[271] Overall, Professor Chalmers and Sir Michael Quinlan agreed with the FCO's assessment that the UK was "the most forward-leaning of the existing nuclear weapons states" as regards nuclear disarmament.[272]

130. Most witnesses who addressed the question directly—including the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy—agreed that, even if the UK were to take further disarmament steps, these would be unlikely on their own directly to affect the nuclear weapons decisions of states which might develop nuclear weapons or which had already done so outside the NPT.[273] For example, Mr Fitzpatrick told us that "Iran's pursuit [of nuclear weapons] has nothing to do with the United Kingdom."[274] However, Dr David Lowry disagreed with this assessment.[275]

131. We received a large number of submissions which were critical of the Government's nuclear weapons policy, and above all of its Trident renewal decision, because of what were claimed to be its negative effects on the non-proliferation effort. Dr Ritchie stated bluntly that the Government was "wrong" to assert that its Trident renewal decision would have no detrimental impact on the NPT.[276] Several witnesses drew attention to the statement in the Chairman's summary of the 2008 Preparatory Conference for the 2010 NPT Review Conference that "concern and disappointment were raised about plans of some nuclear weapon states to replace or modernise nuclear weapons and their means of delivery or platforms".[277] Many submissions to our inquiry called for the suspension or reversal of the renewal decision. Critics of the Government's position highlighted in particular what appeared to be, in the terms of Peter Nicholls of Abolition 2000 UK, the particularly "stark" contrast between the Trident renewal decision and the Government's high-profile language about the importance of disarmament. Critics also regretted that, as a result of the Trident renewal decisions taken so far, plus the prospect of a decision in the next Parliament on renewing the Trident warhead, the Government appeared to be countenancing a scenario in which the UK would remain a nuclear weapons state into the 2050s.[278] According to BASIC, nuclear weapons modernisation of this sort "signal[s] grave doubts [as to] the prospects of mutual nuclear disarmament".[279]

132. The MOD's first report on the Trident replacement programme is due in September 2009, during the Parliamentary recess. This marks the Initial Gate approval point at which approval is needed from the Government before further developments are undertaken. During the Parliamentary debate on Trident in March 2007, the Government made a commitment to providing regular reports on the progress of the programme.[280]

133. We conclude that the decision to renew the UK's Trident system is perceived by some foreign states and some among the British public as appearing to contradict the Government's declared commitment to strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. We recommend that the Government should intensify its public diplomacy work better to explain the reasons for the Trident renewal decision and to give greater prominence to its work for multilateral nuclear disarmament and arms control. We further recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should update us on the progress of the timetable for renewal of the Trident submarines. We recommend that the Government should not take any decision at the Initial Gate stage until Parliament has had the chance to scrutinise the matter in a debate.

134. Witnesses including Lord Robertson identified scope for further reducing the size and significance of the UK's nuclear arsenal, even while renewing the Trident system.[281] For example, Sir Michael Quinlan suggested that the number of missiles on each boat might be reduced to perhaps 12.[282] In his March 2009 nuclear speech, the Prime Minister said that the new Trident submarines would indeed carry only 12 missiles each.[283] Sir Michael also expressed the hope that the new system would involve three submarines rather than four.[284] In the 2006 White Paper, the Government said that it would review this possibility in the light of more detailed work on the design and operating arrangements of the new submarines.[285] According to a recent Public Accounts Committee Report, the decision on the number of new submarines needs to be taken by 2014.[286] Other witnesses suggested variously that the UK could put the Trident system onto an even longer alert time, end the continuous at-sea patrols, separate the warheads from the missiles, and make doctrinal changes to reduce the significance of its nuclear force.[287]

135. In its March 2007 Report, the Defence Committee drew attention to the fact that the Government does not specify the process by which it determines the "minimum nuclear deterrent" to which it is, for the moment, committed. It is therefore difficult to assess the Government's nuclear disarmament performance in absolute terms, or the scope for further steps compatible with the maintenance of a minimum deterrent. In its Response to the Defence Committee's call for it to specify how it calculates the scale of a minimum deterrent,[288] the Government said that it was "not prepared to release precise details" of its assessment process, "because of the sensitive nature of the analysis involved and to maintain ambiguity over the circumstances in which we might consider use of our nuclear deterrent."[289]

136. We conclude that the steps which the Government has taken to scale down and de-escalate the UK's nuclear arsenal are to be commended. We welcome in particular the Prime Minister's announcement that the new Trident submarines are to carry fewer missiles than the current boats. We recommend that the Government should do more to highlight these steps, internationally and at home. However, we note that it is difficult to assess the Government's claim that it retains only a minimum nuclear deterrent in the absence of further information about the process by which it judges this minimum. We therefore recommend that the Government should accede to the Defence Committee's call for it to explain in greater detail the process by which it determines that the current scale and operational arrangements of the Trident force constitute the UK's minimum nuclear deterrent.

137. In seeking to reconcile its Trident retention and its disarmament commitments, the Government presented the former as a hedge against the possibility that multilateral disarmament negotiations might fail. Equally, the FCO told us that "when it will be useful to include [the UK's nuclear warheads] in any negotiations to reduce warhead numbers, we will willingly do so."[290] The Prime Minister reiterated this position in his March 2009 speech.[291] Under our questioning, Bill Rammell confirmed that the relevant multilateral negotiations would have to involve "action on all fronts"—that is, all nuclear weapons states, not only the five recognised nuclear powers.[292] BASIC suggested that the other three recognised nuclear weapons states should perhaps join multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations if the US and Russia agreed to bring their warhead numbers significantly below the maximum set by the SORT—that is, 1,700.[293]

138. We conclude that the Government's confirmation of its willingness to include the UK's nuclear force in multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations is to be welcomed, as likely to strengthen its non-proliferation efforts. We recommend that the Government should give greater prominence to this commitment in its public diplomacy. We further recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should specify—in the light of international disarmament developments by that time—the state of a multilateral nuclear disarmament process that would trigger UK participation. We further recommend that the Government should specify whether there are circumstances under which the UK would be prepared to suspend the Trident renewal programme.

'GLOBAL ZERO'

139. In previous sections we have looked at nuclear disarmament steps which might be taken in the relatively near future. Recently there has been renewed international activism in support of the long-term goal of a world entirely without nuclear weapons. A series of non-governmental initiatives has been directed to this end, with strong links into the highest levels of policy-making:

In January 2007, a cross-party group of four US statesmen—former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry and former Senator Sam Nunn—published an article in the Wall Street Journal in which they called for a nuclear weapons-free world.[294] The article spawned the Nuclear Security Project, an ongoing initiative to pursue that goal. In January 2008, the four statesmen reported a positive response to their initiative and set out concrete steps which they believed would further their objective.[295] Referring to the initiative, as well as developments among elected politicians, Professor Chalmers referred to an "emerging bipartisan consensus in the US"[296] on the need for a more active disarmament policy, and said that this was "the most encouraging recent development".[297]
In June 2008, a cross-party group of four British statesmen—former Foreign Secretaries Lords Hurd and Owen, former Defence Secretary Lord Robertson and former Foreign and Defence Secretary Sir Malcolm Rifkind—aligned themselves behind the US initiative.[298]
December 2008 saw the launch of 'Global Zero', an international campaign backed by, among others, Queen Noor of Jordan, former Presidents Carter, Cardoso and Gorbachev, former prime ministers of France and Norway, former foreign ministers of Australia, Russia, Pakistan and four NATO states (including, from the UK, Margaret Beckett, Sir Malcolm Rifkind and Lords Hurd and Owen), former National Security Advisers from the US and India, former Chairmen of Pakistan's Joint Chiefs of Staff, former US and UK Permanent Representatives to the UN, and two Nobel laureates.[299]

140. The British Government supports the goal of the abolition of nuclear weapons.[300] The FCO told us that it aims to "demonstrate […] that the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons is real, achievable and genuinely held by nuclear weapons states".[301] The FCO told us that it regards the 'global zero' goal as a "legally-binding obligation which we must strive to achieve as soon as practically possible."[302] It frames its 'global zero' goal, like its other disarmament objectives, as a means of strengthening the non-proliferation element of the NPT.[303]

141. The Government has supported the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world on previous occasions, for instance in its 2006 White Paper on Trident renewal.[304] However, CND noted that the Government's position in this respect had become more prominent and proactive since mid-2007.[305] The FCO drew our attention to a number of speeches made by senior Ministers in support of the 'global zero' goal, namely addresses by the then Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett to the Carnegie Endowment in Washington D.C. in June 2007, by the Prime Minister in New Delhi in January 2008, and by the then Defence Secretary Des Browne to the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva the following month. In February 2009, the FCO published what it called a "policy information paper" entitled "Lifting the Nuclear Shadow: Creating the Conditions for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons", which the Foreign Secretary launched at a public event at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Bill Rammell told us that the publication was intended "to engage the public in most critical challenge that we face", and also to help "generate increased momentum internationally."[306] Dr Acton told us that "simply by talking openly about the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons, the UK has earned itself credit and established a position of leadership."[307]

142. Since taking office, US President Obama has confirmed his pre-election support for the 'global zero' goal. In his April 2009 Prague speech, he said that the US would "take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons."[308] In his April 2009 joint statement with President Obama, President Medvedev also committed Russia "to achieving a nuclear free world".[309]

143. Sir Michael Quinlan identified two sets of issues needing "a lot more work" if the goal of 'global zero' was to be realisable. First, he said that there were "technical issues, such as how to verify, how to define what a non-nuclear world is, what must not exist, what must not be done, how to enforce and what to do about the nuclear energy problem." Second, he said that there were the "more intractable" questions of regional and global geopolitics that would need to be resolved before all the nuclear weapons states—including those outside the NPT—would feel able to commit to abolishing their nuclear arsenals.[310] Professor Chalmers similarly identified the existence of a technical and a political track, and argued that work on the two could be mutually reinforcing.[311]

144. The FCO highlighted the work which the Government was doing on the technical track. In her June 2007 Washington speech, then Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett announced that the UK would act as a "disarmament laboratory" for some of the technical work required for movement towards the global elimination of nuclear weapons. In implementing this initiative, the UK's Atomic Weapons Establishment has been conducting work on the verification of warhead dismantling, partly with Norwegian partners. In September 2009, the UK is to host a conference of the five recognised nuclear weapons states which will deal with verification issues, among other matters.[312] The FCO also helped to finance the publication of a major paper by the IISS which examined many of the technical issues which would be engaged by any realistic effort towards 'global zero'.[313] Professor Chalmers highlighted the need for practical work of this type,[314] and Mr Granoff commended the Government's work in this area.[315] However, Dr Acton warned that some non-nuclear weapons states regarded the Government as focusing on process over substance, and suggested that it could boost its credibility by demonstrating its new verification technology at an internationally-verified dismantling of some of the UK's nuclear warheads.[316]

145. We conclude that the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world is gathering more serious international political support than at any time since the end of the Cold War. We conclude that the Government's leadership on this issue is to be commended. In particular, we conclude that the Government is correct to recognise the scale of the technical and confidence-building work that will be required for the goal to be realisable, and in particular the importance of verification. We recommend that the Government should continue and expand its work in this area.

146. A number of our witnesses referred approvingly to the possibility of a Nuclear Weapons Convention, which would—like the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention—ban nuclear weapons.[317] The negotiation of such a Convention was one of the '13 steps' included in the final document of the 2005 NPT Review Conference,[318] and in 2008 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon circulated to all Member States a model text which has long been tabled at the UN.[319] The Acronym Institute argued that, because it would impose the same ultimate obligation equally on all States Parties, a Nuclear Weapons Convention "would be more successful at constraining states outside the NPT […] and potential proliferators than the current regime".[320] A vote on a possible nuclear weapons convention is normally held in the UN General Assembly each year, in which China, India and Pakistan support the idea, and NATO (except Canada), Israel and Russia oppose it.[321] The FCO did not refer to a Nuclear Weapons Convention in its evidence to us.

147. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the FCO should set out its attitude to a possible Nuclear Weapons Convention banning such weapons, including the relationship which it sees between such a Convention, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its stated goal of the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT)

148. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) would ban any nuclear weapon test or other nuclear explosion, and would therefore place a legally-binding constraint on the development of new nuclear weapons types. The Treaty would also activate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), which stands ready to conduct monitoring activities so as to detect any possible test. The FCO identified the CTBT's entry into force as one of the key steps required on the way to any nuclear weapons-free world, and, as such, to be supported.[322] All the nuclear weapons states—inside and outside the NPT—are already observing moratoria on testing, and Sir Michael Quinlan told us that the CTBT was "not, in cold strategic logic, as important as people have talked it up to be". However, he acknowledged that it was "seen as a major symbol of seriousness."[323] Professor Chalmers had the CTBT at "no. 1" on his list of shorter-term priorities,[324] and the Acronym Institute listed CTBT entry into force as one of the steps on which "the continued credibility of the NPT is likely to rest".[325] As we have noted above (in paragraph 101), the CTBT was one of the disarmament steps to which the NPT States Parties committed themselves at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences. The Treaty is also potentially one of the measures to which the non-NPT states, of India, Israel and Pakistan, could adhere without having to accede to the NPT.

149. The CTBT was opened for signature in 1996 but has yet to come into force, because only 35 of the 44 named states which are required to ratify the Treaty have done so. The 44 are the five recognised nuclear powers plus 39 states with nuclear power and/or research reactors. Of the nine named states which have not ratified, six (China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel and the US) have signed but not ratified the Treaty, and three (India, North Korea and Pakistan) have neither signed nor ratified.[326]

150. Our witnesses identified US ratification as key to the prospects that the CTBT might be ratified by other states, such as India and Pakistan, and perhaps Israel and China[327]—although Professor Chalmers warned that even with US ratification, one or two countries might still "hold out".[328] Professor Chalmers also cautioned that if they did sign, India and Pakistan might be tempted to conduct final nuclear tests before doing so.[329] Professor Chalmers also told us that the issue of CTBT ratification would be an "early indicator" of more general prospects for US nuclear disarmament policy in the run-up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference;[330] Dr Acton called CTBT ratification "probably the single most important step toward disarmament the US could take."[331]

151. A number of our witnesses regarded the election of President Obama, together with a Democrat-controlled Senate, as bringing significantly enhanced prospects of US ratification of the CTBT. In his April 2009 Prague speech, President Obama duly said that his Administration would pursue US ratification "immediately and aggressively".[332]

152. We conclude that the Government is correct to identify the speedy entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as a key early step towards reviving multilateral nuclear disarmament. We recommend that the Government should do everything possible to facilitate US ratification, and to maximise prospects that this will be followed by other especially politically important ratifications, such as those of China, India, Israel and Pakistan, even if these are still too few to bring the Treaty into force.

THE FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY (FMCT)

153. A second potential international instrument which the FCO identified as an "essential step" towards 'global zero' is the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).[333] The FMCT would ban the further production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, thus putting a limit for all time on the number of nuclear weapons that could be manufactured, and greatly reducing the risk of potential nuclear weapons material 'leaking' from active production facilities. A verified FMCT would also introduce verification mechanisms that would be required in any nuclear weapons-free world. Like the CTBT, a FMCT would be an instrument to which the non-NPT states of India, Israel and Pakistan could adhere without having to accede to the NPT.

154. Like the CTBT, a FMCT was among the disarmament steps to which the NPT States Parties committed themselves at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences. On the basis of a UN General Assembly resolution, the UN Conference on Disarmament agreed to begin negotiations on a FMCT in 1995. However, the negotiations have never got underway. Mr Granoff told us that the two key obstacles to the start of negotiations have been the view taken latterly by the United States that it would be impossible to verify such a Treaty; and a linkage to progress on other desired disarmament measures made by states including Egypt, Israel, China and Pakistan.[334] As regards the second of these, the FCO told us that it was continuing "to argue forcefully that allowing negotiations to begin does not undermine any country's position on a final treaty."[335] There is also the obstacle that India and Pakistan, at least, are continuing to produce new nuclear material as they continue to build up their nuclear arsenals. Professor Chalmers told us that these two countries were unlikely to sign a FMCT now, but that they might do so "in the not-too-distant future."[336]

155. In his April 2009 Prague speech, US President Obama announced a shift in US policy, back to support for a verified FMCT. "If we are serious about stopping the spread of these weapons", he said, "then we should put an end to the dedicated production of weapons-grade materials that create them."[337]

156. On 29 May, the UN Conference on Disarmament adopted a Programme of Work, for the first time in over twelve years. The programme includes the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Welcoming the breakthrough, President Obama said that he was "committed to consult and cooperate with the Governments represented at the Conference on Disarmament to complete this treaty as soon as possible."[338]

157. We conclude that the Government is correct to identify the start of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) as a step which would significantly strengthen the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation process. In that context, we strongly welcome the agreement reached at the UN Conference on Disarmament in May 2009 on a Programme of Work which includes the negotiation of a FMCT. We recommend that the Government should do all it can to ensure that the negotiations get underway in a speedy and productive fashion and to maximise the prospects that they will result in the coming into force of a verified FMCT. We further recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should set out its view of the most serious difficulties that are likely to arise in the negotiations, the most likely timetable for the conclusion of the talks, the most likely coverage of the proposed FMCT in terms of signatories and non-signatories, and any implications of the proposed FMCT for the UK.

158. We conclude that the agreement reached in May 2009 on a Programme of Work for the UN Conference on Disarmament, after over twelve years of deadlock, is an important signal of the renewed prospects for multilateral arms control which appear to have followed the election of President Obama and, as such, is greatly to be welcomed.

Internationalising the nuclear fuel cycle

159. The 'third pillar' of the NPT regime comprises access for all States Parties to nuclear power for non-weapons purposes. Coming years are expected to see a significant increase in the use of civil nuclear power around the world, by states seeking to meet increased energy demand while minimising climate change effects and energy dependence on other countries.[339] According to the FCO, this conjunction "increases the risk of diversion of the material and technologies involved [in nuclear power] for military use, whether by states or non-state actors."[340]

160. These circumstances have led the British and other governments to put forward a number of proposals for the international provision of the most proliferation-sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle needed for civil nuclear power. The FCO told us that it was "working for internationally-agreed mechanisms under IAEA auspices that will make it unnecessary for countries to develop their own enrichment and reprocessing capacity".[341] According to the FCO, such international provision of access to the nuclear fuel cycle will strengthen the non-proliferation effort via two mechanisms—by rendering unnecessary some aspects of the development of nuclear materials, technologies and expertise in new parts of the world, and by delivering on another element of the 'grand bargain' with the non-nuclear weapons states.[342] Sir Michael Quinlan identified the nuclear energy issue as his third priority for the 2010 NPT Review Conference.[343]

161. The FCO outlined some of the main proposals that have been put forward for international involvement in the nuclear fuel cycle.[344] These are:

An internationally-controlled nuclear fuel bank, on which states could draw. The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), a US NGO, launched a specific proposal for an IAEA-led bank in 2006; the US and Russia also back this kind of proposal. In March 2009, the IAEA announced that it had secured the $100 million in matching funding which the NTI had required in order to release its initial $50 million commitment. The EU has contributed €25 million.[345]
An IAEA fuel cycle facility, built on IAEA land. This is a German proposal, known as the Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project. Baroness Williams suggested that such a "nuclear Vatican", constructed beyond the sovereignty of any other state, might be the only way around some of the political problems associated with international provision of access to the nuclear fuel cycle.[346]
The Global Nuclear Energy Programme (GNEP). This is a US initiative to develop new, proliferation-resistant, civil nuclear energy technologies.
A nuclear fuel assurance. Under this British Government proposal, a supplier state would guarantee nuclear fuel supplies in the event that a recipient state had them denied by a commercial supplier, for other than commercial or non-proliferation reasons. The assurance would be overseen by the IAEA.

162. Concerns have been expressed that the existence of multiple nuclear fuel cycle initiatives might make for competition between them, and a failure to implement any successfully. On this point, as we noted in Chapter 2, Bill Rammell told us that:

347

The FCO sees the British fuel assurance proposal as one component in an international regime. Baroness Williams agreed that the British proposal was "useful essentially as a complement to a relatively small fuel bank."[348]

163. Baroness Williams and Dr Acton told us that many non-nuclear weapons states were suspicious of schemes for international involvement in the nuclear fuel cycle, regarding them as mechanisms for denying states the access to civil nuclear power which is their right under the NPT.[349] Dr Acton also cautioned that many states regard fuel cycle programmes as a "source of international prestige and national pride."[350] The FCO recognised the existence of this concern, and said that it needed "to reassure [such states] that these proposals are in fact intended as affirming their Article IV rights rather than undermining them."[351] BASIC said that supplier states would have to agree that international involvement in access to the nuclear fuel cycle for recipient states was "a first step to a non-discriminatory uranium supply system", which would ultimately require supplier states too to acquire their uranium through the same international mechanism.[352] IAEA Director General ElBaradei wants agreement that all new enrichment and reprocessing activities should be placed exclusively under multilateral control, to be followed by agreement to convert all existing facilities from national to multilateral control.[353]

164. The UK co-hosted an international conference on access to civil nuclear power in Berlin in April 2008, and hosted a further event in London in March 2009 which was attended by representatives of 37 states, the IAEA and the EU, and was addressed by the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change and, via videolink, IAEA Director General ElBaradei.[354] In his speech, the Prime Minister noted that most of the international proposals made so far concentrated on enrichment and fuel provision, and called for more attention to be given to the handling of spent fuel. The Prime Minister also suggested that regional schemes for the joint development of civil nuclear power, under the oversight of an international body, might be a way forward.[355] In his Chairman's summary of the conference, former IAEA Deputy Director General Bruno Pellaud said that "the general concept of multilateral nuclear arrangements was strongly supported by the majority of the participants."

165. We conclude that the Government is correct to identify a need to ensure access for non-nuclear weapons states to civil nuclear power under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, notwithstanding the existence of a heightened proliferation risk arising from the spread of civil nuclear power. We further conclude that, unless pursued with political sensitivity, the effort to limit non-nuclear weapons states' access to the full nuclear fuel cycle risks reproducing the discrimination which it is claimed exists in relation to the possession of nuclear weapons. As such, this aim risks undermining other elements of the nuclear non-proliferation effort. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should provide further details as to the steps it is taking to mitigate this risk.

77 Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, Cm 7291, March 2008, para 3.10 Back

78 Ibid., para 3.12; see para 8 above. Back

79 Ibid., para 3.11 Back

80 Ev 102 Back

81 Qq 1-4 Back

82 Q 5 Back

83 Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, Cm 7291, March 2008, para 4.19 Back

84 Ibid., para 4.19 Back

85 Ev 177 [FCO] Back

86 For example, Ev 131 [Dr Ritchie] Back

88 Q 8 Back

89 Q 8 Back