House of Commons - Global Security: Non-Proliferation

Global Security: Non-Proliferation - Foreign Affairs Committee Contents

6 Terrorism and physical security

The threat posed by terrorists and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

242. The threat that terrorists will acquire nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and use them against the UK is distinct from the risk which is posed by states, although in several respects related to it.[529] In March 2009, the Government issued a revised version of its CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy which stated that:

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The strategy judged that:

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The strategy features "[a] new cross-cutting strand of work on containing the threat from an attack using chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) materials."[532]

243. We wish to place on record that we do not have access to assessments by the intelligence services of the scale and nature of the threat of terrorist acquisition and use of WMD, other than those which are reflected in material in the public domain.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

244. The potential exists for terrorists to mount a nuclear or radiological attack in a number of ways, for example by acquiring a nuclear weapon, attempting to build one from basic materials, or attempting to achieve dispersal of nuclear material by attacking a nuclear facility or detonating a 'dirty bomb' (that is, a bomb which contains nuclear or radiological material but in which the explosion is achieved with conventional means). As Lord Robertson put it to us, "the existence of non-state actors, transnational terrorism and terrorist networks has brought more clearly into focus the potential dangers involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons".[533]

245. There is no doubt that terrorists would like to acquire nuclear weapons. Bill Rammell told us that al-Qaeda "clearly have that intent" and that "Osama bin Laden has talked about an Islamic duty to develop nuclear capability—[…] there was a call to arms, as it were, and they were seeking to recruit physicists and others to come forward and help."[534] Mariot Leslie, Director-General of Defence and Intelligence at the FCO, said that:

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246. Dr Jones told us that "It would be very difficult, but not impossible, for terrorists to acquire one or a very limited number of nuclear weapons. They would probably need the witting or unwitting assistance of a nuclear-capable nation to do so. It would be more difficult for intelligence to detect such activities with a high degree of reliability."[536] The unwitting assistance of a nuclear-capable nation could come as a result of inadequate physical security around nuclear material (discussed below) or the action of rogue individuals. Baroness Williams told us that "internal betrayals" were a serious risk:

the most serious breaches that we know of […] are quite astonishing because they had nothing to do with terrorists. One involved the deputy chairman in charge of security at nuclear sites who was himself a Russian citizen. He was sacked from his job for attempting to smuggle and steal nuclear materials and sell them abroad. The second one, which is almost as troubling […] was an attempt by certain senior figures in the Pakistani military to get hold of nuclear materials to sell them to al-Qaeda.

Baroness Williams cited as her source for these assertions the latest (2008) "Securing the Bomb" report by Matthew Bunn of the Belfer Center at Harvard University, which provides an extensive review of the physical and politico-administrative security of nuclear materials around the world. The report documents known instances of actual or attempted security breaches.[537]

247. Pakistan is a country of particular concern, having spawned the nuclear proliferation network run by A.Q. Khan which helped to supply the illicit nuclear weapons programmes of Iran, Libya, North Korea and possibly other states.[538] Giving evidence in February 2009 to our inquiry into "Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan", Professor Shaun Gregory of the Pakistan Security Research Unit at Bradford University described an incident in which "two very senior Pakistan atomic energy commission individuals" met Osama bin Laden in 2001. He posited that "it is not knowledge of specific individuals that matters; what matters is the relationship between those individuals and the networks that they can reach—that is a very important meeting. One of the dynamics that we need to be worried about is the risk of transfer in that way."[539]

248. Mark Fitzpatrick gave us his assessment of the danger that Pakistan's nuclear technology could fall into the hands of terrorists:

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249. Professor Gregory expressed concern that there was potential in Pakistan for collaboration between

541

Also giving evidence to our Afghanistan and Pakistan inquiry, in May 2009, FCO Minister Lord Malloch-Brown told us that:

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250. Russia and other former Soviet states have also been regarded as countries from which terrorists might source nuclear material, owing to the large quantities present there and the often poor levels of security. Lord Robertson described the "gap [in time] between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Putin era" as "a black hole that unfortunately still represents a danger to us".[543] He told us of a meeting which he had had as NATO Secretary-General with then-President Putin, "who said quite candidly that after the end of the Soviet Union a lot of things happened and a lot of things got lost, and he said that they did not know where they were. He said that that represents a danger not only to them, but to the world as a whole."[544]

251. Although the specific source of the polonium used has not been conclusively identified, at least in public, there was a Russian connection to what The Economist described as "in effect, a miniature act of nuclear terrorism on the streets of London",[545] namely the murder of Alexander Litvinenko by polonium poisoning in November 2006. According to a senior former Australian diplomat in the non-proliferation field:

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The Litvinenko murder also demonstrated the extent of the disruption that may be caused even by a radiological attack that does not appear to have been intended to cause mass casualties: over 700 people had to be tested for polonium contamination, as did a number of locations, some of which had to be closed for several months; and the Health Protection Agency was obliged to run two dedicated centres until February 2007 to deal with the incident, on which over 3,000 people worked in total.[547]

252. We conclude that, although it would appear to be difficult for terrorists acting independently of state agencies to build a nuclear bomb, there is a genuine risk that terrorists could acquire nuclear or radiological material, which might be used as an instrument of terror in various ways. We further conclude that, in addition to inadequate levels of physical security which might allow terrorists to seize nuclear or radiological material directly, 'rogue' individuals or groups in states possessing nuclear weapons or material represent an important but particularly hard-to-address means by which terrorists might acquire such material. We recommend that the Government should press its counterparts in countries that are potential sources of nuclear and radiological materials to treat this issue with the highest priority. We further recommend that the Government in its response to this Report should set out what action it is taking overseas to minimise the 'dirty bomb' threat to the UK.

BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS

253. Biological and chemical weapons are potential terrorist weapons. Dr Paul Cornish of Chatham House has stated that:

Although the large-scale production, weaponization and delivery of chemical weapons would be challenging, scientifically and logistically, as well as extremely expensive, a small number of low-yield chemical weapons would be relatively easy to hide and transport and might thus appeal to a well-organized and well-funded terrorist group.

Dr Cornish also claimed that:

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254. This was also the view of Dr Jones, who told us that:

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255. One problem raised by biological weapons is that much of the technology required for their production is dual-use, and readily available.[550] It is possible that some states may be willing to sponsor terrorist use of biological or chemical weapons. Dr Jones claimed that:

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256. There are precedents for the use of biological and chemical weapons by terrorists. In 2001, attacks in the US using the biological agent anthrax were attributed to a researcher at a US Army research laboratory, Bruce Ivins, who committed suicide in July 2008.[552] Dr Jones described the difficulties in establishing who has carried out such attacks, and said that many experts "remain sceptical" that Bruce Ivins was the culprit in this case.[553] In 1995 sarin gas killed 12 people when it was released into the Tokyo subway system by Japanese terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo.[554] However, production of the sarin was not easy and is estimated to have cost $30 million, involved 80 scientists and taken over a year to achieve.[555] Dr Jones judged that neither the sarin nor the anthrax attack had been particularly successful, and suggested that this was "indicative of the sort of problems that terrorists are much more likely to have in using these systems than a state, if that state has developed a capability using all its resources."

257. In the UK there was an alleged attempt to produce ricin in a Wood Green flat in 2003, and in 2006 police raided a house in Forest Gate where it was suspected that chemical weapons had been in production.[556]

258. It is not easy accurately to assess the risk that terrorists will acquire or use biological or chemical weapons in future, or to adjudge whether there is a greater risk that terrorists will use such weapons than that states will do so. Bill Rammell told us that the FCO considers terrorists to be of greater concern than states in relation to these weapons. The FCO's Mariot Leslie added that "it is relatively easy to make something crude that would have a big impact on members of the public."[557]

259. There are clear indications that terrorist organisations are engaged in the pursuit of chemical and biological weapons capabilities. Dr Paul Cornish has written that al-Qaeda has made significant efforts to acquire a biological weapons capability and that "it is widely accepted that al-Qaeda has, for several years, been committed to the acquisition and/or production of chemical weapons".[558] This is evidenced by the discovery of a laboratory at Kandahar in Afghanistan which was designed for the development of biological agents and to which scientists had been recruited.[559] A number of other recent assessments have strengthened the consensus that terrorist use of biological weapons, in particular, is a serious threat.[560]

260. Daniel Feakes emphasised that any precautions taken must be proportionate to the risk:

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261. We conclude that the Government is correct in its claim that the UK faces a significant threat arising from terrorist use of chemical or biological weapons, and to argue that at present this threat is greater than the threat that such weapons might be used against the UK by hostile states. We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government should set out what action it is taking to mitigate this threat.

BALLISTIC MISSILES

262. As we outlined in Chapter 5, ballistic missiles are one means by which both conventional and nuclear, chemical or biological weapons may be delivered to targets. With regard to ballistic missiles, the FCO told us that:

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263. The extent to which terrorists might seek to acquire ballistic missiles as a delivery method is a matter for argument. Analysts often suggest that ballistic missiles would not be terrorists' most likely delivery method, largely because of the technical difficulties involved. For example, the Nuclear Threat Initiative states that:

Nor does it seem likely that terrorists will have the option of ballistic missiles for delivering nuclear weapons any time soon, all the more so because nuclear weapons fashioned by terrorists are likely to be bulkier and heavier than those that a country will be able to develop. (Of course, if terrorists can steal or take over both a nuclear weapon and a missile with which to deliver it, this assessment changes.)

Other means of delivery abound. […] Terrorists would be likely to choose more 'primitive' delivery methods, as countries also might that wanted to attack someone without revealing the origin of the strike. Such methods could include stashing a bomb on an airliner; using a light aircraft to deliver a bomb over more modest distances (in much the way such aircraft are routinely used for smuggling drugs); or stowing a bomb on a boat (a freighter, a fishing trawler, a luxury yacht) to explode at pier-side in any coastal city.

A bomb that had already been smuggled into the target country, or assembled there, could also be delivered by train, bus, truck, or car. Boats, airliners, trains, buses, and long-haul trucks could handle nuclear weapons of any plausible size, no matter how crude and heavy. Only in the cases of delivery by light aircraft, automobile, or pick-up truck might it be necessary to confine the weight of the bomb to under a ton. And it cannot be ruled out that a bomb would be assembled at the location where it is intended to be detonated, in which case only the nuclear-explosive materials and other components would have to be 'delivered' and there would be essentially no constraint on the size of the completed device.

Nevertheless, concerns have been raised by the trend in ballistic missile technology towards the use of solid-fuelled missiles rather than liquid-fuelled ones, as the former are smaller, more mobile and more easily launched by fewer people.

Initiatives against terrorist acquisition of WMD

264. Multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament treaties—if implemented effectively at the national level—are potentially useful in preventing terrorists from acquiring, developing and training to use WMD, because they reduce the number of states in which such activities might take place or from which they might be sourced. As Nicholas Sims told us:

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265. In effect, terrorists as well as states are targeted by measures to control the trade in essential materials, reduce the threat posed by individuals (such as the UK's ATAS scheme) and cut off sources of finance, such as those we outlined in Chapter 2. There are also a number of measures designed specifically to combat terrorist acquisition or use of WMD. We outline these below.

G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP/UK GLOBAL THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMME

266. The Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction is a G8 programme established in 2002, initially for ten years, which aims "to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology."[564] Over 20 states are now involved, plus the EU. Through the Global Partnership, projects have been implemented in areas including the destruction of chemical weapons, to meet obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention; the dismantling of nuclear submarines and nuclear reactors; nuclear safety and the physical security of nuclear materials; and the creation of alternative employment for former weapons scientists, to reduce the risk of diversion of expertise.[565]

267. The UK's contribution to the Global Partnership is delivered through the UK's Global Threat Reduction Programme. This is the UK's largest programme of non-proliferation assistance, with a budget of £36.5 million a year for the three years from 2008/09 to 2010/11.[566] The programme is led by the FCO, but the budget is allocated to the Department for Energy and Climate Change, which manages the nuclear and radiological elements of the programme and passes onto the Ministry of Defence the roughly 10% of the budget which funds projects relating to chemical and biological weapons.[567] The Government regards the Global Threat Reduction Programme as an "important element" of the 'deny' strand of its '4 D's' counter-proliferation strategy.[568]

268. The Global Partnership and the UK's contribution to it have focused on Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union (FSU). We commended the work under way in Russia in our Report on "Global Security: Russia" in 2007.[569] A mid-point review of the Global Partnership conducted under Germany's G8 chairmanship in 2007 concluded that the scheme was open to geographical expansion. At the Hokkaido summit under Japan's G8 chairmanship in July 2008, G8 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to completing and continuing with projects in the FSU but stated that the Global Partnership "must evolve further to address new, emerging risks worldwide" and said that new recipient countries could be included on a case-by-case basis.[570] The UK is already active in Iraq, Libya and South Asia.[571] The latest (2008) annual report on the UK's Global Threat Reduction Programme said that the Government "expects the geographic spread of its work to widen";[572] and in response to our Report on "Global Security: Japan and Korea", in which we commended the G8's willingness to expand the Global Partnership and suggested that the programme could encompass work in North Korea,[573] the FCO said that it had "already begun discussions with G8 partners […] to identify both new recipient and donor countries."[574]

269. We conclude that the G8 Global Partnership, and the UK's contribution to it through the Global Threat Reduction Programme, are continuing to deliver important results in reducing the risks of a security breach occurring in relation to WMD. We recommend that, despite the current strains on its budgetary position, the Government should maintain its strong political and financial support for the Global Partnership, including the programme's geographical expansion and continuation beyond 2012. We further recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should provide an update on plans for the Global Partnership beyond 2012, following the July 2009 G8 summit in Italy.

UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1540

270. UN Security Council Resolution 1540, passed in 2004, "imposes legally-binding obligations on all UN Member States to establish and enforce domestic legislation to prevent weapons of mass destruction and related delivery systems falling into the hands of non-state actors such as terrorists, criminals and proliferation networks". It requires "all states to tighten their domestic legal framework so as to criminalize and enforce measures against WMD proliferation to and by non-state actors."[575] The Resolution established a Committee of the Security Council, the 1540 Committee, which collates reports from states and reports to the Security Council on implementation. In a process in which the UK was heavily involved, the Committee's initial two-year mandate has been extended twice, most recently in April 2008, for three years. On that occasion, the Committee was also given what the FCO described as a focus on "operational capacity-building" which "should enable the Committee to encourage and to provide practical or financial assistance to those states which still need to improve their performance in this crucial area."[576]

271. The FCO drew our attention to two key features of UNSCR 1540. First, it is legally binding on all UN Member States, unlike treaties which rely on states signing up voluntarily. In this respect, UNSCR 1540 has a more extensive reach than instruments such as the NPT, CWC or BTWC. Second, UNSCR 1540 is directed specifically at the threat posed by non-state groups, whereas international non-proliferation instruments had previously been targeted primarily at states.[577]

272. Lord Robertson described UNSCR 1540 as "a very important—and undervalued—part of the non-proliferation regime at the moment. […] A lot of British expertise is being fed into that area, which we believe should be given greater attention".[578] He expressed concern that it might "wither on the vine, simply because people think, 'Well, we have done as much as we can.' In fact, we have done nowhere near what we could do on that". He suggested that "policing, pushing and invigilating the implementation of that Resolution, believing in it and resourcing are some things that the British Government can do".[579]

273. We conclude that UN Security Council Resolution 1540 is a vital part of the international non-proliferation regime. We commend the work that the British Government has done in support of UNSCR 1540. We recommend that the Government should work actively to ensure that the Resolution is implemented successfully by all UN Member States, providing practical assistance and resources where required.

THE GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO COMBAT NUCLEAR TERRORISM (GICNT)

274. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) was launched by then Presidents Bush and Putin in July 2006. It has 75 state members. It is not a treaty and has no secretariat or subscription, but is designed to build on other instruments described in this chapter. The FCO said that it "brings together like-minded countries to expand and accelerate efforts to combat nuclear terrorism", and that it aims to:

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275. The initiative is currently focussed on a substantive exercise planning programme, as part of which states will host capacity-building workshops. The FCO told us that the UK hosted an Anti-Nuclear Smuggling Assistance workshop in September 2007 and a Knowledge Proliferation workshop in October 2008. A joint US/UK workshop on the detection of radiological and nuclear materials is being planned for 2009/10.[581]

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE SUPPRESSION OF ACTS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM

276. The International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism entered into force in July 2007. It aims to ensure that radioactive material is protected, via the designation by States Parties of certain acts as terrorist offences, and by requiring cooperation to prevent these offences from being committed. It also provides for judicial cooperation among States Parties in the event that such offences are committed, in order to deny terrorists any safe haven.

277. The UK has signed the Convention but has yet to ratify it. The Home Office has the departmental lead for UK ratification.[582] The Home Office told us that it anticipates UK ratification of the Convention before September 2009.[583]

278. We recommend that the UK should ratify the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible. We look forward to the Government taking the steps necessary to allow this to happen in line with its anticipated September 2009 timeframe, and we recommend that in its response to this Report the Government should update us on this process.

Physical security

— Nuclear materials

279. The FCO told us that "the need to ensure the physical protection of fissile material is central to [its] efforts" to tackle the threat of nuclear terrorism.[584] Baroness Williams noted that the vast majority of known incidents in which nuclear material has fallen into unauthorised hands "involved poor security or attempts by people—but not serious terrorist groups—to seize or steal", but the number of these incidents highlights the scale of the physical security problem. Between January 1993 and December 2007, the IAEA had confirmed to its Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) 303 incidents involving unauthorised possession of nuclear or other radioactive materials and related criminal activities. Of these, fifteen involved highly enriched uranium and plutonium. There were in addition 389 reported incidents involving the theft or loss of relevant materials, and 571 incidents involving other unauthorised activities. The IAEA website commented that "information reported to the ITDB shows a persistent problem with the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials, thefts, losses, and other unauthorised activities."[585]

280. Baroness Williams drew our attention to the risk represented by research institutions which possess highly enriched uranium, albeit often in very small amounts, which are "often in countries with no knowledge at all of the dangers of nuclear weaponry" and where there may be "very little proper security".[586] In November 2007, armed men attacked the Pelindaba nuclear research facility in South Africa, which houses "hundreds of kilograms" of weapons-grade uranium, and spent 45 minutes inside the supposedly secured perimeter, shooting a worker in the emergency control centre.[587]

281. Professor Chalmers told us that even as regards the arsenals of the UK and US, "there are real issues surrounding their accidental use and the security of those weapons, and the associated fissile materials, against terrorism which we need to address and which are not being addressed sufficiently right now."[588] He reminded us of two recent security breaches in the US:

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282. Professor Chalmers outlined the advantages with regard to safety of the UK's single-system, submarine-based nuclear arsenal:

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283. The most recent security incident involving the British nuclear force occurred in February 2009, when one of the Trident submarines collided underwater with one of its French counterparts while on patrol in the Atlantic. Both boats were damaged, but First Sea Lord Sir Jonathon Band said that nuclear safety had not been compromised.[591] An inquiry was under way as we completed this Report.

284. As we outlined above, Pakistan is a state of particular concern as regards the physical security of its nuclear materials.[592] Professor Gregory told our "Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan" inquiry that, owing to the fear of attack from India, Pakistan

moved all the nuclear weapons infrastructure to the north and west of Islamabad, so that the key centres are at Wah, Taxila and so forth. There are one or two exceptions, such as Sargodha, which is not in that area. But a substantial proportion of Pakistan's nuclear weapons-related infrastructure is to the north and west of Islamabad, which is of course close to the tribal areas and […] the instability.

While he said that the Pakistani authorities "have in place very robust measures for the safety and security of their nuclear weapons", Professor Gregory said that he did not think that they "have completely secured their nuclear weapons against the terrorist threat". He described the risk that nuclear weapons or related infrastructure could be

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285. Russia is another country of concern as regards the physical safety of nuclear materials. Baroness Williams told us that "about 55% of the Russian nuclear installations have been raised to what are called high security standards. That means that 45% are not there yet—they have not got that high."[594]

286. We conclude that the physical security of nuclear and radiological materials around the world is far from assured, and should remain a prime Government concern. We recommend that the Government should continue to give a high priority to ensuring the security of nuclear and radiological materials, at academic, industrial and military locations in the UK, and to encourage its international partners to do likewise.

International action on the physical security of nuclear materials

287. In addition to wider initiatives such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the G8 Global Partnership, which we considered earlier in this chapter and which have important physical security components, there are a number of international initiatives aimed specifically at improving the physical security of nuclear materials. Most of these are delivered through the IAEA.

288. The IAEA set out recommendations for the physical protection of nuclear materials in its Information Circular (INFCIRC) 225, which was first published in 1975 and has been revised subsequently. A new revision is currently in progress. The FCO informed us that "although many states are obliged under various Conventions and Agreements to take [the INFCIRC 225 recommendations] into account", they are not legally binding.

289. An instrument largely based on INFCIRC 225 which is legally binding is the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which entered into force in 1987 and to which the UK is a State Party. However, the Convention applies only "to civil nuclear material and only to the standards to be met in the international transport of such material",[595] and it does not provide for verification. In July 2005 an amendment to the Convention was opened for ratification which would impose a legal obligation to "establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework to govern physical protection and to designate an authority to implement the framework."[596] The UK has not yet ratified the amendment, but ratification has been enabled by passage of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, and the Government told us that it would be seeking specific Parliamentary approval for ratification. The amendment cannot come into force until two-thirds of the States Parties to the original Convention have ratified it.[597]

290. We conclude that the legally-binding Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is an important and helpful measure, even though it covers only civil nuclear material. We look forward to the Government taking the steps necessary for UK ratification of the 2005 amendment strengthening the Convention. We recommend that the Government should actively promote the negotiation of legally-binding international instruments covering the physical security of nuclear and radiological materials not currently covered by the Convention.

291. The IAEA has brought the various strands of its work on physical protection together in a Nuclear Security Plan. Major activities carried out as part of the plan include:

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A new Nuclear Security Plan will run from 2010 to 2013.

292. Funding for these activities comes from the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund (NSF), which comprises voluntary contributions outside the regular IAEA budget. These contributions totalled £15,883,643 (€17,758,000) in 2007. The UK was the third-largest state donor in 2007, contributing around £2 million from the Global Threat Reduction Programme.[599] As we noted in Chapter 3, in his speech to the international nuclear fuel cycle conference which the UK hosted in London in March 2009, the Prime Minister announced that the UK would be doubling its contribution to the NSF, to £4 million.[600] The UK also contributes to the NSF through the EU.

293. We conclude that the funding provided for international work on the physical security of nuclear material through mechanisms such as the International Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) is vital. We welcome the Prime Minister's announcement of a doubling of the UK's contribution to the NSF, and we recommend that the UK should continue to provide strong financial and practical support for this work.

294. The IAEA has developed a separate Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources which are particularly vulnerable to being used as components of a 'dirty bomb'. The Code is not legally binding, but the FCO told us that "States have been urged to write to the IAEA Director General expressing their support for it. 92 had done so as of 24 July 2008, including the UK." The Code says that every state should be:

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295. The IAEA has released Supplementary Guidance to the Code which relates to the import and export of radioactive sources. The FCO said that:

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BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL MATERIALS

296. Many research institutions hold stocks of biological and chemical materials which are of potential utility to terrorists. In particular, a number of commentators have noted the importance of biosecurity, but few countries have legislated specifically in this area.[603] In 2004, the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change recommended that a biosecurity protocol be negotiated.[604] The US Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism concluded in 2008 that the US should "press for an international conference of countries with major biotechnology industries to promote biosecurity"and "conduct a global assessment of biosecurity risks".[605] Meanwhile, the Commission on National Security in the 21st Century established by the Institute for Public Policy Research concluded that, along with nuclear non-proliferation, global biosecurity was one of the "two fundamentally important areas which require multilateral cooperation."[606] Biosecurity is one of the focuses of the Inter-sessional Work Programme for 2007-2010 agreed at the Sixth Review Conference of the BTWC.[607]

297. We conclude that, given the real risk that terrorists may acquire and use chemical or biological weapons, the security of biological and chemical materials is of paramount concern. We therefore recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should set out the action that it is taking in this area, including its efforts to secure international co-operation, particularly to reduce biological and chemical security risks.

529 Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, Cm 7291, March 2008, para 3.5; see para 8. Back

530 HM Government, Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism, Cm 7547, March 2009, p 7 Back

531 Ibid., p 127 Back

532 Ibid., p 56 Back

533 Q 89 Back

534 Q 229 Back

535 Q 230 Back

536 Ev 99 Back

537 Matthew Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2008 (Cambridge, Mass. and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School and Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 2008) Back

538 Ev 174; see International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nuclear Black Markets; Pakistan, A.Q.Khan and the rise of proliferation networks (London, 2007). Back

539 25 February 2009, Q 45, HC 302-i, via www.parliament.uk/facom Back

540 Q 17 Back