Submission from Acronym Institute
for Disarmament Diplomacy
The Acronym Institute, established in 1995 in
Geneva and London, publishes the quarterly journal Disarmament
Diplomacy and has internationally-recognized expertise on
a range of multilateral, bilateral and global security treaties
and agreements, including the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC),
UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1325, the Outer
Space Treaty, and many of the still-relevant cold war treaties
relating to nuclear weapons, outer space and Conventional Forces
in Europe. In 1999-2000 the Acronym Institute initiated the
establishment of the All Party Parliamentary Group for Global
Security and Non-Proliferation and provided support staff, funding
and eminent speakers for the APPG's first few years before transferring
this responsibility to another NGO in order to devote more resources
to the Institute's international security work. A long-time consultant
for the United Nations and European Parliament, Rebecca Johnson
holds a PhD in international relations and multilateral arms control
from the London School of Economics and was senior advisor to
the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission chaired by Hans Blix
from 2004-2006.
This submission will focus on contradictions
between the security analysis and UK policy and practice with
regard to nuclear weapons, the NPT, rules-based multilateralism
and the distortion of collective security approaches as a consequence
of continued reliance on nuclear weapons and doctrines, including
the use of nuclear weapons.
SUMMARY
1. In our assessment, the National Security
Strategy of the United Kingdom "Security in an interdependent
world", published in March 2008, correctly recognises
that UK and international security requires addressing a range
of diverse but interconnected threats. It reflects a better understanding
that security is not only about military resources and approaches
and makes commendable efforts to identify policies that would
address these challenges. Nevertheless, the discussions on non-proliferation
are hampered by the retention of out-dated defence assumptions
about the role of the UK in international relations.
2. The UK has much experience in policing,
emergency response, forensics and verification and is undoubtedly
able to contribute usefully towards collective and global security.
Though much of the Strategy emphasises partnerships and cooperation,
at times there are still echoes of an out-dated colonialist mentality
that treats Britain as having a special or dominant role beyond
our actual geostrategic position and resources. Examples include
force-projection policies that show Britain attempting to "punch
above our weight" by means of the inadequately thought-through
UK role in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the procurement
of new generations of Trident submarines and aircraft carriers.
3. The persistence of such out-dated ideologies
in some areas has resulted in perpetuation of some inappropriate
policiesmost notably with regard to nuclear weaponsthat
are counterproductive or irrelevant for dealing with today's complex
threats and challenges, and which in some cases feed the very
threats that the Government says it wants to reduce and manage.
4. While the rules-based non-proliferation
regime has its flaws, the network of treaties and agreements centred
on the NPT, CWC, BWC and reinforced by the International Atomic
Energy Agency and UN Security Council resolutions, provide most
of the principles and tools needed to constrain and prevent the
acquisition and use of nuclear weapons. Britain's own nuclear
policies, particularly the renewal of Trident, undermine the NPT
and our strategic and non-proliferation objectives.
5. The NPT rested on the understanding that
if the majority of states renounced the option of nuclear weapons
and joined the treaty as non-nuclear weapon states, the five defined
nuclear weapon states would pursue disarmament. Anything else
would perpetuate the privilege of the nuclear "haves"
to the perceived detriment of the rest. The UK recognises that
non-proliferation is unsustainable without integrated disarmament,
but appears to think that public diplomacy can substitute for
genuine steps to renounce nuclear weapons and remove them from
British security policies.
6. While the positive mood music from the
UK since Margaret Beckett's presentation to the Carnegie Conference
in June 2007 has been widely welcomed, civil society and
NPT states are sceptical that the UK's actions do not match the
words. The continuation of AWE's verification work, stated aspirations
to make Britain into a disarmament laboratory and initiative on
holding a P-5 technical conference are warmly welcomed, but
they are no substitute for concrete actions to devalue and dismantle
UK nuclear weapons.
7. Britain would have far more influence
in the world if the government took positive and irreversible
steps to demonstrate that nuclear weapons are not essential for
security. An announcement that Britain does not envisage replacing
Trident would boost the NPT in the run-up to the 2010 Review
Conference and make a qualitative difference to global security.
Though it would not immediately sweep away the ambitions of Iran
or North Korea (which have different motivations for pursuing
nuclear capabilities), UK renunciation would cut through the perceived
incentives and provide greater muscle and integrity to international
efforts to contain Iran and others within the NPT. With regard
to current Trident deployment, the government should reduce nuclear
dangers and boost international confidence by de-alerting and
taking Trident of its continuous at-sea patrols.
8. As NATO develops a new Security Concept
for the 21st century, consideration should be given to removing
the anachronistic role of nuclear weapons in the Alliance and
reassuring Russia that NATO's expansion poses no security threat.
9. Instead of risking stability through
ballistic missile defences (BMD) and programmes to use weapons
in and from outer space, a more sensible approachand one
consistent with the Security Strategy and the EU's Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP)would combine arms control efforts
with the technical hardening and shielding of as many satellites
as possible, plus space situation awareness, redundancy and other
"passive" defence means. Progress in nuclear disarmament,
strengthening the NPT, negotiating a nuclear weapons convention,
further efforts to restrict missile proliferation, building on
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Hague Code
of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) would
also contribute to security and reduce the chances of space becoming
a battlegroundwhich would be in nobody's interests.
10. The chief purpose of defence should
be to enhance security. In seeking to eliminate nuclear threats,
we must make sure that deterrence theory is not proved right.
In other words, we neither want to see nuclear weapons provoke
wars, nor does anyone want more bloody, conventional wars to take
the place of nuclear weapons. Therefore, in advocating that nuclear
weapons must be progressively abolished, it is important to recognise
the need to reduce the arsenals of other weapons too. As implied
in the Security Strategy, that means we have to move defence strategies
away from old patterns of aggressive, military-dependent national
security reactivity towards multifaceted, preventive human security
approaches.
11. It will be important to work for a successful
review conference in 2010, but it would be counterproductive if
"success" were conceived to be an agreed lowest common
denominator document. While most of the elements of the 1995 and
2000 programmes of action are still relevant, some will be
more critical to a constructive 2010 review conference than
others. The continued credibility of the NPT is likely to rest
on: the viability of CTBT entry into force under a new American
president; whether the nuclear weapon states continue to insist
on rights to use, renew and modernise their nuclear weapons; and
how well (or badly) the regime deals with the nuclear aspirations
of potential proliferators such as Iran.
12. While welcoming the government's verification
initiatives the Committee should question where it is all intended
to lead. At present much energy is being expended on demonstrating
how complex and difficult verification of disarmament would be.
While true, there is a difference between projects designed to
convince the public that verification would be too difficult for
disarmament to be practicable, and projects intended to work out
practical solutions to provide confidence that disarmament is
feasible. As the 2006 Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission,
chaired by Dr Hans Blix stated:
"Weapons of mass destruction cannot be
uninvented. But they can be outlawed, as biological and chemical
weapons have been, and their use made unthinkable. Compliance,
verification and enforcement rules can, with the requisite will,
be effectively applied. And with that will, even the eventual
elimination of nuclear weapons is not beyond the world's reach."[174]
It is more practical to design and implement
a regime that would successfully ban and contain sophisticated
nuclear technologies than to try to prevent terrorist acquisition
or "break-out" under the confused mixed messages of
the current nonproliferation regime.
13. Efforts to achieve a global nuclear
weapon convention would be more successful at constraining states
outside the NPT (India, Israel and Pakistan) and potential proliferators
than the current regime, based on differential obligations. A
nuclear weapon convention, misleadingly portrayed by some government
officials as competing with or detracting from the NPT, is the
logical rules-based objective for states seeking the full implementation
of the NPT. Efforts to achieve a nuclear weapon convention will
reinforce rather than undermine the existing NPT-based regime,
and are consistent with the goals enshrined in the Treaty's preamble
and articles.
14. The practical steps of verified disablement,
dismantlement and irreversible denuclearization will take time,
and those countries still possessing nuclear weapons will need
to keep them safe pending total elimination. Pending negotiations
on a prohibition convention and to undercut the present attractiveness
of nuclear weapons as an instrument of policy or threat, a first
step that the UK could initiate or support is to declare that
the use of nuclear weapons by anyone for any purpose would
be deemed a crime against humanity. Such a move would support
both our non-proliferation and counter-terrorism objectives and
strategies and be very popular with the majority of NPT states
parties, armed forces and civil society.
BACKGROUND AND
ARGUMENTS
15. The Security Strategy rightly recognises
that transnational threats and climate change are relevant security
challenges and that traditional military and state threats have
declined. It perceptively analyses the links and interactions
between individual, collective and global security and responsibility.
We applaud that this significant step to provide joined-up policy
analysis on security has gone further than previous government
documents in recognizing that the challenges and opportunities
of the human security paradigm are more relevant than the national
security paradigm that has dominated thinking since Westphalia.
16. We welcome that the government identifies
as guiding principles and core values "human rights, the
rule of law, legitimate and accountable government, justice, freedom,
tolerance and opportunity for all" [para 2.1]. It is likewise
significant that in paragraph 1.9 the objective of protecting
UK security and interests and enabling people to live freely and
with confidence is placed in the context of "a more secure,
stable, just and prosperous world". In perception at least,
the government clearly recognises the interdependence between
security for people in the UK and conditions in the rest of the
world, and that we have a responsibility to tackle the causes
as well as the symptoms of insecurity.
17. Emphasis is placed on intelligence,
policing and the responsibility to protect, recognising links
between transnational crime and trafficking in weapons, drugs
and women. The UK should expand its tools for investigation, prevention
of conflict and human rights abuses and implementation of treaties
and agreements beyond the traditionally male-dominated military
and police approaches, tools and ways of working. A passing reference
is made to UN Security Council resolution 1325 on Women,
Peace and Security, but this needs to be mainstreamed into all
levels of security policy and practice. The UK should devote far
more resources and training to enable women in this country and
abroad to contribute their skills so that efforts to address and
diminish security threats can benefit fully from gender diversity
and women's different experiences and ways of perceiving and resolving
potential threats and conflicts.
18. Though the Security Strategy discusses
the causes of insecurity and preventing incipient threats from
becoming big, serious or uncontainable, it does not go far enough
in considering how the UK's own policies, practices and projections
can feed into the development of future threats. For example,
the possible re-emergence of a major state-led threat is canvassed
and may even be considered to justify the maintaining of nuclear
weapons and large conventional forces. Russia's military intervention
in Georgia on the side of South Ossetia and statements by Putin
and Medvedev about strengthening Russia's armed forces including
nuclear weapons and space defences are perceived by some as the
first signs of a newly confident Russia as a re-emerging security
threat. They are indeed worrying, but did not come from nowhere.
More attention needs to be given to how perceptions and experiences
of UK, US and NATO actions may fuel other states' senses of insecurity
and impel them to take steps that could become drivers for new
arms build-ups and aggressive posturing. Until we have developed
a more cooperative security architecture regionally and internationally,
it is a sad fact that one state's precautionary military actions
(ballistic missile defence, retention or renewal of nuclear weapons
etc) feed another's threat assessments and may create or amplify
the security challenges they purported to deter.
Trident renewal undermines the UK's strategic
and non-proliferation objectives in the run-up to the 2010 NPT
Review Conference
19. The Security Strategy emphasises rule-based
multilateralism, but the UK decision to renew Trident conflicts
directly with UK obligations under the NPT and will contribute
to the further weakening of the non-proliferation regime and the
credibility of international efforts to reduce nuclear dangers
and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Criticism of Trident
renewal has already been voiced at the NPT Preparatory Committee
(PrepCom) meetings and if the UK does not reverse this policy
it could contribute to another Review Conference failure in 2010.
20. The decision to replace Trident gave
a strong and unpopular signal to the rest of the world that Britaina
small country on the Western edge of a relatively safe and stable
European Unioncontinues to place great value on having
nuclear weapons. Despite Des Browne's rhetoric to the Conference
on Disarmament about the "vision of a world free of nuclear
weapons"[175]
the financial and political commitment to replacing Trident underscores
the government's expectation that nuclear weapons will remain
a valuable asset for at least the next 50 years. Such contradictory
messages undermine the ability of the UK and international community
to deal consistently and effectively with potential proliferators.
"Do as I say and not as I do" smacks of hypocrisy and
alienates those we need to convince, as well as giving ammunition
to potential proliferators.
21. Despite assurances given at the time
of the 14 March 2007 vote on the Nuclear Policy White Paper,[176]
the renewal of Trident clearly entails upgrading the warheads
as well as the submarines. This is confirmed by media reports
and demonstrated by new funding and developments (notably the
Orion laser) at AWE Aldermaston and Burghfield. At the NPT PrepComs
in 2007 and 2008, a large number of non-nuclear weapon state
parties to the NPT raised concerns about nuclear weapon states
(including the UK) going ahead with modernisations, refinements
and new procurements. Summarising the second Preparatory Committee
for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, held in Geneva this year,
paragraph 14 of the Chair stated "Concern and disappointment
were voiced about plans of some nuclear weapon States to replace
or modernize nuclear weapons and their means of delivery or platforms,
and about the development of new types of nuclear weapons."[177]
22. By acknowledging that Britain is not
militarily threatened by other states, the Security Strategy reinforces
the widely-held understanding that there is no security or defence
rationale for deploying or replacing Trident. Having recognised
the need to target military and civilian resources carefully to
support the Security Strategy's objectives, the decision to replace
Trident is indefensible. Likely to be many billions greater than
the government's advertised £20 billion price tag,[178]
the high cost of Trident renewal will either deprive other, more
necessary areas of security and defence of vital resources or
else require the Treasury to fund it directly, in keeping with
its role as a national status project rather than anything to
do with defence. At the same time, Britain's willingness to spend
so much on Trident when budgets are stretched thin for other security
and military endeavours reinforces the proliferation-promoting
message that the UK regards its nuclear forces and status as indispensable.
23. When nuclear-armed states continue to
prioritise their nuclear weapons (and especially if they claim
that their security and deterrence require such weapons of mass
destruction, a claim reproduced in the Security Strategy, though
with much less conviction than in the 2006 White Paper and
other nuclear policy documents), they advertise and provide justifications
that weak leaders in other statesespecially in volatile
regionscan seize on. If these weapons are so potent in
security terms, how could the leaders of any self-respecting country
explain to their citizens why such magnificent protectors should
not be acquired and deployed by everyone. The government's justifications
for clinging to Trident undermine the NPT and the goals of its
own Security Strategy and make it harder for other leaders and
states to resist the lure of nuclear status and power projection.
24. The government's determination to renew
Trident has also led to potentially dangerous misinterpretations
(through intent or ignorance) of the NPT. Tony Blair, for example,
told the House of Commons that the NPT "makes it absolutely
clear that Britain has the right to possess nuclear weapons".[179]
On the contrary, the NPT defines a "nuclear weapon state"
(the five that had conducted a nuclear test before 1 January
1967) in order to impose specific obligations, including nuclear
disarmament (Article VI) and non transference of weapons and related
technologies (Article I). These obligations are necessarily different
from the obligations the NPT imposes on the other 184 states
parties, which joined as non-nuclear weapon states. But they are
obligations nonetheless, and equally binding. They reflected the
status quo in 1968 but were not supposed to perpetuate
it. Like the counterproductive effects of the Bush neocons' policies
based on assertions of US exceptionalism, claiming UK exceptionalism
undermines collective rules-based security by implying that there
are different rules for some or that we can pick and choose among
the tenets of international law that we wish to adhere to.
25. On three occasions during 2004-6, eminent
British and international lawyers[180]
gave authoritative Advice that the consensus decisions and agreements
adopted by NPT states parties in 1995 and 2000 have
become part of the legal meaning and interpretation of the Treaty.
They argued that Article VI contained legal obligations, consistent
with Articles I, II and III, and that strict observance with the
letter and the spirit of the NPT is required of all its parties
including the nuclear weapon states. This, they said, applies
to the disarmament obligation no less than the non-transference
and non-acquisition obligations. Moreover, the post-1995 NPT,
which is now in operation, is not the same as the original NPT
that entered into force in 1970. As a result of the decisions
taken and cross-referenced with the extension decision on May
11, 1995, the principles, objectives and obligations were made
stronger and more specific, especially with regard to disarmament.
26. The 2000 NPT Review Conference,
the first after the 1995 extension, was considered a great
success in part because it adopted by consensus a very substantial
final document that contained, among other things, a 13-paragraph
plan of action to accomplish nuclear disarmament. As part of this,
the NPT states parties endorsed an "unequivocal undertaking
by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination
of their nuclear arsenals". Other steps included: entry
into force of the CTBT; conclusion of a fissile materials production
treaty (fissban); moratoria both on testing and on production
of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium (HEU), pending entry
into force of those treaties; deeper unilateral and bilateral
US-Russian reductions in nuclear forces; transparency (ie the
provision of more open information on nuclear capabilities and
the implementation of disarmament agreements); reductions in non-strategic
(tactical) nuclear weapons; concrete measures to reduce the operational
status of nuclear weapons (diplomatic circumlocution for taking
the weapons off alert); diminishing the role of nuclear weapons
in security policies (understood to mean abandoning the potential
first use of nuclear weapons that underpins NATO and Russian doctrines
of deterrence); the principles of irreversibility, transparency
and verification; five power disarmament approaches; further initiatives
to put fissile materials (declared "excess") permanently
under safeguards, and further progress on conventional disarmament.[181]
27. Since the 2005 Review Conference
was a political disaster, the 2010 Conference is likely to
measure progress against the agreements adopted in 2000 and
1995, though it is recognised that some commitments may have been
overtaken by events. It will be important to work for a successful
review conference in 2010, but "success" needs to be
conceived as more relevant to the real world than just getting
agreement on a lowest common denominator document. While most
of the elements of the 1995 and 2000 programmes of action
are still relevant, some will be more critical to a constructive
2010 review conference than others.
28. The continued credibility of the NPT
as an effective mechanism to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons
is likely to rest on four major planks: the viability of CTBT
entry into force under a new American president; whether the nuclear
weapon states continue to insist on rights to use, renew and modernise
their nuclear weapons; how the regime is strengthened institutionally
and politically to deal with nuclear aspirants such as Iran; and
finding proliferation resistant solutions for meeting the world's
energy demands.
29. In light of the 1995 extension
of the NPT and the commitments undertaken in 2000, a further legal
Advice in 2005 concluded that: (i) the use of the Trident
system would breach customary international law, in particular
because it would infringe the "intransgressible" requirement
that a distinction must be drawn between combatants and non-combatants;
(ii) Article VI is a provision "essential to the accomplishment
of the object or purpose of the treaty"; the replacement
of Trident is likely to constitute a breach of Article VI; and
(iv) that such a breach would be a "material" breach
of the NPT.[182]
30. Insisting on the renewal of Trident
flies in the face of the laudable principles and analyses promoted
by the Security Strategy. Clinging to nuclear weapons misdirects
resources and undermines UK credibility at a time when Britain
should be doing its utmost to uphold the NPT and demonstrate that
we take the multilateral treaty-based regimes and international
law seriously. The fact that the other nuclear-armed states have
a worse record than us is no excuse.
31. Nuclear weapons undermine our security.
As recognized by the government, they cannot possibly deter extreme
ideologues or terrorists, whether state or non-state. As Professor
Malcolm Chalmers noted, "Far from being deterred by nuclear
weapons, terrorists would be delighted to provoke a Trident retaliation,
fully aware of the global opprobrium that this would bring on
Britain."[183]
In other words, a terrorist aggressor would not be deterred by
nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction held by their target
countries or anyone else. On the contrary, having nuclear weapons
could make a country a more attractive target for a mass-destructive
terrorist attack, as the extremists' game plan could include provoking
a nuclear or similarly disproportionate retaliation.
Devalue nuclear weapons by having their use declared
a crime against humanity
32. The Security Strategy emphasises the
need to act early, work with partners and put UK efforts and assets
behind a multilateral rule-based approach (eg para 4.96). With
regard to nuclear weapons threats, acting early means not only
keeping the materials and weapons out of the hands of those who
might use them, but also removing incentives and justifications.
While verified reductions in numbers of weapons are undoubtedly
important, implementing the NPT and strengthening the regime will
require that weapon states like Britain accept and demonstrate
that there is no security role for nuclear weapons in their doctrines
and policies.
33. The practical steps of verified disablement,
dismantlement and irreversible denuclearization will take time,
and those countries still possessing nuclear weapons will need
to keep them safe pending total elimination. However, an essential
confidence-building security step is to stigmatise and devalue
nuclear weapons in the eyes of everyone. One way, which is attracting
growing interest in part due to the support of some of the eminent
nuclear policy architects behind the Wall Street Journal
op-eds by Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, William Perry and Sam
Nunn, is for the use of nuclear weapons to be declared a crime
against humanity. This would address terrorist and resurgent state
threats and be popular with the armed forces as well as the non-nuclear
weapon states and civil society around the world. It would reinforce
non-proliferation, remove incentives from the nuclear aspirants
and accelerate disarmament.
34. The NPT does not address use, but the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its landmark advisory
opinion of July 1996 found that in almost all situations
the use of nuclear weapons would violate international humanitarian
law.[184]
In the legal and political landscape in 1996, a minority of ICJ
justices left open a possible loophole if a state's very survival
was at risk. Though the Security Strategy regards terrorist acquisition
of weapons of mass destruction as a significant threat, only two
kinds of nuclear threat could put Britain's survival at risk:
all out nuclear war; or an exchange of nuclear weapons in another
region that caused environmental and climate effects that threatened
our ability to grow sufficient food. A single use by a terrorist
or despotic leader of a failed state would be locally devastating
and cause widespread horror and shock, but recovery would be possible,
especially with international support. Hanging on to nuclear weapons
ourselves does nothing to deter or mitigate such threats and could
exacerbate them. Renouncing our reliance on nuclear weapons would,
by contrast, strengthen other tools to prevent such threats and
give impetus to global efforts to eliminate these WMD.
35. In its post cold war doctrines, the
United States reintroduced the possibility of nuclear weapons
being used for pre-emption as well as retaliation. While the UK
has tried to distance itself from some aspects of US nuclear policy
that is difficult in view of the UK's dependence on US missiles
and guidance systems and the role of US nuclear weapons in NATO.
Though the details of UK deterrent policies and operations are
opaque, they appear still to entail the option (and threatened)
first use of nuclear weapons and a permanently deployed capability
to fire, epitomised by the retention of continuous patrols with
at least one nuclear-armed submarine always at sea. Those clinging
to nuclear deterrence need to wake up to the 21st century. Post
cold war deterrence does not require deployed, operational readiness
to fire nuclear weapons. If you want to deter terrorists or states
from acquiring or using nuclear weapons (or blackmailing with
threats to use them), as advocates of nuclear deterrence claim,
one of the most effective ways, reflecting post-Nuremburg accountability
and the remit of the international criminal court, would be to
make the use of nuclear weapons a crime against humanity.
36. Unlike a fissile materials ban or nuclear
weapon convention, which have to be negotiated multilaterally
and would be complex and time-consuming, with many political,
technical, verification and implementation challenges to be worked
out, the process of stigmatising and outlawing the use of nuclear
weapons offers opportunities for courageous leaders to take unilateral
steps that build towards creating a multilateral norm. Declaring
the use of nuclear weapons a crime against humanity would not
eliminate nuclear dangers overnight, but would have major impact
in taking nuclear weapons off the lustrous list of objects of
political status and desire. Nuclear weapons may be used against
us, whether or not we have some of our own. But which is worse:
a single use that prompts united international assistance to the
victim and a concerted worldwide effort to bring the perpetrators
to justice; or multiple use, which would almost certainly be triggered
by pre-emptive or retaliatory nuclear strikes? Recovery would
be possible from the first scenario, but much more difficult from
the second. For our national as well as international security,
it is now time for the option of using nuclear weapons to be outlawed.
We need to reinforce the taboo and, like the WMD Commission, treat
all nuclear threats as weapons of terror that no sane or civilized
person would want or be able to use. A potent aspect of making
non-use a component of our deterrence is that even despots and
terrorists fear being held personally accountable and subjected
to public trial and punishment.
Protecting against nuclear weapon threats at home
37. In addition to the international threats
posed by the deployment of nuclear weapons and promotional doctrines,
Trident poses a current threat to UK health, safety and the environment,
especially in the areas near AWE Aldermaston and Burghfield in
Berkshire, the Faslane and Coulport nuclear bases in Scotland
and along the warhead convoy routes. The Security Strategy talks
of working with partners to protect and plan against external
threats but fails to address how the manufacture and deployment
of Trident nuclear warheads, the transporting of live warheads
by road between England and Scotland and the storage of over a
hundred warheads at Coulport pose unnecessary and very significant
potential threats. According to recent reports, all these sites
have suffered accidents and severe safety lapses. The warhead
convoys have got lost and are regularly monitored, followed and
sometimes stopped by protesters. Local councils, fire and emergency
services are kept out of the loop when the warhead convoys pass
through their jurisdiction, but they would be expected to respond
to any emergency with alacrity. We recommend that as part of steps
to fulfil the NPT, the MoD should mothball the warheads and reduce
nuclear transports to the minimum necessary to return the warheads
and related materials to Berkshire for safe dismantlement.
Time to denuclearize NATO's security concept and
increase resources for its peace-supporting roles.
38. In several places (inc. para 3.31),
when discussing the importance of international institutions,
the Security Strategy refers to NATO and the European Union without
distinguishing the different roles that these organisations play
in conception, intention and the perceptions of others. The UK
needs to recognize how NATO's expansion and actions such as the
push to deploy US missiles in Poland and sophisticated radar and
tracking facilities in the Czech Republic are perceived as aggressive
by others, most notably Russia.
39. NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop
Scheffer has put the development of a new Strategic Concept for
the 21st century onto NATO's agenda. It is anticipated that debates
on this will be formally kick-started at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit
in April 2009 and continue for at least a year, with adoption
of a new strategic concept likely to be in 2010. Rather than expanding
the NATO nuclear alliance to Russia's borders, consideration should
be given to removing the anachronistic role of nuclear weapons
in the Alliance and increasing ways to build cooperative security
approaches with Russia and other neighbours.
40. NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept states
that war prevention requires "widespread participation by
European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear
roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory
and in command, control and consultation arrangements." As
a consequence, several participating countries host US nuclear
bases and tactical weapons on their soil, some of their aircraft
are equipped to carry nuclear weapons and their pilots are trained
to fly nuclear missions. Since Britain deploys its own nuclear
weapon system, which is assigned to NATO, it does not participate
in nuclear sharing per se. The UK has long hosted over
100 US nuclear free-fall bombs at the Lakenheath airbase
in East Anglia, but analysts with the Federation of American Scientists
recently revealed information that pointed to the withdrawal of
these.[185]
If US nuclear weapons have now been withdrawn from Britain, this
should be explained and confirmed by the US or UK governments.
If not, it is time that they were.
41. As part of any review of its Strategic
Concept, NATO ought to withdraw all US nuclear weapons from Europe.
The need to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons has been repeatedly
raised at NPT Conferences because they are portable, vulnerable
and readily usable. They are potentially destabilizing and create
additional risks and insecurities. NATO should use its decision
in a leverage strategy to persuade Russia to eliminate its tactical
nuclear forces from Europe as well.
42. NATO members hold that their nuclear
sharing is in compliance with Articles I and II of the NPT, arguing
that the arrangements predated the NPT and that "general
war" would end the validity of the NPT. Both interpretations
have been challenged by other NPT Parties. Looking forward to
the 2010 Review Conference, NPT states should strengthen
the Treaty by declaring that it is binding on all State Parties
"under any circumstances".
43. To enhance stability and security in
Europe, it will be important to withdraw the ballistic missile
defence (BMD) bases from Russia's borders and rethink the threat
assessments, purpose and parameters of programmes to protect against
possible missile threats and developments in the Middle East.
The Security Strategy talks of strongly supporting efforts to
include Russia through a joint regional missile defence architecture
(para 4.68). In view of US reluctance, is this realistic or is
it just a PR gesture towards Russia? The objective is constructive,
but the Committee should find out what in practice is the government
doing to pursue this objective and persuade the United States
not to increase insecurity in Europe by putting unnecessary and
inflammatory pressures onto Russia. The UK should promote a greater
role for NATO in arms control and reduce its capacity for harm
as a military expansionist alliance, as that will have unintended
consequences that could undermine British and international security.
The weaponization of space would pose unacceptable
dangers to security on Earth
44. In para 4.99 the Security Strategy
made a passing reference to space assets. It is a major weakness
of the Strategy that the government fails to address how the uses
and abuses of space for civilian and military applications could
have fundamental ramifications for our security. The commercial,
economic, strategic and security importance of outer space has
come to the fore worldwide. Interest in space exploration, observation,
communications and other uses of space is growing. Space assets
can provide unparalleled resources for supporting our security
in relation to humanitarian and environmental crises and diverse
natural, criminal and military threats.[186]
At the same time, it is important to recognise that potential
misuses of space assets could turn outer space into a battlefield.
45. US programmes for BMD have promoted
the argument that whoever controls space will obtain an unassailable
military and commercial dominance on Earth.[187]
Any country that seeks to establish space superiority and dominance
will jeopardise the peaceful uses of space, with a serious risk
that the weaponisation of space could harm terrestrial security
and might evenas occurred in US wargame scenarios based
on an exchange of anti-satellite attackslead to nuclear
war. If allowed to continue, the further militarisation of space
could threaten global security as well as compromising a range
of civilian and security applications on which our daily lives
now rely.
46. Instead of turning to the sledgehammer
of space weaponisation to deal with the potential vulnerabilities
of space assets, a more sensible approachand one consistent
with the Security Strategy and the EU's Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP)would combine arms control efforts with the
technical hardening and shielding of as many satellites as possible,
plus space situation awareness, redundancy and other "passive"
defence means. Progress in nuclear disarmament, strengthening
the NPT, negotiating a nuclear weapons convention, further efforts
to restrict missile proliferation, building on the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) and the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic
Missile Proliferation (HCoC) would also contribute to security
and reduce the chances of space becoming a battlegroundwhich
would be in nobody's interests.
29 September 2008
174 Weapons of Terror: Freeing the world of nuclear,
biological and chemical arms, Report of the WMD Commission,
Stockholm, June 2006, p 17. Back
175
Des Browne, Secretary of State for Defence, Speech to the Conference
on Disarmament, Geneva, February 5, 2008. Back
176
White Paper on The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent,
December 4, 2006. See the Acronym Institute's Critique on
the White Paper, submitted to the Defence Select Committee and
subsequently revised and published as Rebecca Johnson, "The
UK White Paper on Renewing Trident: the wrong decision at the
wrong time", Disarmament Diplomacy 83, pp 3-14. Back
177
The factual summary of the Second Preparatory Committee for the
2010 NPT Review Conference, prepared by the Chair, Volodymyr
Yelchenko of Ukraine, was opposed by Iran and Syria and was therefore
issued as a Chair's working paper on May 9, 2008. NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.43 Back
178
The MoD's record of cost over-runs on many procurement projects
suggests that the overall cost to taxpayers is likely to be even
larger than the £76 billion figure calculated by the
Liberal Democrat Party analysts. Back
179
Tony Blair, Prime Minister's Questions, February 21, 2007. See
also and "Blair wins Trident vote after telling UK
Parliament that the NPT gives Britain the right to have nuclear
weapons", Disarmament Diplomacy 84, pp 60-70. Back
180
Rabinder Singh QC and Professor Christine Chinkin (Matrix Chambers
and London School of Economics) and Philippe Sands QC were consulted
by different clients and gave different but consistent Advice
regarding the NPT and the British government's proposed renewal
of its nuclear cooperation pact with the United States (the Mutual
Defence Agreement, originally signed in 1958 and renewed
several times thereafter) and procurement of a further nuclear
weapon system as a follow-on to Trident. See www.acronym.org.uk Back
181
2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, adopted
May 20, 2000, New York, NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Part I). For a
detailed examination of the political context and choices before
the Sixth Review Conference, see Rebecca Johnson, Non-Proliferation
Treaty: Challenging Times, ACRONYM 13, The Acronym Institute,
London, February 2000. Back
182
Rabinder Singh QC and Professor Christine Chinkin, The Maintenance
and Possible Replacement of the Trident Nuclear Missile System,
Joint Opinion, Matrix Chambers, published by Peacerights, December
19, 2005. Back
183
Malcolm Chalmers, "Long Live Trident?" Physics World,
August 2005. Back
184
International Court of Justice Reports 1996, p 225. [Reported
for July 8, 1996, General List No. 95]. The full decision, documentation
and dissenting decisions also formed the Annex to "Advisory
Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality
of the threat or use of nuclear weapons", Note by the Secretary-General,
United Nations General Assembly A/51/218, October 15, 1996 pp
36-37. Back
185
Hans M. Kristensen, US Nuclear Weapons Withdrawn from the UK,
at http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/ Back
186
Rebecca Johnson, "Europe's Space Policies and their Relevance
to ESDP", published by the European Parliament (External
Policies), October 2006. Back
187
The drive towards developing weapons for use in or from
space is related to missile defence and its proponents use two
principal justifications: firstly, that space weapons are essential
to protect space assets from a pre-emptive attack, dramatically
called a "Space Pearl Harbor" by the Commission to Assess
United States National Security Space Management and Organization
(known as the 2001 Space Commission); and secondly, that
who controls space will obtain an unassailable military and commercial
dominance on Earth (and that this space superiority and dominance
is the destiny of the United States). In addition to the assumptions
of vulnerability, control and space power projection, some argue
from historical analogy that space weaponization is inevitable,
and that whoever gets there first will enjoy an overwhelming advantage.
From the mid-1990s on, all three types of argument could be found
in US policy documents. See the 1996 National Space Policy;
the 1999 Department of Defense Space Policy; US Space Command's
Vision for 2020 (1997) and Long Range Plan (1998); The US
Air Force Strategic Master Plan for FY02 and Beyond; the
Defense Department's 2001 Transformation Study Report; and
the 2001 and 2006 Quadrennial Defense Reviews. Back
|