Submission from Mr Benjamin Brooks
I write to you today in reference to the inquiry
by the Foreign Affairs Committee entitled "Global Security:
Non-Proliferation" of which you are chair. I wish to draw
the committee's attention to the level of contradiction and hypocrisy
contained within the governments National Security Strategy (NSS)
and its supposed commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The government freely admits within the NSS
that the threats faced in the twenty-first century are radically
different to those of recent decades and have thus confounded
all assumptions relating toward national defence. If this ascertain
is correct then we must question the logic and rationale of renewing
a defence system (trident nuclear missiles/polaris submarines)
that was conceived and deployed primarily in response to a nuclear
armed USSR. An often used governmental response to this line of
questioning is that modern nuclear missiles are of a far greater
technological standard and accuracy, therefore minimising any
risk to civilians. Yet accompanying this level of hypothetical
reassurance are the sobering dual realities that; (a) due to the
comprehensive test-ban treaty the effects (especially long-term)
of any nuclear explosion are unknown, (b) by assuming the contrary
that because of technological advances and fewer warheads the
UK nuclear arsenal is actually decreasing. The potential yield
of Britain's nuclear arsenal is unknown and as such impossible
to qualify as decreasing, therefore contradicting the NPT. A second
danger brought about by a belief in a smaller, more accurate arsenal
is the likelihood of the government deploying them in active combat.
The NSS continues by announcing that Britain
will be at the forefront of diplomatic action pertaining to nuclear
weapons control and (crucially) reduction. Yet with the decisions
to renew all major facets of Britain's nuclear arsenal this commitment
is surely voided. If Britain timely wishes to become a world leader
(within the field of nuclear weaponry) then it should turn its
expertise on verifying the elimination of warheads inward and
become the first of the recognised nuclear-states to completely
disarm.
With the implementation of the US missile defence
shield Britain must begin to believe its own rhetoric as to the
level of safety this system will provide. If Britain is not safe
without a deployable nuclear arsenal then why should states such
as Israel be contented with hypocritical reassurances. By using
our expertise to deconstruct our own arsenal we can begin to regain
the trust and respect of our international partners. If Britain
fails to take such historic steps toward a nuclear-free world
we seek only to heighten the role of proliferation of nuclear
material to states whom feel threatened by global events. Who
would deny the people of Georgia an effective deterrent to the
threat of an overbearing Russia. As a global leader it is Britain's
responsibility to show these states that protection can be found
within international institutions (as espoused in the NSS) and
not via a missile system that in the best case scenario lies dormant
for its lifetime and merely wastes billions of pounds of tax-payers
money.
19 September 2008
| 
