Submission from Scottish Campaign
for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)
1. The Scottish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
(CND) has worked for the global elimination of nuclear weapons
for 50 years. Scottish CND Coordinator John Ainslie has a
BA in International Relations and has produced several detailed
reports on the UK Trident system.[155]
SUMMARY
2. (i) Progress in tackling proliferation
will be influenced by success in moving towards nuclear disarmament.
(ii) Procuring nuclear technology from the US
undermines efforts to tackle proliferation.
(iii) The Government should not modernise or
replace Trident because this would reinforce the value of nuclear
weapons and undermine non-proliferation
(iv) UK policy should be framed in accordance
with the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ.
(v) The UK should take measures to implement
the 13 steps including taking Trident off patrol.
DISARMAMENT AND
PROLIFERATION
3. Disarmament and proliferation could only
be separated if it could be established that states make decisions
about their possession of nuclear weapons in isolation. In practice
the opposite is the case. Factors which influence whether a state
acquires and retains nuclear weapons include:
(i) Perception of potential threats from nuclear-armed
competitors;
(ii) Status relative to nuclear-armed partners;
(iii) International opinion on the acceptability
of the possession, threat and use of nuclear weapons.
4. Examples of the first are the nuclear
triangle of China, India and Pakistan and Iran's relationship
with Israel. France and Britain provide an illustration of the
second factor. International opinion has been a factor when countries
have renounced their nuclear programmes and capabilities and in
the many nations who have decided that they do not need a nuclear
weapons programme.
5. The Chair's factual summary of the 2008 Preparatory
Committee for the Review Conference said: "Emphasis was placed
on the mutually reinforcing nature of disarmament and non-proliferation".[156]
6. A recent report on the Abolition of Nuclear
Weapons, part-funded by the Foreign Office, points out: "Double
standards on matters as materially and psychologically important
as nuclear weapons will produce instability and non-compliance,
creating enforcement crises that increase the risk of conflict
and nuclear anarchy."[157]
7. General Lee Butler, a former Commander
of US nuclear forces, said:
"It is untenable that a handful of nations should
forever arrogate to themselves the right to nuclear weapons, while
denying it to others".[158]
8. If the spread of nuclear technology is
to be addressed it is essential that there is real progress towards
disarmament and the devaluing of nuclear weapons.
US SUPPORT FOR
THE UK NUCLEAR
PROGRAMME
9. The success of efforts to stop the spread
of nuclear technology will require widespread agreement on measures
to prevent the type of exchanges which take place every month
under the Mutual Defence Agreement and Polaris Sales Agreement.
The Anglo-American nuclear black market creates the impression
that the UK ignores the principle that nuclear technology should
not cross international boundaries and is not serious about non-proliferation.
10. Every thermonuclear weapon deployed
by the UK has included essential components from the US. Although
Britain tested a hydrogen bomb in 1958 this design was never
transformed into an operational weapon. Red Snow, WE177, Polaris
and Chevaline warheads all used a US design for the secondary
stage.[159]
The UK Trident warhead is of Anglo-American origin. It contains
vital parts purchased off-the-shelf from the US.[160]
The US supplies not only Trident missiles but also the targeting
software. In the past nuclear material for warheads has been exchanged
between Britain and America. There has been no guarantee that
this practice has ceased.[161]
MODERNISATION AND
REPLACEMENT OF
UK NUCLEAR FORCES
11. The National Security Strategy says
that the Government's approach to proliferation includes defending
our strategic interests by maintaining nuclear forces, based on
the 2006 assessment that a nuclear threat might emerge over
the next 50 years. This is an oblique reference to the plan
to develop, with American help, a new nuclear capability which
could remain in service until 2055.[162]
The plan to replace Trident signals to other nations that nuclear
weapons are of value even where these weapons have no relevance
to any current security threats.
12. At the 2008 Preparatory Committee
for the NPT Review Conference "concern and disappointment
were raised about plans of some nuclear weapon States to replace
or modernize nuclear weapons and their means of delivery or platforms".[163]
13. Two current UK modernisation projects
are the acquisition over the next decade of a new fusing system,
which will increase the destructive capability of the current
warheads, and the purchase of new computer systems in 2010, which
will increase targeting flexibility.[164]
14. With regard to Trident Replacement David
Gould, Chief Operating Officer at Defence Equipment and Support,
revealed that the programme goes well beyond the construction
of a new submarine. In June 2007 he said: "The intention
is to replace the entire Vanguard class submarine system. Including
the warhead and missile."[165]
15. Under the Nuclear Warhead Capability
Sustainment Programme the MoD are rebuilding the Atomic Weapons
Establishment (AWE). If completed this expensive project would
give AWE the capability to design and manufacture a new warhead,
with assistance from the US.[166]
16. The US Department of Defence are developing
a new missile, the Underwater Launched Missile System (ULMS),
to replace Trident. ULMS was discussed at 3 meetings of the
Joint (US/UK) Steering Group in 2007.[167]
In due course the UK would be expected to opt for ULMS, so that
they were not left supporting the Trident system on their own.[168]
17. Annual spending on nuclear weapons is
set to double from £1.1 billion in 2003-04 to £2.1 billion
in 2010-11 and then to rise further.[169]
Continuing with this project as we enter a recession would send
a powerful message that the UK is determined to keep its nuclear
weapons for 50 years.
ADVISORY OPINION
OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE
18. A critical part of the rules-based system
is the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice
in 1996. The Advisory Opinion said that the threat or use of nuclear
weapons was generally contrary to the rules and principles of
International Law. The Court left open a hypothetical window where
the survival of the state was at risk. The UK has failed to adopt
the language of the Opinion. UK policy would appear to permit
the use of nuclear weapons in circumstances which were extreme
but when the survival of the state was not at risk.[170]
19. The Advisory Opinion and the comments
by the President of the Court seriously question whether there
are any circumstances where nuclear weapons could be legally used
or deployed as a threat. Lord Murray, a former Lord Advocate,
has argued that it is not only the threat or use of nuclear weapons
that would be illegal but that the current deployment of the British
Trident system is probably contrary to international law.[171]
20. The failure to take account of the full
Advisory Opinion and its implications for British nuclear weapons
undermines the potential for international law to regulate nuclear
weapons and their proliferation.
IMPLEMENTING THE
13 STEPS
21. At the 2010 Conference the UK Government
should stress the importance of the 13 Steps to implementing
Article VI, which were agreed at the 2000 Review Conference.
The Government should also take practical measures to implement
these steps. This should include the following measures outlined
in Step 9:
22. "Further efforts by the nuclear weapon
States to reduce their arsenals unilaterally".
In 2007 the Government reduced the number
of operationally available warheads by around 40. This could have
been achieved without altering the number of weapons deployed
on submarines.[172]
The Government should be encouraged to make further unilateral
reductions and should abandon plans for modernising and replacing
Trident.
23. "Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon
States"
The MoD has scheduled a major milestone in the
Trident Replacement programme, the Initial Gate of the Future
Submarine Programme, for August 2008. This will be only months
before the review Conference. At or before the Initial Gate the
Government should be urged to explain in full their plans for
Trident Replacement along with a full justification and detailed
costs.
24. "The further reduction of non-strategic
nuclear weapons based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral
part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process"
The Government should encourage the US to withdraw
all its B61 nuclear bombs from Europe. They should also state
whether or not there are US nuclear weapons at RAF Lakenheath.
25. "Concrete agreed measures to further
reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems."
The P5 Disarmament Conference in the UK
will provide an opportunity to address the difficult issue of
reducing the readiness of nuclear submarines. The Government should
announce that it will take Trident submarines off patrol, store
the warheads on shore and increase the alert notice to one month
or more.[173]
If there is no current threat, only a concern
about long-term uncertainty, then there is no need for the nuclear
force to be invulnerable. The theoretical risk from the revised
posture would be more than offset by the contribution such a move
would make to the devaluing of nuclear weapons.
The MoD has stated that the submarine on patrol
is on an alert state of several days. But this cannot be verified.
Ending patrols and storing warheads on shores could be verified.
This would provide a model for other countries, including China
and Russia, and so contribute to wider moves to reduce nuclear
risks.
Taking Trident submarines off patrol and storing
the warheads on shore would increase the potential life of the
submarine hulls and the warheads. No case could be made for replacing
the submarine or warhead at this time and the current replacement
proposals could be shelved, saving over £1 billion per
year.
26. These limited measures are only a starting
point. Britain is in a good position to make progress towards
nuclear disarmament. This would enable the Foreign Office to use
our diplomatic influence to effectively promote both non-proliferation
and disarmament.
29 September 2008
155 The Safety of Trident, SCND, 1994; Trident: Britain's
Weapon of Mass Destruction, SCND 1999; The Future of the British
Bomb, WMD Awareness Programme, 2005. Back
156
Factual Summary of the NPT Preparatory Committee 28 April-9 May
2008. Back
157
George Perkovich & James Acton, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons,
Adelphi Paper 396, IISS, August 2008. Back
158
General Lee Butler, former Commander STRATCOM, interviewed in
Jonathan Schell, The Gift of Time, Granta, 1998, p188 Back
159
Information from The National Archives Back
160
The US have provided the Neutron Generators and most of the Arming,
Fuzing and Firing System for UK Trident warheads. Back
161
When asked when the last transfer of nuclear material had taken
place the Defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon, said "Precise details
of such transfers are being withheld in order to safeguard national
security". Written Answers 8 February 2005 Column
1379W, Hansard. Back
162
The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterent, MoD
and FCO, December 2006, Cm 6994 Back
163
Factual Summary of the NPT Preparatory Committee 28 April-9 May
2008. Back
164
Over the next decade the warheads will incorporate the new US
Mk4A Arming, Fuzing and Firing system. Written Answers, 9 May
2006, Hansard. The submarines will be fitted with the Mk98 Mod
7 fire control system and the targeting computers at the
Corsham Computer Centre will be upgraded to match this. Written
Answers, 28 March 2007, Hansard. Back
165
Papers from the Future Deterrent Industry Day, Abbey Wood, 29 June
2007. The phrase "including the missile and warhead"
was redacted from the version of the speech initially released
to Scottish CND under the Freedom of Information Act. The full
statement was only issued after an internal review under the Act.
Reported in the Guardian 25 July 2008. Back
166
A series of PQs have been asked but only a limited amount of financial
information has been disclosed. Back
167
Written Answer 3 December 2007, Column 843W, Hansard Back
168
Professor John Simpson pointed out that the MoD would not want
to repeat the situation where they were left supporting Polaris
after it had been withdrawn from the US Navy. Defence Committee
inquiry into The Future of the UK's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent:
The Strategic Context, June 2006, HC 986, Ev 29. Back
169
Written answers 30 October 2007 Column 1358W & 3 June
2008, Hansard Back
170
"we would only consider using our nuclear weapons in self
defence (including the defence of our NATO allies), and even then
only in extreme circumstances"-The Future of the United
Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent, MoD & FCO, December 2006,
Cm 6994. Back
171
Paper submitted by Lord Ronald King Murray to the Scottish Government
Summit on Nuclear Weapons, October 2007 and Sunday Herald
20 September 2008 Back
172
In 1998 36 warheads were removed from submarines into
storage. These warheads remained part of the operational stockpile
until 2007. Back
173
NATO's air-based nuclear forces in Europe are on an alert state
measured in months. NATO's Nuclear Forces in the new security
environment, www.nato.int Back
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