Submission from Dr Nick Ritchie, Department
of Peace Studies, University of Bradford[59]
The Legitimacy and Effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty and the Decision to Renew Trident
1. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) was signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970.
It recognised five states as "nuclear weapon states",
defined as those that had "manufactured and exploded a nuclear
weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January
1967". These were the United States, the Soviet Union (now
the Russian Federation), Britain, France and China.
2. The treaty is often presented as a "grand
bargain" between the five nuclear weapon states and the rest
of the world in which the nuclear weapon states agreed to work
towards nuclear disarmament, not provide nuclear weapons or weapon
materials or technology to other countries and assist non-nuclear
weapon states with peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Non-nuclear
weapon states in return agreed not to acquire or develop nuclear
weapons and to accept international safeguards on their civil
nuclear programmes monitored by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA).
3. Compliance with the NPT and support for
nuclear non-proliferation activities is widely regarded as a vital
contribution to global security. The government argues in its
National Security Strategy that the proliferation of nuclear weapons
will increase "the risk of instability in the international
system and ultimately the risk of nuclear confrontation".[60]
The government also acknowledges that the NPT is the cornerstone
of international efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons[61]
and that "the NPT has helped ensure that fewer states have
acquired nuclear weapons than many predicted" even if the
number of nuclear-armed states has slowly increased.[62]
Ambassador John Duncan, head of Britain's delegation to the 2008 NPT
Preparatory Committee, stated that "the NPT remains the foundation
stone of international non-proliferation architecture. If it didn't
exist, the world would be a much more dangerous place, and we
would assuredly need to re-invent it".[63]
4. The government also places considerable
emphasis in its National Security Strategy on the benefits for
international peace and security of a multilateral rules-based
international system. The government is "committed to a multilateral,
rules-based approach to international affairs, where issues are
resolved through discussion and due process, with the use of force
as a last resort".[64]
This applies equally to addressing the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction where the government's approach reflects its
"commitment to multilateralism and the rules-based international
system".[65]
5. The effectiveness of multilateral institutions
depends on their legitimacy. The government argues that addressing
today's international security challenges requires "Multilateral
engagement, ideally through international institutions
to
allow the international community to draw on the full range of
political, economic, and security resources at the disposal of
different countries, and to provide the legitimacy on which
effective action demands" (emphasis added).[66]
This applies equally to the NPT.
6. We can therefore conclude that the government
considers a) the spread of nuclear weapons is detrimental to national
security; b) the NPT is a vital international institutional tool
for stemming the spread of nuclear weapons; c) national and international
security can best be achieved through a multilateral rules-based
international order, of which the NPT is an important component;
and d) the effectiveness of the NPT is innately tied to its perceived
legitimacy.
7. The government has claimed that its decision
announced in December 2006 to begin the process of replacing
the current Trident nuclear weapons system will have no impact
on the NPT and the efforts to stem the further spread of nuclear
weapons. It claims that the decision to replace Trident and maintain
a strategic nuclear weapons capability is benign with no negative
international political repercussions. It asserts that Britain
must continue to field these weapons for the foreseeable future
as a necessary element of its security in order to deter the use
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction by other
states or potentially terrorist groups.[67]
8. This government is wrong. Its decision
will have a detrimental impact on the NPT by undermining the treaty's
legitimacy. The question is how much, not whether it will or will
not.
THE NPT'S
NORMS
9. The NPT embodies two crucial norms: a
norm against nuclear proliferation; and a norm of legitimate expectation
of progress towards nuclear disarmament. The first norm is widely
accepted and supported by the world's major powers, particularly
following the accession of France, China, South Africa, Argentina,
Brazil and all the post-Soviet states to the NPT in the 1990s.
The second norm is contested by a number of nuclear weapon states.
10. Norms are a vital part of international
security. They operate in two ways. First, they can define a state's
identity and therefore its interests such that upholding or disregarding
specific norms defines and validates what sort of state the state
is, for example a "civilised", "Western",
"non-aligned", or "rogue" state.[68]
Second, norms perform an instrumental role by regulating the behaviour
of states by prescribing or proscribing particular actions in
a particular situation based on a state's established identity
and interests.[69]
11. Norms do not determine state behaviour
but provide collective expectations about proper and therefore
legitimate behaviour.[70]
The non-proliferation norm, for example, may not prevent states
that are determined to possess nuclear weapons from acquiring
them but it does provide a vital framework for legitimising condemnation
and sanctions against norm violators. Without the NPT regime the
norm against nuclear proliferation would lack a robust and legitimate
foundation.[71]
12. Norms and the institutional structures
that embody them may shape state identity and behaviour but they
have no independent existence beyond the actions of states. If
all states ignored a norm it would eventually cease to exist.
Norms and normative institutions must be continually reproduced
and reconstructed through state policies and actions, even as
they are guided by them.[72]
State practices therefore affect what a norm means, its strength,
legitimacy and therefore effectiveness in international politics.[73]
13. The non-proliferation and disarmament
norms embodied by the NPT are a very valuable part of international
security and stability, but they are not immutable and will not
endure without support. The actions and policies of the nuclear
weapon states will either reinforce or undermine
these norms to varying extents. To pretend otherwise is a fallacy.
THE NPT'S
LEGITIMACY
14. Compliance with international rules
and institutions is achieved through a combination of coercion,
pure self-interest and legitimacy.[74]
Legitimacy can be defined as "the normative belief by an
actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed".[75]
When an institution or rule is considered legitimate it is invested
with authority by the actor, such as a state, and the rule or
body becomes an "authority".[76]
States will comply with rules and institutions considered legitimate
because they become motivated "by an internal sense of moral
obligation: control is legitimate to the extent that it is approved
or regarded as 'right'."[77]
15. Legitimacy is crucial because without
it the exercise of control either through coercion or through
provision of sufficient levels of incentives to induce self-interested
compliance becomes costly and difficult.[78]
Ian Hurd argues that "a common lesson of studies of complex
organizations is that coercion and repression tend to generate
resentment and resistance, even as they produce compliance, because
they operate against the normative impulses of the subordinate
individual or group."[79]
16. Nina Rathbun argues that equality is
a defining dimension of legitimacy: "Legitimacy refers to
the degree to which regimes ensure sovereign equality. Legitimate
regimes are universal and nondiscriminatory".[80]
The NPT does not discriminate when it comes to preventing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons or benefiting from the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy, but it does discriminate between nuclear
and non-nuclear weapon states. This "is the major factor
reducing the legitimacy of the treaty" and it is here that
the norm of progress towards nuclear disarmament is so vital because
it "strengthens the legitimacy of the regime by creating
the expectation that the special rights of the nuclear weapon
states will end at some point in the future".[81]
As a result the legitimacy of the NPT is based on "a fine
balance of interests and principles that work together to circumscribe
and limit the fundamental discrimination inherent in the treaty".[82]
17. Compliance with and support for the
NPT is therefore intimately linked to its legitimacy, and its
legitimacy is underpinned by the fundamental principles of sovereign
equality and non-discrimination. The discrimination between nuclear
and non-nuclear weapon states that weakens the legitimacy of the
treaty is ameliorated through an expectation of progress towards
nuclear disarmament that will end the treaty's discrimination
by eliminating the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear
weapon states. Progress towards nuclear disarmament alongside
progress in preventing nuclear proliferation is therefore intrinsic
to the legitimacy and consequently the effectiveness of the NPT.
UNDERMINING THE
NPT'S LEGITIMACY
18. Efforts to galvanise support for containing
and rolling-back illicit nuclear weapon programmes in North Korea
and Iran and efforts to negotiate and implement new initiatives
to enhance controls on peaceful uses of nuclear technology as
a means of impeding further proliferation draw on the legitimacy
of these actions under the NPT as a multilateral, rules-based
international institution.
19. This has become particularly salient
with the prospect of a proliferation of nuclear energy capabilities
in response to climate change and energy security demands. The
world's major powers are anxious to ensure these emerging and
expanding civil nuclear programmes cannot be put to military use.
This will require a broader and deeper international verification
and inspection regime and additional non-proliferation measures.[83]
20. For the majority of states the legitimacy
of further non-proliferation measures is dependent upon
further nuclear disarmament measures. New initiatives by the nuclear
weapon states to impose further obligations on non-nuclear weapon
states under the NPT in terms of restricting access to nuclear
energy capabilities are likely to be resisted unless the nuclear
weapon states take further concrete and irreversible steps towards
nuclear disarmament.[84]
James Acton and George Perkovich's recent study on nuclear abolition
for the International Institute for Strategic Studies argues that
the recent momentum behind calls to take nuclear disarmament seriously
have been motivated by "the belief that it will be impossible
to curtail nuclear weapons proliferation without serious progress
towards nuclear disarmament".[85]
21. The norm of a legitimate expectation
of progress towards nuclear disarmament must be adhered to in
order to reproduce and strengthen the norm against nuclear
proliferation. The lack of much greater progress towards nuclear
disarmament will undermine the NPT's legitimacy and risks an erosion
of the non-proliferation norm as non-nuclear weapon states become
increasingly disillusioned with the NPT leading to withdrawals
from the treaty and a potential cascade of nuclear proliferation.[86]
22. Efforts by the nuclear weapon states
to place further obligations on non-nuclear weapon states that
curtail their access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy without
the legitimising authority of the NPT risk a backlash that may
undermine non-proliferation efforts and could have counter-productive
consequences. As Professor John Simpson writes, "the use
of raw power without legitimacy generates the anarchy it may be
claiming to moderate".[87]
Such initiatives could also destabilise the NPT's "fine balance"
by threatening to institute an additional level of informal discrimination
between "nuclear fuel cycle" states and "non-nuclear
fuel cycle states".[88]
23. The policies and actions of the nuclear
weapon states that implicitly or explicitly support the prospect
of permanent discrimination through indefinite possession of nuclear
weapons and downgrade or even dismiss the disarmament norm simultaneously
support the prospect of a permanently illegitimate NPT and the
attendant consequences in terms of its effectiveness. Professor
William Walker, for example, questions whether "the non-proliferation
norm [can] possess meaning and legitimacy if its grounding in
disarmament is denied, and if the NNWS come to regard the NPT
as a duplicitous instrument for locking them into permanent inferiority
and dependence?"[89]
David Broucher, former British Ambassador to the Conference on
Disarmament, warns that if the nuclear powers implicitly or explicitly
abolish the idea they are on a path towards nuclear disarmament
and "if you say there are always going to be nuclear weapons
in the world, then it becomes very much more difficult to maintain
the moral authority for saying that some countries can have it
[a nuclear arsenal] and some cannot".[90]
24. Statements and actions that reinforce
the value of nuclear weapons and the logic of nuclear deterrence
can only stand in opposition to the norm of progress towards
nuclear disarmament and in support of the discrimination at the
heart of the treaty that weakens it legitimacy.[91]
25. The NPT's legitimacy therefore depends
on the realistic expectation of a non-discriminatory NPT through
nuclear disarmament, universal application the non-proliferation
norm and acceptance by the nuclear weapon states that their possession
of nuclear weapons is a temporary phenomenon. The two norms are
innately connected through the powerful and mobilising notion
of legitimacy.
A WIDELY HELD
VIEW
26. The majority of non-nuclear weapon states
accept a clear relationship between the NPT's non-proliferation
and disarmament norms in which the strength of one norm depends
on the strength of the other. The argument that the NPT is primarily
about non-proliferation is refuted, the argument that the nuclear
weapon states have done more than enough to meet their nuclear
disarmament obligations is rejected, and a norm of expectation
of progress towards nuclear disarmament is considered integral
to the NPT and cannot be dismissed.[92]
27. This view maintains that the NPT acknowledged
the possession of nuclear weapons by the five NWS not as a permanent
situation but as a "temporary trust" until nuclear disarmament
is achieved.[93]
The decision taken at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference
to extend the NPT indefinitely cannot and must not be interpreted
as legitimising the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by
the nuclear weapon states.[94]
The double standard at the heart of the NPT that allows some states
to enjoy the supposed security benefits of nuclear weapons whilst
denying those benefits to others cannot last indefinitely.[95]
28. This view that progress on nuclear non-proliferation
and the strength and legitimacy of the non-proliferation norm
is linked to progress towards nuclear disarmament and the strength
and legitimacy of the nuclear disarmament norm is reflected in
the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament agreed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference,
the "13 steps" to work towards nuclear disarmament
agreed at the 2000 Review Conference, the 1996 Advisory
Opinion of the International Court of Justice that confirmed "an
obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations
leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict
and effective international control",[96]
and concerted pressure from the New Agenda Coalition[97]
and Non-Aligned Movement to establish a programme of action on
nuclear disarmament.
29. It is reflected in widespread dissatisfaction
with progress towards nuclear disarmament.[98]
A 2007 working group report on "The P-5 and Nuclear
Proliferation" by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies directed by Robert Einhorn, former US Assistant Secretary
of State for Nonproliferation from 1999-2001, acknowledges that
"One of the factors weakening the NPT today is the perception
by many nonnuclear weapon states party to the treaty that the
nuclear powers are not living up to their obligation under article
VI to pursue nuclear disarmament".[99]
30. It is reflected in statements from the
UN including those by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon,[100]
former Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs at the
United Nations Jayantha Dhanapala,[101]
and Ambassador Sergio Duarte of Brazil who presided over the 2005 NPT
Review Conference.[102]
31. It is reflected in statements by many
of Britain's "Western" allies including Switzerland,
Norway, South Korea, Japan, and Australia and it is a view widely
held beyond the "West" by the Non-Aligned Movement comprising
118 nations from Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean,
and the League of Arab States comprising 10 countries from
North Africa and the Middle East.[103]
This majority view is reinforced by a review of a representative
sample of government delegation statements made to the 2002, 2003 and
2004 NPT Preparatory Committees.[104]
32. It was also acknowledged, with a degree
of surprise, by a 2006 report on "Foreign Perspectives
on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy and Posture" by the Pentagon's
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). One of the report's conclusions
was that America should rethink its approach to nuclear disarmament
in order to secure help from others for its non-proliferation
objectives. This was judged "the most controversial potential
implication of this exploration of foreign perspectives on U.S.
nuclear policy and posture".[105]
33. A particularly salient statement was
made by the Brazilian delegation to the NPT in 2007. Brazil hesitantly
acceded to the NPT in 1998. It has a significant civilian nuclear
power programme that now includes a uranium enrichment capability,
a nuclear research programme that dates back to the 1930s and
had a secret nuclear weapons programme that was terminated in
1990. It represents a state that may in the future opt to leave
the treaty if the nuclear weapon states fail to make significant
progress towards nuclear disarmament.[106]
In 2007 the Brazilian delegation stated that "the implementation
of a sustainable and long-term strategy in the field of non-proliferation
depends on the simultaneous adoption of concrete measures as far
as nuclear disarmament and fissile material are concerned
Without effective, verifiable and irreversible progress in the
field of disarmament, non-proliferation regimes can provide littleif
anysustainable results
an essential step to face nuclear
proliferation is the fulfilment by the nuclear armed states of
their unequivocal commitment towards nuclear disarmament, assumed
at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Brazil understands that,
notwithstanding the changes which eventually took place in the
international security scenario, agreements reached at earlier
conferences are necessarily valid and shall by no means be overlooked."
In the context of the Trident decision Brazil also stated that
"We are also concerned with modernization processes of nuclear
arsenals which seem to ensure that nuclear weapons will remain
operative for at least a quarter of a century".[107]
LEGITIMACY ACCORDING
THE NUCLEAR
WEAPON STATES
34. The nuclear weapon states generally
do not accept this view. They tend to argue that their nuclear
weapons policies and actions have little or no effect on the legitimacy
of the NPT, on nuclear proliferation, or on the willingness of
other states to assist them in achieving their non-proliferation
goals. They argue, for example, that the major reductions in nuclear
forces by Russia and the United States throughout the 1990s did
little stop North Korea or Iran pursuing nuclear weapons.
35. Several nuclear weapon states have attempted
to "de-link" the disarmament and non-proliferation norms.[108]
The extent to which the NPT represents a "grand bargain"
between the nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states
to halt proliferation in exchange for eventual nuclear disarmament
is disputed.
36. They have traditionally placed far greater
emphasis on the non-proliferation norm. America's Ambassador to
Conference on Disarmament, for example, declared in 2007 before
UN First Committee that the US had done more than its fair share
of work towards nuclear disarmament under the NPT and that it
was now time to focus on the "crisis of noncompliance with
its core of nonproliferation provisions". She declared that
"To those who say progress on disarmament and non-proliferation
are out of balance, I say that the United States fully agrees.
It is time for the international community to make the kind of
gains on strengthening nonproliferation norms that we have made
in reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons and the degree of reliance
on those weapons in national security strategies."[109]
37. They also tend to argue that the NPT
is a treaty to halt nuclear proliferation rather than a treaty
to achieve nuclear disarmament. Dr. Christopher Ford, US Special
Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, insisted in 2007 that
"aside from this obligation to "pursue" negotiations,
Article VI [of the NPT] requires no specific disarmament measures."[110]
38. The British government claims that the
decision to begin replacing Trident to maintain the capability
to deploy nuclear weapons into the 2050s will have no detrimental
effect on the NPT. Defence secretary Des Browne, for example,
argues that "there is nothing destabilising about our plans.
Under the NPT regime all the recognised nuclear weapon states,
have taken equivalent steps to maintain their deterrents, including
ourselves in the 1980s, without any perceptible "destabilising"
effect."[111]
39. The government carefully limits the
definition of "effect" to whether the decision to replace
Trident will affect the decisions of the handful of states that
are currently seeking nuclear weapons.[112]
This limited conception of "effect" obscures the wider
impact of the British decision on the legitimacy and therefore
effectiveness of the NPT.
40. The decision by the British government
to renew the Trident system with what initially appears to be
a like-for-like replacement can only reinforce the value
of nuclear weapons and the logic of nuclear deterrence in international
politics. The decision to replace Trident and the rationales presented
to support it reveal a commitment by the government to what it
considers an inescapable and fundamental logic: nuclear weapons
are an essential capability in an increasingly uncertain world.
Declarations of retaining only a "minimum deterrent",
of not targeting nuclear weapons at any particular country and
of only using them in extreme situations of national survival
are overshadowed by this logic. This makes it very difficult for
the government to fully support efforts to reduce the spread of
nuclear weapons and support a universal norm against nuclear proliferation
whilst insisting that it needs these weapons for its own security
for the foreseeable future, particularly when Britain faces no
strategic nuclear threats.[113]
41. The decision to replace Trident therefore
reproduces rather than ameliorates the discrimination at the heart
of the NPT and by its very nature fails to support or reproduce
the norm of progress towards nuclear disarmament, despite some
government rhetoric to the contrary. In doing so the decision
intrinsically undermines the legitimacy of the NPT and
the norm of non-proliferation because of the commonly accepted
linkage between the NPT's two core norms.
42. Clearly this is not the government's
intention but it is nevertheless the outcome. The government stated
before the NPT gathering in 2008, for example, that "the
UK does not belong to an opposite camp that insists on "non-proliferation
first." The UK fully accepts the proposition that progress
must be made on the disarmament and non-proliferation tracks in
parallel".[114]
Nevertheless, the government fails to acknowledge the detrimental
impact of the decision to replace Trident on the legitimacy of
the NPT.
LEGALITY AND
LEGITIMACY
43. The nuclear weapon states, particularly
in the West, have a different interpretation of legitimacy under
the NPT. They argue that the distinction drawn in the NPT between
nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states represents a legal, and
therefore legitimate, entitlement to possess and deploy nuclear
weapons.
44. The British government legitimised its
decision to begin replacing Trident based on this legal definition
of legitimacy: "The UK's retention of a nuclear deterrent
is fully consistent with our international legal obligations.
The NPT recognises the UK's status (along with that of the US,
France, Russia and China) as a nuclear weapon State. The NPT remains
the principal source of international legal obligation relating
to the possession of nuclear weapons. We are fully compliant with
all our NPT obligations, including those under Article I (prevention
of further proliferation of nuclear weapon technology) and Article
VI (disarmament)."[115]
45. The problem with this legal interpretation
of legitimacy is that by extension it appropriates the logic of
nuclear deterrence for just those five countries the treaty recognises
as "nuclear weapon states" and no others. Yet the logic
of nuclear deterrence as an abstract process of reasoning can
be objectively applied to and appropriated by any state
that feels militarily threatened regardless of whether they have
accepted legal obligations and the legal designation of a non-nuclear
party to the NPT.
46. The Western nuclear weapons states proceed
as if the logic of nuclear deterrence is not applicable
to non-nuclear weapon states because they have accepted
the designation of "non-nuclear weapon states". The
danger is that the nuclear weapon states feel free to extol the
virtues of the logic of nuclear deterrence secure in the knowledge
that such activity has no adverse persuasive effect on the non-nuclear
community of states in the NPT because the logic of nuclear deterrence
cannot be appropriated to them or in some cases is ameliorated
through extended deterrence guarantees. It is this legal
definition of legitimacy under the NPT that is used to justify
the nuclear weapon states' "do as I say, not as I do"
approach to the possession of nuclear weapons.
47. The problem is that it does have
a persuasive effect precisely because the logic is universally
applicable on its own strategic political-military grounds. Non-nuclear
weapon states recognise that the logic of nuclear deterrence articulated
by the nuclear weapon states is objectively applicable to all
states. They recognise that the logical destination of the non-discriminatory
application of this logic is a world brimming with nuclear-armed
states and argue that the only legitimate alternative is
the non-discriminatory rejection of the logic of nuclear deterrence
to avert a frighteningly dangerous nuclear-armed world.[116]
It was just such a prospect that motivated states to negotiate
the NPT in the 1960s.
48. Repeated articulation of the legitimacy
of the strategic political-military reasoning that underpins the
logic of nuclear deterrence whilst denying the appropriation of
that logic by others based on a legal (rather than strategic)
distinction reinforces the discrimination at the heart of the
NPT. This erodes the regime's legitimacy and with it the legitimacy
of efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. William Walker,
for example, argues that "to pay open homage to nuclear deterrence
is to jeopardize the non-proliferation norms and regime".[117]
49. By framing the issue of compatibility
with the NPT in a purely legal context, the government avoids
discussion of whether the decision to replace Trident is compatible
with reinforcing or undermining the NPT as a legitimate and therefore
effective normative framework for state behaviour regarding the
possession of nuclear weapons. The government's position may arguably
be legal, but that does not mean it is legitimate. As Rathbun
states, "although legality is a necessary prerequisite for
legitimacy, it is not sufficient."[118]
CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
50. The NPT has a crucial normative effect
in legitimising efforts to constrain proliferation, hold proliferators
to account and mobilise international action and opprobrium against
them, and to provide a vehicle through which states can define
their identity and consequently their interests as a law-abiding
non-nuclear weapon state.
51. Progress on nuclear disarmament is widely
regarded as essential for maintaining the integrity of the non-proliferation
norm and the legitimacy of the NPT. The treaty's legitimacy and
therefore effectiveness is contingent upon concrete actions that
reproduce and reinforce both the non-proliferation and disarmament
norms.
52. The government's argument that the decision
to renew Trident will have no impact on the NPT is wrong. The
decision to begin renewing Trident based on the claim that nuclear
deterrence remains a necessary part of British security
undermines the legitimacy of the NPT by reinforcing value of nuclear
weapons, the intention to remain a nuclear weapon state for the
indefinite future, and consequently the discrimination at the
heart of the treaty. This, in turn, undermines the legitimacy
of new initiatives to enhance nuclear non-proliferation measures
that draw on the legitimacy of the NPT, despite government proclamations
to the contrary.
53. At a fundamental level the government's
nuclear weapons policies and actions can either support or
undermine the NPT's norms and the decision to replace Trident
falls under the latter. This reality cannot be escaped. The decision
can be argued to be legally permissible, but legality should not
be conflated with legitimacy.
54. Diplomatic initiatives to agree concrete
steps towards nuclear disarmament are therefore essential at the
2010 NPT Review Conference if the nuclear weapon states are
to successfully negotiate additional effective and legitimate
steps to stem nuclear proliferation.
55. The government should therefore commission
and publish a detailed study of steps Britain could take to further
de-value and reduce its own nuclear force on a verifiable path
from the current definition of "minimum deterrence"
based on having at least one submarine from four on patrol at
all times armed with 48 warheads under a "continuous-at-sea
deterrence" policy, towards zero nuclear weapons. This would
be a significant step towards former Foreign Secretary Margaret
Beckett's vision of Britain as a nuclear "disarmament laboratory".[119]
56. Britain should seriously consider further
de-valuing nuclear weapons by formally restricting its nuclear
deterrence doctrine to the deterrence of the nuclear arsenals
of other major nuclear powers. The government currently insists
that the logic of nuclear deterrence still pertains in four broad
areas:
i. Deterrence against aggression towards British/NATO
vital interests or nuclear coercion/blackmail by major powers
with large nuclear arsenals.
ii. Deterrence against nuclear coercion or blackmail
by regional "rogue" states.
iii. Deterrence against state-sponsored acts
of nuclear terrorism.
iv. A general "residual" deterrent
to preserve peace and stability in an uncertain world.[120]
57. It also asserts that British nuclear
weapons are not only meant to deter possible threats from other
nuclear forces, but also the threat from chemical and biological
weapons and general threats to British "vital interests"
anywhere in the world. This broad and controversial remit for
nuclear weapons extends far beyond extreme threats to the survival
of the nation to include the deterrence of threats to the security
of the European continent, global economic interests based on
the free flow of trade, overseas and foreign investment and key
raw materials, the safety and security of British citizens living
and working overseas and its Overseas Territories, and general
international stability.[121]
The government also retains the right to use nuclear weapons first
in a conflict.
58. Finally, the government should introduce
a working draft of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) to
the Conference on Disarmament to ban the further production of
fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons. An FMCT is widely
accepted as the next step towards multilateral nuclear disarmament
after the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Conference on Disarmament
has failed to initiate negotiations on such a treaty despite agreement
on a negotiating mandate in 1995. The government should consider
sponsoring either directly or indirectly high-level meetings with
other government delegations to explore how an FMCT could be negotiated
and to invest the negotiation of such a treaty with the full political
will and capital of a nuclear weapon state.
59. It should be re-called that when the
government introduced its motion to the House in March 2007 to
authorise its decision to begin the process of replacing Trident
it assured the House that it would renew its efforts to secure
measures pursuant to nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the
NPT, in particular to bring about negotiations on a FMCT.[122]
September 2008
59 Nick Ritchie is a research Fellow at the Department
of Peace Studies, university of Bradford. Back
60
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security
in an Interdependent World, Cm 7291 (London, Cabinet
Office, March 2008), p. 12. Back
61
Ibid, p. 30. Back
62
Ibid, p. 11. Back
63
John Duncan, "UK General Statement to the 2008 Non-Proliferation
Treaty Preparatory Committee", (Vienna, United Kingdom
Permanent Representation to the Conference on Disarmament, April
28, 2008). Back
64
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, p.
47. Back
65
Ibid, p. 29. Back
66
Ibid, p. 37. Back
67
Major problems with the government's deterrence justification
for replacing Trident are examined in Nick Ritchie, "Trident:
What is it For?-Challenging the Relevance of British Nuclear Weapons",
Bradford Disarmament Research Centre Briefing Paper, (Bradford,
University of Bradford, April 2008). Back
68
Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm
Dynamics and Political Change", International Organization
52: 4, Autumn 1998, p. 903 Back
69
Peter J. Katzenstein, Alexander Wendt, et al., "Norms,
Identity, and Culture in National Security", in Katzenstein,
P. J. (Ed.) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity
in World Politics (New York, Columbia University Press, 1996),
p. 54. Back
70
Ibid, p. 54; Vaughn Shannon, "Norms are what States
Make of them: The Political Psychology of Norm Violation",
International Studies Quarterly 44: 1, June 2000, p. 295. Back
71
See Jayantha Dhanapala, Multilateral Diplomacy and the NPT:
An Insider's Account (New York, United Nations, 2005) chapter
7. Back
72
Katzenstein, Wendt, et al., "Norms, Identity, and
Culture in National Security", p. 63. Back
73
Antje Wiener, "Contested Compliance: Interventions on the
Normative Structure of World Politics", European Journal
of International Relations 10: 2, 2004, p. 192. Back
74
Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics",
International Organization 53: 2, Spring 1999, p. 381. Back
75
Ibid, p. 381. Back
76
Ibid, p. 381. Back
77
Ibid, p. 387 and p. 400. Back
78
Ibid, pp. 383, 388. Back
79
Ibid, p. 384. Back
80
Nina Rathbun, "The Role of Legitimacy in Strengthening the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime", The Nonproliferation
Review 13: 2, July 2006, p. 228. Back
81
Ibid, p. 233. Back
82
Ibid, p. 237. Back
83
See James Acton & George Perkovich, Abolishing Nuclear
Weapons (London, Routledge for IISS, 2008). Back
84
Rathbun, "The Role of Legitimacy in Strengthening the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Regime", p. 236. Back
85
Acton & Perkovich, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, p. 7. Back
86
Michael MccGwire, "The Rise and Fall of the NPT: An Opportunity
for Britain", International Affairs 81: 1, 2005, p.
124. Back
87
John Simpson, "The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Back
to the Future", in Vignard, K. (Ed.) Strengthening Disarmament
and Security (Geneva, Disarmament Forum, UNIDIR, 2004, No.
1) Back
88
Rathbun, "The Role of Legitimacy in Strengthening the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Regime", p. 237. Back
89
William Walker, "International Nuclear Order: A Rejoinder",
International Affairs 83: 4, 2007, p. 752. Back
90
The Future of the UK's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: The Strategic
Context, HC 986, (London, The Stationery Office, June
2006), Ev. 22. Back
91
See Harald Muller, "The Future of Nuclear Weapons in an Interdependent
World", The Washington Quarterly 31: 2, Spring 2008,
p. 72. Back
92
See William Walker, "Nuclear Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment",
International Affairs 83: 3, 2007, p. 436. Back
93
Ibid, p. 436; Tariq Rauf & John Simpson, "The
1999 NPT PrepCom", The Nonproliferation Review:
Winter 1999, p. 128. Back
94
Ambassador Paul Kavanagh, "The First Preparatory Committee
for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", (Vienna,
Permanent Mission of Ireland to the Conference on Disarmament
on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, May 1, 2007). Back
95
See Ivo Daalder, "What Vision for the Nuclear Future?"
The Washington Quarterly 18: 2, 1995, p. 139; George Perkovich,
"Bush's Nuclear Revolution: a Regime Change in Nonproliferation",
Foreign Affairs 82: 2, March/April 2003, p. 2; and Lewis
A. Dunn & Victor Alessi, "Arms Control by Other Means",
Survival 42: 4, Winter 2000/01, p. 130. Back
96
"Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion at the request of the UN General Assembly", ICJ
Reports, (The Hague, International Court of Justice, July
8, 1996). Back
97
The New Agenda Coalition comprises Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico,
New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden. It represents a group of
middle power countries seeking to build an international consensus
for progress on nuclear disarmament. Back
98
See Dhanapala, Multilateral Diplomacy and the NPT, p. 120. Back
99
Robert Einhorn, "The P-5 and Nuclear Proliferation",
Washington, D.C., Center for Strategic and International Studies,
December 2007, p. 12. Back
100
Ban Ki-moon, "Message to the First Session of the Preparatory
Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference", Vienna,
United Nations, April 20, 2007. Back
101
Jayantha Dhanapala, "Multilateralism and the Future of the
Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime", The Nonproliferation
Review: Fall 2001, p. 3. Back
102
Sergio Duarte, "Keeping the NPT Together: A Thankless Job
in a Climate of Mistrust", The Nonproliferation Review
13: 1 March 2006, p. 9. Back
103
See statements made by government delegations to the 2007 and
2008 NPT Preparatory Committees, available at http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/index.html. Back
104
Nick Ritchie, "Contrasting views at the NPT",
(Oxford, Oxford Research Group, working paper, October 2004). Back
105
Lewis Dunn, Gregory Giles, et al., Foreign Perspectives
on U.S. Nuclear Policy and Posture (Ft. Belvoir, VA, Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, 2006), p. 7. Back
106
Daphne Morrison, Brazil's Nuclear Ambitions, Past and Present
(Washington, D.C., Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2006), retrieved
from http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_79.html on September 20,
2008; Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain
their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C., Woodrow Wilson
Center Press, 1995), pp. 48-66. Back
107
Sergio Duarte, "The First Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons", Ministry of External Relations, Brazil,
April 30, 2007. Back
108
Nabil Fahmy, "An Assessment of International Nuclear Nonproliferation
Efforts After 60 Years", The Nonproliferation Review
13: 1, March 2006, p. 83. Back
109
U.S. Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Christina Rocca,
"Statement by Christina Rocca Permanent Representative of
the United States to the Conference on Disarmament", delivered
in the General Debate of the United Nation's First Committee,
October 9, 2007. Back
110
See Christopher Ford, "Nuclear Disarmament and the 'Legalization'
of Policy Discourse in the NPT Regime", (Washington,
D.C., James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November
29, 2007) and Joachim Krause, "Enlightenment and Nuclear
Order", International Affairs 83: 3, 2007, p. 486. Back
111
Des Browne (2007), "The United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent
in the 21st Century", speech at King's College London. London, Back
112
The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent: The White
Paper: Government Response to the Committee's Ninth Report of
Session 2006-07, HC 551, (London, The Stationery Office,
May 2007), p. 9. Back
113
See Nick Ritchie, "Trident: The Deal Isn't Done-Serious Questions
Remain Unanswered", Bradford Disarmament Research Centre
Briefing Paper, (Bradford, University of Bradford, December
2007). Back
114
John Duncan, "Statement by Ambassador John Duncan to the
First Preparatory Committee for the Eighth Review Conference of
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty", (Vienna, United
Kingdom Permanent Representation to the Conference on Disarmament,
April 30, 2007). Back
115
Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Foreign & Commonwealth Office
(FCO), The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent,
Cm 6994, (The Stationery Office, London, December 2003), p.
14. Back
116
On the logic of nuclear deterrence carried to its logical conclusion
see Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May
Better (London, International Institute for Strategic Studies,
Adelphi Paper 171, 1981). Back
117
Walker, "International Nuclear Order: A Rejoinder",
p. 752. Back
118
Rathbun, "The Role of Legitimacy in Strengthening the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime", p. 242. Back
119
Margaret Beckett, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons?",
Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, Keynote Address,
June 25, 2007. Back
120
See "The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent",
pp. 5, 18, 19; Geoff Hoon, "Intervening in the new Security
Environment", speech by the Secretary of State for Defence,
Foreign Policy Centre, November 12, 2002; "Deterrence, Arms
Control and Proliferation", Office the Secretary of State
for Defence, Ministry of Defence, July 1998; Browne, "The
United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent in the 21st Century". Back
121
See Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review, Cm 3999 (The
Stationery Office, London, 1998), chapter two, paras 18-20; Ministry
of Defence, Delivering Security in a Changing World,
Cm 6041-I (The Stationery Office London, 2003), p. 4; National
Security Strategy for the United Kingdom, pp. 31, 44. "The
Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent", p.
14. Back
122
Official Report (Hansard), March 14, 2007 column 301. Back
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