4 Biological and chemical weapons
- Biological
and chemical weapons: the threat
166. The public profile of biological and chemical
weapons is low by comparison with that of nuclear weapons. The
image of the mushroom cloud has haunted public imagination since
1945, and there is widespread awareness of the devastation, as
well as the long-term radioactive effects, likely to be caused
by any use of nuclear weapons. Although chemical weapons have
also been used in warfare, during the First World War and since,
their effects are not nearly as great in terms of the number of
casualties arising from a single use. Public awareness of the
threat posed by biological weapons is even lower, arising from
the fact that, as Dr Jones told us, "to all intents and purposes
biological weapons have never actually been applied, although
my view is that they are possibly the most worrying of the three".[356]
Daniel Feakes pointed out that an attack using biological weapons
"would be less obvious. It would be more of a public health
event, rather than an explosion and the attendant effects."[357]
167. Much of the recent debate on non-proliferation
and disarmament has focussed on nuclear weapons, leading Dr Jones
to argue that control of biological and chemical weapons has been
neglected:
Since the Iraq war the West's main thrust in
arms control has switched away from WMD in general and focused
on nuclear weapons in particular [
] There is little positive
evidence that previous concerns about the proliferation of chemical
and biological weapons have evaporated, but they appear to have
been returned to the second division of arms control.[358]
Dr Jones believed that "the strong pursuit of
nuclear non-proliferation, even as a precursor to total nuclear
disarmament, also threatens the control of biological weapons
and chemical weapons which some nations will see as the next best
thing to nuclear."[359]
DEFINITIONS OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL
WEAPONS
168. Chemical weapons attack the body in various
ways, for example, by being nerve or blister agents. The major
disarmament treaty relating to chemical weapons, the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC), prohibits:
(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except
where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention,
as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes;
(b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed
to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those
toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (a), which would be
released as a result of employment of such munitions and devices;
(c) Any equipment specifically designed for use
directly in connection with the employment of munitions and devices
specified in subparagraph (b).[360]
169. Biological weapons are biological agents or
toxins used to cause disease or toxicity. The major disarmament
treaty relating to biological weapons, the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BTWC), prohibits:
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or
toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types
and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic,
protective or other peaceful purposes;
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed
to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed
conflict.[361]
RECENT AND HISTORICAL USES OF BIOLOGICAL
AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS
170. The first major use of industrially produced
chemical weapons was during the First World War, although they
have also been used recently by both states and non-state actors.
Iraq is widely reported to have used chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq
war and against the Kurds at Halabja in 1988.[362]
In 1995 members of the terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo released
sarin gas into the Tokyo subway system, killing 12 people. Chemical
weapons are often considered to be of little use in conventional
warfare. Dr Jones assessed them as:
by far the least 'destructive' of the classes
of weapon we place in the category of WMD. Perhaps they should
not be there at all, because such large quantities of agent and
hundreds of bombs or warheads would be needed to cause the same
level of 'destruction' as a single nuclear or biological weapon.[363]
In a recent assessment of the threat of terrorist
uses of such weapons, Dr Paul Cornish, Head of the International
Security Programme at Chatham House, also concluded that they
were of limited use in warfare, but he pointed out that they might
still be potentially useful to terrorists (see Chapter 6 below).[364]
171. 'Weaponisation' of biological material is challenging
and biological weapons can be comparatively slow to produce their
effects, which reduces their usefulness in conventional warfare.[365]
Historically, the UK has been amongst those states with biological
and chemical weapons programmes, for example having its own offensive
biological weapons programme until the late 1950s.[366]
For some decades after this, the UK retained stocks of old chemical
weapons, but these have been progressively destroyed, a process
completed in March 2007.[367]
Research continues, but addresses defensive responses to chemical
and biological weapons.[368]
172. Daniel Feakes commented that "it is hard
to imagine any country being able to use CB [chemical and biological]
weapons without provoking widespread condemnation and sanction
from the international community. Even the possession of CB weapons
has been delegitimised to the extent that no country openly admits
to it."[369]
173. At present there appears to be a greater threat
of the use of biological weapons by terrorists than by states.
Historical use of infected cadavers or animal carcasses as biological
weapons demonstrates that biological warfare does not necessarily
require cutting-edge technology. There are recent examples of
the use of such weapons by non-state actors. In 1984 a religious
cult in the US infected 750 people with salmonella after contaminating
food[370] and in 2001,
also in the US, anthrax attacks killed 5 people.[371]
Daniel Feakes told us that despite the stigma attaching to states'
use of chemical and biological weapons, "such normative considerations
may not dissuade terrorists from acquiring and using CB weapons".[372]
Control of chemical and biological
weapons
174. Control of chemical and biological weapons has
evolved since the 1925 Geneva Convention which banned first use
whilst continuing to allow retaliation-in-kind. This was superseded
by two disarmament treaties, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which
are supplemented by commitments such as those made by members
of the Australia Group controlling exports (see paragraph 26 above)
or under UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (see paragraphs 270-273
below). A wide range of organisations is currently involved in
the control of CB weapons. Daniel Feakes listed these as including
the EU, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the G8, the Global
Health Security Initiative, the International Committee of the
Red Cross, the International Maritime Organization, Interpol,
NATO, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development,
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the World Customs
Organization and the World Health Organization (WHO).[373]
175. As we noted in Chapter 3, both the CWC and BTWC
are disarmament treaties, unlike those dealing with nuclear weapons,
which primarily seek non-proliferation or only to limit nuclear
arsenals.[374] Nicholas
Sims told us that disarmament has been an achievable aim because
"biological and chemical weapons were marginal to the armouries
of most states when nuclear weapons were very far from marginal
for several."[375]
Daniel Feakes told us that the term 'non-proliferation' is less
applicable to biological or chemical weapons:
a focus on non-proliferation reflects the predominance
of thinking about nuclear weapons where disarmament is a much
less active part of the NPT regime. Within the CBW [chemical and
biological weapons] field, disarmament and non-proliferation are
two sides of the same cointhey can be seen as respectively
addressing the demand and supply side of the CBW threat. Disarmament
contributes to non-proliferation by ensuring there are fewer weapons
to proliferate and by giving states less reason to acquire their
own CBW capabilities. Non-proliferation contributes to disarmament
by hindering the re-emergence of CBW stockpiles.[376]
Mr Feakes told us that he prefers the term 'non-diversion'
to 'non-proliferation' in the CBW context,[377]
and Nicholas Sims concurred, for the reason that "it carries
no implication of a division into two categories of states, respectively
permitted and not permitted to have certain weapons,"[378]
but rather emphasises that "the diversion of biological or
chemical materials, or know-how, to weapons purposes is forbidden
equally".[379]
176. Both treaties are based on the principle of
a 'general purpose criterion'. They do not contain a list of prohibited
agents but rather assert a general principle that all agents are
prohibited unless intended for a permitted purpose, and in types
and quantities consistent with such a purpose. Mr Feakes commented
that:
These 'general purpose criteria' allow the treaties
to keep pace with scientific and technological developments, ensure
that they cover all relevant agents, even those not yet invented
and permits the use of dual-use chemical and biological agents
by legitimate industries.[380]
The Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC)
177. The primary instrument in the effort to eliminate
chemical weapons is the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which
entered into force on 29 April 1997.[381]
Daniel Feakes described the CWC as "one of the most significant
multilateral achievements of the past 15 years, although it is
among the least known or appreciated by the public."[382]
The CWC "bans the development, production, stockpiling and
the use of chemical weapons and requires the destruction of existing
stockpiles by no later than 29 April 2012".[383]
It was the first arms control treaty targeted at a verifiable
ban on an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. CWC implementation
is facilitated by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW), based in The Hague, which aims to "achieve
the object and purpose of the Convention, to ensure the implementation
of its provisions, including those for international verification
of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation
and cooperation among States Parties".[384]
The UK contribution to the OPCW's £51 million budget for
2009 is £3.8 million.[385]
UNIVERSALITY
178. One way of measuring the success of the Convention
is the number of states that remain outside it. At present the
total number of States Parties to the CWC is 186, Lebanon and
Iraq having recently (in December 2008 and February 2009 respectively)
acceded to the treaty. At present nine states remain outside the
CWC: the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Israel and Burma have
signed but not ratified, whilst Angola, North Korea, Egypt, Somalia
and Syria have not signed.[386]
179. In October 2003 the Executive Council of the
OPCW adopted an Action Plan for the Universality of the Chemical
Weapons Convention. Daniel Feakes has said that the Action Plan
has been instrumental in the recent progress in moving towards
universality.[387]
On 20 February 2009 the Director-General of the OPCW updated its
Executive Council on developments, reporting that the Bahamas
intended to join and that the Dominican Republic was preparing
the instrument of ratification. The organisation was due to hold
a workshop on universality in the Middle East and the Mediterranean
Basin, in Istanbul, in April 2009.[388]
Whilst the number of non-signatories is small, Daniel Feakes told
us that Egypt, Israel, North Korea and Syria are suspected of
possessing chemical weapons.[389]
He added that "there are efforts by the OPCW and by states
such as the UK to get Israel, Syria, Egypt and North Korea on
board, but it is difficultparticularly in the Middle East."[390]
180. The FCO stated that UK priorities in relation
to the CWC are:
the promotion of universality and the full and
effective national implementation of all the Convention's provisions.
The UK works bilaterally and with the EU and other partners to
coordinate diplomatic activity, such as lobbying all States not
yet party to sign and ratify the Convention as soon as possible.[391]
When asked whether in his opinion the UK was doing
enough to encourage further progress towards universality, Daniel
Feakes told us that:
It is hard to say exactly what is happening.
As far as I know, there are démarches every so often. The
EU has a collective démarche, say, in Tel Aviv or Damascus.
Every so often, our Ambassador or the EU representative will deliver
démarches to the Governments there. These countries are
all invited to the various OPCW meetings. The Middle East is a
particularly tough area. There are some meetings that Israel will
not attendfor example, if Syria or Egypt are attendingor
vice versa.[392]
181. We conclude that the fact that the UK has
no chemical weapons, and that the process of destroying its past
stocks of such weapons was completed in 2007, is to be welcomed.
182. We conclude that the Government has correctly
identified further progress towards universality of the Chemical
Weapons Convention as a priority, given that a number of key states
of concern remain outside the Convention, some of which are thought
to possess chemical weapons. We recommend that the Government
should set out in its response to this Report what it believes
to be the obstacles to the accession of each of these states and
how it assesses the likelihood of overcoming these obstacles.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CWC
183. The Government told us that it "attaches
the utmost importance to the full implementation of the CWC".[393]
Daniel Feakes commented that both the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (discussed below) and the CWC
rely upon effective implementation at the national
level and upon awareness among the relevant professional communities,
such as the armed forces, scientists and industry. Analyses of
the national implementation of both treaties shows that neither
have particularly high rates of national implementation.[394]
Article VII of the CWC obliges States Parties to
enact legislation to implement the Convention and to designate
a National Authority to implement it. In the UK this is the Department
for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR), whose powers
derive from the Chemical Weapons Act 1996 under which BERR is
required to prepare an annual report on the operation of the act.[395]
The Government told us that BERR aims to involve business, academia
and NGOs via a National Authority Advisory Committee which advises
Ministers, and through CWC outreach seminars with universities
which include discussion of dual-use research.[396]
184. National Authorities act as a point of contact
with other states, and for the OPCW Technical Secretariat which
co-ordinates meetings, and provides advice and assistance to support
"effective, autonomous, national implementation".[397]
However, such implementation may be of low priority in some countries
where other, more pressing considerations dominate, such as "poverty,
disease, famine, drought, instability and civil war, or a more
straightforward lack of resources or of parliamentary attention".[398]
Despite the requirements implicit in being a CWC signatory, by
February 2009 only 178 of the 186 signatories had established
a National Authority. Daniel Feakes stressed that as well as ensuring
National Authorities are established it is "important to
ensure that these National Authorities are provided with ongoing
funding and resources and are not simply identified to fulfil
a one-off request from the OPCW."[399]
Even fewer States Parties (126) had informed the Organisation
of the legislative and administrative measures they had taken
to implement the Convention, and only 83 States Parties had legislation
covering all key areas.[400]
Even this may overestimate the number of States Parties whose
implementation of the treaty is complete. Daniel Feakes noted
that:
the criteria by which the OPCW assess 'all key
areas' are unclear and do not appear to include implementation
of the comprehensive scope of the CWC which is enshrined in the
'general purpose criterion' [for which, see paragraph 176 above].
The UK should encourage the OPCW to turn its attention to supporting
comprehensive national CWC implementation, including implementation
of the 'general purpose criterion'.
Mr Feakes further suggested that States Parties should
also introduce systems for monitoring compliance and for enforcement.
He added that the OPCW had now adopted a policy of naming and
shaming those countries which shirked their obligations.[401]
185. Bill Rammell told us that the Government "across
the board, advise[s] and help[s] states with the legislative requirements
necessary for them to comply with the Convention".[402]
He stated that "bilateral assistance has included the provision
of National Authority training courses, contributions to the OPCW's
'Associate Programme' [and] support for Protection Assistance
courses (against the use of chemical weapons)."[403]
Daniel Feakes described BERR's National Authority Advisory Committee
as "unique", adding that "the UK deserves praise
for this innovation and the Government should encourage other
CWC States Parties to establish similar committees."[404]
186. We conclude that the relatively small number
of States Parties which have comprehensively implemented the Chemical
Weapons Convention is a matter of concern. We recommend that the
Government should continue to put pressure on those states which
have not implemented the Convention in full to do so. We further
recommend that the Government should take positive steps to promote
the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform's
National Authority Advisory Committee as an example of good practice
that might usefully be adopted by other countries, and that it
should maintain its current programmes of bilateral assistance.
DESTRUCTION OF EXISTING CHEMICAL
WEAPONS
187. The CWC prohibits the development, production,
acquisition, transfer and retention of chemical weapons, as well
as their use. Within 30 days of the CWC coming into force each
State Party is obliged to make a detailed declaration of the chemical
weapons and production facilities that it possesses, or has possessed
since 1946. It must draw up plans for the destruction of stocks
and for facilities to be destroyed or converted for use for peaceful
purposes. The deadline for the destruction of existing stockpiles
is 29 April 2012.[405]
Bill Rammell told us that "real progress" was being
made towards meeting this deadline.[406]
Albania, India, Libya, Russia, South Korea and the US have declared
that they possess chemical weapons.[407]
The FCO commented that in practice:
One-third of the 8.6 million chemical munitions
and containers covered by the Convention and one-third of the
world's declared stockpile of approximately 71,000 metric tonnes
of chemical agent have been verifiably destroyed. Since the CWC
entered into force, two states have completed destruction of their
entire CW [chemical weapons] stockpile; a further four states
are following agreed destruction plans.[408]
Daniel Feakes identified Albania and South Korea
as the states which had completed destruction of their stockpiles,
stated that "India is due to destroy its stockpile by the
end of next year, I think, and Libya by the end of 2010"[409]
and predicted that Russia and the US would miss their 2012 deadline
for chemical weapons destruction:[410]
The US has already said publicly that it cannot
do so and that it will be perhaps 2017, or even 2023. The Russians
are still saying that they can do it, but people who know doubt
that they can do it by then as well.[411]
Nicholas Sims told us that in the first six years
in which the Convention was in operation, Russia had only destroyed
1% of its arsenal.[412]
Mr Feakes argued that this was largely a result of insufficient
financing of destruction programmes in the past and that in both
countries there were technical and environmental obstacles:
these weapons were never designed to be destroyed,
other than through use. [
] You have incineration technologies
or neutralisation technologies and various others [
] Some
technologies are more expensive than others. Others can be done
faster, but less effectively. Various things have to be weighed
up there. In the US, you also have the issue of very strong environmental
regulations. If you are incinerating, there are strong environment
regulations on emissions. I think that the same applies to Russia.
You are not allowed to transport these weapons.[413]
He believed a lack of progress could have serious
consequences for the OPCW:
If the OPCW is seen not to do anything about
it or to just let the issue go, that would affect its credibility.
But it also plays with the internal politics of the OPCW itself
[
] Lots of states were saying that they cannot progress
on this issue until those two states have progressed on destruction.
Everything is being linked together, so it could slow down the
whole agenda in The Hague.[414]
188. The FCO described assistance provided by the
UK Government for destruction of chemical weapons,
for example, by providing assistance to Russia's
destruction programme through the Global Partnership. We have
also provided technical advice to Libya and have participated
in workshops organized by the OPCW to assist Iraq's preparations
for CWC accession.[415]
Bill Rammell told us that "with Russia we have
committed about £23 million to help develop the necessary
facilities for destroying chemical weapons stockpiles".[416]
Daniel Feakes described in more detail how this assistance is:
focused on the Shchuch'ye CW destruction facility
in the Urals which holds 1.9 million artillery and rocket munitions,
containing some 5,500 tonnes of the nerve agents sarin, soman
and VR. The Ministry of Defence has placed contracts worth over
£44 million at Shchuch'ye on behalf of the UK and other international
donors. The UK has also announced assistance to the construction
of another destruction facility, at Kizner in the Udmurt Republic.
This is a significant contribution to the Russian CW destruction
programme and, while more funding would be welcome, it must be
remembered that CW possessor states bear ultimate responsibility
for destruction. To my knowledge the UK is not contributing to
destruction activities in any other remaining declared CW possessor
states (India, Libya and the US).[417]
Whilst the FCO in its written evidence identified
as a future challenge "addressing the potential failure by
one or more State Party to fully comply with the 2012 deadline",[418]
Bill Rammell was positive about the progress made so far, telling
us that the Government's "intention remains that every state
should get there by 2012. In respect of the United States and
Russia, there is commitment and there has been considerable progress.
Russia has reduced by about 25%."[419]
However, Nicholas Sims emphasised that greater focus was required,
and that it was reasonable for other states "to expect the
United States and the Russian Federation, which is far behind
the United States on the percentage it has destroyed, to get a
move on and devote far greater resources to [the destruction of
stockpiles]."[420]
189. Another future challenge for the CWC is identified
by the FCO as "securing consensus on the future priorities
of the OPCW once all declared stockpiles have been destroyed".[421]
Daniel Feakes believed that:
the primary function of the CWC will shift from
verifying destruction to ensuring that re-armament does not occur.
This will entail a radical change in the nature of OPCW verification
activities and will require States Parties to elaborate upon currently
underdeveloped CWC provisions regarding transfers, assistance,
encouragement and inducement and military preparations. [
]
It was therefore disappointing that the transition was not discussed
in more depth at the Second CWC Review Conference and it is worrying
that many non-aligned States Parties appear to be reluctant to
focus more heavily on science and technology and non-diversion.[422]
190. We conclude that the likely failure to meet
the global 2012 deadline for destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles
could erode the credibility of the Organisation for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons and undermine progress towards elimination
of chemical weapons. We further conclude that the Government is
to be commended for the measures it has taken to assist other
states, such as Russia and Libya, with their destruction of chemical
weapons. We recommend that the Government should step up its assistance
activities in this area, and that it should encourage the US and
Russia in particular to devote greater resources to the task of
destroying their chemical weapons stockpiles. We further recommend
that the Government should set out in its response to this Report
what its position will be at the next Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) Conference in relation to the failure of any state to destroy
its stocks of chemical weapons and in relation to the future priorities
for the CWC once stockpiles have been eradicated.
COMPLIANCE WITH THE CWC
191. In order to verify compliance with the CWC,
facilities that produce certain chemicals are subject to control
by the National Authority and inspection by the OPCW.[423]
The Convention provides for a "challenge inspection"
if there are doubts over compliance. Although this may be requested
by any State Party of any other State Party,[424]
Nicholas Sims told us that this provision has not been used.[425]
Daniel Feakes described the extent of the verification activities
under the Chemical Weapons Convention:
There have been almost 3,500 inspections over
the past 10 years at almost 200 chemical weapons facilities and
more than 1,000 industrial facilities. There is a very intrusive
and robust verification regime under the CWC. The Organisation
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, over in The Hague, has
about 200 inspectors who go out every day to military and civilian
facilities around the world. The regime is there and it is robust.[426]
The FCO informed us that the UK actively supports
the OPCW's verification activities, including the challenge inspection
mechanism.[427] Compliance
is the responsibility of an Executive Council, responsible to
the Conference. Daniel Feakes explained that:
if a State Party has failed to fulfil the Council's
request to redress the situation within the specified time, the
Conference can restrict or suspend the State Party's rights and
privileges until it undertakes the necessary action to conform
with its obligations. In cases which could cause serious damage
to the CWC, the Conference can recommend 'collective measures'
(e.g. sanctions) to States Parties in conformity with international
law. None of these provisions have yet been utilised so it is
impossible to comment on their effectiveness. What is apparent
from other incidents though is that enforcement is frequently
linked to wider political considerations and that finding a united
front among key states can often prove extremely difficult.
Ultimately issues can be referred to the UN General
Assembly and Security Council.[428]
192. Two issues arise in respect of the status of
the US under the inspection regime. Firstly, a condition of CWC
ratification by the US was that samples taken during inspections
could not be analysed outside the country. Secondly, the implementing
legislation allows the US President to make a "national security
exception" and deny a request to inspect any US facility.
Daniel Feakes told us that whilst this provision "has to
date and to my knowledge, [
] not caused any practical problems",
it has "set a precedent" which has been "copied
by other CWC States Parties", potentially weakening the treaty.[429]
In response to one of our previous reports on weapons of mass
destruction, published in 2000, the Government undertook to urge
the US to rescind the Presidential veto over challenge inspections.[430]
193. The Harvard-Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological
Weapons has proposed that, in addition to the provisions of the
CWC and BTWC which are directed at States, the enforcement of
both conventions could be strengthened by the introduction of
a new treaty which criminalised CBW activities at the individual
level. This proposal was supported by our witnesses, Nicholas
Sims and Daniel Feakes.[431]
Mr Feakes noted that the proposal had previously received the
support of the Government, expressed during our predecessor Committee's
inquiry into the 2002 Biological Weapons Green Paper.[432]
194. We conclude that the enforcement mechanisms
of the Chemical Weapons Convention are yet to be fully tested.
We recommend that the Government should continue to make representations
to the new US Administration to rescind the Presidential veto
over challenge inspections. We further recommend that the Government
should commit to press for a new convention criminalising chemical
and biological weapons at the individual level.
The Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BTWC)
195. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC) was signed in 1972 and entered into force in 1975. Its
full title is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.[433]
It bans the "development, production, stockpiling, acquisition,
retention or transfer of biological and toxin weapons".[434]
In addition, States Parties agree not to assist or encourage
other States Parties or international organisations to acquire
biological weapons and to take necessary national measures to
implement the convention.[435]
The UK was one of the three depositories of the Convention, along
with the US and Soviet Governments.[436]
Each State Party to the BTWC:
undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful
purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after
entry into force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons,
equipment and means of delivery [
] which are in its possession
or under its jurisdiction or control.[437]
In the UK these principles are enshrined in the Biological
Weapons Act 1974.
Implementation Support Unit
196. The Sixth BTWC Review Conference in December
2006 established an Implementation Support Unit (ISU) with three
full-time staff based in Geneva, whose role is to provide administrative
support to the BWC and to work on confidence-building measures.[438]
In 2008 the UK contributed £33,412 to the ISU towards its
total budget of £280,013.[439]
UNIVERSALITY
197. Since the Sixth Review Conference in December
2006, seven accessions have been made to the BTWC (most recently
the United Arab Emirates, in June 2008), giving a current total
of 163 States Parties. Israel, Egypt, Syria and Burma are amongst
what the Government termed "notable non-ratifiers".[440]
Masood Khan, chairman of the 2007 inter-sessional meeting of the
BTWC, stated that Egypt, Israel and Syria had declared outright
unwillingness to join in the near future as a result of "regional
security circumstances".[441]
Significantly fewer States Parties have signed the BTWC than the
CWC, despite the fact that it has existed for considerably longer.[442]
States Parties agreed at the Sixth BTWC Review Conference
that "a concerted effort by States Parties is needed to persuade
states not party to join the Convention"[443]
and the FCO told us that the UK "continues to play an active
role in promoting the universality of the BTWC".[444]
Nicholas Sims said that "since 2006 clear responsibility
has been placed on the Chairmen of the Meetings of States Parties
for carrying forward the commitment to promote universality."[445]
However, the BTWC has no secretariat equivalent to the OPCW which
could work to achieve this end.[446]
Daniel Feakes suggested that instead this could be accomplished
by:
strengthening the role of the chairs and by mandating
the three-person Implementation Support Unit (ISU) set up by the
States Parties to conduct outreach events such as seminars and
bilateral visits to non-States Parties. Additional effort should
be made to engage parliamentarians in non-States Parties. Such
events could be coordinated with related organizations such as
the OPCW and CTBTO. Existing outreach work by civil society should
also be built upon, such as the successful work of the Bio-Weapons
Prevention Project (BWPP) in Africa. Local civil society groups
are able to sustain an ongoing dialogue with government officials
and parliamentarians which foreign governments or international
organizations cannot.[447]
198. A number of the states outside the BTWC are
members of the Commonwealth, including some which have never signed
the treaty (Cameroon, Kiribati, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Samoa
and Tuvalu) and some which have signed but are yet to ratify (Tanzania,
Guyana and Malawi). Nicholas Sims argued that the UK could play
a useful role in persuading these states to become party to the
Convention.[448]
199. We recommend that the Government should set
out in its response to this Report what efforts it is making to
persuade other states to join the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention and outline what it believes to be the obstacles to
universality. We further recommend that the Government should
seek to persuade those members of the Commonwealth who are yet
to sign or ratify the Convention to do so.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BTWC: THE
ABSENCE OF VERIFICATION
200. The Government told us that effective national
implementation of the BTWC is one of the "key UK priorities":
Current FCO-funded activity is focused on legislative
analysis and assistance to states which do not have comprehensive
national implementing measures in place (a multi-year project
worth £623,000 delivered through the Verification Research
and Information CentreVERTIC) and support to the Bio-Weapons
Prevention Project to develop a strategy to promote universal
adherence to the BTWC. Through the EU we are supporting a Joint
Action in support of WHO activities on laboratory biosafety and
biosecurity, and Joint Action assistance in the areas of Confidence
Building Measures, and support to the Inter-sessional work programme,
as well as ongoing activity in support of universality and national
implementation.[449]
The BTWC differs from the CWC in two important respects.
Firstly, the BTWC requires no declarations to be made and there
is no verification procedure in place.[450]
Secondly, there is no equivalent of the Organisation for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons in relation to the BTWC.
The failed verification protocol
201. Between 1995 and 2001 negotiations took place
to design a verification protocol for the BTWC, but these ended
without agreement. The FCO told us that the failure of these negotiations
related to the nature of biological weapons:
The dual-use nature of virtually all the know-how,
materials and equipment used in biological weapons means that
identifying and agreeing workable and acceptable verification
and compliance measures for biological arms control is fraught
with formidable intellectual, scientific and political problems.[451]
EU Member States agreed on a common position but
could not prevent a breakdown in talks. A number of states would
not commit their support to the draft protocolthese included
China, Cuba, Iran, India, Libya and Pakistan.[452]
Critically, the US opposed the draft protocol, with John Bolton,
the then US Under Secretary of State, commenting that:
first, it was based on a traditional arms control
approach that will not work on biological weapons; second, it
would have compromised national security and confidential business
information; and third, it would have been used by proliferators
to undermine other effective international export control regimes.[453]
Dr Jones concurred that there might be difficulty
with verification in the case of biological weapons "by virtue
of their greater potency, low cost, ease of production, small
size, ease of transport and difficulty of detection", adding
that "for many concepts of use, which tend to the covert
and pre-emptive, the accumulation of a stockpile of weapons for
a rapid response is not a pre-requisite of an offensive BW [biological
weapons] capability."[454]
202. We previously expressed support for a verification
protocol in our Fifth Report of Session 2002-03 on the Government's
Biological Weapons Green Paper, questioning whether the inclusion
of the US in such a protocol was essential for its success.[455]
The Government's response noted that whilst it had been in favour
of a protocol "there was a widespread view amongst delegations
at the 24th AHG [Ad Hoc Group] session that, without US participation,
it was not worth pursuing a Protocol", and that "it
is not politically feasible to resurrect the Protocol given the
strong opposition in Washington, as well as the continuing reluctance
of many others to move forward without the US."[456]
Nicholas Sims told us that he "[understood] the assessment
was made that a Protocol without the USA would also be a Protocol
without Russia, China, India, Pakistan or Iran".[457]
203. President Obama has not indicated yet whether
he will support a resumption of negotiations. Nicholas Sims' view
was that it is unlikely that even the new Administration will
support a verification protocol:
Where people are perhaps over-optimistic is in
expecting that the change of Administration would lead the US
to be more favourable to verification of the BWC. I frequently
have to diminish those hopespour cold water on thembecause
the Clinton Administration was extremely dubious about verification
of the BWC. It became almost a dogma that the BWC was not really
verifiable [
] The new Administration is likely to provide
a change of tone first of all.[458]
I do not think that the USA is likely to be persuaded
that its industry or its national security is safe with an inspection
regime. Therefore, I do not think that a verification regime for
the BWC involving inspection is a politically realistic goal for
the foreseeable future. I know the EU has to hold it as a distant
goal that it cannot retreat from, but realistically, it makes
much more sense to go for other compliance measures.[459]
Mr Feakes agreed that this was likely to be the case,
but expressed hope that verification "might start to come
back onto the agenda. At the end of the day, you need something
with boots on the ground and people on site."[460]
204. Bill Rammell was clear that the Government remain
"long-standing supporters of a verification regime"[461]
and other witnesses emphasised that whilst they supported a protocol
in principle, it was not an achievable short-term objective.[462]
In the meantime, as Nicholas Sims told us, an alternative would
be to strengthen the BTWC using other mechanisms:
My view is that [a verification protocol] could
be useful, and achievable, but only if designed to fit the BWC's
distinctive needs (i.e. not a straight copy of the CWC) and shaped
in recognition of the BWC's long history (i.e. not assuming tabula
rasa). It would need to be constructed around the limitations
that (unless much has changed by the 2020s) some of the BWC prohibitions
are more evidently verifiable than others, and certainty is seldom,
if ever, attainable. Moreover, it should be pursued only after
the BWC has exhausted all the latent potential for strengthening
its treaty regime from within which is contained within the Convention
as it stands and can be tapped through mechanisms developed within
its review process [
] Until then it should remain a long-term
aspiration.[463]
205. We conclude that securing a verification
protocol for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should
remain a key objective for the Government. We recommend that the
Government should work to persuade the new US Administration that
such a protocol for the Convention is essential. We further recommend
that the Government should, in conjunction with other States Parties,
explore ways in which the Convention can be strengthened by other
means until such time as a verification protocol can be achieved.
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE BTWC
206. It is clear that some States Parties have continued
to develop biological weapons, despite having signed the BTWC.[464]
Disputes in relation to the BTWC are settled through "appropriate
international procedures within the framework of the United Nations",
with any State Party being able to report alleged cases of non-compliance
to the UN Security Council.[465]
Whilst there has been one Consultative Meeting of States Parties
to review a case of non-compliance which related to the United
States' alleged use of biological weapons against crops in Cuba,[466]
no compliance concern has ever been raised at the UN Security
Council.[467]
STRENGTHENING THE BTWC
207. The FCO told us that since the failure to agree
a verification protocol it has been focussed on "identifying
and implementing other measures to strengthen the BTWC".[468]
It has expressed a commitment to strengthening the Convention,
believing that "international cooperation in the framework
of the BTWC is key to defeating the threat from biological weapons".[469]
At the Sixth BTWC Review Conference in December 2006 an Inter-sessional
Work Programme for 2007-2010 was agreed. The FCO told us that
it "promotes discussion, common agreements and the sharing
of best practice on these topics through the contribution of working
papers and active participation in BTWC and other meetings."
The topics included in the programme are:
national implementation (2007), biosafety and
biosecurity, awareness-raising, education, oversight of science,
and codes of conduct (2008), capacity building in the fields of
disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and containment of
infectious diseases (2009) and assistance in cases of alleged
use of biological or toxin weapons (2010).[470]
However, when questioned on the UK's specific proposals
for strengthening the BTWC Bill Rammell was unable to provide
much detail, confirming that "inspection has a key role to
play", emphasising that the Government has a "determination
to find a way through" and stating that "moving forward
to the next review in 2011 has to be a priority."[471]
208. Nicholas Sims proposed a programme of specific
measures which the FCO should pursue at the Seventh BTWC Review
Conference in 2011. The first of these is an Accountability Framework,
proposed by Canada in 2006:
The idea at its simplest is that the States Parties
should show that they are accountable one to another in respect
of demonstrating compliance, much more positively than they have
done hitherto. [...] There could be regular accountability sessions
where questions of doubtful activities could be raised and where
there would be reassurance, if there can be reassurance, but also
a working out of real compliance ambiguities and calls for clarification.
Mr Sims also supported the "Action Plan for
Comprehensive Implementation [
] proposed by the President
of the Sixth Review Conferencebut unfortunately too late
in the day to succeed." Such a plan could include "a
request to States Parties to create or designate National Authorities
for the BWC, as they are already required for the CWC". He
suggested better collective scrutiny of developments in technology
through, for example, a Scientific Advisory Panel meeting regularly,
and advocated that in the absence of an equivalent to the OPCW
the mandate and staff of the Implementation Support Unit should
be expanded, allowing it to support a Scientific Advisory Panel,
an Action Plan for Comprehensive Implementation, processing of
Confidence Building Measure returns, the promotion of universality
and the development of an Accountability Framework. The Government
told us that in the absence of a verification protocol and subsequent
creation of an OPCW equivalent "or any expansion of its mandate,
the ISU is likely to remain sufficient to manage the day to day
administration of the BTWC."[472]
209. Mr Sims suggested that formal 'BWC Annual Meetings'
should replace gatherings held in support of the inter-sessional
work programmes and that there should be fewer constraints on
the agenda and more recurring items. He also supported work to
refine and improve the Confidence-Building Measures (as did Daniel
Feakes)[473] and to
complete the 'consolidation agenda' of politically-binding commitments
agreed by consensus at earlier Review Conferences and recorded
in their Final Declarations but still not fulfilledfor
example, withdrawal of the right of retaliation held under the
Geneva Protocol. As we noted above (see paragraph 193), both Daniel
Feakes and Nicholas Sims supported the Harvard-Sussex Program
on Chemical and Biological Weapon's proposal to enable criminal
prosecutions of individuals involved in illegal preparation or
use of biological weapons.[474]
210. Progress on strengthening the BTWC is likely
to depend, in part, on the attitude taken by the US. Nicholas
Sims argued that in the past the US had "a very good national
record"[475] in
the area of biological weapons, having given them up before the
BTWC came into force.[476]
However, he commented that the US "certainly are not engaged",
adding that:
In the BWC, they have been remarkably discouraging
to multilateral endeavours ever since 2001, and therefore the
predominant mode in BWC diplomacy in Geneva has been, 'How much
will the Americans allow us to do? How fast can we move towards
recovery from the debacle of the ending of the protocol negotiations
in July 2001? How far and how fast can we move towards something
that is almost a secretariat?' The Americans will not let us call
it a secretariat, so we have to call it an Implementation Support
Unit. It is a tremendous achievement to be allowed to employ three
people full-time for four years. That is the sort of grudgingness
that I hope the new US Administration will get right away from.
I would like them to be encouraged to be far
more positive on reinforcing the BWC from within, allowing the
treaty regime to develop in the sorts of ways that plenty of European
Union and other NATO members, such as Canada and Norway, have
put forward. Those members have, however, found themselves held
back by the constraints that the US has placed since 2001 on any
development of multilateralism within the BWCvery severe
agenda constraints, very severe constraints on linking progress
in one year's meeting of States Parties to the next, very severe
constraints on any negotiation or addition of commitments at all
and, unfortunately, no secretariat.
211. We conclude that strengthening the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention should be a priority for the Government
in the absence of a verification protocol. We recommend that in
its response to this Report the Government should comment on the
specific suggestions aimed at achieving this end, set out in previous
paragraphs, and outline what measures it intends to pursue further
at the Seventh Review Conference in 2011. The suggested measures
include an Accountability Framework, Action Plan for Comprehensive
Implementation, better collective scrutiny of developments in
technology, an expansion of the role and staff of the Implementation
Support Unit, formal annual meetings, work to refine and improve
the Confidence-Building Measures, a consolidation agenda of politically-binding
commitments agreed at earlier Review Conferences and criminalisation
of biological weapons activities at the individual level.
The BTWC and CWC and new technologies
212. Technological advances are likely to pose significant
challenges to the CWC and BTWC. The British Medical Association
drew our attention to "the risks associated with the rapid
advances in biotechnology". It emphasised the need to engage
with scientists and the medical profession about the "control
of biological experimentation, and the dissemination of the results
of such research", particularly "how they make decisions
on whether to publish the results of potentially 'dangerous' research."[477]
The development of whole new fields such as synthetic biology,
and the likely future convergence of chemistry and biology, mean
that "the BWC and CWC will have to demonstrate adaptability
and devote time to investigating the areas of overlap between
them".[478]
213. As we noted in paragraph 176, general purpose
criteria were included in the CWC and BTWC "in conscious
recognition of the need to prohibit in advance the sources of
future threats",[479]
and as Mr Feakes put it these apply to "intentions rather
than to particular chemical or biological agents."[480]
The intention has been that such criteria should be incorporated
into national implementing legislation,[481]
but Mr Feakes explained that "loopholes can emerge during
the implementation of the treaties and through disagreements between
States Parties."[482]
Nicholas Sims told us that:
overlap of coverage between the two Conventions,
for example in the case of toxins, should not be cause for concern.
It does not matter if something is banned twice over. It does
matter if something noxious falls between the two and is not banned
at all. At present [
] I have no doubt over the comprehensiveness
of legal coverage. But if others do have doubts, and can identify
the S&T [science and technology] areas in which doubts arise,
then there could be value in bringing together expert groups of
BWC and CWC scientists to examine the problem and make agreed
recommendations. Comprehensiveness of prohibitionswith
nothing noxious falling between the two Conventionscould
then be reaffirmed by the respective Review Conferences.[483]
It is important that suitable mechanisms are in place
to monitor developments in science and technology. Daniel Feakes
explained that the CWC already has a Scientific Advisory Board
but that its recommendations "are not always heeded by the
States Parties". Both he and Nicholas Sims proposed a similar
body for the BTWC.[484]
NON-LETHAL BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL
WEAPONS
214. One of the significant recent developments in
science is in the area of incapacitating biochemical weapons.[485]
A recent publication by the British Medical Association, entitled
"The use of drugs as weapons", "highlights how
the development and use of medicines as a means of incapacitating
people in law enforcement and combat situations, risks undermining
chemical and biological weapons conventions."[486]
These weapons were also the focus of a submission from the Bradford
Non-lethal Weapons Research Project, at the Department of Peace
Studies, Bradford University, which pointed out that, despite
their name, so-called non-lethal weapons carry significant risk
of death and are being developed by a number of states. In October
2002 Russian forces used an unidentified gas in a building where
Chechen separatists were holding over 800 hostages, resulting
in the death of 129 hostages, largely as a result of the gas.
The CWC permits use of toxic chemicals for "law enforcement"
without defining the term and there is no obligation to declare
substances used for this purpose.[487]
Daniel Feakes stated that one danger of non-lethal weapons would
be that "the norm against using poison and disease in warfare
might start to unravel."[488]
However, Nicholas Sims noted that "neither the CWC nor the
BWC is limited to lethal weapons in terms of prohibitions",[489]
suggesting that they would be covered.
215. We also examined the status of herbicides and
defoliants under the CWC. Nicholas Sims told us that following
the Vietnam War, "the sensitivity for the United States of
the issue of defoliants and herbicides resulted in special handling
of this issue".[490]
Therefore, whilst these chemicals are in no way a new technology,
the final Convention did not explicitly refer to such agents.
Instead, a compromise was reached in which preambular paragraph
seven contained the text "recognizing the prohibition, embodied
in the pertinent agreements and relevant principles of international
law, of the use of herbicides as a method of warfare". As
Mr Sims pointed out, "by its very nature a preambular reference
does not constitute a treaty obligation but reflects the intentions
of the negotiators and the context of existing law and institutions
which they regarded as particularly relevant to the new treaty."[491]
216. Mr Sims cited a legal commentary on the CWC
by Dr Walter Krutzsch and Dr Ralph Trapp which highlights the
fact that the Convention specifically defines toxic chemicals
in terms of their effects on humans or animals, excluding plants.
The implication of this is that herbicides would be covered only
if they also caused harm to humans and animals. Whilst use of
agents directed against plants is covered by the Convention on
the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques (ENMOD) of 18 May 1977, the ban extends
only to the use of such weapons, and then "only if the use
is for military or any other hostile purpose and has effects which
are widespread, long-lasting or severe as the means of destruction,
damage or injury to another State Party." The CWC, in contrast,
prohibits a wider range of activities including development, production
and stockpiling.[492]
Mr Sims told us that "it would indeed be desirable to revisit
the issue of defoliants and herbicides, but within the wider category
of toxic chemicals" which could also include consideration
of the status of other 'non-lethal' chemical agents that have
been discussed. For this item to appear on the agenda of the CWC
Third Review Conference in 2013 accompanied by useful proposals,
the Government would need to press for this for several years
in advance.
217. We conclude that whilst general purpose criteria
provide the means by which the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
and Chemical Weapons Convention can keep pace with advances in
technology, this is still an area which requires close attention.
We recommend that the Government should set out its proposals
for ensuring that the Conventions are able to keep pace adequately
with future technologies, particularly in areas of overlap.
218. We recommend that in its response to this
Report the Government should set out its view on non-lethal agents
such as herbicides, defoliants and incapacitating biochemical
weapons and the status of such agents under the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapons Convention. We conclude
that there is a case for certain biological and chemical agents
which are non-lethal or which target plants, including crops and
vegetation, to be prohibited from use as weapons for the purposes
of these Conventions. We further recommend that the Government
should press for negotiations on an unambiguous prohibition of
their use as weapons to commence at the next Review Conferences.
356 Q 54 Back
357
Q 54 Back
358
Ev 105 Back
359
Ev 105 Back
360
Chemical Weapons Convention, Article II, http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/articles/article-ii-definitions-and-criteria/
Back
361
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on Their Destruction, April 1972, Article I Back
362
Ev 103 Back
363
Ev 100 Back
364
Paul Cornish, "The CBRN System, Assessing the threat of terrorist
use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons
in the United Kingdom", Chatham House, February 2007 Back
365
Ibid., p 13 Back
366
FCO, Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention:
Countering the Threat from Biological Weapons, Cm 5484, April
2002, para 17 Back
367
Hart and Clevestig, "Reducing security threats from chemical
and biological materials", SIPRI Yearbook 2008, pp
439-442 Back
368
http://www.dstl.gov.uk/capabilities/science_tech/index.php Back
369
Ev 238 Back
370
Ulla Jasper, "The challenge of biological weapons: proposals
for greater EU effectiveness", Disarmament Diplomacy,
July/August 2004 Back
371
"Bioterrorism: a mystery unravelled", The Economist,
9 August 2008; see also para 256 below. Back
372
Ev 238 Back
373
Ev 238 Back
374
Ev 101, 237 Back
375
Q 61 Back
376
Ev 238 Back
377
Ev 238 Back
378
Ev 237 Back
379
Q 63 Back
380
Ev 238 Back
381
"Status of participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention
as at 19 June 2008", Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons Technical Secretariat, June 2008 Back
382
Ev 238 Back
383
Ev 185 Back
384
http://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/ Back
385
Ev 295 Back
386
http://www.opcw.org/news/news/article/opening-statement-by-the-director-general-to-the-executive-council-at-its-fifty-fifth-session/
Back
387
Daniel Feakes, "Practical steps for accelerating BWC universality",
Disarmament Diplomacy, Spring 2006 Back
388
"Status of universality and external relations as at February
2009", Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,
20 February 2009, at http://www.opcw.org/news/news/article/status-of-universality-and-external-relations-as-at-february-2009/ Back
389
Ev 238; Q 69 Back
390
Q 69 Back
391
Ev 185 Back
392
Q 77 Back
393
Ev 185 Back
394
Ev 238 Back
395
http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/energy/non-proliferation/cbw/national-authority/page40746.html
Back
396
Ev 186 Back
397
http://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/member-states/national-authorities/ Back
398
Ev 288 Back
399
Ev 288 Back
400
http://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/member-states/national-authorities/
Back
401
Q 78 Back
402
Q 292 Back
403
Ev 185 Back
404
Ev 237 Back
405
Chemical Weapons Convention, Article I; Ev 185 Back
406
Q 218 Back
407
Q 69 Back
408
Ev 185 Back
409
Q 69 Back
410
Ev 238 Back
411
Q 69 Back
412
Q 84 Back
413
Q 82 Back
414
Q 84 Back
415
Ev 185; for the Global Partnership, see paras 266-269. Back
416
Q 292 Back
417
Ev 288 Back
418
Ev 185 Back
419
Q 293 Back
420
Q 84 Back
421
Ev 185 Back
422
Ev 238 Back
423
Chemical Weapons Convention, Article VI Back
424
Chemical Weapons Convention, Article IX Back
425
Ev 280 Back
426
Q 64 Back
427
Ev 185 Back
428
Ev 287 Back
429
Ev 288 Back
430
Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs to the Eighth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee,
Session 1999-2000, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Cm 4884, para
15 Back
431
Ev 253, 289 Back
432
Foreign Affairs Committee, First Report of Session 2002-03, The
Biological Weapons Green Paper, HC 150; Ev 35 Back
433
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on Their Destruction, April 1972; the Convention is also sometimes
known simply as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Back
434
Ev 185 Back
435
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on Their Destruction, April 1972, Articles III-IV Back
436
Ev 186 Back
437
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on Their Destruction, April 1972, Article II Back
438
Ev 296; Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, 2006, p 19 Back
439
Ev 296 Back
440
Ev 186; http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/7BE6CBBEA0477B52C12571860035FD5C?OpenDocument
Back
441
Hart and Clevestig, "Reducing security threats from chemical
and biological materials", SIPRI Yearbook 2008, p
434 Back
442
Ev 186 Back
443
Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, 2006, p 22 Back
444
Ev 186 Back
445
Ev 253 Back
446
Ev 289 Back
447
Ev 289 Back
448
Ev 281 Back
449
Ev 186 Back
450
Ev 185 Back
451
Ev 185 Back
452
FCO, Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention:
Countering the Threat from Biological Weapons, Cm 5484, April
2002, para 40 Back
453
John Bolton, "Remarks at Tokyo America Center", 27 August
2002 Back
454
Ev 104 Back
455
Foreign Affairs Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2002-03, The
Biological Weapons Green Paper, HC 671, paras 6-9 Back
456
Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs to the Fifth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee,
Session 2002-03, The Biological Weapons Green Paper, Cm 5857,
paras 4 and 10 Back
457
Ev 281 Back
458
Q 73 Back
459
Q 86 Back
460
Q 87 Back
461
Q 297 Back
462
Ev 282, 290 Back
463
Ev 282 Back
464
"Strengthening the BTWC", Journal of the European
Molecular Biology Organisation, special issue, 2003 Back
465
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on Their Destruction, April 1972, Articles V-VI Back
466
FCO, Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention:
Countering the Threat from Biological Weapons, Cm 5484, April
2002, para 26 Back
467
"Strengthening the BTWC", Journal of the European
Molecular Biology Organisation, special issue, 2003 Back
468
Ev 185 Back
469
Ev 185 Back
470
Ev 185 Back
471
Q 298 Back
472
Ev 302 Back
473
Ev 289 Back
474
Ev 253, 289 Back
475
Q 71 Back
476
Q 72 Back
477
Ev 260 Back
478
Ev 238 Back
479
Ev 283 Back
480
Ev 291 Back
481
Ev 238 Back
482
Ev 291 Back
483
Ev 283 Back
484
Ev 283, 291 Back
485
Ev 291 Back
486
Ev 260 Back
487
Ev 226 Back
488
Ev 238 Back
489
Ev 283 Back
490
Ev 245 Back
491
Ev 245 Back
492
Ev 245 Back
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