House of Commons - Global Security: Non-Proliferation

Global Security: Non-Proliferation - Foreign Affairs Committee Contents

7 Conventional weapons

298. There is no official, internationally agreed, definition of what should be considered a conventional weapon. Whilst the Ministry of Defence simply defines conventional weapons as those which are "neither nuclear, biological nor chemical",[608] the NGO campaign Control Arms offers this wider definition:

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Further complication arises from 'dual-use' items—that is, items which can have both a civilian and military application, depending on how they are used.

Impact on global security

299. Conventional weapons are a major contributing factor to global insecurity. While the potential for human and physical destruction arising from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons may be greater, not to mention the strategic threat that they pose to the UK and its allies, conventional weapons exact much the greatest toll in practice. However, not all conventional weapons are equally lethal, with small arms and light weapons being particularly deadly. The FCO stated that "according to research by Oxfam, globally an estimated 1,000 people die every day due directly to the use of small arms and Africa loses around $18 billion per year due to wars, civil wars and insurgencies."[610] Writing in 2005, the UN Office of Drugs and Crime asserted:

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300. We conclude that, while it may not be straightforward to define what a conventional weapon is, more effective efforts to counter their proliferation would have a significant positive impact on global security. Accordingly, we conclude that the Government is to be commended for taking the view that countering the proliferation of conventional weapons is one of its top foreign policy goals, and for seeking to pursue this goal through the promotion of bans on certain kinds of weapon and, as a longer-term aspiration, through the establishment of global rules and standards for the regulation of the conventional arms trade.

Success outside the UN framework: cluster munitions and landmines

301. Recent successes in the control of conventional weapons have been focussed on individual categories of weapon. The processes which banned both cluster munitions and landmines were set in motion by states which believed that negotiations at the UN pursuant to a further Protocol to the 1980 UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons were failing to address these issues adequately.

CLUSTER MUNITIONS

302. The 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions bans the production, use, stockpiling and trade of cluster munitions. The Convention arose from an alternative, non-UN based process begun in Oslo in February 2007 by a group of countries led by Norway. At a conference in Dublin in May 2008, participating states agreed a definition of the term 'cluster munitions', which had proven impossible in negotiations under the auspices of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, and they adopted the Convention. The Government helped to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion through its announcement during the Dublin conference that it would withdraw all the UK's cluster munitions from service with immediate effect, although some observers questioned why it had taken the Government so long to reach this decision.[612] A signing ceremony took place in Oslo on 3 December 2008. The Convention on Cluster Munitions has already been signed by over 100 countries. It has yet to come into force but will do so six months after 30 states have ratified or acceded to it. Current non-signatories include the US, China, Russia, India, Israel and Pakistan. Perhaps more surprisingly, several EU Member States are also yet to sign: Finland, Poland, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, Greece and Cyprus.[613]Of these countries, only Poland has indicated that it does not intend to sign.[614] Greece, Cyprus and Romania have not indicated that they will sign the treaty.[615]Latvia's position is unclear. Finland, Estonia and Slovakia were amongst the countries which adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions at the Dublin conference in May 2008, which suggests that they will sign the treaty eventually.[616]

303. In March 2009, the US Congress passed legislation which introduced a ban on the export of cluster munitions. Campaigners have welcomed this move and have expressed the hope that the Obama Administration will soon renounce use by the US military of these weapons and sign the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[617] The UK has already begun to implement the Convention's provisions. With regard to export controls the FCO told us that: "All cluster munitions have been classified as Category 'A' goods, making them subject to the most stringent level of trade controls and thereby taking an immediate step to prevent proliferation."[618] In response to a Parliamentary Question in February 2009, Bob Ainsworth, Minister of State at the MOD, stated:

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304. We conclude that the Government is to be commended for the role it played in helping to bring the negotiations on a Convention on Cluster Munitions to a successful conclusion. We recommend that the Government should continue to do everything it can to persuade other states, especially all EU Member States, to sign and ratify the Convention without delay. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government should set out what steps it is taking to achieve this.

Negotiations on cluster munitions under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

305. The fact that the Convention on Cluster Munitions was negotiated outside the ambit of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons does not mean that those countries which took this step have abandoned negotiations under its auspices. The FCO stated:

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Bill Rammell told us that:

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He added: "in all our bilateral and multilateral contacts, we make it clear that that is a short-term step towards eventual adoption of the Oslo convention."[622] However, there is concern that such a Protocol might undermine the Convention on Cluster Munitions rather than reinforce it. Roy Isbister of the UK Working Group on Arms, a coalition of NGOs which campaigns on a range of non-proliferation issues, told us:

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306. We conclude that the negotiation of a Protocol on cluster munitions under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons might not be an appropriate foreign policy objective for the UK. We recommend that, if it decides to continue arguing for such a Protocol, the Government should ensure that any such Protocol is as strong in its provisions as the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It should withdraw its support for such a Protocol if it appears that this will not be the case.

LANDMINES

307. Signed in 1997, the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines (known as the Mine Ban Treaty) has been in force since 1999. The UK has been a strong supporter and passed the 1998 Landmines Act to incorporate the Convention's provisions into national law. A significant number of non-signatories in 1997 remain non-signatories today. However, the "use of anti-personnel mines has been stigmatized and use of anti-personnel mines, especially by governments, has become a rare phenomenon."[624] Equally importantly, "global trade in anti-personnel mines has consisted solely of a low-level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers."[625] Key non-signatories have also introduced official or unofficial moratoria on the export of anti-personnel mines. For example, the US has an official moratorium in place until 2014 and Israel has a similar moratorium in place until 2011.[626] In a leaflet published to mark its tenth anniversary, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines called the Mine Ban Treaty "a success in progress".[627]

308. The UK has been criticised by some countries and by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines for its failure to start clearing mined areas in the Falkland Islands. At a meeting of States Parties in late November 2008, the Government requested a ten-year extension of its deadline for clearing landmines.[628] The extension was granted, but the Government promised to produce within 18 months a detailed plan for completing the de-mining process.[629] In our July 2008 Report on the UK's Overseas Territories, we concluded that:

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Notably, the Falkland Islands Government has expressed no wish to have mined areas cleared, instead emphasizing their value as wildlife conservation areas.[631] In his evidence to us, Bill Rammell also emphasised that, when he visited the Falkland Islands, he had not met "one person or elected representative […] who said, given the very clear signage and that everybody knows where they are, that they thought that this was a priority."[632] He added that the UK was one of 15 states that applied for an extension at the November 2008 Meeting of States Parties. However, he also announced that contracts were due to be signed shortly for three de-mining area activities.[633] In a subsequent letter, he stated that the procurement process was "at an early stage" but that the aim was that the contract would be awarded by the end of 2009, with work beginning "shortly thereafter".[634]

309. Roy Isbister took a more critical view. He said:

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However, Bill Rammell argued that the Government had prioritised correctly by

contributing about £10 million per year to humanitarian de-mining activity in the most dangerous and heavily mined developing countries, such as Afghanistan, Angola, Laos and Sri Lanka. Like you, I have visited the Falklands, where there has not been an incident or accident in 25 years resulting from this. […] in Angola, Laos and Sri Lanka, the population say, 'For God's sake, do something about this.' People risk being injured and killed. In fact, Falkland Islanders and representatives have said to me, 'Of course, you should be spending it on those other areas'.

The Mine Ban Treaty has not been followed by agreement of a new or amended Protocol on mines under Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons auspices.

310. We conclude that the Government has been correct to identify as a priority the clearance of mines worldwide which threaten human life. We conclude that there are understandable reasons for the failure to clear landmines on the Falkland Islands over the last decade. However, the failure to de-mine the Falklands risks damaging the UK's reputation and credibility in this area. We therefore conclude that the Government's intention to move ahead with de-mining in three areas to fulfil its international obligations is a positive step forward, and recommend that this should proceed provided this can be achieved without risk to human life.

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

311. In December 2006 the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 61/89, endorsing the idea of an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) to "establish common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms".[636] The FCO told us that the criteria for assessing exports would include:

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312. A Group of Governmental Experts met between February and August 2008 to discuss issues relating to an ATT. Its report revealed differences, among other things, over:

Whether an international treaty is the best way to improve the regulation of conventional arms;

Whether its scope would be more effectively established by a simple, generic set of descriptions of the categories of weapons covered or a comprehensive list;

Which activities and/or transactions should be covered;

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313. On 31 October 2008, 147 states voted in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly to move forward with work on a Treaty, up from the 139 who had voted in 2006 to initiate the process. Only the US and Zimbabwe voted against the resolution. However, 19 countries abstained, including China, Russia, Cuba, Egypt, Israel, India and Pakistan. There was particularly strong support from countries in Europe, South and Central America and Africa. The resolution called on the UN to convene an Open Ended Working Group (OEWG), in which all Member States can participate, which is due to meet a maximum of six times, starting in 2009, and then submit a further report to the General Assembly.[639] According to the FCO, these meetings will seek "to establish areas of agreement on the possible scope and parameters for a treaty."[640] The full General Assembly passed resolution 63/240 in December 2008, endorsing the First Committee's resolution of 31 October.[641]

314. The Government has been a strong supporter of an ATT since 2005. In July 2008, the Committees on Arms Export Controls concluded that the Government "is to be commended and supported in its efforts to achieve a comprehensive and effective international arms trade treaty."[642] The UK Working Group on Arms told us that "alongside its international partners, the UK has continued to play a lead role in promoting the ATT on the international stage."[643]

315. We conclude that the Government is to be commended for the energy and commitment which it has displayed in seeking to achieve a comprehensive and effective international Arms Trade Treaty. We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government should provide an update on the status of the negotiations on the Treaty.

FEASIBILITY OF AN ATT

316. While acknowledging the concerns of some states, the Government set out a positive view of the feasibility of the ATT in its March 2007 submission to the Group of Governmental Experts.[644] Opponents and sceptics put forward a variety of arguments against the proposed treaty. Some of those countries that have not endorsed it, like Zimbabwe, largely reject it because they see it as an unwarranted infringement upon national sovereignty.[645] Other positions are more nuanced. The previous US Administration was suspicious in general of binding international legal commitments of this kind, preferring in the context of conventional non-proliferation to act multilaterally through the Wassenaar Agreement, and did not believe that an ATT could be effective. During the debate in the General Assembly First Committee in October 2008, a representative of the US Government stated:

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When we asked him to respond to this argument, Roy Isbister said:

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317. Bill Rammell told us that the Government "want as strong a treaty as we can possibly deliver",[648] qualifying this by adding that:

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In his evidence to us, David Hayes, representing the Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD), said: "Fundamentally, we see the concept as being one of raising the bar at the lower end of the continuum of export control systems, rather than adding another layer on top of systems that are already fairly rigorous".[650]

318. The UK is often considered to have a rigorous export control regime, and an ATT would potentially add little or nothing to the national regime. Concerns about UK conventional arms exports to Israel have been revived in recent months in the context of Israel's military action in the Occupied Palestinian Territory of Gaza in December 2008 and January 2009. Writing before the latest crisis in Gaza, the Campaign against the Arms Trade argued that the Government had failed to uphold the arms export criteria contained within the 2002 Export Control Act with regard to Israel. It also noted that no arms embargo was imposed during Israel's 2006 conflict with Hizbollah in Lebanon.[651] When asked if an ATT would have altered UK policy on selling arms to countries such as Israel, Saudi Arabia or Indonesia, both Roy Isbister and Dr Plesch told us that, as they conceived it, it would.[652] However, David Hayes disagreed.[653]

319. We conclude that whilst there are inherent dangers in adopting a lowest common denominator approach to an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), a treaty that is both inclusive and credible can be achieved. We further conclude, however, that if in the future, the Government is forced to choose between giving priority to the strength of the treaty or achieving the widest possible ratification, it should give priority to securing the strongest possible treaty.

ENFORCEMENT OF AN ATT

320. Another important issue in terms of feasibility which is yet to be seriously addressed in the negotiations is that of effective enforcement, which will be crucial to the credibility of a future treaty but, as discussed above, will be difficult to achieve. Bill Rammell told us: "We are not looking for a paper tiger; we are looking for a legally enforceable instrument".[654] Roy Isbister stated that this was "clearly a complex question […] You will have all the normal problems and, hopefully, solutions involved in enforcing international law",[655] whilst David Hayes said: "To be credible, the treaty needs to be enforceable. The tightness of rules is important, because a loose treaty would achieve little more than to bring export controls into disrepute".[656]

321. We conclude that effective enforcement will be crucial to the credibility and effectiveness of an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), and we recommend that the Government does all it can to make this issue a high priority in future negotiations. We further recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government should set out its current position with regard to the ways in which an ATT would ideally be enforceable.

SCOPE OF AN ATT

322. During its deliberations in 2008, the Group of Governmental Experts disagreed over important issues relating to the scope of a treaty.[657] Firstly, some countries favoured agreeing a comprehensive list of weapons to be covered by the ATT, perhaps drawing on the list used under the Wassenaar Arrangement, in order to ensure that nothing important is excluded from its scope.[658]Others appeared to prefer the idea of a treaty that is based on a simple, generic description of the categories of arms covered, similar to those that are used under the 1995 UN Register on Conventional Arms, a voluntary reporting mechanism for participating states which covers seven categories of major conventional arms, on the grounds that it could be relatively straightforwardly updated. Secondly, there were differences over which activities and/or transactions should be included. Key issues of debate included dual-use arms and equipment, brokering, transit and trans-shipment and in-country transfers, with some arguing that most, if not all, activities and/or transactions should be covered but others suggesting a more restrictive approach.

323. The Government set out its views on both issues in a March 2007 submission to the Group of Governmental Experts. On whether a treaty should be based on a simple, generic description of categories of arms covered or a detailed list, the Government stated that there are arguments for and against both. However, at the March 2009 meeting of the Open Ended Working Group, UK Ambassador for Arms Control and Disarmament John Duncan added that "no single existing list will be adequate for our global needs."[659] The Government favoured a treaty that covers all conventional arms and equipment, munitions, the technology used to produce and maintain them, and their parts and components. It also supported consideration of including dual-use items "directly relevant to the above arms, munitions and production technology."[660] In addition, it called for a treaty to make clear what is meant by the terms "import, export and transfers." The Government also favoured including other activities within the scope of a treaty, "including brokering, transit and trans-shipment, loans, gifts and temporary imports/exports for demonstration or exhibition". Finally, it suggested that the treaty should cover only transfers between states, excluding internal transfers.[661]

324. The UK Working Group on Arms has expressed concerns about how discussions within the Group of Governmental Experts on scope have proceeded:

[The ATT] must also be as comprehensive as possible, applying to all conventional arms; including their components, manufacturing technology, production equipment and relevant dual-use goods. It is of great concern that discussions amongst governments are focusing on using the seven categories on major conventional weaponry from the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNRCA), plus small arms and light weapons, often referred to as '7+1'. Under such formulation, the ATT would not cover many categories of weapons, police and internal security equipment that are used in the commission of human rights violations, including ammunition and explosives, many types of military vehicles and aircraft, and many categories of ordnance including short-range missiles and bombs. Utilising the UNRCA categories would also not include components and parts, which are central to international supply chains that dominate the increasingly global nature of the production of conventional weapons.

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325. Bill Rammell played down fears that a generic '7+1' approach would be adopted, rather than a list akin to the Wassenaar military list, arguing that the negotiations were not yet at "that detailed stage".[663] Dr Plesch told us that some states may be suspicious about drawing too much on the Wassenaar military list because the Wassenaar Agreement was in origin a "Cold War device".[664] He added:

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326. We recommend basing an Arms Trade Treaty on a detailed list of the weapons to be covered rather than on a set of simple generic descriptions of the categories of arms covered. We conclude that the Government should take this position in future negotiations. We further recommend that a broad range of activities and/or transactions should be brought within the scope of the treaty, including dual-use items, brokering and trans-shipment.

STANDARDS TO BE DEFINED IN AN ATT

327. In August 2008 the Group of Governmental Experts also disagreed about which international legal standards should apply under an ATT.[666] Some countries clearly favoured a minimalist approach, where explicit reference is made only to a very limited number of existing treaties—for example, the UN Charter. While the Charter refers to the importance of upholding and promoting human rights, it places strong emphasis on both the right of states to self-defence and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. Flowing from this minimalist approach would be a relatively limited set of conditions that must apply when considering whether to approve an arms transfer. Other countries, including the Member States of the EU, argued for a more expansive approach, where explicit reference is made not just to the UN Charter but more widely to the applicability of existing international human rights law and international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions. This expansive approach would be the basis for the conditions to be applied when considering whether to approve an arms transfer.[667]

328. Both in its evidence to us[668] and in its March 2007 submission to the Group of Governmental Experts, the Government endorsed a relatively expansive approach and suggested that the following criteria should be followed when deciding whether or not to approve a specific arms transfer:

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Roy Isbister told us:

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329. We recommend that an Arms Trade Treaty should fully incorporate the protections provided by international human rights law and international humanitarian law. We conclude that the inclusion within its ambit of human rights protections should be viewed as a key test of the likely credibility and effectiveness of such a treaty.

THE FUTURE OF NEGOTIATIONS TOWARDS AN ATT

330. Negotiations on the next steps with regard to an ATT are to proceed on an 'overwhelming majority' basis, breaking with the customary UN tradition of proceeding by consensus on such issues. In its August 2008 report, the Group of Governmental Experts called for further progress "on the basis of consensus".[671] However, the resolution of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on 31 October 2008 simply called for consensus to be further "developed".[672] The UK has been a strong supporter of an 'overwhelming majority' approach. UK Ambassador John Duncan has been quoted as saying that the Group will "work on the basis of majority, but […] strive to achieve consensus in the first instance."[673] This shift away from a requirement for consensus may reduce the ability of small numbers of countries hostile to the idea to undermine the entire negotiating process. However, it can be argued that there are also risks in such an approach. The previous US Administration claimed that it was the removal of "consensus-process language" that led it to vote against the resolution of 31 October 2008 and threw into doubt its participation in the Open Ended Working Group. However, a requirement for consensus can lead to frustration, as for example with negotiations on bans on cluster munitions and landmines which were eventually moved outside the UN framework. On the ATT, Roy Isbister told us: "Given that we have made progress and are still making progress, it would be remiss to suggest that we should move outside a UN formula at this stage".[674]

331. The Open Ended Working Group is due to meet a maximum of six times. It held its first substantive session on 2-6 March 2009. The UK Working Group on Arms also highlighted a series of EU- and UN-sponsored regional meetings taking place over the next 15 months, calling them "an alternative platform to discuss elements further from Group of Governmental Experts consensus".[675] They went on to tell us that:

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Bill Rammell told us that the Government hopes that a further resolution reflecting the work of the Open Ended Working Group during 2009 will be passed by the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October or November of this year. This would "set in train negotiations on the treaty during 2010."[677] In subsequent written evidence, the FCO added:

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332. We conclude that it is to be welcomed that negotiations on an Arms Trade Treaty are proceeding on an 'overwhelming majority' basis rather than by consensus, and we recommend that this continues. We further recommend, however, that in order to secure a treaty that is as widely supported as possible, all the parties to the negotiations should seek to keep them within the UN framework. We conclude that much depends on how effectively the Open Ended Working Group advances negotiations during 2009.

Universality of an ATT

333. The ATT has faced opposition from the US and Zimbabwe which voted against the 31 October 2008 resolution, and, in practice, from many of those states which abstained in that vote. Russia, one of the abstainers, is an interesting case. By all accounts, one of its main concerns is the costs that adherence to an ATT might impose on its struggling defence industry.[679]When asked whether Russia and China were "still sitting on the sidelines", Bill Rammell told us "Yes, but I do not think that they are in the position of outright hostility; rather, we are in the position of needing to persuade and convince those states to move."[680]

334. The country which supporters of the ATT want most to convert is the US, which dominates the global arms export market. During the Bush Administration, the US was an implacable opponent of the proposed treaty, although it did participate in the Group of Governmental Experts. The Obama Administration may take a different view. NGOs working on the issue believe that the early signs, which include more positive US participation in the first meeting of the Open Ended Working Group in January 2009, have been good.[681]The Obama 'transition team' did not make a specific statement on the issue, but in September 2008 Obama stated that "In general, I strongly support international initiatives to limit harm to civilians caused by conventional weapons."[682] At the first substantive session of the Open Ended Working Group, held on 2-6 March 2009, while noting that the previous Administration had been opposed to the ATT, the US representative stated:

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335. The Government is certainly hoping for a change of US position. Bill Rammell told us that "we are encouraging their attendance at the forthcoming Open Ended Working Group. There are hopes of movement, but we have to keep working and negotiating."[684] Despite the strong opposition of, amongst others, the National Rifle Association, there is little evidence that US public opinion as a whole is particularly hostile.[685] But doubts must remain as to how much 'political capital' an Obama Administration will be prepared to expend on the ATT, when it has so many other objectives in the sphere of proliferation, not least with regard to nuclear weapons. It is as yet unclear whether a shift in the US position could trigger moves by other abstainers, such as China, Russia, India and Pakistan. Roy Isbister said: "In terms of a knock-on effect, certainly if you have the main exporter falling into line than everybody will have to reassess their own relationship to the process."[686]

336. When asked if all Member States of the EU were pulling their weight in the negotiations, Bill Rammell responded that none of them had displayed any reluctance about supporting an Arms Trade Treaty, adding: "All our EU partners are helping us, some extremely enthusiastically."[687]

337. We conclude that securing the support of the new US Administration for an Arms Trade Treaty should be a priority for the Government. We recommend that the Government should intensify its efforts to persuade those states that are as yet not persuaded of the merits of a treaty to change their mind.

THE ROLE OF NGOS AND THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY

338. The Government has encouraged the involvement of NGOs active on conflict, development and human rights issues, along with the UK defence industry, in the ATT process. The FCO said:

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Coalitions of NGOs such as the UK Working Group on Arms and the Control Arms campaign have been influential at the international level. The Government has provided funding to a number of NGOs such as Saferworld for their work on arms control issues.[689]

339. We conclude that the co-operation between the Government and key NGOs involved in the campaign for a credible and effective Arms Trade Treaty, which has included providing official funding for NGO activities on transfer control issues, has been productive. We recommend that the Government should continue to foster these productive relationships.

340. The UK Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD), which brings together the Defence Manufacturers Association, the Society of British Aerospace Companies and a number of other trade bodies, views an ATT as being an important means through which 'irresponsible' and illegitimate conventional arms transfers, which damage the reputation of all companies in the field, can be reduced.[690] Given that, they argued that the UK already has a tightly regulated arms trade at the national level and therefore the defence industry has little to lose by supporting the idea of an ATT. EGAD also emphasises to its members that an ATT will level the playing field, removing the competitive advantages currently enjoyed by companies in countries where the regulatory framework is weaker. The UK Working Group on Arms has developed a longstanding relationship with EGAD and played an important role in persuading it to endorse the idea of an ATT in mid-2006. This does not mean that their views completely overlap. For example, EGAD has said in the past that it opposes the inclusion of any dual-use items within the scope of the ATT.[691]

341. The Defence Manufacturers Association has on occasions joined meetings about the ATT between Government officials and representatives of more sceptical governments, for example, in Russia, as part of efforts to win them around.[692] EGAD told us that it "applaud[ed] [the Government] for its outreach activities in other countries, but believe that much more of this needs to be done".[693] However, David Hayes indicated that EGAD had no specific future plans for greater co-operation with the Government on lobbying work.

342. Some commentators have argued that, if the US defence industry can be persuaded of the merits of an ATT, its influence is such that the US Government may well follow.[694] Referring to contacts which EGAD had had with US counterparts, David Hayes suggested that it was more likely to happen the other way round. On whether the US defence industry favoured an ATT, he answered:

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343. We conclude that the wholehearted support of the defence industry for an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) will help significantly in pursuit of an effective treaty and in its successful implementation. We recommend that the Government should swiftly draw up plans for greater co-operation with the UK Export Group for Aerospace and Defence on lobbying and outreach over the coming period, particularly with the aim of persuading the US defence industry of the merits of an ATT.

THE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN ATT AND EXISTING NON-PROLIFERATION INITIATIVES

344. The FCO emphasised that it funds "a range of SALW [small arms and light weapons] projects undertaken by the UN, EU, OSCE and other international and regional organizations, NGOs and civil society more widely".[696] This has included expenditure of £31 million through its Conflict Prevention Pool since 2001. Funding worth £3.25 million was provided for 20 such projects during 2008. NGO beneficiaries included the International Action Network on Small Arms, Saferworld and the Small Arms Survey.[697]

The UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons

345. An ATT could have an impact on existing initiatives in the sphere of conventional non-proliferation, such as the 2001 UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (the UN PoA) and the Wassenaar Arrangement.[698] The UN PoA is a non-legally binding political agreement that proceeds on the basis of consensus.[699] It has produced a number of concrete initiatives—for example, on the marking and tracing of guns and on illicit brokering. In 2005 the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons was agreed.[700] At the 2005 biennial meeting of states, it was agreed to establish a Group of Governmental Experts to consider further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons. Its report was published in 2007 and contained a range of recommendations.

346. In 2006 a Review Conference on the implementation of the UN PoA was held in New York. However, participants were unable to agree an outcome document and for a few months there were fears that the entire process might collapse. A special edition of the Small Arms and Human Security Bulletin in the aftermath of the 2006 Review Conference stated:

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However, it was agreed to continue with the system of biennial meetings, and in July 2008 the Third Biennial Meeting of States focused on cooperation and assistance, curbing illicit brokering, stockpile management and surplus disposal. The International Action Network on Small Arms stated afterwards that "the UN small arms and light weapons process remains healthy, two years after the meltdown at the UN Review Conference."[702] The FCO told us that the meeting "achieved a reasonable outcome, with a final document agreed, albeit by a vote."[703]

347. There was common agreement that the UN PoA could run parallel to any ATT. Roy Isbister stated that:

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While acknowledging that EGAD was less engaged with the UN PoA than with the ATT process, David Hayes told us: "I can see the two running in parallel, because the arms trade treaty has a much broader potential scope than the other activity."[705] The future prospects of the UN PoA also depend on the position taken by the new Obama Administration. There are some initial indications that the US position will change, but as Roy Isbister said when giving evidence: "It is too early to say."[706]

348. We conclude that it is desirable that the new US Administration takes a more positive attitude to the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons. We recommend that the Government should encourage such a shift. We further recommend that due care be taken by all stakeholders to ensure that the Arms Trade Treaty process and the UN Programme of Action remain complementary and mutually reinforcing.

The Wassenaar Arrangement

349. It remains to be seen what form the final ATT will take and whether it will supersede the Wassenaar Arrangement. Some states might wish to retain the Arrangement if the ATT does not contain similarly strong provisions, for example, in the area of transparency and scrutiny of arms transfers. A conceivable alternative to an ATT might be to extend the membership of the Wassenaar Arrangement. However, Dr Plesch described the Wassenaar Arrangement as a "Cold War device",[707] whilst Roy Isbister argued that "it is not regarded well" by a significant number of states, adding: "It is seen as a political and excluding instrument—if you are not in, you are out".[708] In his evidence, Bill Rammell said:

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350. We conclude that, while the Wassenaar Arrangement may in due course be superseded wholly or in part by an Arms Trade Treaty, the positive gains made under the Arrangement should, as far as is possible, be incorporated into the Arms Trade Treaty and built upon.

608 Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom glossary of joint and multinational terms and definitions, Joint warfare publication 0-01.1 Edition 6, 2004, C-22 Back

609 "Frequently asked questions on the Arms Trade and the Arms Trade Treaty", Control Arms, April 2008 Back

610 Ev 189 Back

611 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, "UN Firearms Protocol: Curbing the Spread of Illicit Weapons", http://www.unodc.org/newsletter/en/200504/page005.html Back

612 Until that point, the Government had expressed a preference for retaining two types of cluster munition; "Brown commits to banning all cluster bombs", Cluster Munition Coalition, Press Release, 28 May 2008, http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/media/press-releases/?id=284 Back

613 For a full list of signatories and ratifications of the Convention on Cluster Munitions compiled by the UN Office at Geneva, see http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/67DC5063EB530E02C12574F8002E9E49?OpenDocument Back

614 "The Ban Bus in Poland", International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 10 December 2008, http://www.icbl.org/news/banbus_poland Back

615 "Sofia regional conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions", Cluster Munition Coalition, September 2008, http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/calendar/?id=627 Back

616 "Signatories and Non-Signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions at 15 December 2008", Cluster Munition Coalition, December 2008, http://www.fundacioperlapau.org/arxiu_documental/documents/181208_signaturesoslo.pdf Back

617 "Obama takes US closer to total ban on cluster bombs", The Guardian, 13 March 2009 Back

618 Ev 190 Back

619 HC Deb, 23 February 2009, col 25W Back