Submission from Mr Lee Bruce and
Dr Robert Crowcroft
Mr Bruce is an expert on political negotiations,
defence and military strategy having completed a research thesis
at the University of Leeds on British policy in Northern Ireland.
Dr Crowcroft is an expert on British political parties and transatlantic
security. He recently received a doctorate from the University
of Leeds on British politics and statesmanship during the Second
World War. He has published articles in learned journals.
SUMMARY
— The possibility of achieving international
agreement as a means to successfully counter the proliferation
of dangerous materials and ballistic missile technology is limited.
Only export controls negotiated between a small number of countries
are likely to be effective, and even then only in the short term.
Wider ranging agreement is impractical and the UK Government should
focus its efforts in alternative directions.
— Proliferation is inevitable, and
consequently a much tougher foreign policy stance should be adopted
by the UK and its partners. Negotiation with proliferators is
unlikely to produce long-term success. Some states and certain
non-state actors are committed to the overthrow of the present
international system, and consequently cannot be bought off. The
UK should lead the way in arguing the case for a firmer line on
combating this threat. There is a serious danger that controversies
over the 2003 invasion of Iraq risk obscuring the merits
of that approach as a means to enhance security.
— The UK Government should question
the precise value of arms control treaties and disarmament. Adversarial
regimes are almost certain to ignore them, while benevolent states
such as the UK are not aggressive anyway. The historical precedents
for seeking successful dialogue on these issues are not encouraging,
and it is difficult to see how this will change.
— Rather than attempting to establish
international frameworks that are likely to be ineffective, the
UK and its partners should take vigorous action against individual
proliferators on a case-by-case basis. This should involve more
extensive sanctions and the setting out of clear military "red
lines". Given the gravity of the threat, the UK and its allies
should be more willing to take military action on this issue than
they seem at present.
THE MERIT
OF DIPLOMATIC
INITIATIVES IN
COMBATING PROLIFERATION
1. The UK Government must adopt a hard-headed
view of the feasibility of impeding the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles technology. Proliferation
is unfortunately inevitable and thus it must be questioned as
to how useful future diplomatic initiatives to address this threat
are likely to be. Furthermore it must be doubted whether certain
polities and non-state actors are likely to be restrained by such
initiatives.
2. This is not to rule out the potential
value of export controls and similar measures intended to restrict
the follow of certain targeted materials to "rogue"
regimes and other proliferators. For instance the 2003 Proliferation
Security Initiative, making provision for the interdiction of
WMD and delivery systems, is worthwhile, as is the April 2004 United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, placing obligations
on states to physically control WMD-related materials. Yet while
the international mechanisms for conducting this should be strengthened,
a great deal of scepticism is warranted as to the possibility
of success. It is almost inevitable that given time a sufficiently
determined regime will be able to acquire specific materials via
illicit trade. And the feasibilities of international consensus
are too remote to warrant optimism. Advanced states such as Russia,
China and Pakistan, for instance, will prove particularly difficult
to tie into international diplomatic efforts on a consistent basis.
Moreover, none of this takes into account the fact that nations
might seek to supply Islamic extremist groups with WMD capabilities.
In a sense, within many countries, WMD and ballistic missiles
will be pursued for reasons that cannot be easily signed away—or
owned up to—in a treaty.
3. The idea of successfully linking UK foreign
policy on proliferation to international mechanisms is therefore
implausible. Diplomatic initiatives to construct anti-proliferation
frameworks are likely to prove a failure in an international community
of 195 states due to the sheer impossibility of a workable
agreement. The practicalities of agreeing materials to be controlled,
ways to monitor them and methods of punishing proliferators are
too difficult for the international community to reach a consensus
on. Even states such as Britain, France and Germany would have
difficulty agreeing on a framework for non-proliferation, as events
of recent years have demonstrated. Nation states have different
interests. The notion that proliferation should be countered is
not enough in itself; agreement is also necessary on precisely
how to counter it. The ineffective attempts over the last
five years by the European Union to deal with Iran's nuclear programme
have demonstrated that if no red lines are clearly laid out the
endeavour will simply lead to a weakened geopolitical position,
as well as increased demands by proliferators. Diplomacy cannot
be, and is not, an end in itself. Bilateral agreements, or arrangements
between a small number of countries, may be useful, but larger
agreements are problematic and if enforcement mechanisms are not
clear the potential for disagreement means the arrangements will
likely prove useless when violation occurs.
ARMS CONTROL
IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE
4. Arms control and disarmament have historically
been unproductive in their objectives of preventing proliferation,
in improving the stability of the international environment, and
modifying the behaviour of other states. Arms treaties do not
work if one of the signatories is a rogue state, ie the type of
regime that anti-proliferation efforts are directed against. Entering
into negotiations with such actors is likely to prove dangerous.
The value of any agreements reached with regimes of this sort
is questionable due to the innate character of that regime. The
fact is that authoritarian states cheat. Peaceful states on the
other hand do not act aggressively because of the fundamental
nature of their polity, regardless of their military-industrial
power. Frequently, debate over arms control becomes trapped in
technical details, while the soundness of the notion itself escapes
attention. In a sense, the question that must be asked is precisely
what can a treaty achieve?
5. The basic logic of arms control is that
states enter into agreement, on either a bilateral or multilateral
basis, in order to co-operate, even if they are enemies, because
of the awful damage to their nation and interests that might occur
should conflict erupt. But is it tenable to see the above logic
being applicable to cases such as Iran, North Korea, Libya, Syria,
Pakistan and potentially Saudi Arabia? Why would states such as
Iran and Syria be sufficiently anxious of the "awful damage"
that might occur through usage of certain weapons, particularly
nuclear forces, when they are faced with powerful adversaries
that, in their view, threaten their security? The imperative acting
upon Iran and others is therefore to seek to develop the weapons
themselves. The logical direction of current international trends
is towards a more heavily nuclearised world.
6. We must be careful not to confuse the
act of diplomacy, ie negotiating with states, for actual
progress in the art of diplomacy, ie concrete achievements.
The reality is that proliferators are simply not likely to respond
to calls for reasonableness. The sooner the UK absorbs this and
impresses it upon its allies the better.
7. The key issue in international relations
is not armaments but the motives of those who seek to possess
them. As Professor Colin Gray has noted, "arms control theory
postulates a cause-and-effect nexus between armaments and conflicts
that does not stand up well under either historical inquiry or
theoretical challenge".[3]
Lethal instruments only become so in the hands of those inclined
to use them. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and similar
initiatives represent an inconvenience and nothing more for those
determined to acquire WMD and ballistic missile technology.
8. Arms control has little precedent for
success. The most striking example is, of course, post-1987 US-Soviet
relations—but this occurred only after the Reagan
administration had "won" the Cold War and forced changes
in Soviet behaviour through a strategy of pressure not accommodation;
arms control agreements became something to be sought only after
the political paradigm was changed. Once it had been, for some
years it seemed that almost any measure of arms control seemed
possible (and much good work was achieved as a result). But it
is difficult to see how this could be replicated with, for instance,
Iran. Beyond the Reagan-Bush era successful examples are few.
Even the relative successes of the 1920s were easily reversed—and
the fallacies underpinning them brutally exposed—in the
1930s. Moreover, the treaties that were made in the thirties—for
instance the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935—did nothing
to prevent Europe's slide into war. As Gray argued, "Arms
control glitters attractively only when its ideas are viewed in
isolation as ideas. Adhering generally to pleasing concepts, spokesmen
for arms control have not had to suffer a rigorous audit or to
contend with fundamental theoretical challenges".[4]
9. Arms treaties are therefore only useful
if negotiated from a position of strength and as a means to specific
foreign policy goals. The initiatives taken by the Reagan administration,
particularly the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty,
as a means of managing the ongoing collapse of the USSR in the
late 1980s and guiding it to a "soft-landing" are one
isolated example of the utility of armament-centred diplomacy.
Such treaties are dangerous, however, if negotiated from a position
of weakness. For instance, the SALT process of the 1970s begun
by the Nixon Administration helped the Soviet Union avoid expending
resources it could not afford, thus considerably strengthening
the USSR. The pre-eminent historical lesson of arms control treaties
is that they allowed the lifespan of the Soviet empire to be prolonged.
They also permitted the USSR to divert resources elsewhere, principally
to sponsoring Communist forces across the globe. The treaties
did not secure any significant change in Soviet behaviour. Moreover,
the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty had virtually no impact
on the rise of strategic offensive weapons, while the rather more
modest content of arms talks between 1983-90—relating principally
to theatre deployment and command-and-control arrangements for
nuclear arms rather than reductions in numbers—achieved
far greater success in the way of verifiable results than earlier
efforts to address the overall size of arsenals. It only became
possible to properly address the number of nuclear weapons once
the USSR had yielded and it broke up post-1991. In the same vein,
North Korea extorted concessions from the Clinton administration
and still built nuclear weaponry despite a number of "agreed
frameworks"; prior to 2003, Iraq used these tactics effectively
while Iran and Syria are replicating this at present. On the other
hand, Libya gave up its WMD programme because of fear of US power,
not because of the "awful damage" that spiralling possession
of WMD could bring about.
10. It might be thought offensive to question
the idea of arms control, but that should not deter analysis of
what it can actually achieve. Would-be controllers need to bear
in mind that arms control agreements have never successfully
shaped the political dynamic between governments. Hoping that
a nebulous agreement will reshape antagonistic relations for the
better is naïve.
IMPLICATIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
11. The UK Government should not expend
diplomatic energy on arms control agreements as a strategy for
countering proliferation. Such treaties will embolden recalcitrant
actors and tie the hands of the UK and its partners. A tougher
approach to foreign policy is more likely to achieve results than
consensus-dependent international arrangements. As noted earlier,
proliferation is inevitable. In this respect the effort to stop
it is doomed to long-term failure. However, two points flow from
this: firstly, that it can be slowed through the robust
application of economic and diplomatic pressure—if this
is likely to be effective—and the employment of military
power where necessary. Secondly, that it should be countered
through the build-up of military strength sufficient to defend
the UK and its partners, deter an adversary or prevail should
war come.
12. In this respect, the rationale for the
invasion of Iraq was strategically sound, and the model could
be duplicated as a basis for action elsewhere. The international
community faces a series of challenges from proliferators and
those attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
missiles. Efforts to counter this should not centre upon offering
incentives for non-proliferation, currently being tried with no
success in Iran, but instead upon the application of pressure
sufficient to persuade proliferators to desist. For instance,
far more aggressive pursuit than is undertaken at present of those
countries' financial portfolios abroad would be one worthwhile
measure. So too would stringent economic sanctions and political
isolation. Military action, escalating from blockades to targeted
air strikes to regime-change interventions should also be policy
options clearly "on the table". Red lines must be marked
out, the crossing of which entail serious consequences. Signalling
weakness to proliferators, as UK Government policy has done since
2003, is a fatal error; more positive results would flow from
an alternative stance.
13. The UK should work with its partners,
particularly the US, to achieve this. The EU and its other member
states should only be co-operated with on this issue where those
countries take a stand sufficiently firm to be compatible with
UK national interests, which, to date, they have not. French attempts
to mend fences with the Saddam Hussein regime from 1991-2003,
and the weak response to Iranian belligerence, are not encouraging
precedents. Given the inevitability of proliferation, it is probable
that the UK will face attack from WMD and ballistic missiles.
The UK must not compromise its foreign policy for fear of breaking
with EU partners who favour "mediation" to firm action.
THE POSSIBILITY
OF DISARMAMENT
14. The strategic errors in the case mounted
by proponents of disarmament are replete. For instance, the authors
of one recent publication by the International Institute for Strategic
Studies asserted that it is illegitimate to use concerns over
the strategic intentions of adversarial states as a reason to
avoid disarmament, while arguing that "the size, roles and
political-strategic significance" of US and Russian nuclear
arsenals should be reduced.[5]
How security is thought attainable minus the traditional constituents
of power is unclear, while judgments about the intentions and
capabilities of other states represent the fundamental starting-point
of external policy since the time of Thucydides. Moreover, considering
the success of the size of the US and Russian arsenals in preserving
international peace, the value of such a reduction is debatable.
The advocates of disarmament outline no alternative authority
that can plausibly assume responsibility for providing states
with their security, nor explain precisely why states should give
up the right to take their own decisions to a nebulous body. Finally,
the proponents of disarmament demand robust enforcement mechanisms
but seek to deprive the UK and its partners of the means to defend
global security. A world without nuclear weapons in the hands
of the UK, US and other unofficial guarantors of security is an
unsafe world.
15. In addition, there is a risk in constructing
an elaborate international framework that would entail stigmatising
nuclear weaponry when it might feasibly become necessary to use
nuclear forces to attack Hard and Deeply Buried Targets (HDBT)—such
as bunkers containing weapons, laboratories, assembly facilities
and C³—resistant to conventional attack. This is a
real possibility, as recognised in both the 2001 US Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) and subsequent, if vague, comment by the
UK Government. The US believes there to be 10,000 HDBTs worldwide.
Conventional weapons may lack the destructive capability necessary
for attacks on such locations and stigmatising nuclear weaponry
without an understanding of how foreign policy would operate in
practice without them is dangerous.
16. Disarmament advocates ignore the fact
that the type of states that pose the biggest risk are not likely
to be responsive to the type of solutions that they outline. The
UK has less than 200 operationally available warheads and
the December 2006 White Paper announced a further twenty
per cent reduction. This is quite sufficient as a measure of disarmament.
It may be enticing to seize the moral high ground with the argument
that UK disarmament could set an example for others, but this
is not borne out by the historical record or the probable reactions
of others. States will make security decisions based upon their
own perceived needs. Advocates of this position have yet to demonstrate
that UK disarmament would influence others.
CONCLUSION
17. The UK Government should base a key
part of its foreign policy around combating the problem of proliferation.
Paradoxically, however, this must include acceptance of the fact
that proliferation is inevitable and a robust foreign policy posture
consequently necessary. The UK should take the lead in forging
consensus for such a posture with its partners. The feasibility
of constructing effective arrangements between the international
community is limited and likely to prove unworkable, as well as
providing proliferators with the scope to exploit divisions, avoid
punishment and play for time—precisely as Iran has done
since 2004. Moreover, non-adversarial actors such as Taiwan, South
Korea and Japan could also enter a race for nuclear weaponry.
The Government should recognise this and shift its efforts accordingly.
18. Moreover, the utility of arms control
treaties has historically been questionable. The same is true
of disarmament. The very fact that proliferators are willing to
defy the international community suggests that attempts to conciliate
them will fail. The current preference in European foreign policy
circles for a role as "mediator" should not divert UK
policy from the necessity of demanding concrete results from its
diplomacy. The utility of this as a foreign policy strategy should
thus be seriously questioned. A tougher approach to those proliferating
WMD and missile technology could be adopted, including much firmer
economic, political and military sanctions. The controversy over
Iraq should not deter the UK and its allies from using decisive
force where necessary to remove threats.
25 September 2008
3 Colin Gray, "Arms Control Does Not Control Arms",
in Gray, Strategy and History (London, 2006), p. 121. Back
4
Gray, p. 125. Back
5
G. Perkovich and J. M. Acton, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons
(London 2008), pp. 113-5. Back
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