Submitted by Jonathan Granoff, Esq.
President, Global Security Institute
In 1965, I met Robert Kennedy while working
in Washington. A small group of interns listened in rapt attention
as he explained how close we were to the end of civilization during
the Cuban Missile Crisis. I will never forget how he emphasized
that the challenge of eliminating nuclear weapons before they
eliminate us is the litmus test for humanity. Success or failure
will determine our moral standard and our capacity to be led by
reason and law to security, or to oblivion through fear, the quest
for power and apathy.
Nearly every country in the world has accepted
the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a necessary legal
instrument to address this threat. While simultaneously condemning
the spread of nuclear weapons, this treaty sets forth a related
obligation to obtain their universal elimination. In 1995, in
order to obtain the indefinite extension of the NPT, now with
188 states parties, commitments to nuclear elimination were
confirmed and strengthened by the five declared nuclear weapon
statesChina, United States, France, Russia, and the United
Kingdom. However, the nuclear weapon states with over 96% of the
weapons, the United States and Russia, have not fully addressed
their fundamental dilemma: they want to keep their nuclear weapons
indefinitely and at the same time condemn others who would attempt
to acquire them. It is as if parents were telling their children
not to smoke while puffing on cigars themselves. It is simply
not effective.
This incoherence in policies leads to instability
in cooperation. Nothing could be more hazardous in today's world.
In order to ensure that nuclear weapons do not proliferate to
more states and to dangerous sub-state actors, confidence in the
restraint of the exercise of power by the most powerful is needed.
The trust and cooperation needed for a global assault against
such threats will not be effective if some states flaunt their
disarmament obligations yet display a passion for non-proliferation.
I will highlight some of the incoherencies that
are creating instability in the non-proliferation regime, and
a path to coherence that simultaneously reduces threat and strengthens
non-proliferation efforts. The path to stability and security
is a return to promoting the pursuit of collective security through
the rule of law. In the field of nuclear weapons, this translatesamong
other thingsinto fulfilling the existing legally mandated
disarmament responsibilities that remain unaddressed by the nuclear
weapon states. It is simply impractical and hypocritical for some
to say that nuclear weapons are morally acceptable for them to
possess and even threaten to use, and evil for others to attempt
to acquire.
With this in mind, allow me to address the perception,
common in Washington, that the NPT is failing. Looking at the
NPTs good record over the past three and one-half decades, it
is hard to understand the basis for the perception. It is true
that three states that stayed outside the treaty have acquired
arsenals, Israel, India and Pakistan. This is unfortunate, but
it is also a problem that predated the NPT.[23]
In contrast to these three, other states have
changed their policies over time, renounced nuclear weapons and
joined the treaty. For example, South Africa relinquished its
small arsenal and Brazil and Argentina gave up weapons-relevant
programmes. China and France accepted the NPT disarmament obligation
in joining the treaty as declared nuclear weapon states in 1992.
The vast majority of states have complied with the obligation
of non-acquisition. Serious, demonstrated efforts to acquire nuclear
weapons in violation of the treaty are known to have occurred
only in a handful of cases, Iraq and Libya, where programmes have
been reversed, and North Korea.
With a negotiated settlement to the North Korean
situation, the area of immediate concern relating to the spread
of nuclear weapons is Iran. Should Iran achieve a weapons capability
over the next five to ten years, or go further and acquire weapons
at some point in the future, other states in the region will face
enormous pressure to follow suit. Whilst speaking at a conference
in Tehran hosted by the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I
put forth a "win-win-win" approach that meets the core
concerns of the West, Iran and, moreover, strengthens the international
disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole. A policy
brief on Iran further outlining this win-win-win approach is appended
here as Appendix A.[24]
THE NPT BARGAIN:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The NPT has a remarkable record of preventing
the spread of nuclear weapons, but is now facing multiple challenges,
such as:
1. Iran's defiance of Security Council sanctions
and its claims to rights to a fuel cycle pursuant to Article IV
of the Treaty;
2. The encouragement of proliferation by awarding
Nuclear Suppliers' Group exemptions to India;
3. The failure of the nuclear weapon states to
unambiguously affirm and act upon their disarmament commitments.
The first issue is addressed in Appendix C.[25]
The nuclear trade arrangement with India represents a clear setback
for non-proliferation. States which have ratified the Comprehensive
Test-Ban Treaty, an essential element of a stable non-proliferation
regime, failed to attach a condition that India sign the CTBT,
thus undermining a core bargain of the NPT: that those who eschew
nuclear weapons should get the benefit of nuclear technology.
A good understanding of the mechanisms of the
Treaty is needed to explicate its disarmament commitments. The
basic bargain underlying the text completed in 1968 was this:
In exchange for a commitment from the non-nuclear weapons states
not to acquire nuclear weapons and to submit their peaceful nuclear
activities to monitoring to verify compliance with the non-acquisition
commitment (Article II), the NPT nuclear weapon states pledged
to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the elimination
of their nuclear arsenals (Article VI)[26]
and promised the non-nuclear-weapon parties unfettered access
to peaceful nuclear technologies (eg nuclear power reactors and
nuclear medicine; Article IV). During the negotiations at its
creation, several prominent non-nuclear weapons statesGermany,
Italy and Sweden, for examplewould not permit the treaty
to be permanent and ensured that it would be reviewed after 25 years
and either be extended for a fixed period, be indefinitely extended
(Article X), or lapse. At the 1995 Review and Extension Conference,
many states were extremely dissatisfied with the progress on disarmament
of the nuclear weapons statesUS, Russia, UK, France, and
Chinaand argued that they would not accept the inequity
of a dual global system of nuclear haves and have-nots. They demanded
and obtained a bargain. It contained a Statement of Principles
and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament,[27]
which politically, if not legally, conditioned the indefinite
extension of the treaty, pledging to:
complete a Comprehensive nuclear
Test-Ban Treaty by the end of 1996
reaffirm the commitment to pursue
nuclear disarmament
commence negotiations on a treaty
to stop production of nuclear bomb materials
encourage the creation of nuclear
weapons free zones
vigorously work to make the treaty
universal by bringing in Israel, Pakistan and India
enhance IAEA safeguards and verification
capacity
reinforce negative security assurances
already given to non-weapons states against the use or threat
of use of nuclear weapons against them
The bargain to extend the treaty centered on
a strengthened review process with near yearly preparatory conferences
and a rigorous review every five years to ensure the promise as
set forth in the Principle and Objectives:
"The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon
states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear
weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those
weapons."
The 1995 re-commitment to and elaboration
of the NPT nuclear disarmament obligation was reinforced by the
1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.
Interpreting Article VI of the NPT and other international law,
the Court unanimously held: "There exists an obligation to
pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations on
nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective
international control."[28]
The 2000 Review Conference successfully
reached a consensus on 13 Practical Steps to advance the
commitments to lower the salience of nuclear weapons in policies,
reinforce non-proliferation measures, and move toward the elimination
of nuclear weapons. All 187 States Parties agreed on the
following measures:[29]
1. Entry into Force of the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT): The importance and urgency of
signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions
and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the
early entry into force of the CTBT.
2. Holding the Line Against Testing: A moratorium
on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions
pending entry into force of the CTBT.
3. Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT):
The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament
on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and
effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme
of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations
on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.
4. Negotiations on Nuclear Disarmament:
The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament
an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear
disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on
a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment
of such a body.
5. Irreversibility: The principle of irreversibility
to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms
control and reduction measures.
6. Commitment to Elimination: An unequivocal
undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total
elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament
to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.
7. Verified Reductions: The early entry
into force and full implementation of Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START) II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible
while preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a
basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in
accordance with its provisions.
8. Control of US/Russian Excess Fissile
Materials: The completion and implementation of the Trilateral
Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation
and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
9. Progress by Nuclear Weapons States: Steps
by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament
in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the
principle of undiminished security for all:
Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon
States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.
Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon
States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the
implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary
confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear
disarmament.
The further reduction of non-strategic
nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral
part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.
Concrete agreed measures to further
reduce the operational status of nuclear weapon systems.
A diminishing role for nuclear weapons
in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever
be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.
The engagement as soon as appropriate
of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the
total elimination of their nuclear weapons.
10. Excess fissile materials under IAEA
control: Arrangements by all nuclear weapon States to place, as
soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them
as no longer required for military purposes under International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or other relevant international verification
and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful
purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside
of military programs.
11. General and Complete Disarmament: Reaffirmation
that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament
process is general and complete disarmament under effective international
control.
12. Reporting: Regular reports, within the
framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States
parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c)
of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling
the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of
8 July 1996.
13. Verifying: The further development of
the verification capabilities that will be required to provide
assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for
the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.
On this last point, the UK Government should
be commended for its work to examine and experiment with potential
methodologies in a future disarmament verification regime. This
type of leadership by the British Government is all the more important
and useful at this time, since, unfortunately, the United States,
since 2000, has backtracked on key commitments made in the Practical
Steps, notably the CTBT; negotiation of a verified FMCT;
the START process and the ABM Treaty. The 2002 bilateral
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) with Russia fails
to apply the principles of transparency, verification, and irreversibility.
Furthermore, it could be argued that SORT fails to diminish the
role of nuclear weapons in security policies, a duty consistence
with NPT pledges. It is worth emphasizing that what is at stake
here is not just a US-Russian issue. The Practical Steps, adopted
at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, represent an international
consensus on the means for compliance with Article VI. The US's
recent failure to live up to its good faith commitments undermines
not just the NPT, but the primacy of international law.
In the absence of active US leadership, hopes
for progress on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament were
dashed from the outset of the 2005 Review Conference, held
at the UN in May 2005. The states parties were unable to even
generate a timely working agenda and 15 out of 20 days
were squandered on procedural battles. The procedural squabbles
masked real debate on substantive political differences. The capacity
to make substantive progress on disarmament or non-proliferation
was thwarted despite efforts of the world's best diplomats. The
2005 agenda was stalled along several fault lines. The United
States would not permit the commitments already made under the
treaty review process to be the basis for a working agenda and
focused on the proliferation threats posed by Iran and North Korea;
Egypt demanded recognition of previous commitments, in particular
regarding making the treaty universal; Iran baited the nuclear
weapon states on their failure to make progress on disarmament,
specifically the United States for its research on modified or
new-design warheads with new military capabilities. In the end,
no consensus document was generated.
This institutional deadlock has poisoned most
of our other existing multilateral disarmament machinery, beyond
just the NPT review process. The Conference on Disarmament (CD)
has failed to make any substantive progress in over a decade.
Other fora spawned from the General Assembly First Special Session
on Disarmament in 1978, such as the annual Disarmament Commission,
has been unable to contribute substantively to the global regime.
This institutional deadlock has arisen from a profound failure
of political will to work cooperatively, wherein substantive disagreements
are callously masked by procedural wrangling and arcane squabbling
over agendas and asterisks. This diminution of utilization of
diplomacy and law renders the reliance on force and war more likely.
Proliferation is unacceptable, indeed. Yet we now know that counter-proliferation
efforts, such as the war in Iraq, far from an effective non-proliferation
measure, actually exacerbate insecurity on a regional and global
scale.
Coupling this failed review process with the
recent India deal's approval by the NSG makes rapid clear progress
on disarmament obligations even more important. If the commitment
of the nuclear weapon states to disarmament is not vouchsafed
through actions, the NPT will not be sustainable.
LOOKING FORWARD
With the next Review Conference less than two
years away, our task now is to ascertain the achievable steps
that can be taken now to ensure that we do not squander another
important opportunity. The steps that I advocate here meet key
criteria: they do not diminish the security of any state; they
reinforce the NPT and enhance the rule of law; they make the world
safer now; and they move the world towards the elimination of
nuclear weapons.
These steps, inter alia, were derived
from and advocated by a process called The Article VI Forum, an
ongoing series of consultations between like-minded governments
and non-governmental experts. The priorities identified by the
Article VI Forum are contained in the briefing paper, Towards
2010: Priorities for NPT Consensus.[30]The
Article VI Forum is a project of the Middle Powers Initiative,
a programme of the Global Security Institute. [31]
Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty
An FMCT would permanently end production of
fissile materials, primarily separated plutonium and highly enriched
uranium (HEU), for use in weapons. It would affect most directly
the countries possessing nuclear weapons; NPT non-weapon states
already are subject to a verified ban on diverting materials to
weapons. Achievement of an FMCT would restrain arms racing involving
India, China, and Pakistan, cap Israel's arsenal, and establish
ceilings on other arsenals as well. A verified FMCT also would
help build a stable framework for reduction and elimination of
warheads and fissile material stocks; help prevent acquisition
of fissile materials by terrorists; meet a key NPT commitment;
and institutionalize one of the basic pillars of a nuclear weapons-free
world.
The two major hurdles to an effective FMCT are:
the 2004 reversal by the United States of its position to
support a verification mechanism within a future treaty and; resistance
by some CD members, in particular Egypt, Israel, China and Pakistan
to begin negotiations absent concurrent discussions within the
CD on issues relating to outer space and/or nuclear disarmament.
The United Kingdom has maintained a careful
position on this issue, neither accepting the US's claims that
verification is impossible nor adamantly insisting on inclusion
of verification prior to the commencement of negotiations. With
increased British expertise and leadership on this issue, however,
the onus is upon the UK to bring that expertise and priority to
the FMCT context and work diligently to include such an effective
mechanism into the final treaty.
Verification of reduction and elimination of nuclear
arsenals
US President Reagan repeatedly invoked the Russian
dictum, "trust but verify." The principle of verification
follows from the truth that none of us can be secure in an insecure
world. Verification is needed to bring greater security to the
rest of the world because the rest of the world is properly concerned
with the efficacy of the disarmament and arms reduction efforts
of the US and Russia. It is essential to bring the principle of
verification symbolized by that dictum back to centre stage. Thankfully,
the United Kingdom is well-situated to take up this crucial task.
The UK should be commended for its "verification
laboratory" initiatives undertaken with Norway and the non-governmental
organization VERTIC. The findings of these experiments will be
useful to all nuclear weapon states as they work to implement
their sworn "unequivocal undertaking" to the total elimination
of nuclear weapons. Strict, proven, effective verification methods
will do much to assuage the fears of adversaries that actual disarmament
has taken place. The smaller the arsenals, the greater these insecurities
become. Therefore, as global arsenals gradually reduce, the more
important the UK/Norway/VERTIC's work will be. Therefore, the
UK Government must continue its financial and political support
of these undertakings for the foreseeable future.
Reduction of the operational status of nuclear
forces
Since 2000, the UK has reduced the operational
status of its nuclear forces with a several day "notice-to-fire"
readiness posture. This measure contributes to disarmament and
non-proliferation by minimizing the risks of use associated with
mistakes, coups, attacks on nuclear weapons facilities, false
warnings, unauthorized launches, hacking into command and control
systems and developments that could not now be anticipated. De-alerting
also lessens the moral corruption inherent in reliance on nuclear
weapons for security and defense.
The UK should pressure other nuclear weapon
states to emulate its position as a step towards the goal of having
zero weapons on alert or on patrol at any time. Furthermore, the
UK, having demonstrated its commitment to this issue, should vote
in favour of the General Assembly resolution that calls for further
de-alerting measures (A/62/36), which will be put to a vote again
in the 2008 First Committee.
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
As a signatory to the CTBT, the United Kingdom
must strongly support all efforts to achieve its entry-into-force.
It is regrettable that the UK missed the tremendous opportunity
of requiring CTBT ratification as a condition of approval by the
NSG for the US-India deal. Other such opportunities to advance
the entry-into-force of the Test Ban Treaty must not be similarly
ignored.
The United Kingdom must make entry-into-force
of the CTBT one of its top foreign policy objectives, using the
wide range of diplomatic carrots at its disposal.
A diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security
policies and strengthened assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons
against non-weapon states
The 2007 White Paper extending the life
of the Trident system was a step backwards for diminishing the
role of nuclear weapons. Both the Trident system and its predecessor
Polaris were designed to deter aggressive action by the now defunct
USSR. The downfall of the USSR eliminated that threat. No new
existential threats to the UK have emerged. The UK continues to
spend half of its defence budget on a system to protect against
a threat that does not exist. Moreover, nuclear weapons are not
only useless in the face of real threatssuch as terrorists,
climate change, poverty and diseasebut they actually work
to heighten the risks posed by these threats. Even a limited nuclear
exchange would have calamitous effects on the climate and global
food supplies. The continued production of fissile material and
the failure to lockdown and secure the existing stockpiles heightens
the risk of nuclear terrorism. The absurd sums of money spent
on nuclear weapons on a daily basis are an affront to the global
battle to meet the Millennium Development Goals and eradicate
poverty forever. In the 21st century, nuclear weapons make us
all less, not more, secure. In sum, the most serious challenges
to national and global security cannot be addressed by nuclear
weapons. Indeed, the continued reliance on nuclear weapons exacerbate
these threats.
The package of decisions adopted at the 1995 Review
and Extension Conference of the NPT contained non-binding negative
security assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against
non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT. However, these assurances,
and similar ones issued via Security Council resolution 984, remain
insufficient. The NPT would be strengthened greatly by the codification
of these assurances to non-nuclear weapon states parties. The
UK should incorporate these assurances into their nuclear security
doctrine, thus eliminating the perceived need of some non-nuclear
weapon states to develop a nuclear deterrent of their own.
Prevent the Weaponization of Outer Space
At the Reykjavik summit in 1986, both the US
and the Soviet Union were willing to discuss the abolition of
nuclear weapons, not just steps to stop the arms race. But President
Reagan's refusal to include Star Wars and other space-based weapons
in the framework of nuclear abolition thwarted the talks. Just
as nuclear weapons are not just about nuclear weapons, space weapons
are not just about space weapons. Rather, the two are burlesque
examples of the lack of a cooperative security framework. The
pursuit of space weapons is about the pursuit of dominance. Gorbachev
understood this at the time, and he reiterated it recently at
a conference at the Belfer Center at Harvard in December last
year.[32]
He knew that what the Americans called defence (or missile shield),
was a concomitant capacity for offensive space weapons, which
would create strategic imbalances, all the more pronounced if
there were actual movement toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.
Therefore, serious efforts to move towards the
total abolition of nuclear weapons must also address efforts to
prevent, through a legally-binding, verifiable treaty, the weaponization
of outer space. The UK must support such efforts at the Conference
on Disarmament and in the General Assembly First Committee.
CONCLUSION: DISARMAMENT
AS THE
COMPASS POINT
Implementation of the above-outlined priority
measures and the regime-management reforms outlined in the Appendix
I should take place in the context of a visible intent to achieve
a nuclear weapons-free world. The priority measures are valuable
in and of themselves. They decrease risks of use, diminish the
access of terrorists to catastrophic weapons and materials to
build them, raise barriers to acquisition by additional states,
and generate support for strengthening the non-proliferation side
of the regime and resolving regional crises. Moreover, the measures
pass key tests: they enhance security generally; they do not diminish
the security of any state; they reinforce the NPT and enhance
the rule of law; they make the world safer now; they move the
world towards elimination of nuclear weapons.
To conclude: Building an effective non-proliferation/disarmament
regime is complex and challenging. The underlying principle, however,
is simple, and serves as a guide to the work. Nuclear weapons
are morally, legally, and practically unacceptable. As my mentor,
the late Senator Alan Cranston, used to say, "Nuclear weapons
are unworthy of civilization." Perpetual nuclear apartheidsome
countries have the weapons, others are forbidden to have themis
unsustainable. Both practical and moral coherence requires application
of a universal standard, a golden rule: no country may possess
weapons capable of inflicting catastrophic, city-destroying or
even civilization-ending, damage. If we meet the challenge of
implementing this rule, we will pass down to our children and
grandchildren and all succeeding generations a world preserving
the advances made by hundreds of previous generations, including
our own.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT:
I gratefully acknowledge the assistance in preparing
this testimony of Dr. John Burroughs, Executive Director, Lawyers'
Committee on Nuclear Policy; Ambassador Robert T. Grey, Jr., the
director of the Bipartisan Security Group; James Wurst, Programme
Director, Middle Powers Initiative/Global Security Institute and
especially Rhianna Tyson, Senior Officer, Global Security Institute.
Appendix A
Needed Non-proliferation Reforms
Experience since the Cold War with preventing
proliferation, in particular with regard to North Korea and Iran,
teaches four lessons about strengthening the regime for the future.
First, material and ongoing violations
of safeguards reporting requirements should result in forfeiture
of the right to acquire nuclear fuel production technology under
Article IV of the NPT. The United States made this point in
NPT meetings with respect to Iran, but it has never been squarely
addressed by the IAEA Board of Governors, NPT states parties,
or the Security Council.
Second, institutional reform is needed to
create effective compliance assessment mechanisms. There is
no body empowered to assess whether a state is breaching its NPT
obligation by seeking to acquire nuclear weapons nor by failing
to comply with the commitment to good faith negotiations on disarmament.
Under its Statute, the IAEA has the important but limited task
of ascertaining whether nuclear materials have been diverted to
a weapons programme, which it has not found to be the case
in Iran. But there are other aspects to a weapons program, for
example warhead design and missile development. What is needed
is an NPT governing body which together with the IAEA, perhaps
also drawing on UNMOVIC-type resources, has this responsibility,
as well as the responsibility of monitoring reduction and elimination
of existing arsenals. There have been multiple proposals to strengthen
NPT institutional capability, by adding a secretariat, a governing
council, and/or empowered annual meetings of states parties. The
proposals have come from responsible states like Ireland and Canada
and from the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission,[33]
and have been advanced as well by Jayantha Dhanapala, chair of
the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and former UN Under
Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs.[34]
So far the United States has shown no interest.
Third, policy tools work best when integrated
into the global system. Effective non-proliferation and disarmament
requires a robust multilateralism based upon global norms. This
is not to say that policy tools involving international cooperation
short of a global regime have no place. The tools include export
control arrangements; the network of states (the Proliferation
Security Initiative) prepared to interdict illicit shipments of
nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapon-related equipment,
materials, and delivery systems; and the G-8 program building
on the Cooperative Threat Reduction program aimed at securing
NBC weapons and materials in Russia and other countries. But their
effectiveness can be optimized by finding ways to link them to
the global regime. An example of movement towards such integration
is Security Council resolution 1540, which requires all states
to take steps to prevent acquisition of and trafficking in NBC
weapon-related items by states, terrorists and other non-state
actors. Among other things, the resolution requires all states
to appropriately regulate exports. It is a step toward universalizing
nuclear weapons control by means of law established by the Security
Council. The Bush administration is to be commended for its leadership
in the solidification of global law through resolution 1540. But
I must register two cautions. The first is that, as with other
non-proliferation measures, the extent of compliance will depend
crucially on how well the states possessing nuclear arsenals do
in fulfilling their side of the bargain. The second is that given
the limited membership of the Security Council and its control
by the United States and other permanent members, all possessing
nuclear weapons, legitimacy and in-depth commitment will best
be achieved by subsequent codification of 1540 and similar
requirements in multilateral treaties.
Appendix B
Underlying Practical and Moral Concerns
"The unleashing of power of the atom bomb has
changed everything except our mode of thinking, and thus we head
toward unparalleled catastrophes."Albert Einstein
"If men can develop weapons that are so
terrifying as to make the thought of global war include almost
a sentence of suicide, you would think that man's intelligence
and his comprehension
would include also his
ability to find a peaceful solution."President
Dwight D. Eisenhower
We must and we can change our course for life
is precious.
General George Lee Butler, former Commander-in-Chief
of US Strategic Air Command (1991-92) and US Strategic Command
(1992-94), was responsible for all nuclear forces of the American
Air Force and Navy. His insights should be of paramount concern
to all Members of Congress:
"Despite all the evidence, we have yet to
fully grasp the monstrous effect of these weapons, that the consequences
of their use defy reason, transcending time and space, poisoning
the Earth and deforming its inhabitants." Nuclear weapons
are "inherently dangerous, hugely expensive and militarily
inefficient."
General Butler stated that "accepting nuclear
weapons as the ultimate arbiter of conflict condemns the world
to live under a dark cloud of perpetual anxiety. Worse, it codifies
mankind's most murderous instincts as an acceptable resort when
other options for resolving conflict fail." He added, "I
have spent years studying nuclear weapons effects
have investigated
a distressing array of accidents and incidents involving strategic
weapons and forces
I came away from that experience deeply
troubled by what I see as the burden of building and maintaining
nuclear arsenals
the grotesquely destructive
war plans, the daily operational risks, and the constant prospect
of a crisis that would hold the fate of entire societies at risk"[35]
He stated his profound concern regarding how
little high-level scrutiny (the US nuclear war plan) had received
over the years, and by how readily his military colleagues threw
up their hands and rolled their eyes at the grim challenge of
converting mathematical estimates of the destructiveness of nuclear
arms and the resilience of Soviet structures into dry statistical
formulas for nuclear war. (reprinted from R. Jeffrey Smith, Ex-Commander
of Nukes Wants to Scrap Them, A Believer No More, The Sacramento
Bee, 29 March 1998. See also R. Jeffrey Smith, The
Dissenter, The Washington Post, 7 December 1997,
at Magazine, W18.)
General Butler had a unique comprehension of
how little the matter has been understood in the chambers of decision
making:
"'It was all Alice-in-Wonderland stuff,'
General Butler says. The targeting data and other details
of the war plan, which are written in an almost unfathomable million
lines of computer software code, were typically reduced by military
briefers to between 60 and 100 slides that could be
presented in an hour or so to the handful of senior US officials
who were cleared to hear it: 'Generally, no one at the briefing
wanted to ask questions because they didn't want to embarrass
themselves. It was about as unsatisfactory as could be imagined
for that subject matter. The truth is that the President only
had a superficial understanding' of what would happen in a nuclear
war, Butler says. Congress knew even less because no lawmaker
has ever had access to the war plan, and most academics could
only make ill-informed guesses."[36]
We remain in a state of incomplete comprehension
largely because the magnitude of the destructive capacity of a
nuclear bomb is simply too great to imagine. Moreover, the illogic
of this improved means to an unimproved end challenges our fundamental
concepts of what we are willing to do to millions of innocent
people to protect our own creation, the State.
The UN in its 1991 report found the "(n)uclear
weapons represent a historically new form of weaponry with unparalleled
destructive potential. A single large nuclear weapon could release
explosive power comparable to all the energy released from the
conventional weapons used in all past wars."[37]
Experts have estimated that the total conventional
bombs dropped by United States Air Force amounted to only two
megatons for the entirety of WWII, the yield of one or two ordinary
nuclear bombs today.[38]
What exactly does one nuclear bomb do? Former
Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner offers his
brief description:
The fireball created by a nuclear explosion will
be much hotter than the surface of the sun for fractions of a
second and will radiate light and heat, as do all objects of very
high temperature. Because the fireball is so hot and close to
the earth, it will deliver enormous amounts of heat and light
to the terrain surrounding the detonation point, and it will be
hundreds or thousands of times brighter than the sun at noon.
If the fireball is created by the detonation of a 1-MT (megaton)
nuclear weapon, for example, within roughly eight- to nine-tenths
of a second each section of its surface will be radiating about
three times as much heat and light as a comparable area of the
sun itself. The intense flash of light and heat from the explosion
of a 550-KT weapon can carbonize exposed skin and cause clothing
to ignite. At a range of three miles surfaces would fulminate
and recoil as they emanate flames. Particles of sand would explode
like pieces of popcorn from the rapid heating of the fireball.
At 3.5 miles, where the blast pressure would be 5psi, the
fireball could ignite clothing on people, curtains and upholstery
in homes and offices, and rubber tires on cars. At four miles,
it could blister aluminum surfaces, and at six to seven miles
it could still set fire to dry leaves and grass. This flash of
incredibly intense, nuclear-driven sunlight could simultaneously
set an uncountable number of fires over an area of close to 100 square
miles.[39]
What is the destructive effect of this blast?
In his landmark opinion for the International Court of Justice,
Judge Christopher Weeramantry made a short list:
1. cause death and destruction; induced cancers,
leukemia, keloids and related afflictions;
2. cause gastrointestinal, cardiovascular and
related afflictions; continued for decades after their use to
induce the health related problems mentioned above;
3. damage the environmental rights of future
generations;
4. cause congenital deformities, mental retardation
and genetic damage;
5. carry the potential to cause a nuclear winter;
6. contaminate and destroy the food chain;
7. imperil the eco-system;
8. produce lethal levels of heat and blast;
9. produce radiation and radioactive fallout;
10. produce a disruptive electromagnetic pulse;
11. produce social disintegration;
12. imperil all civilizations;
13. threaten human survival;
14. wreak cultural devastation;
15. span a time range of thousands of years;
16. threaten all life on the planet;
17. irreversibly damage the rights of future
generations;
18. exterminate civilian population;
19. damage neighbouring states;
20. produce psychological stress and fear syndromes--as
no other weapons do.[40]
What does this mean in terms of human experience?
Please read this bearing in mind that the current arsenals represent
nearly one million times the horror that overtook Hiroshima. Takashi
Hiroaka, Mayor of Hiroshima testified before the International
Court of Justice:
"The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki shattered all war precedent. The mind-numbing damage
these nuclear weapons wrought shook the foundations of human existence
The dropping of the nuclear weapons is a problem
that must be addressed globally. History is written by the victors.
Thus, the heinous massacre that was Hiroshima has been handed
down to us as a perfectly justified act of war.
As a result, for over 50 years we have never
directly confronted the full implications of this horrifying act
for the future of the human race. Hence, we are still forced to
live under the enormous threat of nuclear weapons
Beneath the atomic bombs' monstrous mushroom
cloud, human skin was burned raw. Crying for water, human beings
died in desperate agony. With thoughts of these victims as the
starting point, it is incumbent upon us to think about the nuclear
age and the relationship between human beings and nuclear weapons
The unique characteristic of the atomic bombing
was that the enormous destruction was instantaneous and universal.
Old, young, male, female, soldier, civilianthe killing
was utterly indiscriminate. The entire city was exposed to the
compound and devastating effects of thermal rays, shock wave blast,
and radiation
Above all, we must focus on the fact that the
human misery caused by the atomic bomb is different from that
caused by conventional weapons. (H)uman bodies were burned by
the thermal rays and high-temperature fires, broken and lacerated
by the blast, and insidiously attacked by radiation. These forms
of damage compounded and amplified each other, and the name given
to the combination was "A-bomb disease
"
(T)he bomb reduced Hiroshima to an inhuman state
utterly beyond human ability to express or imagine. I feel frustrated
at not being able to express this completely in my testimony about
the tragedy of the atomic bombing
It is clear that the use of nuclear weapons, which
cause indiscriminate mass murder that leaves survivors to suffer
for decades, is a violation of international law."[41]
During the Cold War the deployment of the arsenals
of the Soviet Union and the US were designed to ensure nonuse.
Not only does it seem that nuclear weapons challenge our capacity
of using law and morality to guide our conduct but also reason
as well. We have built a device which renders us less secure the
more we perfect its effectiveness. Thus, George Kennan, a key
figure in developing the architecture of the Cold War, said about
nuclear weapons:
"The readiness to use nuclear weapons
against other human beingsagainst people we do not know,
whom we have never seen, and whose guilt or innocence is not for
us to establishand, in doing so, to place in jeopardy the
natural structure upon which all civilization rests, as though
the safety and perceived interests of our own generation were
more important than everything that has taken place or could take
place in civilization: this is nothing less than a presumption,
a blasphemy, an indignityan indignity of monstrous dimensionsoffered
to God!"[42]
The perverse logic of the Cold War based on having
enough destructive capacity at the ready to make a use unthinkable
makes no sense at all today. The hair trigger deployments of thousands
of warheads between Russia and US renders logic impotent since
we are not even enemies. Yet, as if we were acting rationally,
we keep these arsenals precisely calibrated and well organized
thus efficiently risking the destruction of all human life on
the planet.
I would now like to offer a simple legal test
that the National Academy has given to these devices followed
by the relevant excerpts from statements of recent years of the
Nobel Peace Laureates who have gathered at a Summit in Rome, Italy
and then close with the entire most recent Nobel Peace Laureates
Statement from Gwangju, Korea of June 2006.[43]
My hope is to instill a greater sense of the
moral aspect of this issue into our public discourse. At root
we are addressing whether this use of the gift of science and
technology solves any problem as great as the problem this use
has created. I would contend that practically, legally, morally,
and militarily it has not. Thus the argument to set the compass
point toward abolition is well founded.
The Committee on International Security and
Arms Control of the US National Academy of Sciences succinctly
summed up the legal analysis of the current posture of international
law:
"(T)he International Court of Justice
agreed that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is strictly limited
by generally accepted laws and humanitarian principles that restrict
the use of force. Accordingly, any threat or use of nuclear weapons
must be limited to and necessary for, self-defense; it must not
be targeted at civilians, and be capable of distinguishing between
civilian and military targets; and it must not cause unnecessary
suffering to combatants, or harm greater than that unavoidable
to achieve military objectives. In the Committee's view, the inherent
destructiveness of nuclear weapons, combined with the unavoidable
risk that even the most restricted use of such weapons would escalate
to broader attacks, makes it extremely unlikely that any contemplated
threat or use of nuclear weapons would meet such criteria."[44]
Judge Ranjeva, of the ICJ, stated what should
be axiomatic in addressing world threats, and by that I mean,
threats that impact on not just United States' interests but the
entire planet and generations yet unborn:
"On the great issues of mankind the requirements
of positive law and ethics make common cause, and nuclear weapons,
because of their destructive effects, are one such issue."[45]
In a world with many different religions and
cultures there are few places where we can look for an expression
of global ethical principles and norms. Many would agree that
the Nobel Peace Laureates are a sufficiently distinguished group
whose opinions should not be lightly ignored. Below are several
quotes from Summits of this distinguished group on the subject
of nuclear weapons.
From the 2005 Rome Final Statement:
While expressing regret that some African
nations spend too much on conventional weapons, we commend the
entire African continent for becoming a nuclear weapons free zone.
It is absurd that the nations with nuclear weapons refuse even
to pledge not to use nuclear weapons against all nuclear weapons
free nations.
As in past years, we reiterate our insistence
that the existence of nuclear weapons is morally unacceptable
and condemn military doctrines allowing their use. We demand progress
by the nuclear weapons states in fulfilling their disarmament
obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The corrosion
of the non-proliferation regime is a danger to world peace.
From the 2004 Rome Final Statement:
Preserving and strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. We reject double standards and emphasize the legal responsibility
of nuclear weapons states to work to eliminate nuclear weapons.
We call for continuation of the moratorium on nuclear testing
pending entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
and for accelerating the process of verifiable and irreversible
nuclear arms reduction. We are gravely alarmed by the creation
of new, usable nuclear weapons and call for rejection of doctrines
that view nuclear weapons as legitimate means of war-fighting
and threat pre-emption.
From 2003 Rome Final Statement:
The threat of weapons of mass destruction
remains with us. We call for an immediate end to the newly resurgent
arms race, which is being fueled by a failure to universally ratify
a treaty banning nuclear testing, and by doctrines that lower
the threshold of use and promote the creation of new nuclear weapons.
This is particularly dangerous when coupled with the doctrine
of pre-emption.
For some to say that nuclear weapons are good
for them but not for others is simply not sustainable. The failure
of the nuclear weapons states to abide by their legal pledge to
negotiate the elimination of nuclear weapon, contained in the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is the greatest stimulus to
their proliferation.
Nuclear weapons are immoral and we call for
their universal legal prohibition. They must be eliminated before
they eliminate humanity.
For a list of the Nobel Peace Laureates who
have endorsed these strong statements, please go to http://www.nobelforpeace-summit.org/index-en.asp
Appendix C
A Sensible Policy on Iran: Towards a Safer,
Saner World
By Jonathan Granoff, President, with Rhianna
Tyson, Senior Officer, September, 2008.
Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to
new states is imperative.[46]
Iran is one such state. The current policies towards this end
are not working well. There is a need for a more effective course,
one with more clearly defined goals and objectives, and one which
is situated within the global framework of disarmament and non-proliferation.
Further, a more responsible policy must take into deeper consideration
the cultural, as well as the political motivations for Iran's
behavior, and seek to re-employ those motivators towards a behavior
aligned with our goals.
The goal of US policy towards Iran must be to
prevent it from becoming a nuclear weapon state. Other distracting
objectives towards this endincluding regime change through
international pressure and/or by supporting opposition groups
inside Iranare of dubious legality or, at the least, undermine
the capacity of the United States to be a trusted leader in promoting
the norms of nuclear non-proliferation. Such mistrust is too high
a cost to the US, especially at this historical juncture.
The most effective route to achieving our goal
is to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime based on
the rule of law, and simultaneously take steps to ensure that
no more countries, regardless of the vicissitudes of political
leadership, can develop nuclear weapons. This route is dramatically
enhanced to the extent that the US decries, in policies and practices,
the use of nuclear weapons and takes active steps to fulfill disarmament
obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Such leadership affects other existing nuclear weapon states to
similarly begin walking down the nuclear ladder toward the stable
ground of a nuclear weapons-free world. The proliferation flashpoint
of Iran is an immediate challenge to that journey.
A responsible Iran policy must: understand the
role that national pride plays in Iran's pursuit of a nuclear
program; highlight and exploit the incompatibility of nuclear
weapons with Islam, as stated by the highest Shi'a clerics including
Ayatollah Khomenei;[47]
and enable Iran to feel it is taking a leadership role in strengthening
a global non-proliferation norm. Based on these understandings,
an effective policy can successfully advance a "win-win-win"
approach, satisfying the core concerns of Iran, the US and the
international community.
This article is premised on the political legitimacy
of the sovereign state of the Islamic Republic of Iran, recognized
by the international system. This recognition is a fact, regardless
of whether one likes or dislikes the government of Iran.
Iran seeks to have its own indigenous, complete
nuclear fuel cycle as a means to produce nuclear energy. As a
signatory to the NPT, Iran has the "inalienable right
to develop, research, produc(e) and use
nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination," as stated in Article
IV of the Treaty. Several non-nuclear weapon states party to the
Treaty, such as, inter alia, Japan, Germany, Argentina
and Brazil possess this capability. In Iran's view, they want
to gain the perceived benefits of the right that these other states
already enjoy as part of the NPT bargain. It is particularly bothersome
to Iran, and many other non-nuclear weapon states in the NPT,
that India has refusal to join the NPT and other important non-proliferation
treaties and is nevertheless being rewarded and encouraged in
pursuing nuclear energy by the US through a vigorously sought-after
nuclear sharing deal.
In 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) reported that Iran had been engaging in surreptitious nuclear
activities, such as plutonium separation, that violated Iran's
IAEA safeguards agreement.[48]
The US argues that Iran's past misconduct diminished its rights
to nuclear energy under the NPT and that its ongoing efforts represent
a quest to develop a fuel cycle enrichment process that will enable
it to develop nuclear weapons materials.[49]
Yet, the IAEA has confirmed that it has not discovered dispositive
evidence that Iran then was using such technology for weapons
purposes nor that it is pursuing nuclear weapons development now.
Nevertheless, based on Iran's past deceptive conduct and President
Ahmadinejad's bellicose rhetoric, three Security Council resolutions
have been adopted,[50]
two of which (1737 and 1747) impose serious economic and
trade sanctions unless Iran suspends all uranium enrichment activities.
Iran insists that it is in full compliance with
its obligations under the NPT and has provided information and
assistance beyond what is legally required of them, such as (temporary)
voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol, a non-required
agreement with the IAEA to allow for relatively intrusive inspections.[51]
(Iran has since rescinded on this voluntary implementation.) Iran's
view is that because the IAEA has yet to unambiguously declare
Iran to be in non-compliance with its duties not to pursue the
development of nuclear weapons, the actions undertaken by the
Security Council are politically motivated and illegal. Pursuant
to Article 25 of the UN Charter,[52]
Security Council resolutions are to be honored, and Iran's conduct
challenges therefore the integrity of the UN Charter. Thus the
present course discredits international law and does not enhance
security.
Should Iran develop nuclear weapons, they would
have to overcome several considerable hurdles and pay a significantly
high political and cultural cost, both internationally and domestically.
Internationally, Iran would be roundly condemned by the international
community. The tepid support for Iran's nuclear programme currently
expressed by the Non-Aligned Movement would promptly dissolve.
Most importantly, it would spark a new wave of nuclear proliferation
by states in the region and elsewhere, including by states that
are historically at odds with the Persian nation. It is sadly
ironic then, that Iran has been one of the foremost champions
of a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East for over 30 years.[53]
This stated aspiration would be drastically, nearly irreversibly
undermined by a nuclear weapons arsenal in Iran.
Domestically, the Iranian leaders will have
to reconcile their nuclear weapons capability against the statements
by the highest Islamic clerics which declare nuclear weapons to
be fundamentally against the principles of Islam. (See Appendix
A)[54]
These statements have been reiterated in multilateral fora, such
as the Security Council, and reverberated in mosques and universities
throughout the country.
What is to be done now? The cost of using force
to strong-arm Iran into compliance is inordinately high and very
dangerous. Attempting to punish Iran through sanctions is unlikely
to prevail since it has financially profited from the skyrocketing
price of oil and their confidence in their domestic oil reserves.
With these considerations in mind, the United
States should adopt a "win-win-win" approach that addresses
the concerns of all parties and strengthens international law
as a whole. Such an approach could include the following:
1. Iran's rights under Article IV of the NPT.
Under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
all non-nuclear weapon States are granted an "inalienable
right to develop, research, production and use of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes without discrimination." Under the
NPT, there are no limits to uranium enrichment and thus far no
stipulations over reprocessing.
The NPT is law. In order to avoid further erosion
of international law, there must be an explicit acknowledgement
of Iran's rights under the law, which are fully enjoyed by countries
such as Japan, Sweden, Brazil, Canada and others.
However, since Iran has engaged in a secret
program it is proper to state that it has a burden of proving
that its practices remain well within the realm of singularly
peaceful purposes of nuclear energy production. In that regard
an inspection and monitoring regime is in which a sufficient degree
of confidence must be established.
Will Iran allow itself to be singled out as
if it were a criminal or rogue state or even a state with questionable
integrity? No. But will Iran submit to a new highly intrusive
regime that could be applied to other states similarly situated
under the NPT? Most likely yes if it could claim that it is doing
so voluntarily and not in response to US led coercion.
2. The creation with the IAEA and Iranian
leadership of much more intrusive verification and monitoring
measures to be applied universally to enhance non-proliferation
efforts and lead to a nuclear weapons free world.
Currently the only safeguards on nuclear facilities
required by the NPT are inadequate to fully ensure that
no materials or resources from a civilian nuclear program have
been diverted for weapons purposes. This was demonstrated by Iraq's
clandestine nuclear program in the 1980s, which was destroyed
by UNSCOM and later UNMOVIC. Such alarming revelations led to
the creation of the IAEA Additional Protocol,[55]
a more stringent set of safeguards that is not required by all
states party to the NPT. (As of 2008, 86 NPT states party
have an Additional Protocol in force, with another 30 that
have signed it.) Iran, for its part, has not signed it but maintains
that they are "voluntarily implementing" the Additional
Protocol. Still, the Additional Protocol is insufficient at alleviating
all concerns of the international community.
International leaders like Gareth Evans, former
Australian Foreign Minister and the President of the International
Crisis Group[56]
as well as one of the driving visionaries of the prestigious Canberra
Commission on the elimination of nuclear weapons, are championing
an idea called "Additional Protocol Plus," a system
of verification and monitoring, going well beyond even the snap
inspections and environmental sampling of the Additional Protocol.
Such strengthened verification mechanisms are needed to upgrade
confidence in preventing the production of materials for weapons
purposes. Heightened levels of confidence are a requirement to
move toward a nuclear weapons free world.
Iran should be offered the opportunity to work
directly with the IAEA to formally set up this new, more intrusive
inspection, verification and monitoring regime that will set the
standard for universal application. Whatever this regime will
cost it will be a fraction of the cost of war or the ongoing corrosion
of respect for international law.
Iran's leadership in this field will not only
contribute towards achieving a viable Fissile Material Cut-Off
Treatya stated goal of nearly all countriesbut it
will allow Iran to claim to be a global leader in efforts to stem
proliferation. Also, it will make us all safer.
3. Multinationalization of Iran's fuel cycle
activities of concern.
Making Iran's enrichment efforts multinational
has been previously endorsed by Iranian leadership and has now
been recently advocated by several much respected AmericansAmbassador
Bill Luers, the President of the United Nations Association of
the USA, Ambassador (ret.) Thomas Pickering and Jim Walsh.[57]
They highlight that such an approach could help pave the way for
Iranian membership in the World Trade Organization, increase trade
with Europe, help access quickly advanced technologies. Iran could
continue to run its existing facilities and centrifuges but management
and operations would be shared by partner governments and any
new technologies owned and managed jointly by the consortium.
4. Security assurances
In 1995, the Permanent Five members of the Security
Council each offered assurances that non-nuclear weapon states
party to the NPT would not be threatened by use of nuclear weapons.
This was part of the negotiations to persuade countries to support
the indefinite extension of the NPT. These so called Negative
Security Assurances were referenced in Security Council Resolution
984[58]
and were referenced by countries as part of their reason for supporting
US led efforts in obtaining the indefinite extension of the NPT.
These assurances must be embodied in positive international law
through a formal, legally-binding instrument. Additionally all
talk about regime change must cease and be replaced by efforts
to change minds and policies through ongoing civil dialogue and
diplomacy.
Iran is a leading voice for the codification
of these "negative security assurances". Such a carrot
would be perceived as a "win" for Iran, and, since the
US already agreed to these through SC resolution 984, it would
not require us to give up anything new. Further, it would not
be applied only to Iran, but rather would constitute a
new universal norm, a step toward the realization of a world free
of nuclear weapons.
5. Implementation of Security Council resolutions
Three sets of Security Council resolutions calling
on Iran to suspend uranium enrichment have gone unheeded. Iran
regards these resolutions as politically motivated and, thus illegal.
The result is that international law is corroded. The motivation
for why a law is created is not relevant if the correct political
body has acted. That is the case here, whether it is a good decision
or not.
In order to restore the credibility, viability
and primacy of international law, part of the diplomatic package
must include Iran's commitment to abide by the resolutions, suspend
enrichment pending establishment of the inspection and monitoring
regime and the enrichment consortium. In the meantime there would
be no reason Iran could not start a very innovative process of
bringing before the Security Council a resolution asking the International
Court of Justice to render and advisory opinion on the Security
Council resolutions. This would give Iran a degree of pride in
advancing a legal process.
These are but a few of the many positive steps
that can be taken which meet important principles. They must enhance
respect for international law, constrain universally the proliferation
of nuclear weapons, and reinforce efforts leading to the abolition
of nuclear weapons. These steps will help encourage Iran to take
a leadership role in setting a global standard for inspections
that ultimately will have to be applied universally, including
to nuclear weapon states. They will also help in addressing the
confidence deficit with real actions that build bridges through
shared activities. This approach could give wins to the US, Iran
and the entire world.
(Appendices to this brief were omitted for
inclusion in this testimony. Please visit www.gsinstitute.org
or contact us to receive this brief in full.)
24 September 2008
For a full listing of conference participants, which
included GSI President Jonathan Granoff, see:
http://www.gsinstitute.org/gsi/newsletter/newsletter_2008_Spring.html£dpe
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf.
http://geneva.usmission.gov/press2003/0507semmel.htm
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/106/06/PDF/N9510606.pdf?OpenElement
23 In the case of India, facing a Chinese arsenal,
it made clear during NPT negotiations that a process of global
elimination of nuclear weapons would be required for it to forgo
the option of acquiring its own. Given that India's traditional
commitment to nuclear disarmament dates back to the days of Gandhi
and Nehru, I am convinced that India, as it repeatedly says in
international forums, would participate in a disarmament process.
The United States and India are now seeking to create an arrangement
under which India would accept safeguards on civilian but not
military nuclear facilities in return for access to civilian nuclear
fuel and technology. While the proposed deal would partially engage
India in the non-proliferation system, it undermines a core bargain
of the NPT: that countries renouncing nuclear weapons are promised
access to peaceful uses of nuclear technology, and would indirectly
augment India's capability to produce fissile materials for weapons.
It is therefore unacceptable as currently framed. Minimal criteria
for approval of the deal by the US Nuclear Suppliers Group should
be entry into force of a verified Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty
and the Comprehensive nuclear Test-Ban Treaty as well as India's
formal acceptance of the NPT obligation of good-faith negotiation
of cessation of arms racing and nuclear disarmament. Back
24
Ev 123 Back
25
Ev 127 Back
26
See Thomas Graham, Jr., Commonsense on Weapons of Mass Destruction
(2004) 10. Back
27
1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Decision 2,
"Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament," Final Document, Part I, NPT/CONF.1995/32,
Annex: Access at http://disarmament2.un.org/wmd/npt/1995nptrevconfdocs.html. Back
28
International Court of Justice, "Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons," Advisory Opinion of 8 July
1996, ICJ Reports (1996): 226, para. 105(2)F. Online at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/iunan/iunanframe.htm. Back
29
2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Vol.
I, NPT/CONF.2000/28, Part I: 14-15. Access at http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/finaldoc.html. Back
30
The full text of Towards 2010 can be downloaded at: http://www.gsinstitute.org/mpi/docs/Towards_2010.pdf Back
31
For more information about MPI and GSI, see: www.gsinstitute.org Back
32
Read the report of the Belfer Center conference at:
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18102/gorbachev_and_belfer_center_combine_forces_to_overcome_nuclear_danger.html. Back
33
Weapons of Terror at 63-66. Back
34
See Jayantha Dhanapala with Randy Rydell, Multilateral Diplomacy
and the NPT: An Insider's Account (UNIDIR, 2005) 129-132. Back
35
CHARLES J. MOXLEY JR., NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
THE POST COLD WAR WORLD, 535 (footnote omitted) (reprinted
from Otto Kreisher, Retired Generals Urge End to Nuclear Arsenal,
THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec.5, 1996, at A-1.); See, Jonathan
Granoff, Nuclear Weapons, Ethics, Morals, and Law, Volume
2000 Number 4, Bringham Young University Law Review, 1417 (2000). Back
36
See id. at n 27 (quoting R. Jeffery Smith, Ex-Commander
of Nukes Wants to Scrap Them, A Believer No More, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Mar. 9, 1998; see also R. Jeffrey Smith, The Dissenter,
WASH. POST MAG., Dec. 7, 1997, at W18). Back
37
MOXLEY, supra note 1, at 398 ( quoting WOLRD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS, EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR ON HEALTH
AND HEALTH SERVICES 7 (2d ed. 1987); see also, UN
DEPARTMENT FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A COMPREHENSIVE
STUDY 6, at 7, (1991). Back
38
See Center for Defense Information, Nuclear War Quotations 39,
(hereinafter NUCLEAR WAR QUOTATIONS) (quoting Ray S. Cline in
WORLD POWER ASSESSMENT 58 (1975). Back
39
STANSFIELD TURNER, CAGING THE NUCLEAR GENIE , app. A 127-128 (1997). Back
40
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 454 (separate
opinion of Judge Weeramantry). Back
41
JOHN BURROUGHS, THE (IL)LEGALITY OF THE THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, 90-91(1997); see also, DOUGLAS ROCHE, THE ULTIMATE EVIL
and AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK (1995) for thorough expositions of the
relationship between the threat of nuclear weapons and international
legal and diplomatic affairs. Back
42
GEORGE F. KENNAN, THE NUCLEAR DELUSION 206-207 (1982). Back
43
Report on Nobel Laureate organization the International Peace
Bureau delegations to the Nobel Peace Laureate Summits lists the
Laureate participants and the statements in full,
http://www.gsinstitute.org/docs/IPB_NobelSummitReports.pdf; see
also the official web site of the Summits at
http://www.nobelforpeace-summit.org Back
44
JOHN BURROUGHS, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR NON-USE AND ELIMINATION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, quoted at p. 6 (2006), http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/Gpeacebrfpaper.pdf Back
45
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 1996 ICJ 296 (separate
opinion of Judge Ranjeva). Back
46
187 states are party to the 1975 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was indefinitely extended in 1995 and
reaffirmed and strengthened again in 2000. Under the NPT, the
five nuclear weapon states-the US, Russia, the United Kingdom,
France and China-agreed to negotiate in good faith nuclear disarmament,
in exchange for the promise of the non-nuclear weapon states to
never acquire them. Additionally, non-nuclear weapon states are
granted the "inalienable right" to the technology and
materials needed for nuclear energy. The full text of the treaty
can be found at: http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/npttreaty.html Back
47
See Appendix A. Back
48
See, in particular, p7 of the report of the Director-General: Back
49
"In light of the serious unresolved issues posed by Iran's
nuclear programme, we strongly disagree with Iran's assertion
that it has an inherent 'right' under Article IV to its programme
or to receive foreign assistance or cooperation with it."
Statement by Dr. Andrew K. Semmel, Alternative Representative
of the United States of America to the Second Session of the Preparatory
Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference. Geneva, Switzerland,
May 7, 2003: Back
50
The first resolution on Iran, SC/Res/1696, was adopted on July
31, 2006. Full text is available at:
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/450/22/PDF/N0645022.pdf?OpenElement.
The second resolution, SC/Res/1737, adopted December 23 2006,
is available at:
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/681/42/PDF/N0668142.pdf?OpenElement.
The most recent resolution, SC/Res/1747, was adopted on March
24, 2007:
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/281/40/PDF/N0728140.pdf?OpenElement Back
51
The Model Additional Protocol is a voluntary bilateral agreement
between an NPT state party and the IAEA to serve as a supplement
to the safeguards agreement required under the NPT to further
prevent diversion of nuclear material and technology for weapons
purposes. The need for an additional protocol developed after
Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme was discovered in the 1980s
in spite of its implemented mandatory safeguards. For the full
text of the Additional Protocol, see: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf.
For a history of the development of the Additional Protocol, see
Findlay, Trevor, "Looking Back: The Additional Protocol,"
Arms Control Today, November 2007: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_11/Lookingback Back
52
"The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the
present Charter." The full text of the Charter can be found
at: http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ Back
53
"The establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the
Middle East has been the long-standing goal of the people of the
region. Iran first initiated the idea of the establishment of
a nuclear weapon-free zone as an important disarmament measure
in the Middle East in 1974, followed by the relevant resolutions
in the United Nations General Assembly, the IAEA General Conference
as well as Final Declarations of all NPT Review Conferences."-statement
by H.E. Dr. Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Ambassador and Permanent Representative
of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations and Other
International Organizations, Vienna, to the First Session of the
Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference;
1 May 2007, Vienna. Available at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom07/statements/1mayIran.pdf Back
54
Ev 123 Back
55
See footnote 52. Back
56
See "Iran: Is There a Way Out of the Nuclear Impasse?"
Middle East Report No.51, 23 February 2006:
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3976&l=1 Back
57
"A Solution for the US-Iran Nuclear Standoff," The
New York Review of Books, Vol. 55, No. 4, March 20, 2008:
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/21112 Back
58
SC/Res/984 was adopted on 11 April 1995: Back
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