Submission from Professor Malcolm
Chalmers, Royal United Services Institute
Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation: Strengthening
the Links
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
1. The last two years have seen a revival
of interest in nuclear disarmament in the US, most notably through
the initiative led by distinguished statesmen George Shultz, Bill
Perry, Sam Nunn and Henry Kissinger. Both John McCain and Barack
Obama have made clear their commitment to give a higher priority
to non-proliferation than the current administration, and have
confirmed their support for the "vision" of a world
free of nuclear weapons.
2. The UK Government has welcomed these
developments. Its announcement of a programme to replace Trident
submarines and missiles was accompanied by a reaffirmation of
its commitment to the goal of global nuclear disarmament, a commitment
that was subsequently highlighted in Foreign Secretary Margaret
Beckett's speech in Washington DC in June 2007. In March 2008,
the National Security Strategy committed the Government to "lead
the international effort to accelerate disarmament among possessor
states, in pursuit of our objective of a negotiated elimination
of all nuclear weapons."
3. As in the US, there is growing cross-party
agreement on the need for progress in this area. In June 2008,
former Foreign Secretaries Douglas Hurd, David Owen and Malcolm
Rifkind, together with former NATO Secretary-General George Robertson,
called for the UK to support the campaign in America for a nuclear
weapon free world. Subsequently, Shadow Foreign Secretary William
Hague, in a major speech in July 2008, welcomed the renewed debate,
and made it clear that "showing that we take our disarmament
commitments seriously is a vital part of winning the moral argument
against nuclear proliferation."
4. It remains to be seen whether these recent
developments in the discourse on nuclear disarmament, on both
sides of the Atlantic, is carried through into policy in the run
up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference. An early indicator
will be whether a new US administration is confident in its ability
to obtain Senate ratification for the CTBT, a step which would
require a significant degree of cross-party support. The US will
also come under considerable pressure to promise further deep
reductions in its nuclear stockpile, beyond those currently planned.
The prospects for developing a political consensus behind such
reductions, however, could become hostage to the wider state of
relations between the US and Russia.
Language matters
5. While nuclear disarmament has risen up
the political agenda over the last two years, there is still a
tendency to view it as being largely subordinate to the problem
of proliferation. This is reflected in the FCO's policy goal of
"tackling nuclear proliferation and countering terrorism",
the first part of which is the subject of this Inquiry. It may
be time to revisit this nomenclature. The result of labelling
proliferation as the primary problem is that it focuses attention
on those who have not yet acquired nuclear weapons (or other WMD),
while devoting less effort to those who have already done so.
A more appropriate goal might be "countering the threats
of nuclear weapons and terrorism".
6. A primary focus on proliferation tends
to assume that existing nuclear-armed states have developed stable
deterrent relationships, and are therefore not of primary concern.
Some go further, distinguishing the "trustee" role that
existing nuclear weapons states allegedly provide for the international
order from the destabilisation that acquisition by other states
would bring. Such an argument underestimates the danger that existing
nuclear arsenals might be at risk of use or diversion. Over the
next two decades, the possibility of political instability in
Pakistan and Russia, in particular, make their arsenals as significant
a source of concern as those of North Korea or (potentially) Iran
are today. The possibility of future arms racing between existing
nuclear-armed states (especially China, Pakistan, India and the
US) also poses real risks to international peace and stability.
7. The "double standards argument"—that
existing nuclear weapons states must support the vision of nuclear
disarmament in order to fulfil their NPT obligation to do so,
and in order to address the accusation that the regime is a discriminatory
one—is a powerful one. But it should not be the only reason
for promoting nuclear disarmament. There are good reasons why
the UK and its allies do not want particular regimes to acquire
nuclear weapons. There are also particular risks involved in the
transition to nuclear-armed status for states in regions of tension,
not least that their weapons programmes might trigger pre-emptive
attacks by other powers (as is the case for Iran). But such risks
are case-specific and time-limited, rather than generic. By contrast,
the argument for non-discriminatory norms for constraining, and
eventually eliminating, nuclear weapons is based on an assessment
that both current and possible future arsenals are a source of
concern.
Politics matters
8. The prospects for nuclear disarmament
cannot be viewed in isolation from wider strategic and political
circumstances. Of all the nuclear-armed states, the US and its
European allies have the greatest structural incentives to support
nuclear disarmament. The removal of nuclear weapons from world
politics would reinforce the advantages derived from US strength
in conventional forces, while removing one of the few ways in
which other states could pose credible threats to US or European
territory. Similarly, India might view nuclear disarmament positively,
given the conventional superiority that it would give it over
Pakistan, and the lack of a credible threat of invasion from other
states.
9. For the four other nuclear-armed states,
by contrast, support for disarmament is likely to be dependent
on significant amelioration to current strategic vulnerabilities.
Israel will not disarm in the absence of a peace settlement with
the other states of the region, some of whom (notably Iran) continue
to contest its very existence. Renunciation of nuclear weapons
by Pakistan is difficult to envisage without a transformation
of its relationship with India, including a settlement of the
Kashmir dispute. Similarly, preventing proliferation in potential
candidates for acquiring nuclear weapons will require continuing
attention being given to their strategic vulnerabilities and concerns.
The central success of the current non-proliferation regime is
that far fewer states have acquired nuclear weapons than have
had programmes to do so. But the remaining cases are the most
difficult ones.
10. The strategic vulnerabilities of both
Russia and China pose more fundamental problems for the prospects
of nuclear disarmament. Both are seeking to maintain status and
autonomy in a world where the US will remain the dominant military
power for at least the next two decades. Both are powerful enough
to exert an effective veto on wider moves towards nuclear disarmament.
11. As its economic and soft power increases,
China may become less reliant on military strength for its security.
Moreover, the conventional military balance with other Asian states
seems likely to shift in its favour over time, giving it additional
reasons to favour nuclear disarmament. On the other hand, there
are growing signs of armament competition between the US and China,
which could limit the extent to which China (or, in future, the
US) is prepared to reduce its nuclear arsenal. Without a broader
process of military confidence-building and d
tente between the two countries, arms racing between
the US and China could develop into a central feature of the world's
strategic landscape a decade from now.
12. Russia's nuclear posture is a more immediate
issue. The collapse of the Soviet Union has left Russia's leadership
concerned at their country's vulnerability (political and military)
to NATO members' efforts to extend their sphere of influence eastwards.
In recent years, it has given a high priority to modernising its
nuclear force, reflecting the continuing centrality that conflict
with NATO plays in its strategic thinking. Given the extent of
"overkill" in the arsenals of both states, Russia may
be prepared to agree some further reductions in strategic forces
with the US in coming years. But much more fundamental change
in Russian perceptions of its strategic vulnerabilities—both
to NATO and, increasingly, to China—would be required for
it to be willing to support a world free of nuclear weapons.
Iran: the next crisis?
13. The Iranian nuclear programme is the
biggest current threat to the global non-proliferation regime.
Current E3+3 efforts to persuade Iran to freeze or suspend
its enrichment programme have failed to produce any sign of movement
from Iran. As a result, military action against Iran's nuclear
facilities is a real possibility in the near term, despite all
the risks for regional security and global energy markets that
this would involve. Yet even large scale military strikes may
not be sufficient to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons
if it remains determined to do so. It may have the opposite effect,
as bombing of Iraq's Osirak nuclear facility in 1980 (by
Iran) and Israel (in 1981) probably did in the past. Whether or
not an attack takes place, therefore, there is a real possibility
that Iran will become the world's ninth (or tenth) nuclear weapons
states within the next decade.
14. Optimists argue that, if Iran does acquire
nuclear weapons, it will quickly learn the risk-averse and stability-enhancing
behaviour that, it is claimed, existing nuclear-armed states (including
India and Pakistan) already exhibit. It is perhaps just as likely
that Iranian armament will lead to an extended period of instability,
testing deterrence theory as never before.
15. Diplomatic possibilities for preventing
Iranian nuclearisation still remain. The Iranian government has
already been offered substantial economic and political concessions
in return for suspending its programme. It could gain more, consolidating
its strategic gains in Iraq and lessening the risk of US-inspired
regime change.
16. Although the current focus of attention
is on the risk of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, the UK and its
allies should also be considering how to prevent further proliferation
in the region. Even if Iran does become a nuclear-armed power,
it is far from inevitable that other regional states (notably
Saudi Arabia and Egypt) will follow in its path. Nor would it
be in the wider interests of regional or global stability that
they do so. Although both states are currently US allies, medium-term
diversion risks would be as high, and probably higher, than for
Iran. East Asian experience suggests that it is possible to halt
regional proliferation to less powerful states (South Korea, Taiwan)
even when the region's largest state (China) goes nuclear. The
US and its European allies need to be thinking now about how to
contain proliferation in the Middle East in the event of Iran
being successful in its current efforts. The provision of security
guarantees to Iran's neighbours could play an important role in
this effort.
Missile defences and nuclear umbrellas
17. Since its origins in the 1960's, nuclear
arms control has had to consider the interaction between offensive
and defensive strategic systems. For much of this period, the
symbolic importance which the US and the Soviet Union (and now
Russia) have attached to defensive systems has not been matched
by technical effectiveness. Nevertheless, notably in relation
to President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, the prospect
of defensive deployments has had considerable political impact.
18. Current controversies over the planned
deployment of ten US missile interceptors in Poland by 2011 illustrate
the continuing political sensitivity of this issue for US/Russia
relations. Yet, at least in the early phase of the decision-making
process, US military leaders do not appear to have considered
how a deployment intended primarily to counter threats from the
Middle East might be perceived by Russia. The current assumption
that deployment could proceed before Iran has tested missiles
capable of reaching central Europe, far less the US, does little
to dampen speculation on the purposes of the deployment.
19. It would therefore be a welcome recognition
of Russian concerns if the US were to refrain from interceptor
deployment until Iran tests missiles capable of reaching the region
that they are intended to protect. If Iran does acquire nuclear-armed
missiles capable of reaching central Europe and/or the US, the
political pressure for missile defence deployment (at or in excess
of currently planned levels) is likely to become irresistible.
This possibility makes it all the more important that the US should
also continue to seek ways of providing verifiable assurances
to Russia that the interceptors are not configured against its
strategic forces.
20. Even if Iran fails to deploy longer-range
missiles, its acquisition of nuclear weapons is likely to increase
pressure from its neighbours for the provision of external security
guarantees, including the deployment of US missile defence systems
and troops in the western Gulf. In the Cold War, the provision
of "extended deterrence" to the US's non-nuclear allies
in Asia and Europe was widely taken to require a credible threat
of nuclear retaliation against threats to their security. In the
case of a nuclear-armed Iran, however, the threat of regime change
would be a more credible, and morally justifiable, deterrent.
Far from driving the US out of the region, one of the many consequences
of an Iranian nuclear capability could be the consolidation of
its military presence there.
Taking the high ground
21. The immediate prospects for rapid progress
on the nuclear disarmament agenda are not good. Negotiations with
Iran show few signs of producing a change of heart in that country's
drive to develop a military nuclear capability. Military action
against its known nuclear sites could further deepen, rather than
resolve, this impasse. At the same time, the recent deterioration
in US/Russia relations is narrowing the ability of leaders, in
both countries, to make progress on bilateral arms control.
22. Despite these problems, commitment to
the NPT as the centre piece of efforts to contain the threat of
nuclear weapons remains strong. The most encouraging recent development
has been the US policy establishment's recognition of the need
for a more active approach towards fulfilling the disarmament
part of the NPT bargain. If translated into Government policy,
this can help put the US and Europe on the front foot in discussions
leading up to the 2010 NPT, as well as providing additional
legitimacy to its opposition to Iran's nuclear ambitions.
29 September 2008
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