Global Security: Non-Proliferation - Foreign Affairs Committee Contents

 Memorandum submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office


  1.1  The Terms of Reference given by the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs (FAC) for this Inquiry on Global Security: Non-Proliferation are as follows:

    "The Foreign Affairs Committee will examine the work of the British Government in working towards the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's policy goal on countering weapons proliferation and its causes. The Committee will consider the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. It will also consider the role of ballistic missiles. In particular, the inquiry will examine:

    The British Government's non-proliferation approach, as set out in the National Security Strategy;

    The effectiveness of the current rules-based international system in curbing current weapons proliferation;

    The potential merit of forthcoming diplomatic initiatives on non-proliferation, for instance the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference;

    The role of arms control and disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, in non-proliferation efforts."


  2.1  Through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the overwhelming majority of states has chosen not to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Some states have abandoned their nuclear weapons programmes altogether while the five Nuclear Weapons States have substantially reduced their nuclear arsenals since the Cold War and further significant reductions are in prospect.

  2.2  But the international counter-proliferation system is facing serious challenges. In particular:

    (i) the emergence of India and Pakistan as nuclear-armed states and their continued resistance, with Israel, to joining the NPT;

    (ii) the clear breaches of the international legal obligations of two non-nuclear weapons States Parties to the NPT, Iran and North Korea, and the risks these pose for the global counter-proliferation system as well as for regional security and proliferation;

    (iii) the considerable work still required to build the support necessary to achieve a positive outcome at the NPT's Review Conference in 2010. Many moderate states do not give priority to counter-proliferation, leaving more radical states space to pursue their own narrower agendas;

    (iv) increasing efforts by terrorists and criminal networks to acquire WMD;

    (v) the increasing ranges of ballistic missiles available to rogue states, bringing the UK, our friends and allies potentially within range of an attack;

    (vi) an anticipated significant increase in the use of civil nuclear power world-wide, driven by the need for energy security and to address climate change. This increases the risk of diversion of the materials and technologies involved for military use, whether by states or non-state actors;

    (vii) large arsenals of nuclear weapons remain. The START I treaty expires in December 2009 and no agreement is yet in place for the extension of its provisions, although the US and Russia have agreed in principle to work for a legally binding successor. Counter-proliferation efforts risk being undermined if other states perceive, rightly or wrongly, that the Nuclear Weapon States are not delivering on their side of the bargain and actively pursuing nuclear disarmament;

    (viii) meanwhile, efforts to expand the international legal framework essential to contain nuclear weapons technology and numbers are stalled, with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty yet to enter into force or be ratified by several key states and agreement yet to be reached to start negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

  2.3  How these challenges are addressed in the next few years will be critical for the future of global security. As the National Security Strategy published in March concluded: "the international security architecture has yet to adapt satisfactorily to the new landscape. Its level of ambition in the face of new challenges is too low and the response to crises is too slow. The range and scale of those challenges is only likely to grow, particularly as a result of climate change and competition for resources. How the international system responds and how well it succeeds in entrenching the rules-based approach to resolving disputes and dealing with states which violate international laws and norms will be one of the most significant factors in global and UK national security."


  3.1  The UK Government has made clear that it judges that the proliferation of WMD poses one of the gravest threats to UK and to global security and that we are firmly committed to the goal of the global elimination of all such weapons. Driving forward more urgent and robust international action on both counter-proliferation and nuclear disarmament is a personal priority for the Foreign Secretary. As recently as last week, at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, the Foreign Secretary emphasised that to address the profound threats to the counter proliferation regime, we need to remake the bargain between the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and that we must defend the Treaty aggressively on both the non-proliferation and the disarmament fronts. Our aim is to reinforce the consensus against proliferation: firstly by demonstrating that the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons is real, achievable and genuinely held by nuclear weapons states; and secondly by building ways in which all countries can enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology.

  3.2  The revision of the FCO's Strategic Framework in April 2008 made counter proliferation, together with counter terrorism, one of the FCO's four new Policy Goals. (Departmental Strategic Objective 5 is "to counter terrorism, weapons proliferation and their causes".) To achieve this objective, detailed action plans have been elaborated within the FCO, which the Foreign Secretary is personally involved in reviewing on a regular basis.

  3.3  To prompt fresh thinking on the issues, on 18 July the Foreign Secretary hosted a brainstorming seminar with eminent academics, commentators and policy makers from the UK, France and US on the future of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Building on the themes discussed at the seminar, this autumn the Foreign Secretary will be launching a public discussion paper to stimulate public debate on the key issues around nuclear disarmament and proliferation. (A copy of the paper will be forwarded to the Committee as soon as it is available.)

  3.4  The Foreign Secretary's initiatives build further on the UK's international leadership on these issues:

    (i) the former Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett, set out a progressive agenda in her June 2007 speech "A World free of Nuclear Weapons?" to the Carnegie Endowment in Washington and announced that the UK would act as a "disarmament laboratory" for the thinking and practical work required to move forward global nuclear disarmament;

    (ii) in Delhi in January the Prime Minister argued for a reinvigorated global commitment to nuclear disarmament and for zero tolerance for proliferation. The Prime Minister subsequently announced in Parliament on 19 March a major international conference in London, likely to be in early 2009, to take forward work on nuclear energy;

    (iii) the Secretary of State for Defence announced in a 5 February speech to the Conference on Disarmament that the UK is willing to host a conference of P5 nuclear laboratories. The conference would examine ways to move forward on disarmament as well as building trust and fostering transparency;

    (iv) the appointment of Baroness Williams as Non-Proliferation Adviser to the Prime-Minister;

    (v) speeches by Dr Howells and Lord Malloch Brown to expert audiences;

    (vi) the launch of the National Security Strategy in March.

  3.5  We have also warmly welcomed the contributions to this important debate by other leading figures in particular by US statesmen Schultz, Perry, Kissinger & Nunn, by President Sarkozy, by former Foreign and Defence Secretaries of State Lords Hurd, Robertson and Owen and Sir Malcolm Rifkind, by the Shadow Foreign Secretary, Mr Hague, by Prime Minister Rudd of Australia and by the US Presidential candidates.

  3.6  Broadly, HMG's approach recognizes that effective strategies for tackling non-proliferation and disarmament, energy security, climate change and the strengthening of international institutions must be linked. We also recognise that the impetus behind proliferation is complex and varies from one state to another: for there to be progress, we need to take account of the security concerns of all states and to promote peaceful, just and comprehensive settlements of regional conflicts and tensions. For these reasons, we consider that collective action, in international bodies including the UN, the EU, NATO, the IAEA, treaty-specific and export control groups remains the most effective way of managing and reducing the threats and the only prospect of eliminating them completely. A multilateral approach, in particular a rules-based approach led by international institutions, legally-binding and verifiable where possible, brings not only greater effectiveness but also, crucially, greater legitimacy.

  3.7  The National Security Strategy set out the main lines of the UK Government's work to counter the threat from WMD arranged under four strands— the "4 Ds" ie dissuade, detect, deny and defend. The considerable body of work government-wide and by other relevant departments and agencies on these is co-ordinated by the Cabinet Office, which oversees action plans under each of the four headings through the Counter Proliferation Committee. On the international aspects, the FCO works closely with other relevant Departments, in particular with the Ministry of Defence and the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform as well as with other parts of the Government as appropriate.

  3.8  The FCO's new Strategic Programme Fund provides funding rising from £300,000 in 2008-2009 to £2 million in 2009-10 and £3 million in 2010-11 in support of the strategic objectives set out in the FCO's counter proliferation and counter terrorism Policy Goal. Drawing on these funds, in the months ahead the UK will finance a series of direct legislative assistance visits to help 30 states to fulfil their obligations under a number of treaties including the BTWC, CWC and NPT. Other funded activities include NPT outreach and workshops in sub-Saharan Africa. We have also sponsored a project by the International Institute of Strategic Studies on the practical steps required for the elimination of nuclear weapons which has recently been published (see below). More widely, the UK Government is spending some £36 million a year through the Global Threat Reduction Programme (see below).

  3.9  We also work closely with EU partners and the EU institutions to ensure the EU contributes effectively to countering the threat from states acquiring or developing WMD (including means of delivery) and preventing terrorists from acquiring WMD or radiological weapons or materials. This is carried out through co-ordinated bilateral and multilateral activity and through the deployment of funds from EU Joint Actions or the Commission's new Instrument for Stability.

  3.10  This paper sets out how the UK is leading and contributing to international action to counter the proliferation of WMD, starting with nuclear weapons and the three pillars of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It then addresses chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles, the specific threat of terrorists acquiring WMD, and current initiatives on conventional weapons.


  4.1  The clear international consensus is that the way forward on both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament is through the NPT. States remaining outside the regime (India, Israel and Pakistan) or breaching its provisions (North Korea) or flouting their United Nations Security Council and IAEA obligations in respect of their nuclear programmes (Iran), risk undermining the basis of this consensus, igniting a dangerous arms race and endangering stability in and beyond their regions. It will be vital to reinforce the international commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament at the next in the five-yearly cycle of NPT Review Conferences (RevCons) in 2010.

Towards the NPT Review Conference in 2010

  4.2  HMG's goal remains adherence by all states to the NPT and to see its original "grand bargain" strengthened at the Treaty's 2010 RevCon. This is based on the three pillars of the treaty:

    (i) The five states (China, France, Russia/USSR, UK and USA) that had manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967 were recognised as "Nuclear Weapons States". They undertook not to assist any other state to acquire or develop nuclear weapons. All other signatories—the "Non-Nuclear Weapons States"—renounced the right to develop or acquire nuclear weapons or to assist others to do so. This is the non-proliferation pillar (Articles I and II);

    (ii) In return the Non-Nuclear Weapons States received an undertaking from the Nuclear Weapons States that they would pursue good faith negotiations on cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. This is the disarmament pillar (Article VI);

    (iii) The Non-Nuclear Weapons States' right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful uses under international safeguards and in conformity with Articles I and II, was formally recognised and acknowledged. This is the peaceful uses pillar (Article IV).

  4.3  The three pillars need to be treated equally: to advance, we need to address all three in parallel. Our priorities under each are:

    (i) Zero tolerance for nuclear proliferation, which needs to be robustly supported by all the P5. North Korea and Iran must comply with their UN Security Council, NPT and IAEA obligations;

    (ii) A re-invigorated approach to nuclear disarmament. The UK wants a clear forward plan put into practice, that demonstrates that the Nuclear Weapons States are serious about their obligations;

    (iii) Ensuring the expected growth in civil nuclear power generation is not accompanied by increased proliferation risks. The UK is working for internationally-agreed mechanisms under IAEA auspices that will make it unnecessary for countries to develop their own enrichment and re-processing capacity.

  4.4  The Second Preparatory Committee of the 2010 NPT Review Conference took place in Geneva from 28 April to 9 May (a copy of the Chairman's Summary is at Annex 1). Lord Malloch Brown and Baroness Williams (Non-Proliferation Adviser to the Prime Minister) attended a high-level conference in the margins. UK leadership resulted in the first statement from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (known as the "P5") for eight years and created a new P5 dynamic on which we can build. Significantly, Thailand became the first developing country publicly to support nuclear fuel assurances.

  4.5  But much remains to be done to secure a successful RevCon in 2010. To build the consensus necessary to achieve a positive outcome in 2010, there are three key groups of countries:

    (i) P5: a substantive and cohesive P5 dynamic is essential. The P5 statement at the NPT PrepCom this year was a good start (a copy is at Annex 2). This dialogue would benefit from further deepening. We are also in touch with both US Presidential campaigns and will work closely with the new US Administration on these issues;

    (ii) some key Non-Nuclear Weapons States Parties (eg South Africa, Brazil, and Egypt) have appreciated the UK's commitment. But urging such states to approach the negotiations required for 2010 in a more constructive way—and leave actual and potential proliferators with nowhere to go—will require continued senior political engagement;

    (iii) the majority of developing countries see nuclear non-proliferation as a lower priority than economic development, poverty and regional instability. We need to raise awareness of the dangers posed to developing countries by nuclear proliferation and re-engage mainstream NAM members with the NPT process.

  4.6  The Foreign Secretary regularly engages with his counterparts on these issues, for example with the Chinese and Brazilian Foreign Ministers at the UN this month. We also work closely with our EU partners in this area, both through co-ordinated bilateral activity and effective use of the available multilateral tools (eg use of the "WMD clauses" with Third Parties.)

  4.7  We have an active programme of outreach. FCO, BERR and MOD officials regularly meet stakeholders from outside Government to listen to new ideas, brief on UK objectives and policies, and answer questions. We benefit from regular interaction with Members of both Houses of Parliament. Since the start of this year we have held an "outreach" event for parliamentarians to explain our "Enrichment Bond" proposal, have hosted nuclear disarmament NGOs such as Medact, Mayors for Peace and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Dr Howells took questions from students on counter-proliferation issues during his recent visit to the United States and made a speech to an academic audience in South Africa. We briefed NGOs and other interested parties and published a guide to the NPT setting out UK objectives before the start of this year's Preparatory Committee in Geneva in April. We also have an extensive programme of outreach on export controls (see below). We will remain engaged with NGOs and civil society more broadly as the 2010 RevCon approaches.

  4.8  We welcome the establishment of an International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, co-chaired by former Australian and Japanese Foreign Ministers, Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, and the appointment of Baroness Williams as the UK Commissioner. The Commission intends to publish a report by January 2010 with the aim of helping to shape a global consensus in the lead-up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference. It will also consider publishing a supplementary report in mid-2010, making such further recommendations as it judges may be appropriate in the aftermath of that Conference. We look forward to co-operating closely with the Commission.

  4.9  The following sections examine each of the three NPT pillars in turn.


  5.1  We are pursuing a number of tracks in parallel:

    (i) strengthening the IAEA and its safeguards regime;

    (ii) initiatives to make nuclear weapons (and other WMD) and their related materials and technologies more secure;

    (iii) robust action against any state which breaks the rules;

    (iv) working to bring into the NPT the three states which remain outside it;

    (v) supporting regional zones free from nuclear weapons and WMD.

(i)  Strengthening IAEA safeguards

  5.2  IAEA safeguards provide the essential foundation of international non-proliferation work. We are pressing for all those Non-Nuclear Weapons States which have not yet done so to agree, sign and bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as provided for in Article III of the NPT.

  5.3  We are also urging those States that have not yet done so to agree, sign and bring into force an Additional Protocol based on the Model Protocol developed by the IAEA (INFCIRC/540) to strengthen the system of safeguards. This involves, inter alia, the provision of additional information to the IAEA and greater access for IAEA inspectors to enable the IAEA to build up a more complete picture of a State's nuclear-related activities, thereby enabling it to look for inconsistencies or anomalies which could be indicative of clandestine activities. A key feature of the new system is that, for the first time, it gives the IAEA access to information on nuclear fuel cycle-related activities (for example, manufacture of specialised equipment, and research & development) even where nuclear material is not involved. We are working for recognition that a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol should be the norm for IAEA safeguards, and that both are needed to satisfy the requirements of Article III of the NPT.

  5.4  We will also engage in taking forward recommendations contained in the wide-ranging report into the future of the IAEA by the Commission of Eminent Persons, including to allow the Agency to inspect for indicators of weaponisation and for more transparency in civil nuclear activities. The UK will also work to ensure the election of a successor to the outgoing Director General who has the vision, leadership and change management skills the IAEA requires.

(ii)  Making Nuclear (and other WMD) more secure

  5.5  We are working urgently to make it increasingly difficult for states or non-state actors, including terrorists, to acquire nuclear (and other WMD) or the related materials, equipment, skills and technologies and to detect any attempts to do so. Work on this was particularly stimulated by the valuable work done to identify and close down the proliferation network set up by AQ Khan, in supporting nuclear weapons programmes in states including Libya, Iran and North Korea. The main actions in this area are as follows.

 G8 Global Partnership/UK Global Threat Reduction Programme

  5.6  These initiatives are aimed at establishing cooperative projects to reduce the threat of proliferation of the most dangerous nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical materials. Its main focus is the Former Soviet Union and focuses on projects to improve the security of fissile materials; reducing the number of sites containing nuclear material; working towards closure of reactors still producing plutonium; improving nuclear safety, to reduce the risk of further Chernobyl-type incidents; contributing to the destruction of chemical weapons stocks; and providing sustainable employment for former weapon scientists whose expertise could be misused.

  5.7  The UK has committed up to $750 million over ten years to this work. Expenditure is currently running at around £36 million a year. Projects we are currently supporting include work to:

    —  Assist in long term safety and security of spent nuclear fuel from decommissioning nuclear submarines in Russia;

    —  Enhance physical protection of nuclear and radiological materials held in insecure facilities across the Former Soviet Union;

    —  Support the irreversible shutdown of plutonium production reactors in Kazakhstan and Siberia;

    —  Create sustainable employment opportunities for 3,000 former Soviet weapons scientists.

  5.8  In delivering the programme, the UK works closely with key partners, most notably the US, Canada, the EU, France, Sweden, Norway and the IAEA. The sheer quantity and poor level of safety and security of materials has meant that Russia has been the focus of the majority of this work. However, significant progress has been made and the programme is increasingly focusing on collaboration in other FSU countries and other key geographical regions such as Iraq, Libya and South Asia. This widening of the UK's geographical focus reflects the broader agreement the UK and close partners secured at the G8 Tokyo Summit to ensure that Global Partnership activity is able to focus on emerging threats where national capacity to ensure security of WMD-related materials and equipment is least developed.

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

  5.9  The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a group of nuclear supplier countries which seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear related exports. The NSG Guidelines are implemented by each Participating Government (currently 45) in accordance with its national laws and practices. Decisions on export applications are taken at the national level in accordance with national export licensing requirements.

  5.10  The NSG Guidelines aim to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Guidelines facilitate the development of trade in this area by providing the means whereby obligations to facilitate peaceful nuclear cooperation can be implemented in a manner consistent with international nuclear non-proliferation norms.

  5.11  The AQ Khan revelations have given an impetus to thinking anew about how to control the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology. The G8 declared in July 2008 that they do not intend to transfer such technology, material or equipment to any additional states while more lasting arrangements are considered. The NSG is currently working on these. The NSG did, however, agree in 2005 on what its members should do if a recipient state's compliance with its safeguards obligations is in doubt or if non-compliance is proven.

  5.12  We are also working to establish the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply; to promote enhanced nuclear cooperation with India (see below); and to prevent the supply of nuclear related items to prohibited Iranian nuclear activities.

International outreach on export controls

  5.13  More broadly, HMG believes that outreach to promote effective export controls is an important tool in the fight against proliferation. The UK works closely with EU partners, with the USA, and with other countries in delivering this work. Outreach can take several forms, including bilateral activities by the UK, or multilateral efforts through other institutions such as the EU and other export control regimes. It can consist of inward and outward visits involving officials from across Government (including from the FCO, BERR, MOD, and HMRC), and covers areas such as: industry awareness of export controls; capacity-building; customs procedures; and assistance with drafting legislation. It also includes targeted lobbying on political issues such as how to ensure that export controls and customs activities are used effectively to implementing UN Security Council resolutions.

  5.14  As the resources available for export control outreach work are limited, HMG efforts are prioritised; in 2008, our priority countries are China, Malaysia, Pakistan, and the UAE. We have also hosted inward visits from Jordan and Thailand. The Committees on Arms Exports Controls have also kindly agreed to participate in an Outreach visit to their opposite numbers in Kiev, to focus on Parliamentary Scrutiny. This follows an inward visit by Ukrainian parliamentarians in 2007. (Further information on outreach activities was provided in the 2007 Report on the UK's Strategic Export Controls (pages 19-20) and is provided on an ongoing basis directly to the Committee on Arms Export Controls at their request.)

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

  5.15  Launched by President Bush in May 2003, the PSI is a multi-national initiative that aims to establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to combat the illicit trafficking of WMD and related materials. PSI is not treaty-based but participants are committed to a Statement of Interdiction Principles to improve their efforts to impede and stop shipments of WMD. Nations meet in a number of formats and take part in an exercise programme intended to test national capabilities and decision-making structures. PSI is best characterised as an activity rather than an organisation and remains an open and flexible mechanism.

  5.16  The UK plays an active role in PSI, hosting and participating in exercises, outreach events and meetings of the Operational Experts Group, the PSI "steering committee". The PSI 5th Anniversary Senior-Level Meeting was held in Washington on 28 May 2008. The focus was building on past successes and strengthening the initiative for the future. Nearly 90 endorsees of the initiative attended the meeting.

  5.17  To ensure PSI continues to be effective we need to find ways to persuade key non-endorsees such as China, Malaysia and Republic of Korea to support PSI, encourage less active endorsees to participate more and ensure that PSI meetings and exercises remain focussed on operational issues.

UN Security Council Resolution 1540

  5.18  UNSCR 1540 (2004) is a Chapter VII resolution which imposes legally-binding obligations on all UN member states to establish and enforce domestic legislation to prevent weapons of mass destruction and related delivery systems falling into the hands of non-state actors such as terrorists, criminals and proliferation networks, such as AQ Khan's. The resolution seeks to strengthen existing non-proliferation mechanisms by focusing on areas which are under-represented in the non-proliferation architecture, most notably in two areas:

    (i) Non-State Actors. Pre-existing WMD related treaties fail to address adequately the role played by non-state actors in the proliferation of WMD materials or their means of delivery and assume that only states have the intention and capability to develop WMD. UNSCR 1540 seeks to address this by requiring all states to tighten their domestic legal framework so as to criminalize and enforce measures against WMD proliferation to and by non-state actors;

    (ii) Non-signatories of International Treaties. As UNSCR 1540 is mandatory on all UN member states, it has the advantage of applying to those states which have chosen not to sign up to the NPT, CWC or BTWC.

  5.19  UNSCR 1540 established a Committee of the Security Council (known as the 1540 Committee) charged with reporting to the Security Council on the implementation of the resolution by States, which were themselves to report to the Committee on their implementation activities. This Committee has played a central role in raising awareness and promoting implementation. The resolution gave this Committee a life of only two years but, following extensive diplomatic activity by the UK, in April 2006 a further resolution (UNSCR 1673) was passed extending its life for a further two years and in April 2008 another resolution (UNSCR 1810) extended its life for a further three years with a focus on operational capacity-building. This should enable the Committee to encourage and to provide practical or financial assistance to those States which still need to improve their performance in this crucial area.

Proliferation Finance

  5.20  HM Treasury leads on work within the international Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to identify future methods of tackling the financing of proliferation activity. They are also working closely with HM Revenue and Customs, the Serious and Organised Crime Agency and the Financial Services Authority on the UK domestic/legal response to this issue. We await an expected FATF report on Proliferation Finance and aim to build on its recommendations and to assist states which do not have capacity to enforce the recommendations themselves.

  5.21  In the meantime, a number of financial restrictions have been put in place against Iran (see below). Under UN Security Council Resolutions, Bank Sepah's assets have been banned. The EU has also frozen Bank Melli's assets, and is in the process of setting rigorous reporting requirements for the Iranian banks, especially Bank Saderat. These financial restrictions have limited Iran's ability to move funds to and from abroad, making their proliferation-sensitive activities more difficult.

Student Screening

  5.22  The UK's Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) has been in place for nearly one year. We are now able to provide, on request, nationality-specific reports of clearances issued on a regular basis. An interim review of ATAS has already taken place and made several suggestions on funding and upgrading, including developing ATAS IT capacity. We will shortly be undertaking a full review of the Scheme, with input from Partners across Government, Posts and academia.

(iii)  Robust action against states which break the rules

  5.23  It must be clearly and widely understood and agreed that all States Parties of the NPT and other international legal instruments must abide by their legally-binding obligations. There need to be meaningful and valuable incentives for all states which do so, complemented by robust and swift costs imposed on those states which do not. Establishing agreement on this needs to be a key outcome of the NPT Review Conference in 2010. Bringing other states with us in this direction is clearly vital. We need to build a common understanding of where the main threats lie and the best way to tackle them.

  5.24  Consultations on proliferation issues among P5 representatives in the Security Council help build common understandings and pave the way to greater unity at times of crises. Despite the challenges of pressure of other work and differences of approach among the P5, we would like to see these become more regular and to include looking ahead, to anticipate and as far as possible to head off emerging proliferation threats.

  5.25  Since the international response to the nuclear weapons programme in North Korea and to Iran's breach of IAEA safeguards has been addressed extensively in other recent submissions by the FCO to the Foreign Affairs Committee, the following offers only an overview and update on both issues. It also briefly addresses the situations in Syria and Libya.


  5.26  The UK Government considers that it is vital that the international community remains united in order to compel Iran to come clean about the past, present and future ambitions for its nuclear programme. The UK does not deny Iran its rights to civil nuclear power under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in fact has made a generous offer including help to develop this. But we and the international community are concerned that Iran hid aspects of its programme for two decades and continues its proliferation sensitive activities, such as uranium enrichment, despite the lack of any convincing civilian use. As successive IAEA reports have made clear, Iran refuses to answer key questions concerning possible military aspects of its programme. Unless Iran can be deterred from continuing its proliferation-sensitive activities until such time that trust has been restored, there are concerns that other states in the region may feel that they need to respond to the risk of Iran armed with a nuclear weapon. There is a further danger that Iran's actions will undermine the wider counter-proliferation architecture.

  5.27  Iran's consistent failure to abide by its commitments and to stop all enrichment-related activities has led directly to a series of UN Security Council Resolutions, most recently 1835 of 27 September 2008, including three resolutions (1737, 1747 and 1803) imposing sanctions on Iran. At the same time, the E3+3 (the UK, France, Germany, the US, Russia and China) have been pursuing a dual-track strategy of sanctions to press Iran to comply with its obligations and dialogue to persuade Iran to change its path. The E3+3 have consistently stated that they are not seeking to deny Iran its right to civil nuclear power and in their June 2006 proposal to Iran they have included help with developing a modern nuclear power programme. Javier Solana subsequently handed over a revised proposal in Tehran on 14 June. Solana met the Iranians again on 19 July in Geneva. Iran's non-committal replies to these efforts to seek a diplomatic solution have been disappointing. Meanwhile it continues to develop its uranium enrichment capability at increasing speed. Diplomatic efforts to find a way forward continue. But the leaders of Iran need to understand that they have a choice: further defiance leading to increasing confrontation and economic and political isolation, or acceptance of the E3+3's latest generous offer of June 2008 leading to a transformed relationship with the international community.

  5.28  EU Member States have sought to implement UNSCR 1803 through the adoption of a revised Common Position on 8 August 2008 and an EC Regulation currently being finalised. The new Common Position reinforces financial vigilance, extends the EU ban on certain dual-use goods, includes provisions for carrying out cargo inspections on Iranian shipping lines and calls for restraint in export credits for Iran.

  5.29  The Director General of the IAEA issued his latest report on Iran on 15 September. As he did in his May report, the Director General reported that Iran has continued to fail to answer the IAEA's questions relating to studies with a military dimension, which he notes are of "serious concern". This was followed up by a new UN Security Council Resolution 1835, unanimously adopted on 27 September, which reaffirmed the call on Iran to comply with its international obligations. The Foreign Secretary welcomed the resolution, emphasizing that it "is designed to send a very particular signal … that our resolve has not weakened on this issue … and that a very clear message needs to go out around the world that the two-track policy—of engagement on the one hand, including on economic and scientific matters, but also sanctions in the face of Iranian defiance of the UN and the IAEA inspectors—remains very much in play and it's important that the unity that does exist about this issue is not clouded."

  5.30  Iran needs to establish, in an open and transparent manner, that its ambitions are, as it claims, entirely peaceful and to suspend uranium enrichment. Once that has been achieved we will be able to forge a more productive and positive relationship between Iran and the international community. Until it is achieved, we will seek to increase the international pressure on Iran.

North Korea

  5.31  The DPRK's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programmes are the most immediate threat to security in the region. Besides the potential threat to the DPRK's neighbours and the wider risk from onward proliferation, an unchecked DPRK nuclear programme would undermine global non-proliferation norms weakening our ability to counter proliferation elsewhere.

  5.32  By conducting a nuclear test in 2006, North Korea contravened its international legal obligations under Article II of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, whereby it undertook not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. The UK recognises the sovereign right of every state to withdraw from its Treaty obligations. However, this withdrawal must take place within the requirements of the Treaty (Article X in the case of the NPT). We do not believe that the DPRK has fulfilled these obligations. We continue, therefore, to regard it as a State Party, bound by the provisions of the Treaty.

  5.33  On 3 October 2007, in return for political and financial concessions from the other parties to the Six Party Talks (US, Japan, China, Republic of Korea, and Russia), the DPRK agreed to disable its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon and to make a declaration of its nuclear programmes. Although the North Koreans missed the original deadline of 31 December 2007 for the declaration, they finally produced it on 26 June 2008. In a symbolic gesture, the cooling tower at Yongbyon was destroyed on the 27 June in front of the media. In return for the declaration, the US has instigated the procedure necessary to remove the DPRK from the Trading with the Enemy Act, and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List.

  5.34  But Washington has made clear that sanctions can be re-imposed, depending on satisfactory verification and on the DPRK's actions and that it would not take the final steps in this process until arrangements to verify the DPRK's declaration were agreed. When no such agreement was reached, and the US therefore refused to take the final delisting step, the DPRK retaliated by suspending the removal of spent fuel from the Yongbyon reactor that had hitherto been taking place and have started to restore some facilities, had IAEA staff remove the seals within the fuel reprocessing plant and barred access to the plant by the IAEA and US monitoring teams. The focus now is on trying to find a way forward out of this impasse.

  5.35  There are concerns that the DPRK is being allowed to move towards normalisation while falling short of the "complete and correct" declaration promised last October. But the deal is a compromise in order to pursue the central goal of dismantling the DPRK's plutonium production capability and removing their existing plutonium stockpile, based on an assessment that any past HEU programme is probably defunct, and that extracting an accurate account of past DPRK proliferation activities and clandestine programmes is less important than depriving them of the fissile material which we know they have actually produced.

  5.36  The next phase will involve the DPRK giving up its plutonium stockpile in exchange for normalised relations with the US—and this will demand unprecedented levels of trust on both sides, and robust and intrusive verification arrangements inside the DPRK.

  5.37  While not a member of the Six Party Talks, the UK strongly supports the process. We remain in touch with all the parties, urging the North Koreans to fulfil their obligations, and encouraging the Chinese (including through the EU) to keep up their pressure on the DPRK. We also continue to urge DPRK to adhere to UN Security Council Resolutions 1695 and 1718. We will consider seriously any request for UK practical assistance. At the same time, we continue to keep close to partners about any requirements that are beyond the IAEA's remit, including possible future dismantling of weapons. We are working closely with EU partners to maintain support for the Six Party Talks and to keep up international pressure on human rights in DPRK.


  5.38  In April, the CIA presented compelling evidence to Congress and the media on clandestine Syrian activity to build a nuclear reactor with North Korean help (the Israeli Airforce destroyed the site in September 2007). From 22-24 June an IAEA team inspected the Al Kibar site and had meetings in Damascus with the Syrian Government. In his opening statement to the IAEA Board of Governors in September, the Director-General said that samples taken from the site are still being analysed but so far no indication of any nuclear material had been found. In order to assess the veracity of information available to the IAEA, they asked the Syrian authorities in July to provide access to additional information and locations. Syria has not yet responded to this request but has indicated that any further developments would depend on the results of the samples taken during the first visit. The Director General encouraged Syria to show maximum cooperation and transparency and to provide all the information needed by the Agency to complete its assessment. It is clearly vital that the IAEA should be able to verify that Syria has remained compliant with its legally binding obligations as a State Party to the NPT and not broken UNSCR 1718.


  5.39  The example of Libya demonstrates what can be achieved by concerted joint diplomatic efforts. In December 2003, Libya announced that it intended to give up its covert WMD programmes including a covert nuclear weapons programme and to restrict its ballistic missile programmes. This followed nine months of secret discussions between Libya, the UK, and the US and was followed in 2004 by a further period of intense tripartite work, now with IAEA and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) involvement as well, to make sure the Libyan decision was implemented and met with due recognition. As a result, Libya has seen genuine benefits including the lifting of EU sanctions and the US removing Libya from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list. Both decisions have enabled redevelopment of political, commercial, scientific and technical contact. We are currently funding a Strategic Programme Fund project to assist Libyan former nuclear weapons specialists to establish new and sustainable business streams based on the nuclear facilities at Tajura. This process has also led to the Libyan accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which is leading to the conversion of its chemical weapons production facility into a pharmaceutical plant which will manufacture drugs for Africa On 24 September, the IAEA Board adopted a resolution (co-sponsored by the UK) highlighting Libya as a model of co-operation and transparency and supporting the recommendation of the Director-General to implement safeguards in Libya as a routine matter.

Working to bring the remaining three states into the NPT

  5.40  We are committed, including through the EU Strategy Against Proliferation Of Weapons Of Mass Destruction, to the universalisation of multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements. Together with our European Union partners, we have carried out extensive lobbying activity to secure adherence by all states to key non-proliferation agreements, particularly the NPT and in the meantime, we are working to bring them closer to conformity with its rules.


  5.41  The EU Common Position and UNSCR 1172 call on India and Pakistan to accede to the NPT as Non-Nuclear Weapons States without conditions and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). That is and remains the basis of the UK Government's position. At the same time, we are working to draw India into the broader non-proliferation framework. Hence we have actively supported the US/India Civil Nuclear Initiative in the context of which India has agreed to put its civil nuclear facilities and material under safeguards and to make a number of important non-proliferation commitments. This initiative involved the negotiation and approval of a new India/IAEA safeguards agreement (achieved in August 2008) and an exemption by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to its Guidelines to allow civil nuclear exports to India.

  5.42  A number of NSG Participating Governments, as well as UK domestic commentators, had concerns over the implications of the Initiative for the international non-proliferation regime. The UK worked hard in the NSG for consensus on key issues such as the provisions for a review mechanism, making clear that the NSG would regularly discuss all matters relating to the implementation of the decision, and undertake urgent consultations if circumstances required; and how to handle the issue of the export of enrichment and reprocessing technology (any such exports would remain subject to the relevant provisions of the NSG Guidelines).

  5.43  In a statement by its Foreign Minister on 5 September (a copy is at Annex 3), India reiterated its "long-standing, steadfast commitment to the universal, non-discriminatory and total elimination of all nuclear weapons", to maintain its voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing, to the conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, to an effective and comprehensive system of national export controls and all necessary steps to secure its nuclear materials and technology, and to sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol with the IAEA with respect to India's civil nuclear facilities.

  5.44  The Foreign Secretary warmly welcomed the NSG agreement on 6 September: "We believe it will make a significant contribution to energy and climate security, as well as developmental and economic objectives, for India and the International Community. India's clear commitment to a voluntary unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing is also important. Today's result represents a gain for the non-proliferation regime by bringing India further into the broader non-proliferation framework, a framework the UK firmly supports."

  5.45  We look forward to building on our engagement with India on a full range of non-proliferation and arms control issues. We believe the agreement between the US and India will have a positive impact on the broader nuclear non-proliferation framework. We remain committed to the objective of universal NPT adherence, but recognise this is a long-term objective.


  5.46  Pakistan's strategic posture, including nuclear, is clearly framed around its perception of the threat from India. We are working to reduce the risk of a nuclear conflict between Pakistan and India by supporting Indo-Pakistan rapprochement, including through the Composite Dialogue, and encouraging dialogue and trust building initiatives.

  5.47  We continue to pursue our long-term objective, which is for Pakistan to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. In the shorter term, we are looking for ways in which we can ensure Pakistan aligns itself more closely with NPT principles. In particular, we continue to argue that it is in Pakistan's interests to agree to start negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (see below) in the Conference on Disarmament without preconditions.

  5.48  We want to work with Pakistan and others (possibly using the offices of the IAEA) to improve civil nuclear security and to encourage Pakistan's continuing active participation in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. We also need to work to ensure that any civil nuclear power new-builds are put under safeguards alongside existing facilities and that more nuclear power does not result in an increased proliferation risk. A Civil Nuclear Initiative with Pakistan on the lines of that agreed with India is not under consideration, particularly given concerns over the AQ Khan clandestine supply network.


  5.49  Israel has never admitted to having nuclear weapons but there is a widespread assumption that it does. Its neighbours believe Israel should renounce such weapons by acceding forthwith to the NPT (which it can only do as a non-nuclear-weapon State) and to a Middle East Zone Free of WMD (which the UK has actively supported, see below). Led by Egypt, they regularly seek to highlight this issue at international gatherings, in particular at NPT Preparatory Committees and Review Conferences. Israel, for its part, while never wholly rejecting the possibility of eventually acceding to the NPT, has made it clear that it will not do so before a comprehensive peace settlement is in place.

  5.50  The UK has consistently urged Israel to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state, and to sign a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Under such an agreement, Israel's nuclear facilities would be subject to regular inspection to detect any diversion of nuclear materials for weapons production.

Supporting Nuclear and WMD-free zones

  5.51  The UK remains fully committed to the negative security assurances we gave to the Non-Nuclear Weapon States Parties to the NPT in our 1995 letter to the UN Secretary General, subsequently noted in United Nations Security Council Resolution 984. These assurances state that the UK will not use nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear States Parties to the NPT, except in the case of attack on the UK, or its allies, carried out by such a state in alliance with a nuclear weapon state.

  5.52  We believe that the most appropriate way to give further effect to the stated desire of the Non-Nuclear Weapon States for treaty-based security assurances is to make further progress with Nuclear Weapons Free Zones. This will provide credible, regional, internationally binding legal instruments on negative security assurances, which many are looking for. The UK has achieved this through our ratification of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Tlatelolco (Latin America and Caribbean), Raratonga (South Pacific) and Pelindaba (Africa—not yet in force) establishing nuclear weapon-free zones in those particular regions and has, as a consequence, granted treaty-based negative security assurances to almost 100 countries.

  5.53  We are keen to help resolve outstanding differences that will enable the Nuclear Weapons States to sign protocols to the Treaties of Bangkok (South East Asia) and Semipalatinsk (Central Asia) and thereby bring into force the South-East Asia and Central Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones.

  5.54  The UK Government fully supports the principle of establishing a Middle East Zone free from all weapons of mass destruction. We co-sponsored the resolution on the Middle East, which called for the establishment of a Middle East Zone free from Weapons of Mass Destruction, at the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference and have consistently supported similar resolutions at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. But we also recognise that the achievement of a MEWMDFZ is unlikely in the absence of a comprehensive regional peace settlement in which Israel is recognised by all its neighbours. It will also require confidence in Iran's compliance with all its treaty and other international non-proliferation obligations: the unanimously adopted UN Security Council Resolution 1747 recalled that a solution to the Iran nuclear issue would contribute towards the objective of a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction.


  6.1  The UK is committed to working towards the ultimate goal of a world free from nuclear weapons. The UK Government does not regard this as simply a theoretical obligation under Article VI of the NPT; rather, it is a legally-binding obligation which we must strive to achieve as soon as practically possible. However, regrettably, the conditions for total nuclear disarmament do not exist today. Hence the Government's decision to retain our ability to have an independent nuclear deterrent beyond the 2020s. The continuing risk from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the likelihood that a number of other countries will still have substantial nuclear arsenals, mean that our minimum nuclear deterrent capability, currently represented by Trident, remains a necessary element of our security although, as described below, we have been able to further reduce this minimum capability.

  6.2  But we remain absolutely committed to working actively to create the conditions under which a nuclear weapons free world can be achieved and to moving more decisively towards it. We want to see a renewed political determination to that goal.

  6.3  While there is no conditionality between progress on disarmament and non-proliferation, progress on one reinforces the other and the disarmament obligations enshrined in Article VI of the NPT are a vital element of the global nuclear arms control regime. To build and sustain international consensus for non-proliferation, we need to ensure progress on the interests of all parties. We have to recognise that, despite the substantial reductions made in nuclear arsenals since the Cold War, there is nevertheless a widespread perception by many states that the five recognized Nuclear Weapons States are not living up to their obligations under Article VI to pursue nuclear disarmament, in part because of the absence of a clear forward plan. Renewing the credibility of this commitment will be critical to reinvigorating the commitment of Non-Nuclear Weapons States to essential WMD counter-proliferation measures.

  6.4  UK action to take forward nuclear disarmament lies primarily in four areas:

    (i) Reductions in existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons;

    (ii) UK technical work as a "Disarmament Laboratory";

    (iii) P5 discussions;

    (iv) At a global level: the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

(i)  Reductions in nuclear weapons

  6.5  The UK has made significant progress in respect to its disarmament obligations as set out in Article VI of the NPT. Since the end of the Cold War we have:

    (i) withdrawn and dismantled our maritime tactical nuclear capability and the RAF's WE177 freefall bomb;

    (ii) significantly reduced the operational status of our nuclear weapons system. Normally, only one Trident submarine is on deterrent patrol at any one time. It has a maximum of 48 warheads on board, and is normally at several days "notice to fire". Its missiles are not targeted at any country;

    (iii) now met the commitment outlined in the 2006 White Paper on the future of the United Kingdom nuclear deterrent to reduce the number of operationally available warheads to fewer than 160. The explosive power of our nuclear arsenal has been reduced by 75% since the end of the cold war;

    (iv) not conducted a nuclear test explosion since 1991. We ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1998;

    (v) ceased production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and increased our transparency with regard to our fissile material holdings. We have produced historical records of our defence holdings of both plutonium and highly enriched uranium.

  6.6  The UK holds only a small fraction of the global stockpile of nuclear warheads. Our consistent position remains that when it will be useful to include these in any negotiations to reduce warhead numbers, we will willingly do so.

  6.7  The US has similarly reduced its total arsenal by over a half since the Cold War. It plans a further reduction of 15% by 2012. This brings its stockpile to less than one quarter of its Cold War high, the lowest level for 50 years. France, before Easter, announced its intention to cut its arsenal to below 300 warheads. Russia too has made significant reductions under START. Overall, over 40,000 nuclear warheads have been destroyed by the US and Russia since the end of the Cold War.

  6.8  But further urgent steps to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons are essential. The US and Russia retain some 95% of the total. START, the mainstay of their bilateral arms control effort, will expire in 2009. We welcome their commitment to work for a successor agreement, and hope that this will achieve greater reductions to come, going beyond the reductions already agreed in the 2002 Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions. We will continue to work closely with the US Administration, current and future, to strengthen US confidence in the international rules-based system and commitment to multilateral action.

(ii)  The UK as a "Disarmament Laboratory"

  6.9  In parallel, we are undertaking analysis, as a "disarmament laboratory", of what the commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons means in practice. We want the UK to act as a role model and testing ground for measures on disarmament, to determine the requirements for verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons, enabling us all to have confidence that when a state says it has fully and irrevocably dismantled a warhead, we can all be assured it has. We want to help clarify what verification and enforcement regimes may be necessary to enable the practical attainment of that goal without creating new instabilities.

  6.10  Whilst acknowledging that verification of multilateral nuclear disarmament is a political as well as technical issue, the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) is developing technical expertise in this area. It has also undertaken a cooperation initiative with several Norwegian defence laboratories, which is already providing valuable insights into how future multilateral discussions might proceed at a technical level. The challenge is to develop technologies which strike the right balance between protecting security and proliferation considerations and at the same time providing sufficient international access and verification. The sensitivities in verifying the dismantlement of warheads are considerable. Access to nuclear warheads is tightly restricted—for good reasons. Not only are national security concerns at stake, but the NPT itself prohibits any transfer of information relating to nuclear weapon design. The AWE reports its latest conclusions to the international community at meetings of the parties to the NPT.

(iii)  P5 discussions

  6.11  We must continue to foster greater confidence and build relationships on a number of levels, both political and technical, between the five Nuclear Weapons States. In February 2008, the Secretary of State for Defence proposed a conference of the P5 nuclear weapons laboratories to discuss the issues on verifying nuclear disarmament. Discussions on the scope and format of this conference are moving forward with P5 colleagues.

  6.12  We also want to engage the other members of the P5 in deepening our discussions on transparency and confidence building measures (CBMs) to promote greater trust and confidence as a catalyst for further reductions, without undermining the credibility of existing nuclear deterrents. We co-sponsored a report by the International Institute of Strategic Studies on the practical steps required for the elimination of nuclear weapons which has recently been published. This work has been valuable in identifying a wide range of issues, both of a practical and a policy nature, which will need to resolved if the goal of a nuclear weapons free world is to be realised. Discussion of these and other issues amongst the Nuclear Weapons States needs to begin.

(iv)  Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)

  6.13  The UK continues, in good faith, to pursue multilateral negotiations toward disarmament within the NPT and other disarmament fora. At the global level, the next key steps towards a nuclear weapons free world are already clear: early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the start of negotiations, without preconditions, on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).

  6.14  The entry into force of the CTBT would constrain the development of new types of nuclear weapons and would therefore represent an important step towards global disarmament. The UK and France were the first Nuclear Weapons States to ratify the CTBT and we are working for its entry into force at the earliest possible date. On 24 September, a CTBT Ministerial Meeting was held in New York to reaffirm commitment to the CTBT and to promote its entry into force; Dr Howells made a statement to underline the UK's support. Following the adoption of its third Joint Action in support of the CTBT's international monitoring system, the EU also plan a new round of diplomatic demarches to promote entry into force. Both US Presidential candidates have indicated readiness to take forward the US debate on CTBT ratification, and this is something on which we will seek to build.

  6.15  In the meantime, the UK is committed to furthering the development of the CTBT's verification regime, including completion of the international monitoring system, in support of which the EU has recently adopted a third Joint Action. The CTBTO Provisional Technical Secretariat ran a major on-site inspection exercise in Kazakhstan at the former Soviet nuclear test site from 27 August to 30 September; UK experts from AWE Aldermaston, University of Keele and the FCO participated.

  6.16  In addition to the CTBT, a key priority remains the negotiation of a treaty banning the future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, an FMCT. This is an essential step towards the global elimination of nuclear weapons. The start of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament remains blocked. We continue to argue forcefully that allowing negotiations to begin does not undermine any country's position on a final treaty. We have been very active at high levels in making the case to reluctant states that it is in their interests to enable the negotiations to go ahead without preconditions.

  6.17  The UK is legally entitled to hold stocks of nuclear materials needed for national security outside international safeguards. But we have declared details of the size of these stocks and placed those not required for national security under EURATOM safeguards and made them liable for inspection by the IAEA. All planned future reprocessing and enrichment in the UK will take place under international safeguards. In the Strategic Defence Review in 1998, we announced that we would forego our right as a recognized Nuclear Weapons State to withdraw fissile material from these safeguarded stocks, except for small quantities of material unsuitable for weapons purposes (and this would be made public).


  7.1  We remain absolutely committed to upholding the inalienable right of all States Party to the NPT under Article IV to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty and the relevant principles on safeguards. We are working to create a viable regime of nuclear fuel assurances under IAEA auspices to guarantee supply of nuclear fuel to reinforce that right.

  7.2  Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in civil nuclear power across the globe for sound economic, energy and security reasons. Nuclear power can make a significant contribution to meeting commitments to mitigate damaging climate change whilst at the same time meeting increasing demands on energy supplies. Although there is limited proliferation concern over States running nuclear reactors, there are proliferation risks in attempting to master the entire fuel cycle, in particular enrichment and reprocessing. These technologies could be misused to produce materials suitable for weapons.

  7.3  In order to provide attractive and secure alternatives to States contemplating going down the route of developing their own fuel cycle technologies, and thereby mitigate the above proliferation risks, some in the international community have begun to develop initiatives whereby security and assurance of supply of the relevant fuel products would be guaranteed.

  7.4  In 2005, and with the Director-General taking a lead, the IAEA published a report that looked at the proliferation risks of a growth in civil nuclear power. A subsequent report in 2007 set out 3 main approaches that would help minimise the proliferation risks but improve assurance of supply. These approaches are:

    (i) the reinforcement of existing market mechanisms;

    (ii) involvement of governments and the IAEA in the assurance of supply, including the establishment of low-enriched uranium stocks as reserves;

    (iii) conversion of existing national uranium enrichment and reprocessing enterprises into multilateral ones under international management and control, and setting up new multilateral enterprises on regional and international levels.

  7.5  We welcome the work of the IAEA on multilateral approaches to address this challenge. Such an approach would support implementation of the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a safe and secure fashion, preserve the existing competitive open market, respond to the real needs of recipient countries and simultaneously strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

  7.6  HMG's work in this area continues to expand. The UK and our Urenco partners Germany and the Netherlands co-hosted a conference in Berlin in April 2008 to follow-up on our joint declaration entitled "Multilateral Cooperation in Energy Security". 35 countries were represented, including both countries considering civil nuclear power for the first time and those which supply nuclear fuel and enrichment services, to discuss the practical implementation of Article IV of the NPT. We intend to use the major international conference in London (the date is yet to be confirmed but is likely to be early 2009) announced by the Prime Minister in Parliament on 19 March to take this work forward. We are now working on the scope, timing and objectives of the conference.

  7.7  One of the key challenges we face is to secure agreement from NAM states which have been sceptical of these proposals and the EU is looking at ways in which it can assist. Many see them as an attempt to maintain the current supplier monopoly or as violating their rights under Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to the peaceful exploitation of nuclear technology. We need to reassure them that these proposals are in fact intended as affirming their Article IV rights rather than undermining them.

Nuclear Fuel Cycle proposals

  7.8  A number of proposals addressing the issue of the nuclear fuel cycle are already on the table. Many are complementary rather than in direct competition. We aim to develop a viable regime of proposals that will support States' rights to the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear technology. We anticipate this will draw on a number of the initiatives that have been put forward. The four main sets of ideas currently under discussion are:

(i)  Enriched Uranium Reserves/Fuel Bank

  7.9  Proposals from the US, Russia and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (an influential US NGO) would create stockpiles of nuclear fuel under IAEA control (though the host country would still exercise control over the release of the fuel). Such stocks would be drawn down if the commercial market failed to deliver for other than commercial or non-proliferation reasons. This is instinctively attractive to many in the international community. We recognise that an international nuclear fuel bank has the potential to offer genuine benefits in terms of energy security and reduced proliferation risks. Challenges which will need to be addressed include the costs (a typical reactor takes 100 tonnes of low enriched fuel whose raw value, without fabrication into fuel rods, is around US$ 20 Million at current rates); coping with demands for fuel for any type of reactor, all of which require different enrichment levels; where the reserve would be situated; how national legal issues would be resolved; and who would be responsible for security.

(ii)  Multinational Enrichment Facilities

  7.10  This German proposal involves the concept of ceding land to the IAEA on which to build a new fuel-cycle facility. Likewise this is instinctively attractive but with some practical difficulties. Such a facility would only be justifiable from a proliferation perspective if the region in which it sits has sufficient nuclear power stations to use the output of the centre. Further discussion is needed to clarify who would operate the plant and how the staff would be selected so that they do not present an additional proliferation risk, and what would be the impact on the commercial market of the operation of the centre.

(iii)  Global Nuclear Energy Programme (GNEP)

  7.11  This US proposal seeks to develop new technologies to provide proliferation-resistant nuclear power. It also contains aspects of fuel assurances through the concept of fuel leasing and take-back. Its intention to limit developing states to yet-to-be-developed proliferation-resistant reactor technology is questioned by some NAM states. But it has attracted positive engagement from both well-established civil nuclear power countries (including the UK—we joined earlier this year—the other P5, Japan, South Korea) as well as some states aspiring to develop civil nuclear power industries. Some 21 partner States have now signed up to the GNEP principles. The Programme has the potential to draw together experts who are able to discuss and identify ways forward in a cooperative manner which other forums, such as the IAEA, would find difficult in this potentially contentious area.

(iv)  Enrichment Bond

  7.12  This UK proposal is intended as a key component in any international agreed regime of nuclear fuel assurances. As such we do not see it as the sole proposal to be adopted, but as one of several different proposals that would complement each other. For example, the Enrichment Bond could be adopted in the short term while others, such as the German proposal, are likely to take longer before they become practical realities.

  7.13  The idea is based on assurance of supply and relies on the commercial market to continue to provide the actual fuel and enrichment, but backs this with a "bond" between the supplier state and the customer state, overseen by the IAEA. This "bond" would guarantee the supply of fuel services if the Customer State had its normal commercial supplies withheld for other than commercial or non-proliferation reasons. The customer would still be expected to pay the commercial going rate for its fuel under the "bond". This approach does not need any physical buffer, costs of set up are minimal and, with the IAEA acting as the Guarantor, the international community should have confidence in the "bonds". Any other supplier state could also offer equivalent "bonds"; this would be beneficial in both sharing the risks and increasing confidence in the supply market. States are not asked to explicitly forego developing indigenous enrichment capabilities, although the Bond provides an economic and proliferation incentive not to do so and the Supplier State(s) can choose which State they sign a bond with.

  7.14  We are engaging with potential recipient and supplier states to develop the proposal further. We will also be working on the legal framework within which the enrichment bond will operate. We aim to have this in place soon and to have at least one recipient State signed up to the Bond by the 2010 NPT Review Conference. We have asked many NAM States for their views on the proposal. The feedback so far has been mostly positive with many key NAM states expressing their interest to know more about the proposal.

Memoranda of Understanding

  7.15  At the same time as pursuing the Enrichment Bond proposal, we have also been working bilaterally with states such as the UAE and Jordan in support of their plans for civil nuclear energy, which they hope will meet their domestic energy needs. The UAE announced plans to develop a civil nuclear programme on 20 April 2008. The announcement emphasised UAE's intention to be transparent and committed to safety and full compliance with IAEA obligations and international co-operation. Domestic enrichment and re-processing has been specifically forsworn and the UAE have additionally said that they will adopt the Additional Protocol and the Convention on Nuclear Safety, Spent Fuel Management and the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. We hope the UAE will provide a model for countries embarking responsibly on the civil nuclear path. A final UAE decision is likely in mid-2009, but in the meantime a UK-UAE MOU was signed by Lord Digby Jones during his visit to the UAE on 15 May in support of the UAE's goal of developing civil nuclear power.

  7.16  A similar agreement was signed with Jordan on 29 June. Jordan has a solid non-proliferation record having implemented the Additional Protocol and signed up to the full range of relevant international agreements. Jordan signed up to the US led Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) shortly after signing a civil-nuclear agreement with the US in September 2007. The GNEP principles include long term commitments to promote the development of more proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors and the responsible disposal of nuclear waste. Given Jordan's clear commitment to non-proliferation the UK Government is working closely with the private sector to support all aspects of Jordan's development of nuclear civil power, in line with existing international obligations.

  7.17  A number of other Middle Eastern countries are interested in developing civil nuclear energy plants in the near future. These include Egypt (2018), Turkey (2015), Morocco (2017), and Saudi Arabia (which have signed an MOU on civil-nuclear cooperation with the US).


The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

  8.1  The CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997. It bans the development, production, stockpiling and the use of chemical weapons, and requires the destruction of existing stockpiles by no later than 29 April 2012. It has a rigorous verification and inspection regime, thus making it the first multilateral disarmament agreement that aims to ban an entire category of WMD in a verifiable manner.

  8.2  184 states have acceded to the CWC, with only 11 remaining outside (Angola, Barbados, Burma, DPRK, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Somalia and Syria). One-third of the 8.6 million chemical munitions and containers covered by the Convention and one-third of the world's declared stockpile of approximately 71,000 metric tonnes of chemical agent have been verifiably destroyed. Since the CWC entered into force, two States have completed destruction of their entire CW stockpile; a further four States are following agreed destruction plans.

  8.3  The UK is strongly committed to the Chemical Weapons Convention and to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and attaches the utmost importance to the full implementation of the CWC. Since entry into force in 1997, the UK has played a full and active role in the CWC's policy and decision-making bodies within the OPCW. The Second Review Conference took place in April 2008 and agreed a comprehensive final document reaffirming the strong commitment of all States Parties to achieve universality, complete the destruction of chemical weapons, further strengthen verification measures to ensure non-proliferation, provide assistance and protection, and promote the uses of chemistry for peaceful purposes.

  8.4  UK priorities include the promotion of universality and the full and effective national implementation of all the Convention's provisions. The UK works bilaterally and with the EU and other partners to coordinate diplomatic activity, such as lobbying all States not yet party to sign and ratify the Convention as soon as possible, and implementation assistance efforts. Bilateral assistance has included the provision of National Authority training courses, contributions to the OPCW's "Associate Programme", support for Protection Assistance courses (against the use of chemical weapons), and support to the OPCW's verification activities, including the Challenge Inspection mechanism.

  8.5  We are also committed to providing practical assistance where possible to help States meet their obligations to complete the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, for example, by providing assistance to Russia's destruction programme through the Global Partnership. We have also provided technical advice to Libya and have participated in workshops organized by the OPCW to assist Iraq's preparations for CWC accession.

  8.6  The UK is also involved in outreach to other stakeholders, including business, academia and NGOs. A CWC National Authority Advisory Committee created in 1997 advises Ministers on the actions taken by the National Authority (BERR) to ensure UK compliance with the CWC and the Chemical Weapons Act. The UK is also conducting a series of outreach seminars to regional universities to raise awareness of the CWC and of potential dual-use issues.

  8.7  The CWC's forthcoming challenges include securing consensus on the future priorities of the OPCW once all declared stockpiles have been destroyed; addressing the potential failure by one or more State Party to fully comply with the 2012 deadline, ensuring that the CWC remains relevant in the face of scientific and technological advances and is able to respond to new challenges including that of terrorism, and making progress towards universalisation. The UK is engaged in detailed discussions with partners and the OPCW on ways to address these challenges.

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)

  8.8  The BTWC, which entered into force in 1975, bans the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention or transfer of biological and toxin weapons. Upon ratification or accession, each State Party "undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after entry into force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery…which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control…". Unlike the CWC, there are no declared stockpiles of biological weapons, and the BTWC has no effective provisions to verify compliance. The dual-use nature of virtually all the know-how, materials and equipment used in biological weapons means that identifying and agreeing workable and acceptable verification and compliance measures for biological arms control is fraught with formidable intellectual, scientific and political problems. Between 1995 and 2001 an Ad Hoc Group of States Parties attempted to negotiate a draft verification Protocol but was unable to reach consensus on a text. Since then UK efforts have focused on identifying and implementing other measures to strengthen the BTWC.

  8.9  The UK believes that international cooperation in the framework of the BTWC is key to defeating the threat from biological weapons, and we are committed to strengthening the BTWC. The Intersessional Work Programme 2007-10, agreed at the Sixth BTWC Review Conference in December 2006, is advancing work on agreed topics such as national implementation (2007), biosafety and biosecurity, awareness-raising, education, oversight of science, and codes of conduct (2008), capacity building in the fields of disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and containment of infectious diseases (2009) and assistance in cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons (2010). The UK promotes discussion, common agreements and the sharing of best practice on these topics through the contribution of working papers and active participation in BTWC and other meetings.

  8.10  The UK (not least as one of the three depositories of the Convention) also continues to play an active role in promoting the universality of the BTWC. The UAE acceded to the BTWC in June, bringing the number of States Parties to 162 (the seventh accession since the 6th Review Conference in December 2006). Despite this steady progress, the BTWC remains significantly behind the CWC, so promoting universal adherence and effective national implementation remain key UK priorities (notable non-ratifiers include Israel, Egypt, Syria and Burma). The UK works bilaterally and with the EU and other partners to coordinate diplomatic action and assistance activities in these areas. Current FCO-funded activity is focused on legislative analysis and assistance to states which do not have comprehensive national implementing measures in place (a multi-year project worth £623,000 delivered through the Verification Research and Information Centre—VERTIC) and support to the Bio Weapons Prevention Project to develop a strategy to promote universal adherence to the BTWC. Through the EU we are supporting a Joint Action in support of WHO activities on laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, and Joint Action assistance in the areas of Confidence Building Measures, and support to the Intersessional work programme, as well as ongoing activity in support of universality and national implementation.

  8.11  Scientific and technological advances in the life sciences, increasing international cooperation in research, public health, agriculture and the pharmaceutical and biotechnological industries, and the availability of knowledge through the internet bring huge benefits. But the wider dissemination of knowledge and skills in dual-use scientific applications also increase the potential for their misuse in biological weapons. We therefore monitor advances in such technologies and assess their implications to raise awareness among the scientific and research communities of their ethical and legal obligations. Since 2003 the UK has held five BTWC related seminars for academics, research councils, professional and trade organisations, and the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. The most recent event took place in March 2008 and was devoted primarily to oversight, education and awareness-raising.

Australia Group

  8.12  The Australia Group (AG) is an informal forum of countries which, through the harmonisation of export controls, seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons. Coordination of national export control measures assists Australia Group participants to fulfil their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to the fullest extent possible. At the annual Plenary meeting in April, there was considerable interest in the UK's presentation on the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) and in a UK proposal to enhance Australia Group industry outreach. The Ministry of Defence are pursuing the outreach initiative.


Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD)

  9.1  In the coming years, it is likely that a small number of states will further develop their ballistic missiles, improving their range, accuracy and also their supporting infrastructure. In particular, both Iran and North Korea continue to develop their ballistic missile capabilities and both may have the capability to strike Europe within the next 20 years. There were some 100 non-US ballistic missiles launches around the world in 2007, some 30% more than the previous year, reflecting the determination of many countries to acquire and develop ballistic missile capabilities.

  9.2  In the light of this potential threat, in 2002 NATO Heads of State and Government commissioned a Missile Defence Feasibility Study to examine options for protecting Alliance territory, forces and population centres against all ranges of missile threats. The study was completed in 2006 and further work, examining the political and military implications of acquiring missile defence for the Alliance, was requested at the NATO Riga Summit in November 2006.

  9.3  Separately, in February 2007, the US announced that it intended to begin formal negotiations to place missile defence assets in Poland (interceptor missiles, which will be manned and operated by a garrison of US military personnel) and the Czech Republic (radar facilities) which would provide coverage for most of Europe, including the UK, from a limited ballistic missile threat from a country of concern, such as Iran or North Korea. On 19 September, the US and Czech Republic signed a Status of Forces Agreement covering the basing of US troops in the Czech Republic to operate the radar. US negotiations with the Poles are nearing conclusion.

  9.4  The UK Government has welcomed these developments, and the consequent benefits for European security. We are clear that ballistic missile defence is a response to the current proliferation and strategic uncertainty, and not the cause. HMG will continue to support US ballistic missile defence plans, including through the use by the US of facilities in the UK at RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill.

  9.5  At the April 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO leaders recognized that ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies' forces, territory and populations; that missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter this threat; and that the planned deployment of European-based US missile defence assets will make a substantial contribution to the defence of NATO allies. The Summit also agreed a plan of work to: explore ways in which to link the US BMD capability with NATO's missile defence efforts; and tasked NATO to develop a range of options for a missile defence architecture that covers those parts of Alliance territory not otherwise covered by the US system. This work has begun, and it is anticipated that a paper containing recommendations for NATO Ministers will be presented at the 2009 Summit in Strasbourg.

  9.6  Although the US has made clear that its plans to place missile interceptors in Poland and radar in the Czech Republic are not aimed at countering Russian strategic nuclear forces, Russia has reacted adversely, claiming this would upset the existing strategic balance. They have also linked missile defence with a threatened withdrawal from, and the suspension of, their obligations to legally binding treaties.

  9.7  The US missile defence system does not threaten the nuclear strategic balance: a defensive system with ten interceptor missiles cannot undermine an arsenal of many hundreds of missiles, such as that held by Russia. Nevertheless, Russia's concerns have been addressed directly through high level bilateral discussions between the US and Russia. Both sides have suggested a number of practical measures to resolve the concerns which have been raised, in particular: including Russian radar sensors in a joint missile defence architecture; the creation of joint missile defence data exchange centres in Russia and Europe; and the phased activation of the Europe missile defence system, commensurate with the emerging ballistic missile threat from the Middle East.

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

  9.8  The Missile Technology Control Regime is an informal and voluntary association of countries which share the goals of non-proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and which seek to coordinate national export licensing efforts aimed at preventing their proliferation. While concern has traditionally focused on state proliferators, after the tragic events of 11 September 2001 it became evident that more also has to be done to decrease the risk of WMD delivery systems falling into the hands of terrorist groups and individuals. One way to counter this threat is to maintain vigilance over the transfer of missile equipment, material, and related technologies usable for systems capable of delivering WMD.

  9.9  The MTCR rests on adherence to common export policy guidelines applied to an integral common list of controlled items. All decisions are taken by consensus, and MTCR partners regularly exchange information about relevant national export licensing issues. National export licensing measures on these technologies make the task of countries seeking to achieve capability to acquire and produce unmanned means of WMD delivery much more difficult. As a result, many countries, including all MTCR partners, have chosen voluntarily to introduce export licensing measures on rocket and other unmanned air vehicle delivery systems or related equipment, material and technology.

Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)

  9.10  The HCOC is aimed at bolstering efforts to curb ballistic missile proliferation worldwide. It consists of a set of general principles, commitments, and limited confidence-building measures, including annual declarations by each subscribing state on its space and ballistic missile policies and pre-launch notifications. It is intended to supplement, not supplant, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). It was brought into effect in 2002. The UK is one of the original Subscribing States. HMG's objectives in HCOC are to promote the universalisation of the Code by increasing the number of subscribers, and to encourage all members to meet their commitments under the Code. As of July 2008, 130 countries had subscribed to it.


  10.1  Terrorists using WMD or radiological weapons poses a global threat and requires a global response. The UK Government takes extremely seriously the potential threat from terrorists acquiring chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons and we are working actively, across UK Government Departments and agencies and with the international community to take robust and urgent measures to prevent such weapons or their related materials, equipment, technology and expertise falling into the wrong hands.

  10.2  The need to ensure the physical protection of fissile material is central to these efforts. Through substantial financial contributions to the Global Partnership, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the IAEA's nuclear security fund, the UK, in addition to providing high level technical and project management expertise to international partners, has made a long term commitment in helping to address the potential risks associated with proliferation and terrorism issues.

  10.3  Many of the steps set out elsewhere in this paper, to help ensure compliance and to detect non-compliance with NPT and other treaty obligations, such as the work under UN Security Council Resolution 1540, are relevant and form part of a comprehensive strategy to deny WMD to terrorist organizations. But these steps have also been complemented with a number of specific initiatives.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)

  10.4  The GICNT was launched jointly by the US and Russia in July 2006. Twelve initial Partner Nations subsequently agreed a Statement of Principles "to develop partnership capacity to combat nuclear terrorism on a determined and systematic basis." Since then there have been further meetings of a gradually-widening number of subscribers (now over 70) to the Statement of Principles. The focus is on providing help to states which need it to:

    —  ensure the accounting, control and physical protection of nuclear materials and radioactive substances;

    —  detect and suppress illicit trafficking of nuclear materials;

    —  respond to and mitigate consequences of nuclear terrorism;

    —  co-operate in the development of technical means to combat nuclear terrorism;

    —  deny safe haven to terrorists who wish to acquire or use nuclear materials;

    —  strengthen national laws to prosecute and punish terrorists and their supporters.

  10.5  The UK contributes to partner capacity-building efforts through this initiative and others. UK experts attend workshops and seminars on the full range of issues in a bid to raise awareness, share information and advise partners on best practise. The UK also hosts activities and expert events, such as the Anti-Nuclear Smuggling Assistance Workshop in London (September 2007).

INFCIRC 225, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Amendment

  10.6  IAEA recommendations for the physical protection of nuclear material are set out in INFCIRC 225, first published in 1975 and revised four times since then; a fifth revision is currently underway in a Working Group chaired by the Deputy Director of the UK's Office of Civil Nuclear Security. These recommendations reflect a broad consensus among IAEA Member States on the requirements which should be met by systems for the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities.

  10.7  Although many states are obliged under various Conventions and Agreements to take them into account, the IAEA recommendations are not legally binding. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which entered into force in 1987, imposed such legally binding obligations, based on INFCIRC 225. But these apply only to civil nuclear material and only to the standards to be met in the international transport of such material. The Convention does not contain any mechanism for verifying the application of these standards, it being the view of states that responsibility for physical protection within a state rests entirely with that state. The UK is a party.

  10.8  The Amendment to the CPPNM was opened for ratification in July 2005. This will, for the first time, impose a legal obligation to establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework to govern physical protection and to designate an authority to implement the framework. It will come into force when two-thirds of the parties to the original Convention have ratified. The necessary legislation to enable the UK to ratify (contained in the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008) received Royal Assent on 8 May; an Explanatory Memorandum on the Amendment is being prepared and will be laid before Parliament to obtain approval for UK ratification. BERR has the policy lead on this.

International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

  10.9  This Convention entered into force in 7 July 2007. It requires States Parties to make every effort to adopt appropriate measures to ensure the protection of radioactive material. It is principally concerned with identifying a number of terrorist offences relating to attacks involving the use of radioactive material (which it defines as including nuclear material), obliging States Parties to establish these as criminal offences under their national laws, and requiring them to cooperate in preventing the commission of these offences. It also contains provisions for mutual judicial cooperation in the event of such terrorist offences, to help ensure that there is no hiding place for terrorists who use WMD or radiological weapons. The UK has signed the Convention but not yet ratified it. The Home Office has the policy lead for achieving this.

IAEA's Nuclear Security Plan

  10.10  Following 9/11, the IAEA's physical protection activities were brought together into a Nuclear Security Plan (NSP). Activities carried out include the issuing of a range of guidance documents on nuclear security beyond just INFCIRC 225 (the Agency launched a new Nuclear Security Series in 2006); the holding of training courses in nuclear security; encouraging the establishment of Nuclear Security Support Centres in member states; the provision of advisory services to states by the IAEA; the formulation of Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans for individual States to help implement recommendations from the Agency's range of nuclear security missions in a coherent way; and the development of the Illicit Trafficking Database.

  10.11  While there is no obligation on Member States to engage with the IAEA on nuclear security, experience has shown that its services are highly sought after. Its programme is heavily supported by Member States who provide experts to participate in its advisory missions and training activities as well as helping to develop guidance documents. The programme has expended some $15 million in each of the past three years. This is financed from a Nuclear Security Fund, which relies on voluntary extra-budgetary contributions. The EU is one of the major donors.

  10.12  Thought is now being given to the development of a new NSP to run from 2010 to 2013. There is to be a major International Symposium on Nuclear Security in Mar/Apr 2009 and the discussions there will feed into the finalisation of the new NSP at the IAEA's September 2009 Board of Governors meeting. We are considering how best to ensure an effective British input to this Symposium.

Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

  10.13  Radioactive sources are used throughout the world for a wide variety of peaceful purpose in industry, medicine, research, and education as well as in military applications. Because of their high level of radioactivity, some of these radioactive sources could pose a significant risk to safety or security, in particular if they were used in a radiological dispersion device, also known as a "dirty bomb"—ie, a bomb that would use conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material but would not involve a nuclear explosion.

  10.14  The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources has been developed by the IAEA to address this risk. It sets out basic principles that every State should follow, including taking appropriate measures necessary to ensure that radioactive sources are safely managed and securely protected; having an effective national legislative and regulatory system; establishing a national register of radioactive sources and ensuring that any transfers are undertaken in a manner consistent with the provisions of the Code.

  10.15  The Code is not legally binding but States have been urged to write to the IAEA Director General expressing their support for it. 92 had done so as of 24 July 2008, including the UK. Supplementary Guidance to the Code of Conduct, relating to the import and export of radioactive sources, has also been developed and approved by the IAEA. Again, this is not legally binding but States have been encouraged to notify the Director General of their intention to support it, to designate a point of contact, and to send the IAEA a completed version of the specimen self-assessment questionnaire annexed to the Guidance. The UK has done all three. (DEFRA is responsible for the Code's implementation within the UK.)

Forensic science

  10.16  The UK Government has made clear that we will hold states accountable if they assist terrorists in acquiring WMD. World-leading forensics work by the AWE, in cooperation with other leading nuclear laboratories overseas, will help us identify the source of nuclear materials in any device used against us so that we will be in a position to respond appropriately. Our ability to do so should constitute a powerful deterrent against any state considering assisting terrorists in the use of WMD against the UK or our allies.


  11.1  While strictly outside the scope of this Inquiry, an important part of UK counter proliferation work is aimed at tackling the threat posed by conventional weapons to humanitarian interests, to UK, regional and global stability, and to sustainable development. The following briefly summarises our current efforts on three sets of issues in particular: an Arms Trade Treaty, cluster munitions and small arms and light weapons.

Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

  11.2  According to research by Oxfam, globally an estimated 1,000 people die every day due directly to the use of small arms and Africa loses around $18bn per year due to wars, civil wars and insurgencies.

  11.3  The aim of an Arms Trade Treaty is to establish a globally-agreed set of common standards for the trade in all conventional arms. It would make it a legal obligation for all countries to adopt uniform and high standards against which they would assess their arms exports, including the recipient country's respect for human rights and international humanitarian law. The Treaty would thereby contribute to preventing imported arms being used for human rights abuse, repression, terrorism, and undermining social and economic stability and development.

  11.4  In 2006, the UK worked with Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan and Kenya to introduce a draft UN General Assembly resolution calling for a global Arms Trade Treaty. This was supported by 153 countries. In 2007, there was an unprecedented level of response to calls from the UN Secretary General for views on the scope and feasibility of this treaty; over 100 countries submitted their views. A UN Group of Government Experts has concluded its review of these submissions and their conclusions will be discussed at the UN General Assembly in October. We are working to ensure that the UN agrees to maintain the momentum that has been generated so far.

  11.5  We also want to generate more support and understanding of the issues surrounding this proposal and to broaden the discussion. It is an issue that should be important not just to governments and NGOS, but to industry, academics, "think tanks" and religious leaders. With this in mind, on 9th September the Foreign Secretary met a broad constituency of stakeholders from the wider business community, NGOs, and from a range of religious communities to discuss the issues and the benefits that such a treaty would offer, and to explain how stakeholders in the wider community can contribute to the achievement of this goal.

  11.6  We are also working very closely with a core group of NGOs and UK industry through the Defence Manufacturers' Association and Society of British Aerospace Companies in support of the ATT process, to galvanize a broader global coalition to act as multipliers and to act directly to influence the sceptics and opponents by raising awareness more widely of what an ATT would be and the benefits that could accrue.

Cluster Munitions

  11.7  The Dublin Conference (19-30 May), which brought the Oslo Process to an end, adopted a Convention that defined cluster munitions and imposed a ban on the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of them. The Prime Minister's announcement on 28 May that we would withdraw from service all the UK's cluster munitions with immediate effect was instrumental in bringing about this result. The UK intends to sign the Convention when it is opened for signature in Oslo on 3 December. We are already implementing key norms ahead of signature, such as putting the remaining UK cluster munitions into a disposal programme and introducing new export controls. All Cluster Munitions have been classified as Category "A" goods, making them subject to the most stringent level of trade controls and thereby taking an immediate step to prevent proliferation.

  11.8  We will continue to work within the UN framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) to secure the strongest possible new Protocol on cluster munitions and thereby add to the humanitarian benefit we have achieved. It is in this forum that the major users and producers (eg the US, China, Russia, India, Pakistan and Israel) who have remained outside the Oslo Process are actively engaged. The Group of Governmental Experts established in November last year has had productive meetings in January, April, July and September this year taking forward work on drafting a new Protocol that includes restrictions on transfers. In November they will hold their final meeting before reporting back to the Meeting of States Parties later that month.

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

  11.9  The Biennial Meeting of States (BMS) for the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPoA) took place in New York in July. It achieved a reasonable outcome, with a final document agreed, albeit by a vote. We continue to fund a range of SALW projects undertaken by the UN, EU, OSCE and other international and regional organisations, NGOs and civil society more widely.


  12.1  The UK Government's goal is a more secure UK in a more secure world. We believe that a world free of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons would be a more secure place. Conversely, the proliferation of such weapons, both to states and to terrorists, poses one of the most significant threats to global security. Accordingly, the National Security Strategy and the FCO attach high strategic priority to our work to counter proliferation and to pursue nuclear disarmament.

  12.2  The UK, from the Prime Minister down, is providing vital leadership to the international community, in setting out the vision of where we need to go, in working bilaterally and in concert with our partners and allies to persuade others to join us, and in doing the hard diplomatic and technical work at official and expert level to find effective ways forward and to build consensus around them. We do not underestimate the considerable challenges involved nor the time and sustained commitment which will be required to resolve them. We would welcome the views of the Select Committee and its recommendations for how our efforts might be further enhanced or focused.

1 October 2008


    1. Chairman's Summary from NPT Preparatory Committee meeting, May 2008

    2. P5 Statement at NPT Preparatory Committee meeting, May 2008

    3. Statement by the External Affairs Minister of India, 5 September 2008

Annex 1



Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

  9 May 2008

  Original: English

  08-34927 (E) 270608

Second session

  Geneva, 28 April-9 May 2008


  1.  States parties[189] reaffirmed that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty) was the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. In the face of grave challenges to the non-proliferation regime, preserving and strengthening the Treaty was vital to international peace and security.

  2.  States parties noted the positive outcome of the first session of the 2007 Preparatory Committee and expressed the need to lay a solid basis for a successful Review Conference in 2010. They also noted that the 2008 session of the Preparatory Committee had taken place in the year of the fortieth anniversary of the Treaty's opening for signature. Recent public and political momentum towards a world free of nuclear weapons was noted. The need for concrete and practical steps to achieve that goal was highlighted.

  3.  States parties reaffirmed that the Treaty rested on three pillars: nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The importance of the balanced, full and non-selective application and implementation of the Treaty was stressed. Emphasis was placed on the mutually reinforcing nature of disarmament and non-proliferation, and due respect for the right of States parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in conformity with the Treaty.

  4.  States parties continued to attach great importance to achieving compliance with the Treaty. The importance of compliance by all States parties with all the provisions of the Treaty at all times was stressed. Non-compliance with the Treaty's provisions by States parties undermined non-proliferation, disarmament, universality and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

  5.  States parties reiterated their commitment to the effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty, the decisions and resolution on the Middle East of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, adopted without a vote, and the final document of the 2000 Review Conference, adopted by consensus.

  6.  States parties reaffirmed the importance of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes in ways consistent with the non-proliferation goal of the Treaty. A number of proposals for establishing multilateral mechanisms that guaranteed the provision of nuclear fuel under strict international control were presented.

  7.  States parties stressed that continued support to achieve universality of the Treaty remained essential. They expressed concern about the lack of progress in the achievement of universality, which seriously undermined the Treaty. States parties called upon India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, promptly and without conditions. Those States were also called upon to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with Additional Protocols, for ensuring nuclear non-proliferation, to reverse clearly and urgently any policies to pursue any nuclear weapons development, testing or deployment, and to refrain from any action that could undermine regional and international peace and security and the international community's efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation. States parties called upon India and Pakistan to maintain moratoriums on nuclear testing, and called upon India, Israel and Pakistan to become parties to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

  8.  States parties expressed concern that non-State actors could gain access to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The gravity of the dangers of weapons of mass destruction being acquired by terrorists further reinforced the need to strengthen the Treaty and its implementation. In addition, States parties noted the need for adherence to existing legal instruments, especially the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and for full compliance with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

  9.  States parties expressed the need for multilateralism and mutually agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as the only sustainable method for dealing with the multiplicity of disarmament, non-proliferation and international security issues. Multilateralism based on the concept of shared commitments and obligations provided the best way to maintain international order.

  10.  States parties remained committed to implementing article VI of the Treaty. The full implementation of the 13 practical steps, including the unequivocal undertaking contained in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference, was called for. Recent moves towards nuclear disarmament by some nuclear-weapon States were recognized. Concern continued to be expressed, however, about the slow pace of progress made in implementing the practical steps. A forward-looking review of the 13 steps and of progress towards their implementation was urged.

  11.  States parties stated that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against their proliferation or use or threat of use. Despite achievements in bilateral and unilateral reductions by some nuclear-weapon States, concern was expressed that the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and stockpiled still amounted to thousands. It was stressed that the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty did not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear arsenals. There were calls for a time-bound framework for achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

  12.  The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligations of nuclear-weapon States (96/23 of 8 July 1996) was recalled and support was voiced for the development of a nuclear weapons convention. A subsidiary body dealing with nuclear disarmament at the 2010 Review Conference was sought.

  13.  Concerns were also voiced about the increased role of nuclear weapons in some strategic and military doctrines, and the apparent lowering of the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. Calls were made for the re-evaluation of the strategic utility of nuclear weapons and their role in national security policies in the post-Cold War context.

  14.  Concern and disappointment were voiced about plans of some nuclear-weapon States to replace or modernize nuclear weapons and their means of delivery or platforms, and about the development of new types of nuclear weapons. In response, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America provided clarifications and explanations on their efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. The need to foster an environment conducive to nuclear disarmament was underlined. Considerable concern was also expressed about nuclear cooperation of States parties with States not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

  15.  States parties also attached significance to reducing the deployed status of nuclear weapons through de-alerting and de-targeting, to reducing reliance on nuclear weapons and to securing greater information from nuclear-weapon States on the active and reserve status of nuclear arsenals with a view to increasing confidence among all States parties. They welcomed the efforts of some nuclear weapon States in that regard, noting such practical measures could raise the threshold for uses of nuclear weapons and help avoid the risk of accidents and miscalculation.

  16.  Nuclear weapon States reiterated their commitment to nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty. The more forthcoming way in which some nuclear weapon States were treating their article VI commitments was recognized. A number of nuclear weapon States outlined their respective measures taken in accordance with article VI, underscoring actual and projected reductions in nuclear weapons arsenals, an accelerated programme of dismantlement, reduced reliance on nuclear weapons and reductions in their status of alert. France referred to its concrete plan of action on disarmament, to which the nuclear-weapon States should commit by 2010. The importance of transparent verification for nuclear disarmament measures was stressed, and the initiatives of the United Kingdom to explore the technical aspects of verifying nuclear disarmament through greater cooperation among nuclear-weapons States and with non-nuclear-weapon States were welcomed. It was noted that strategic conditions could have an impact on the pace of nuclear disarmament. Concerns were also voiced about apparent re-interpretations of nuclear disarmament obligations.

  17.  States parties underlined the special responsibility of the two States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals and acknowledged the progress made under the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (the Moscow Treaty). While noting those achievements, States parties called for further reductions beyond those required by the Moscow Treaty and stressed that reductions in deployments and in operational status could not be a substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. States parties noted that START I and the Moscow Treaty were due to expire in 2009 and 2012, respectively, and called for bilateral follow-up agreements. They welcomed the Russian Federation-United States declaration in Sochi regarding a legally binding post-START arrangement. It was stressed that the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency should guide all nuclear disarmament measures.

  18.  States parties welcomed the more detailed information provided by most nuclear-weapon States on the number of weapons in their arsenals and progress in reducing those numbers. All States parties were called upon to increase transparency and accountability with regard to their nuclear weapons arsenals, implementation of disarmament measures and security doctrines. The establishment of mechanisms for standardized reporting and progressive recording of reductions in nuclear arsenals was urged.

  19.  Reporting by all States parties on the implementation of article VI was urged. Reporting by non-nuclear-weapon States in regional alliances with nuclear-weapon States on their efforts to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in collective security arrangements was encouraged. It was noted that routine reporting would promote increased confidence in the overall Treaty regime by increasing transparency and at the same time would help address compliance concerns.

  20.  States parties welcomed the impetus that had developed in the Conference on Disarmament under the six Presidents for 2006 and 2007 and that had continued in 2008. The positive contribution of cooperation and coordination of the six-President mechanism was noted and calls were made for its continuation. With reference to proposal CD/1840, it was widely emphasized that the Conference should commence substantive work as a matter of urgency.

  21.  Strong support was expressed for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The importance and urgency of its early entry into force were underscored. In that regard, the recent ratifications by Bahamas, Barbados, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Malaysia and Palau were welcomed. States that had not ratified the Treaty, especially the remaining nine whose ratification was necessary for its entry into force, were urged to do so without delay. The Joint Declaration of the Article XIV Conference, held in Vienna in 2007, was welcomed.

  22.  The testing of a nuclear weapon by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had highlighted the need for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. States parties reaffirmed the importance of maintaining a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. They commended the progress made by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in establishing the international monitoring system. States parties were called upon to support the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization by providing adequate resources and expertise.

  23.  The abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the development of missile defence systems drew concern as adversely affecting strategic stability and having negative consequences on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Concern was also expressed about the risk of a new arms race on Earth and in outer space. In the latter regard, States parties noted the tabling in the Conference on Disarmament of a proposal for a treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space.

  24.  States parties highlighted the need to address non-strategic nuclear weapons, including their withdrawal to the possessor's territory. The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992 by the United States and the Russian Federation were welcomed and calls were made for the formalization of those initiatives. The importance of further reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons in a transparent, accountable, verifiable and irreversible manner was stressed. The proposal by the Russian Federation to transform the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty into a multilateral instrument was noted, as was the importance of continuing to fulfil existing commitments. The need to deny terrorists access to non-strategic nuclear weapons was also noted. Moreover, concerns were expressed about the ongoing proliferation of ballistic missiles. The reference to the elimination of the means of delivery in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was noted, and States parties were invited to adhere to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.

  25.  The importance of the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty concerning fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices was stressed. Calls were made to address the verifiability of such an instrument and the need for coverage of existing stocks. The urgent conclusion of such a treaty would be beneficial to the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Several proposals for progress on that issue were put forward, including a phased approach perhaps beginning with a framework treaty that could be strengthened and elaborated in protocols, the establishment of a group of scientific experts within the Conference on Disarmament, joint declarations to stop production of such material, a fissile material control initiative and the convening of a high-level expert panel. States that had not yet done so were called upon to declare moratoriums on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

  26.  The importance was emphasized of arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or other relevant international verification, and on arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes. Some nuclear-weapon States reported on the actions they had taken in that regard. In that context, the Trilateral Initiative was regarded as an important measure. The ongoing efforts of nuclear weapon States to convert excess highly enriched uranium for civilian use was commended and encouraged.

  27.  States parties recognized the positive contribution of various initiatives towards cooperation in reducing threats from all weapons of mass destruction. They included the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the Proliferation Security Initiative.

  28.  States parties welcomed other new initiatives by Governments and within civil society aiming at achieving the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, including the five principles and 10 recommendations developed at an international disarmament conference held in Oslo in February 2008, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission and the call from four United States elder statesmen.

  29.  The importance was stressed of education on disarmament and non-proliferation to strengthen the disarmament and non-proliferation regime for future generations. In that regard, States parties were encouraged to undertake concrete activities to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General on disarmament and non-proliferation education (see A/57/124) and to share information thereon. Steps and means as well as new initiatives to implement the recommendations were reiterated at the meeting.

  30.  States parties noted that, pending the elimination of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon States should provide security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. Security assurances could serve as incentives to forgo the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and to achieve universality of the Treaty. It was recalled that both the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference had underscored the importance of security assurances. It was further recalled that the final document of the 2000 Review Conference called upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on security assurances. It was emphasized that negative security assurances, an element that contributed to the 1995 extension decision, remained essential and should be reaffirmed and implemented. The view was expressed that it was a legitimate right of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to receive such assurances. Reaffirmations were expressed of commitments under Security Council resolution 984 (1995). Some States parties emphasized the importance of a no-first use policy as maintained by China.

  31.  States parties stressed that efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority, without prejudice to security assurances already given bilaterally or under nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. In that regard, references were made to pursuing a protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the prospect of substantive discussions envisaged by the current draft decision put forward by the six Presidents of the Conference on Disarmament. Pending the conclusion of any new instrument, nuclear-weapon States were called upon to honour their respective commitments under Security Council resolution 984 (1995), nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and bilateral arrangements. The view was expressed that commitments under resolution 984 (1995) were not legally binding or unconditional, falling short of meeting non-nuclear-weapon States' security requirements. Concern was expressed that recent developments in respect of nuclear doctrines might, in any event, undermine the aforementioned commitments. An international conference under the auspices of the United Nations to discuss the issue of security assurances was proposed. There were calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances at the 2010 Review Conference.

  32.  It was stressed that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was a fundamental goal of the Treaty. Concern was expressed that grave proliferation challenges strained the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, eroding confidence in the compliance by States parties with their obligations under the Treaty. The need to effectively address proliferation issues within the Treaty was stressed. States parties were called upon to exert maximum effort to bring about diplomatic solutions to concerns about compliance and strengthen confidence among all States parties.

  33.  States parties reaffirmed that IAEA was the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the statute of the Agency and the IAEA safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. States parties underlined the need for strengthening the role of IAEA and reaffirmed that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the Agency in verifying non-diversion. They noted the need for effectively addressing violations of safeguards obligations in order to uphold the integrity of the Treaty.

  34.  States parties welcomed the efforts of the Agency in strengthening safeguards and its completion of the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards, as well as the steps taken towards their application. They stressed the importance of IAEA safeguards as a fundamental part of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and commended the important work of IAEA in implementing safeguards to verify compliance with the non-proliferation obligations of the Treaty. The IAEA safeguards thereby promoted further confidence among States, helped to strengthen their collective security and played a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

  35.  States parties expressed the need to strive towards the universalization and strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system. While welcoming the recent entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols with a number of States parties, concern was expressed that some 30 States parties had yet to bring into force safeguards agreements, as required by article III, and that only 87 had Additional Protocols in force. States that had not yet concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA were called upon to do so without further delay.

  36.  The importance of the Additional Protocol as an essential and indispensable tool for effective functioning of the IAEA safeguards system was underlined. It was stressed that States parties must have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol in place for IAEA to be able to provide credible assurance of both the non-diversion of declared material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the States concerned.

  37.  States parties reaffirmed the need for the Additional Protocol to be universalized, and noted that further efforts in promoting that goal were needed to increase confidence in the compliance by States parties with their non-proliferation obligations. States parties that had not yet concluded Additional Protocols were called upon to do so as soon as possible. Efforts to achieve universal application of the Additional Protocol should not hamper efforts towards achieving universality of comprehensive safeguards agreements.

  38.  Views were expressed that the strengthened safeguards system—a comprehensive safeguards agreement coupled with the Additional Protocol—constituted the Non-Proliferation Treaty's verification standard and that that standard should be used as a precondition for new supply arrangements. In that regard, views were also expressed that concluding an Additional Protocol should remain a voluntary confidence-building measure. New arrangements on the Small Quantities Protocols agreed in 2005 at IAEA were welcomed and considered an important step in the process of strengthening safeguards. All concerned States were called upon to adopt that new standard.

  39.  It was reiterated that export controls were a key element of the non-proliferation regime under the Treaty. In the light of revelations regarding clandestine proliferation networks, States parties underlined that effective export controls, together with IAEA safeguards, were an integral part of the regime. Their legitimate role in ensuring compliance with articles I, II and III, and in facilitating peaceful nuclear cooperation was emphasized, as was the need for all States to exercise vigilance in the transfer of sensitive equipment and technology. The important role played by the international export control framework for nuclear related materials and technologies, namely the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, was noted, in particular their utility in guiding States in setting up their national export control policies. States parties were urged, however, to implement export controls in a transparent, non-discriminatory and cooperative manner. It was further stressed that the inalienable rights under article IV should not be undermined.

  40.  Support was expressed for internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States in the regions concerned and on the basis of established United Nations guidelines. The contribution of such zones to enhancing global and regional peace and security, including the cause of global nuclear non-proliferation, was emphasized. It was noted that the number of States covered by the nuclear-weapon-free zones exceeded 105. The establishment of such zones under the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk was considered a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. The importance of the entry into force of all the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties was stressed. In that regard, States parties welcomed the recent ratifications of the Pelindaba Treaty and the Plan of Action endorsed by the South East Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Commission to strengthen the implementation of the Bangkok Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States' renewed efforts to resolve the pending issues on the protocol to the Bangkok Treaty were seen as encouraging. Nuclear-weapon States were called upon to provide security assurances to members of nuclear-weapon-free zones by signing and ratifying protocols to those treaties.

  41.  Continuing and increased cooperation among the parties to the zones was encouraged, as was the development of a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere. States parties welcomed the conclusion and the recent ratifications of the Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The need for further consultations among concerned countries in accordance with the 1999 United Nations Disarmament Commission guidelines to resolve outstanding issues regarding the Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone was expressed. Support for the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia was reiterated. Efforts to institutionalize that status were noted.

States parties underlined the importance of establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in the Middle East and South Asia.

  42.  States parties reaffirmed the importance of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and emphasized that the resolution remained valid until its goals and objectives were achieved. The resolution was both an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and an essential part of the basis on which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had been indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. States parties reiterated their support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Strong concern was voiced at the lack of measurable implementation of the resolution. Renewed, action-oriented determination to implement the resolution was strongly urged. States parties affirmed the importance of establishing practical mechanisms within the review process to promote the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in particular by reporting to the Secretary-General on the steps they had taken to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. A subsidiary body within Main Committee II of the 2010 Review Conference was sought, together with a specific period of time during the Preparatory Committee and the establishment of a standing committee of the members of the Bureau of that Conference to follow up inter-sessionally the implementation of recommendations concerning the Middle East. The convening of an international conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, with the participation of nuclear-weapon States and all States in the region, was sought.

  43.  States parties noted that all States of the region of the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, were States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Great concern was expressed regarding the nuclear capability of Israel. States parties called upon Israel to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible as a non-nuclear weapon State, conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement and place its nuclear facilities under full scope IAEA safeguards. Concern was also expressed about nuclear cooperation with States outside the IAEA safeguards system, especially Israel. The need for monitoring compliance by States parties with articles I, II and III, in particular obligations regarding transfer, was stressed.

  44.  The importance of creating an environment conducive to implementation of the Middle East resolution was emphasized. The presence of nuclear weapons in the region was seen as an impediment to aspirations for the Middle East to become a nuclear-weapon-free zone. States parties welcomed the voluntary decisions by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to abandon its programmes for developing weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as well as its ratification of the Additional Protocol. All States in the region that had not yet done so were urged to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, conclude with IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols, and become parties to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. More generally, States parties also expressed full support for achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The view was expressed that the lack of progress in the Middle East peace process should not inhibit implementation of the 1995 resolution. It was also noted that the accession of all States in the region to the Non-Proliferation Treaty would contribute to the objective of establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as of other weapons of mass destruction.

  45.  States parties reaffirmed the importance of the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards agreement of the Islamic Republic of Iran and insisted that that country comply fully and without further delay with all the requirements in Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) as well as the relevant resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors. States parties noted that IAEA had reported that it continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in the Islamic Republic of Iran and that it remained unable to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in that country; and that certain questions and verification matters were resolved while yet others, including some of serious concern, were not. The completion of the work-plan to resolve some outstanding issues between the Islamic Republic of Iran and IAEA was noted. States parties noted further that IAEA would continue, in accordance with its procedures and practices, to seek corroboration of its findings and to verify, as part of its verification, the completeness of that country's declaration. States parties believed the issue should be resolved peacefully through diplomatic efforts and negotiations. Questioning the need for the involvement of the Security Council, the Islamic Republic of Iran indicated its readiness to continue to resolve the outstanding issues within the framework of IAEA. It underscored its intention to continue to cooperate with IAEA in accordance with its legal obligations envisaged in the IAEA statute and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It reiterated the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme and declared its resolve not to suspend enrichment and reprocessing activities.

  46.  States parties recognized that the nuclear activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea presented a grave challenge to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and noted the progress achieved under the 13 February 2007 initial actions and the shutdown of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. They welcomed the monitoring and verification arrangements implemented by IAEA with the agreement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. They also welcomed the continuing verification by IAEA of the shutdown status of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. States parties noted that the disabling of some of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was currently under way. They were concerned that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had not yet submitted a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programmes and activities, and urged it to do so promptly. They urged that country to comply with Security Council resolutions 1695 (2006) and 1718 (2006) and the joint statement of September 2005, to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes as well as associated ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and to return promptly to compliance with the obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement. States parties stressed the importance of achieving the goal of the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. They underlined the need for a peaceful solution to that issue and welcomed the diplomatic efforts undertaken in the framework of the six-party talks.

  47.  There was concern about reports of alleged clandestine nuclear activities by the Syrian Arab Republic, and calls were made for prompt clarifications regarding those activities in cooperation with IAEA. The unilateral actions taken in response to those alleged activities prompted some States parties to highlight the need for early involvement of IAEA in cases of suspected proliferation activities. The Syrian Arab Republic reiterated its commitment to compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and safeguards agreements with IAEA, rejecting the validity of any information suggesting otherwise.

  48.  States parties reaffirmed their inalienable right under article IV to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. It was noted that, as part of the fundamental bargain, nothing in the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be interpreted as affecting that right. It was stressed that participating in and facilitating the exchange of nuclear technology for peaceful uses must be consistent with the Treaty's non-proliferation obligations.

  49.  In view of climate change and the growing demand for nuclear energy and sustainable development, a call was also made to fully ensure the free, unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The proliferation risks associated with the growing global energy demand were noted. The importance of assisting States parties to develop safeguards, safety and security was emphasized. The development of internationally agreed criteria for transfers of proliferation-sensitive nuclear equipment and technology was suggested. It was reiterated that additional restrictions should not be applied to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially in developing countries or for political purposes.

  50.  In that context, States parties emphasized the value and importance of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, underlining that technical cooperation played an important role in further developing the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. States parties acknowledged the wide application of nuclear technology for areas in health, industry, agriculture and environmental protection. Appreciation was expressed for the assistance rendered, in particular for developing countries, through the programme. It was stressed that States parties should take measures to ensure that the programme was adequately and predictably financed. There was some concern that the programme could be used as a political tool.

  51.  Attention was drawn to the significance of developing proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies, including through the international project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO). In that regard, references were made to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership.

  52.  The importance of strengthening nuclear safety, radiation protection, the safety of radioactive waste management and the safe transport of nuclear and radioactive materials, including maritime transport, was highlighted. The need for maintaining the highest standards of safety at civilian nuclear installations through national measures and international cooperation was also emphasized. Concern was expressed about the environmental consequences of uranium mining and assistance was sought with radiological assessment and remedial measures in the affected areas in accordance with the appeal made in the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.

  53.  The role of IAEA in the promotion of safety in all its aspects was underlined and it was noted that further efforts were needed in that regard. States parties that had not yet done so were called upon to accede to all relevant conventions on nuclear safety, safe waste management and physical protection of nuclear material and the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. States parties supported efforts to enhance the security of existing stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, while minimizing its use in the civilian nuclear sector.

  They called for the acceleration of efforts to develop and implement a fully effective global nuclear security framework. Support was expressed for the work undertaken by the International Expert Group on Liability (INLEX). The importance of maintaining dialogue on facilitating safe maritime transport of radioactive material was stressed.

  54.  States parties noted the importance of combating nuclear terrorism and strongly supported existing IAEA initiatives in that regard. The IAEA action plan on protection against nuclear terrorism was widely noted and supported. States parties called for full implementation of Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006) and 1810 (2008). In addition, the entry into force of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, in July 2007, was noted and States parties were called upon to accede thereto.

  55.  Other initiatives, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism were also noted. IAEA work in support of States' efforts to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material was commended. In that context, States noted the new proliferation threat posed by clandestine activities and networks for the supply of nuclear goods and technologies. It was emphasized that only through proactive and full cooperation and assistance to the Agency could such proliferation threats be addressed. States parties were encouraged to enhance cooperation among themselves and with international organizations, in particular IAEA, to prevent, detect and respond to suspected proliferation activities and illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, equipment and technology. States parties stressed the importance of contributions to the Nuclear Security Fund of IAEA. States expressed support for measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and related material and welcomed the principles of the Group of Eight in that regard.

  56.  States parties urged the strengthening of the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities as an element of the non-proliferation regime that should be emphasized, in particular in the light of the heightened risk of nuclear terrorism. They welcomed the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and urged States that had not yet done so to accede to the amended convention. All States were urged to implement the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

  57.  States parties emphasized the need to increase international cooperation in respect of the promotion of multilateralism in the nuclear fuel cycle and the supply of nuclear fuel. The numerous existing proposals, including the establishment of a fuel bank of low enriched uranium and multilateral enrichment centres, as well as the ongoing discussions in IAEA on fuel supply assurance mechanisms, were welcomed. States parties expressed their willingness to participate in and contribute to such discussions. It was stressed that such proposals should be addressed in a multilaterally negotiated, comprehensive, economically viable and non-discriminatory manner under the auspices of IAEA, without restrictions on access to nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes. It was noted that a balanced multilateral mechanism could significantly contribute to confidence-building in the field of non-proliferation, to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to the overall strength of the non-proliferation regime. It was emphasized that the multilateralization of the fuel cycle should not deny States parties choices regarding the development of national fuel cycles and should be consistent with the Treaty.

  58.  States parties reaffirmed the sovereign right of each State party to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as provided for in article X (1). It was noted that article X envisaged that withdrawal would be exercised only in the face of extraordinary events. It was stated that the goal was not to deny the right to withdraw, but to make it more difficult for violators to use withdrawal to escape accountability for their violations. Importance was attached to the need for any withdrawal to be made in a manner consistent with the requirements, purposes and objectives of the Treaty. The view was expressed that because of its potential to undermine the Treaty, a withdrawal would warrant international scrutiny, as envisaged in article X. The elaboration of effective and prompt modalities under which States parties could collectively respond to notifications of withdrawal was urged.

  59.  Views were expressed that a State that withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty should not be able to benefit from nuclear materials, equipment and technology acquired while party to the Treaty. States parties urged supplier countries to make arrangements to retrieve from the withdrawing State any nuclear material, facilities and equipment transferred prior to withdrawal or ensure an end to their use. It was emphasized that, under international law, a withdrawing party was liable for breaches of the Treaty that occurred prior to withdrawal. It was also stressed that nuclear material, equipment and technology acquired by States parties for peaceful purposes prior to withdrawal must remain subject to peaceful uses under IAEA safeguards. Concerns were expressed that some proposals on article X went beyond the provisions of the Treaty.

  60.  The need was noted for States parties to undertake consultations and conduct every diplomatic effort, including on a regional basis, to encourage a party to reconsider its sovereign position to withdraw. Given the particular circumstances envisaged in article X for the exercise of the right to withdraw, the role of the Security Council, as provided for in that article, was also underlined.

  61.  The need to strengthen the Treaty and its review process was expressed. A range of views was expressed on the need for institutional improvements, such as annual or extraordinary meetings of States parties, consideration of national reports, a small standing bureau or standing committee, streamlining of documentation and an enhanced secretariat.

  62.  Views were expressed on rotation among regional groupings of the chairpersonship of the preparatory committees and the review conferences for future cycles. The issues of financial assessments and adequate financial support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle were also raised.

  63.  Noting the contributions from civil society in promoting the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and in developing proposals on practical measures to achieve this vision, States parties emphasized the value of the involvement and contribution of civil society in the process of reviewing the Treaty. Substantive proposals were made for the enhanced participation of non-governmental organizations.

Annex 2

P5 Statement to the NPT Preparatory Commission 2008


NPT PrepCom 2008

  Statement by the Delegations of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America delivered by UK Ambassador John Duncan to the 2008 NPT PrepCom, Geneva, 9 May 2008.

  1.  The delegations of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm the strong and continuing support of our countries for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on the occasion of the second Preparatory Committee of the eighth NPT review cycle.

  2.  The proliferation of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The NPT has served the global community well over the last four decades. It remains a key instrument for collective security and the bedrock on which the international architecture to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons is built. We wish to see the NPT thrive and therefore affirm our unequivocal commitment to strengthening the Treaty and to a successful outcome to the 2010 Review Conference. We welcome the constructive and substantive discussion that has taken place at this year's Preparatory Committee meeting and will work to reinforce the positive dynamic that has been established.

  3.  We wish to address the proliferation challenges through Treaty-based multilateralism and through partnerships and relevant initiatives in which we all participate. The NPT's central role in promoting security for all depends on concerted action by all States Party to ensure compliance and respond quickly and effectively to non-compliance. We attach great importance to achieving the universality of the NPT and call on those countries remaining outside to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States.

  4.  We stress the importance of the IAEA Safeguards system, which should be adequately funded. We seek universal adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards, as provided for in Article III, and to the Additional Protocol and urge the ratification and implementation of these agreements. We are actively engaged in efforts toward this goal, and are ready to offer necessary support.

  5.  We reaffirm that all States Party must ensure strict compliance with their non- proliferation obligations under the NPT. The proliferation of nuclear weapons undermines the security of all nations, imperils prospects for progress on other important NPT goals such as nuclear disarmament, and hurts prospects for expanding international nuclear co-operation. The proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme continue to be a matter of ongoing serious concern to us. We recall that the United Nations Security Council recently sent for the third time a strong message of international resolve to Iran by adopting sanctions resolution 1803 on Iran's nuclear programme under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter as part of a dual-track strategy. We call for Iran to respond to the concerns of the international community through prompt and full implementation of the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA. We are fully behind the E3+3 process to resolve this issue innovatively through negotiations on the basis of the offer agreed in London on 2 May 2008. We also restate our support for the Six-Party Talks process moving towards the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, urge the implementation of relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions and call on the relevant Six-Party members to continue their cooperation through the full implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005. We confirm our determination to achieve satisfactory resolution of these dossiers through dialogue and negotiation.

  6.  We reiterate our enduring commitment to the fulfilment of our obligations under Article VI of the NPT and note that these obligations apply to all NPT States Party. We note the unprecedented progress made by Nuclear Weapon States since the end of the Cold War in the field of nuclear disarmament, which has enhanced global security and advanced the goals of the NPT. Our individual contributions to systematic and progressive efforts in nuclear disarmament, including the reduction of the number of nuclear weapons in the world, have been and will be highlighted by each of us nationally.

  7.  We restate our support for the 1995 NPT resolution on the Middle East, which, inter alia, advocates a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. We welcome efforts to support the principles and objectives of the Middle East peace process, which contribute toward this end. We note that significant security challenges remain in the region.

  8.  We reaffirm our determination to abide by our respective moratoria on nuclear test explosions. We recognise that one element in the effective implementation of Article VI and in the prevention of nuclear proliferation is a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. We urge all members of the Conference on Disarmament to show the necessary flexibility to get the Conference back to work.

  9.  We reaffirm the inalienable right of all States Party to the NPT under Article IV to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty and the relevant principles on safeguards. We note that a growing number of States Party is showing interest in developing nuclear programmes aimed at addressing their long-term energy requirements and other peaceful purposes. We are ready to co-operate with States Party in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses and we emphasise the requirement for compliance with non-proliferation obligations and for development of research, use and production of nuclear energy to be solely for peaceful purposes. We believe such international co-operation should contribute to the full implementation of the NPT and enhance the authority and effectiveness of the global non-proliferation regime.

  10.  We welcome the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and encourage efforts towards a multilateral mechanism to assure access for all countries to nuclear fuel services as a viable alternative to the indigenous development of enrichment and reprocessing. We note the various proposals that have been put forward. Such an approach would support implementation of the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a safe and secure fashion, preserve the existing competitive open market, respond to the real needs of recipient countries and simultaneously strengthen the non-proliferation regime. We hope States Party will contribute to discussion and development of this agenda in an open-minded and constructive manner. We stress the necessity for the 2010 Review Conference to address this issue.

  11.  We support, and will work to uphold and strengthen, the framework for the safe and secure uses of nuclear and radioactive materials for peaceful purposes. We reaffirm our commitment to safe and secure regulatory infrastructures, and our determination to develop innovative nuclear energy systems via our respective joint and national initiatives, which will underpin clean and affordable nuclear development, increase energy security, minimise the impact on the environment and the production of radioactive waste, and provide greater protection against proliferation through the provision of reliable fuel services, proliferation-resistant reactor technologies and strengthened international safeguards.

Annex 3

Statement by India's Minister of External Affairs, 5 September 2008



  To reiterate India's stand on disarmament and nonproliferation, EAM has made the following statement:

    A Plenary meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to consider an exception for India from its guidelines to allow for full civil nuclear cooperation with India is being held in Vienna from 4-5 September 2008.

    India has a long-standing and steadfast commitment to universal, non-discriminatory and total elimination of nuclear weapons. The vision of a world free of nuclear weapons which Shri Rajiv Gandhi put before the UN in 1988 still has universal resonance.

    We approach our dialogue with the Nuclear Suppliers Group and all its members in a spirit of cooperation that allows for an ongoing frank exchange of views on subjects of mutual interest and concern. Such a dialogue will strengthen our relationship in the years to come.

    Our civil nuclear initiative will strengthen the international non-proliferation regime. India believes that the opening of full civil nuclear cooperation will be good for India and for the world. It will have a profound positive impact on global energy security and international efforts to combat climate change.

    India has recently submitted a Working Paper on Nuclear Disarmament to the UN General Assembly, containing initiatives on nuclear disarmament. These include the reaffirmation of the unequivocal commitment of all nuclear weapon States to the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons; negotiation of a Convention on the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, leading to the global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeframe.

We remain committed to a voluntary, unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. We do not subscribe to any arms race, including a nuclear arms race. We have always tempered the exercise of our strategic autonomy with a sense of global responsibility. We affirm our policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons.

    We are committed to work with others towards the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament that is universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable.

    India has an impeccable non-proliferation record. We have in place an effective and comprehensive system of national export controls, which has been constantly updated to meet the highest international standards. This is manifested in the enactment of the Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems Act in 2005. India has taken the necessary steps to secure nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export control legislation and through harmonization and committing to adhere to Missile Technology Control Regime and Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines.

    India will not be the source of proliferation of sensitive technologies, including enrichment and reprocessing transfers. We stand for the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. We support international efforts to limit the spread of ENR equipment or technologies to states that do not have them. We will work together with the international community to advance our common objective of non-proliferation. In this regard, India is interested in participating as a supplier nation, particularly for Thorium-based fuel and in establishment of international fuel banks, which also benefit India.

    India places great value on the role played by the IAEA's nuclear safeguards system. We look forward to working with the IAEA in implementing the India-specific Safeguards Agreement concluded with the IAEA. In keeping with our commitment to sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol with respect to India's civil nuclear facilities, we are working closely with the IAEA to ensure early conclusion of an Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement.

5 September 2008

188   Paragraph 7 of the section entitled, "Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty" in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2000/28, Parts I and II), vol. I, part I) states, "The consideration of the issues at each session of the Preparatory Committee should be factually summarized and its results transmitted in a report to the next session for further discussion." Back

189   Any reference to "States parties" in the present summary is not intended to imply unanimity among States parties.
2 08-34927 

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