Memorandum submitted by the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office
1. TERMS OF
REFERENCE OF
THE INQUIRY
1.1 The Terms of Reference given by the
Select Committee on Foreign Affairs (FAC) for this Inquiry on
Global Security: Non-Proliferation are as follows:
"The Foreign Affairs Committee will examine
the work of the British Government in working towards the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office's policy goal on countering weapons proliferation
and its causes. The Committee will consider the proliferation
of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. It will also consider
the role of ballistic missiles. In particular, the inquiry will
examine:
— The British Government's non-proliferation
approach, as set out in the National Security Strategy;
— The effectiveness of the current rules-based
international system in curbing current weapons proliferation;
— The potential merit of forthcoming
diplomatic initiatives on non-proliferation, for instance the
2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference;
— The role of arms control and disarmament,
including nuclear disarmament, in non-proliferation efforts."
2. THE INTERNATIONAL
CONTEXT
2.1 Through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the overwhelming majority
of states has chosen not to develop weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). Some states have abandoned their nuclear weapons programmes
altogether while the five Nuclear Weapons States have substantially
reduced their nuclear arsenals since the Cold War and further
significant reductions are in prospect.
2.2 But the international counter-proliferation
system is facing serious challenges. In particular:
(i) the emergence of India and Pakistan as nuclear-armed
states and their continued resistance, with Israel, to joining
the NPT;
(ii) the clear breaches of the international
legal obligations of two non-nuclear weapons States Parties to
the NPT, Iran and North Korea, and the risks these pose for the
global counter-proliferation system as well as for regional security
and proliferation;
(iii) the considerable work still required to
build the support necessary to achieve a positive outcome at the
NPT's Review Conference in 2010. Many moderate states do not give
priority to counter-proliferation, leaving more radical states
space to pursue their own narrower agendas;
(iv) increasing efforts by terrorists and criminal
networks to acquire WMD;
(v) the increasing ranges of ballistic missiles
available to rogue states, bringing the UK, our friends and allies
potentially within range of an attack;
(vi) an anticipated significant increase in the
use of civil nuclear power world-wide, driven by the need for
energy security and to address climate change. This increases
the risk of diversion of the materials and technologies involved
for military use, whether by states or non-state actors;
(vii) large arsenals of nuclear weapons remain.
The START I treaty expires in December 2009 and no agreement
is yet in place for the extension of its provisions, although
the US and Russia have agreed in principle to work for a legally
binding successor. Counter-proliferation efforts risk being undermined
if other states perceive, rightly or wrongly, that the Nuclear
Weapon States are not delivering on their side of the bargain
and actively pursuing nuclear disarmament;
(viii) meanwhile, efforts to expand the international
legal framework essential to contain nuclear weapons technology
and numbers are stalled, with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty yet to enter into force or be ratified by several key states
and agreement yet to be reached to start negotiations on a Fissile
Material Cut-Off Treaty.
2.3 How these challenges are addressed in
the next few years will be critical for the future of global security.
As the National Security Strategy published in March concluded:
"the international security architecture has yet to adapt
satisfactorily to the new landscape. Its level of ambition in
the face of new challenges is too low and the response to crises
is too slow. The range and scale of those challenges is only likely
to grow, particularly as a result of climate change and competition
for resources. How the international system responds and how well
it succeeds in entrenching the rules-based approach to resolving
disputes and dealing with states which violate international laws
and norms will be one of the most significant factors in global
and UK national security."
3. THE UK GOVERNMENT
RESPONSE
3.1 The UK Government has made clear that
it judges that the proliferation of WMD poses one of the gravest
threats to UK and to global security and that we are firmly committed
to the goal of the global elimination of all such weapons. Driving
forward more urgent and robust international action on both counter-proliferation
and nuclear disarmament is a personal priority for the Foreign
Secretary. As recently as last week, at the Council on Foreign
Relations in New York, the Foreign Secretary emphasised that to
address the profound threats to the counter proliferation regime,
we need to remake the bargain between the parties to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and that we must defend the Treaty
aggressively on both the non-proliferation and the disarmament
fronts. Our aim is to reinforce the consensus against proliferation:
firstly by demonstrating that the goal of a world free from nuclear
weapons is real, achievable and genuinely held by nuclear weapons
states; and secondly by building ways in which all countries can
enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology.
3.2 The revision of the FCO's Strategic
Framework in April 2008 made counter proliferation, together
with counter terrorism, one of the FCO's four new Policy Goals.
(Departmental Strategic Objective 5 is "to counter terrorism,
weapons proliferation and their causes".) To achieve this
objective, detailed action plans have been elaborated within the
FCO, which the Foreign Secretary is personally involved in reviewing
on a regular basis.
3.3 To prompt fresh thinking on the issues,
on 18 July the Foreign Secretary hosted a brainstorming seminar
with eminent academics, commentators and policy makers from the
UK, France and US on the future of nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament. Building on the themes discussed at the seminar,
this autumn the Foreign Secretary will be launching a public discussion
paper to stimulate public debate on the key issues around nuclear
disarmament and proliferation. (A copy of the paper will be forwarded
to the Committee as soon as it is available.)
3.4 The Foreign Secretary's initiatives
build further on the UK's international leadership on these issues:
(i) the former Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett,
set out a progressive agenda in her June 2007 speech "A
World free of Nuclear Weapons?" to the Carnegie Endowment
in Washington and announced that the UK would act as a "disarmament
laboratory" for the thinking and practical work required
to move forward global nuclear disarmament;
(ii) in Delhi in January the Prime Minister argued
for a reinvigorated global commitment to nuclear disarmament and
for zero tolerance for proliferation. The Prime Minister subsequently
announced in Parliament on 19 March a major international
conference in London, likely to be in early 2009, to take forward
work on nuclear energy;
(iii) the Secretary of State for Defence announced
in a 5 February speech to the Conference on Disarmament that
the UK is willing to host a conference of P5 nuclear laboratories.
The conference would examine ways to move forward on disarmament
as well as building trust and fostering transparency;
(iv) the appointment of Baroness Williams as
Non-Proliferation Adviser to the Prime-Minister;
(v) speeches by Dr Howells and Lord Malloch Brown
to expert audiences;
(vi) the launch of the National Security Strategy
in March.
3.5 We have also warmly welcomed the contributions
to this important debate by other leading figures in particular
by US statesmen Schultz, Perry, Kissinger & Nunn, by President
Sarkozy, by former Foreign and Defence Secretaries of State Lords
Hurd, Robertson and Owen and Sir Malcolm Rifkind, by the Shadow
Foreign Secretary, Mr Hague, by Prime Minister Rudd of Australia
and by the US Presidential candidates.
3.6 Broadly, HMG's approach recognizes that
effective strategies for tackling non-proliferation and disarmament,
energy security, climate change and the strengthening of international
institutions must be linked. We also recognise that the impetus
behind proliferation is complex and varies from one state to another:
for there to be progress, we need to take account of the security
concerns of all states and to promote peaceful, just and comprehensive
settlements of regional conflicts and tensions. For these reasons,
we consider that collective action, in international bodies including
the UN, the EU, NATO, the IAEA, treaty-specific and export control
groups remains the most effective way of managing and reducing
the threats and the only prospect of eliminating them completely.
A multilateral approach, in particular a rules-based approach
led by international institutions, legally-binding and verifiable
where possible, brings not only greater effectiveness but also,
crucially, greater legitimacy.
3.7 The National Security Strategy set out
the main lines of the UK Government's work to counter the threat
from WMD arranged under four strands— the "4 Ds"
ie dissuade, detect, deny and defend. The considerable body of
work government-wide and by other relevant departments and agencies
on these is co-ordinated by the Cabinet Office, which oversees
action plans under each of the four headings through the Counter
Proliferation Committee. On the international aspects, the FCO
works closely with other relevant Departments, in particular with
the Ministry of Defence and the Department for Business, Enterprise
and Regulatory Reform as well as with other parts of the Government
as appropriate.
3.8 The FCO's new Strategic Programme Fund
provides funding rising from £300,000 in 2008-2009 to
£2 million in 2009-10 and £3 million
in 2010-11 in support of the strategic objectives set out
in the FCO's counter proliferation and counter terrorism Policy
Goal. Drawing on these funds, in the months ahead the UK will
finance a series of direct legislative assistance visits to help
30 states to fulfil their obligations under a number of treaties
including the BTWC, CWC and NPT. Other funded activities include
NPT outreach and workshops in sub-Saharan Africa. We have also
sponsored a project by the International Institute of Strategic
Studies on the practical steps required for the elimination of
nuclear weapons which has recently been published (see below).
More widely, the UK Government is spending some £36 million
a year through the Global Threat Reduction Programme (see below).
3.9 We also work closely with EU partners
and the EU institutions to ensure the EU contributes effectively
to countering the threat from states acquiring or developing WMD
(including means of delivery) and preventing terrorists from acquiring
WMD or radiological weapons or materials. This is carried out
through co-ordinated bilateral and multilateral activity and through
the deployment of funds from EU Joint Actions or the Commission's
new Instrument for Stability.
3.10 This paper sets out how the UK is leading
and contributing to international action to counter the proliferation
of WMD, starting with nuclear weapons and the three pillars of
the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It then addresses chemical
and biological weapons, ballistic missiles, the specific threat
of terrorists acquiring WMD, and current initiatives on conventional
weapons.
4. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
4.1 The clear international consensus is
that the way forward on both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament
is through the NPT. States remaining outside the regime (India,
Israel and Pakistan) or breaching its provisions (North Korea)
or flouting their United Nations Security Council and IAEA obligations
in respect of their nuclear programmes (Iran), risk undermining
the basis of this consensus, igniting a dangerous arms race and
endangering stability in and beyond their regions. It will be
vital to reinforce the international commitment to non-proliferation
and disarmament at the next in the five-yearly cycle of NPT Review
Conferences (RevCons) in 2010.
Towards the NPT Review Conference in 2010
4.2 HMG's goal remains adherence by all
states to the NPT and to see its original "grand bargain"
strengthened at the Treaty's 2010 RevCon. This is based on
the three pillars of the treaty:
(i) The five states (China, France, Russia/USSR,
UK and USA) that had manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon
or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967 were
recognised as "Nuclear Weapons States". They undertook
not to assist any other state to acquire or develop nuclear weapons.
All other signatories—the "Non-Nuclear Weapons States"—renounced
the right to develop or acquire nuclear weapons or to assist others
to do so. This is the non-proliferation pillar (Articles I and
II);
(ii) In return the Non-Nuclear Weapons States
received an undertaking from the Nuclear Weapons States that they
would pursue good faith negotiations on cessation of the nuclear
arms race at an early date and nuclear disarmament and on a treaty
on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control. This is the disarmament pillar (Article
VI);
(iii) The Non-Nuclear Weapons States' right to
develop nuclear energy for peaceful uses under international safeguards
and in conformity with Articles I and II, was formally recognised
and acknowledged. This is the peaceful uses pillar (Article IV).
4.3 The three pillars need to be treated
equally: to advance, we need to address all three in parallel.
Our priorities under each are:
(i) Zero tolerance for nuclear proliferation,
which needs to be robustly supported by all the P5. North Korea
and Iran must comply with their UN Security Council, NPT and IAEA
obligations;
(ii) A re-invigorated approach to nuclear disarmament.
The UK wants a clear forward plan put into practice, that demonstrates
that the Nuclear Weapons States are serious about their obligations;
(iii) Ensuring the expected growth in civil nuclear
power generation is not accompanied by increased proliferation
risks. The UK is working for internationally-agreed mechanisms
under IAEA auspices that will make it unnecessary for countries
to develop their own enrichment and re-processing capacity.
4.4 The Second Preparatory Committee of
the 2010 NPT Review Conference took place in Geneva from
28 April to 9 May (a copy of the Chairman's Summary
is at Annex 1). Lord Malloch Brown and Baroness Williams (Non-Proliferation
Adviser to the Prime Minister) attended a high-level conference
in the margins. UK leadership resulted in the first statement
from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (known
as the "P5") for eight years and created a new P5 dynamic
on which we can build. Significantly, Thailand became the first
developing country publicly to support nuclear fuel assurances.
4.5 But much remains to be done to secure
a successful RevCon in 2010. To build the consensus necessary
to achieve a positive outcome in 2010, there are three key groups
of countries:
(i) P5: a substantive and cohesive P5 dynamic
is essential. The P5 statement at the NPT PrepCom this year
was a good start (a copy is at Annex 2). This dialogue would benefit
from further deepening. We are also in touch with both US Presidential
campaigns and will work closely with the new US Administration
on these issues;
(ii) some key Non-Nuclear Weapons States Parties
(eg South Africa, Brazil, and Egypt) have appreciated the UK's
commitment. But urging such states to approach the negotiations
required for 2010 in a more constructive way—and leave
actual and potential proliferators with nowhere to go—will
require continued senior political engagement;
(iii) the majority of developing countries see
nuclear non-proliferation as a lower priority than economic development,
poverty and regional instability. We need to raise awareness of
the dangers posed to developing countries by nuclear proliferation
and re-engage mainstream NAM members with the NPT process.
4.6 The Foreign Secretary regularly engages
with his counterparts on these issues, for example with the Chinese
and Brazilian Foreign Ministers at the UN this month. We also
work closely with our EU partners in this area, both through co-ordinated
bilateral activity and effective use of the available multilateral
tools (eg use of the "WMD clauses" with Third Parties.)
4.7 We have an active programme of outreach.
FCO, BERR and MOD officials regularly meet stakeholders from outside
Government to listen to new ideas, brief on UK objectives and
policies, and answer questions. We benefit from regular interaction
with Members of both Houses of Parliament. Since the start of
this year we have held an "outreach" event for parliamentarians
to explain our "Enrichment Bond" proposal, have hosted
nuclear disarmament NGOs such as Medact, Mayors for Peace and
the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Dr Howells took questions
from students on counter-proliferation issues during his recent
visit to the United States and made a speech to an academic audience
in South Africa. We briefed NGOs and other interested parties
and published a guide to the NPT setting out UK objectives before
the start of this year's Preparatory Committee in Geneva in April.
We also have an extensive programme of outreach on export controls
(see below). We will remain engaged with NGOs and civil society
more broadly as the 2010 RevCon approaches.
4.8 We welcome the establishment of an International
Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, co-chaired
by former Australian and Japanese Foreign Ministers, Gareth Evans
and Yoriko Kawaguchi, and the appointment of Baroness Williams
as the UK Commissioner. The Commission intends to publish a report
by January 2010 with the aim of helping to shape a global
consensus in the lead-up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
It will also consider publishing a supplementary report in mid-2010,
making such further recommendations as it judges may be appropriate
in the aftermath of that Conference. We look forward to co-operating
closely with the Commission.
4.9 The following sections examine each
of the three NPT pillars in turn.
5. PILLAR ONE:
NON-PROLIFERATION
5.1 We are pursuing a number of tracks in
parallel:
(i) strengthening the IAEA and its safeguards
regime;
(ii) initiatives to make nuclear weapons (and
other WMD) and their related materials and technologies more secure;
(iii) robust action against any state which breaks
the rules;
(iv) working to bring into the NPT the three
states which remain outside it;
(v) supporting regional zones free from nuclear
weapons and WMD.
(i) Strengthening IAEA safeguards
5.2 IAEA safeguards provide the essential
foundation of international non-proliferation work. We are pressing
for all those Non-Nuclear Weapons States which have not yet done
so to agree, sign and bring into force a comprehensive safeguards
agreement with the IAEA, as provided for in Article III of the
NPT.
5.3 We are also urging those States that
have not yet done so to agree, sign and bring into force an Additional
Protocol based on the Model Protocol developed by the IAEA (INFCIRC/540)
to strengthen the system of safeguards. This involves, inter alia,
the provision of additional information to the IAEA and greater
access for IAEA inspectors to enable the IAEA to build up a more
complete picture of a State's nuclear-related activities, thereby
enabling it to look for inconsistencies or anomalies which could
be indicative of clandestine activities. A key feature of the
new system is that, for the first time, it gives the IAEA access
to information on nuclear fuel cycle-related activities (for example,
manufacture of specialised equipment, and research & development)
even where nuclear material is not involved. We are working for
recognition that a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an Additional
Protocol should be the norm for IAEA safeguards, and that both
are needed to satisfy the requirements of Article III of the NPT.
5.4 We will also engage in taking forward
recommendations contained in the wide-ranging report into the
future of the IAEA by the Commission of Eminent Persons, including
to allow the Agency to inspect for indicators of weaponisation
and for more transparency in civil nuclear activities. The UK
will also work to ensure the election of a successor to the outgoing
Director General who has the vision, leadership and change management
skills the IAEA requires.
(ii) Making Nuclear (and other WMD) more secure
5.5 We are working urgently to make it increasingly
difficult for states or non-state actors, including terrorists,
to acquire nuclear (and other WMD) or the related materials, equipment,
skills and technologies and to detect any attempts to do so. Work
on this was particularly stimulated by the valuable work done
to identify and close down the proliferation network set up by
AQ Khan, in supporting nuclear weapons programmes in states including
Libya, Iran and North Korea. The main actions in this area are
as follows.
G8 Global Partnership/UK Global Threat
Reduction Programme
5.6 These initiatives are aimed at establishing
cooperative projects to reduce the threat of proliferation of
the most dangerous nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical
materials. Its main focus is the Former Soviet Union and focuses
on projects to improve the security of fissile materials; reducing
the number of sites containing nuclear material; working towards
closure of reactors still producing plutonium; improving nuclear
safety, to reduce the risk of further Chernobyl-type incidents;
contributing to the destruction of chemical weapons stocks; and
providing sustainable employment for former weapon scientists
whose expertise could be misused.
5.7 The UK has committed up to $750 million
over ten years to this work. Expenditure is currently running
at around £36 million a year. Projects we are currently
supporting include work to:
— Assist in long term safety and security
of spent nuclear fuel from decommissioning nuclear submarines
in Russia;
— Enhance physical protection of nuclear
and radiological materials held in insecure facilities across
the Former Soviet Union;
— Support the irreversible shutdown
of plutonium production reactors in Kazakhstan and Siberia;
— Create sustainable employment opportunities
for 3,000 former Soviet weapons scientists.
5.8 In delivering the programme, the UK
works closely with key partners, most notably the US, Canada,
the EU, France, Sweden, Norway and the IAEA. The sheer quantity
and poor level of safety and security of materials has meant that
Russia has been the focus of the majority of this work. However,
significant progress has been made and the programme is increasingly
focusing on collaboration in other FSU countries and other key
geographical regions such as Iraq, Libya and South Asia. This
widening of the UK's geographical focus reflects the broader agreement
the UK and close partners secured at the G8 Tokyo Summit
to ensure that Global Partnership activity is able to focus on
emerging threats where national capacity to ensure security of
WMD-related materials and equipment is least developed.
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
5.9 The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is
a group of nuclear supplier countries which seeks to contribute
to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation
of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear related exports.
The NSG Guidelines are implemented by each Participating Government
(currently 45) in accordance with its national laws and practices.
Decisions on export applications are taken at the national level
in accordance with national export licensing requirements.
5.10 The NSG Guidelines aim to ensure that
nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the
proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
The Guidelines facilitate the development of trade in this area
by providing the means whereby obligations to facilitate peaceful
nuclear cooperation can be implemented in a manner consistent
with international nuclear non-proliferation norms.
5.11 The AQ Khan revelations have given
an impetus to thinking anew about how to control the spread of
enrichment and reprocessing technology. The G8 declared in
July 2008 that they do not intend to transfer such technology,
material or equipment to any additional states while more lasting
arrangements are considered. The NSG is currently working on these.
The NSG did, however, agree in 2005 on what its members should
do if a recipient state's compliance with its safeguards obligations
is in doubt or if non-compliance is proven.
5.12 We are also working to establish the
Additional Protocol as a condition of supply; to promote enhanced
nuclear cooperation with India (see below); and to prevent the
supply of nuclear related items to prohibited Iranian nuclear
activities.
International outreach on export controls
5.13 More broadly, HMG believes that outreach
to promote effective export controls is an important tool in the
fight against proliferation. The UK works closely with EU partners,
with the USA, and with other countries in delivering this work.
Outreach can take several forms, including bilateral activities
by the UK, or multilateral efforts through other institutions
such as the EU and other export control regimes. It can consist
of inward and outward visits involving officials from across Government
(including from the FCO, BERR, MOD, and HMRC), and covers areas
such as: industry awareness of export controls; capacity-building;
customs procedures; and assistance with drafting legislation.
It also includes targeted lobbying on political issues such as
how to ensure that export controls and customs activities are
used effectively to implementing UN Security Council resolutions.
5.14 As the resources available for export
control outreach work are limited, HMG efforts are prioritised;
in 2008, our priority countries are China, Malaysia, Pakistan,
and the UAE. We have also hosted inward visits from Jordan and
Thailand. The Committees on Arms Exports Controls have also kindly
agreed to participate in an Outreach visit to their opposite numbers
in Kiev, to focus on Parliamentary Scrutiny. This follows an inward
visit by Ukrainian parliamentarians in 2007. (Further information
on outreach activities was provided in the 2007 Report on
the UK's Strategic Export Controls (pages 19-20) and is provided
on an ongoing basis directly to the Committee on Arms Export Controls
at their request.)
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
5.15 Launched by President Bush in May 2003,
the PSI is a multi-national initiative that aims to establish
a more coordinated and effective basis through which to combat
the illicit trafficking of WMD and related materials. PSI is not
treaty-based but participants are committed to a Statement of
Interdiction Principles to improve their efforts to impede and
stop shipments of WMD. Nations meet in a number of formats and
take part in an exercise programme intended to test national capabilities
and decision-making structures. PSI is best characterised as an
activity rather than an organisation and remains an open and flexible
mechanism.
5.16 The UK plays an active role in PSI,
hosting and participating in exercises, outreach events and meetings
of the Operational Experts Group, the PSI "steering committee".
The PSI 5th Anniversary Senior-Level Meeting was held in Washington
on 28 May 2008. The focus was building on past successes
and strengthening the initiative for the future. Nearly 90 endorsees
of the initiative attended the meeting.
5.17 To ensure PSI continues to be effective
we need to find ways to persuade key non-endorsees such as China,
Malaysia and Republic of Korea to support PSI, encourage less
active endorsees to participate more and ensure that PSI meetings
and exercises remain focussed on operational issues.
UN Security Council Resolution 1540
5.18 UNSCR 1540 (2004) is a Chapter
VII resolution which imposes legally-binding obligations on all
UN member states to establish and enforce domestic legislation
to prevent weapons of mass destruction and related delivery systems
falling into the hands of non-state actors such as terrorists,
criminals and proliferation networks, such as AQ Khan's. The resolution
seeks to strengthen existing non-proliferation mechanisms by focusing
on areas which are under-represented in the non-proliferation
architecture, most notably in two areas:
(i) Non-State Actors. Pre-existing WMD related
treaties fail to address adequately the role played by non-state
actors in the proliferation of WMD materials or their means of
delivery and assume that only states have the intention and capability
to develop WMD. UNSCR 1540 seeks to address this by requiring
all states to tighten their domestic legal framework so as to
criminalize and enforce measures against WMD proliferation to
and by non-state actors;
(ii) Non-signatories of International Treaties.
As UNSCR 1540 is mandatory on all UN member states, it has
the advantage of applying to those states which have chosen not
to sign up to the NPT, CWC or BTWC.
5.19 UNSCR 1540 established a Committee
of the Security Council (known as the 1540 Committee) charged
with reporting to the Security Council on the implementation of
the resolution by States, which were themselves to report to the
Committee on their implementation activities. This Committee has
played a central role in raising awareness and promoting implementation.
The resolution gave this Committee a life of only two years but,
following extensive diplomatic activity by the UK, in April 2006 a
further resolution (UNSCR 1673) was passed extending its life
for a further two years and in April 2008 another resolution
(UNSCR 1810) extended its life for a further three years with
a focus on operational capacity-building. This should enable the
Committee to encourage and to provide practical or financial assistance
to those States which still need to improve their performance
in this crucial area.
Proliferation Finance
5.20 HM Treasury leads on work within the
international Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to identify future
methods of tackling the financing of proliferation activity. They
are also working closely with HM Revenue and Customs, the Serious
and Organised Crime Agency and the Financial Services Authority
on the UK domestic/legal response to this issue. We await an expected
FATF report on Proliferation Finance and aim to build on its recommendations
and to assist states which do not have capacity to enforce the
recommendations themselves.
5.21 In the meantime, a number of financial
restrictions have been put in place against Iran (see below).
Under UN Security Council Resolutions, Bank Sepah's assets have
been banned. The EU has also frozen Bank Melli's assets, and is
in the process of setting rigorous reporting requirements for
the Iranian banks, especially Bank Saderat. These financial restrictions
have limited Iran's ability to move funds to and from abroad,
making their proliferation-sensitive activities more difficult.
Student Screening
5.22 The UK's Academic Technology Approval
Scheme (ATAS) has been in place for nearly one year. We are now
able to provide, on request, nationality-specific reports of clearances
issued on a regular basis. An interim review of ATAS has already
taken place and made several suggestions on funding and upgrading,
including developing ATAS IT capacity. We will shortly be undertaking
a full review of the Scheme, with input from Partners across Government,
Posts and academia.
(iii) Robust action against states which break
the rules
5.23 It must be clearly and widely understood
and agreed that all States Parties of the NPT and other international
legal instruments must abide by their legally-binding obligations.
There need to be meaningful and valuable incentives for all states
which do so, complemented by robust and swift costs imposed on
those states which do not. Establishing agreement on this needs
to be a key outcome of the NPT Review Conference in 2010. Bringing
other states with us in this direction is clearly vital. We need
to build a common understanding of where the main threats lie
and the best way to tackle them.
5.24 Consultations on proliferation issues
among P5 representatives in the Security Council help build
common understandings and pave the way to greater unity at times
of crises. Despite the challenges of pressure of other work and
differences of approach among the P5, we would like to see these
become more regular and to include looking ahead, to anticipate
and as far as possible to head off emerging proliferation threats.
5.25 Since the international response to
the nuclear weapons programme in North Korea and to Iran's breach
of IAEA safeguards has been addressed extensively in other recent
submissions by the FCO to the Foreign Affairs Committee, the following
offers only an overview and update on both issues. It also briefly
addresses the situations in Syria and Libya.
Iran
5.26 The UK Government considers that it
is vital that the international community remains united in order
to compel Iran to come clean about the past, present and future
ambitions for its nuclear programme. The UK does not deny Iran
its rights to civil nuclear power under the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and in fact has made a generous offer including help to
develop this. But we and the international community are concerned
that Iran hid aspects of its programme for two decades and continues
its proliferation sensitive activities, such as uranium enrichment,
despite the lack of any convincing civilian use. As successive
IAEA reports have made clear, Iran refuses to answer key questions
concerning possible military aspects of its programme. Unless
Iran can be deterred from continuing its proliferation-sensitive
activities until such time that trust has been restored, there
are concerns that other states in the region may feel that they
need to respond to the risk of Iran armed with a nuclear weapon.
There is a further danger that Iran's actions will undermine the
wider counter-proliferation architecture.
5.27 Iran's consistent failure to abide
by its commitments and to stop all enrichment-related activities
has led directly to a series of UN Security Council Resolutions,
most recently 1835 of 27 September 2008, including three
resolutions (1737, 1747 and 1803) imposing sanctions on Iran.
At the same time, the E3+3 (the UK, France, Germany, the
US, Russia and China) have been pursuing a dual-track strategy
of sanctions to press Iran to comply with its obligations and
dialogue to persuade Iran to change its path. The E3+3 have
consistently stated that they are not seeking to deny Iran its
right to civil nuclear power and in their June 2006 proposal
to Iran they have included help with developing a modern nuclear
power programme. Javier Solana subsequently handed over a revised
proposal in Tehran on 14 June. Solana met the Iranians again
on 19 July in Geneva. Iran's non-committal replies to these
efforts to seek a diplomatic solution have been disappointing.
Meanwhile it continues to develop its uranium enrichment capability
at increasing speed. Diplomatic efforts to find a way forward
continue. But the leaders of Iran need to understand that they
have a choice: further defiance leading to increasing confrontation
and economic and political isolation, or acceptance of the E3+3's
latest generous offer of June 2008 leading to a transformed
relationship with the international community.
5.28 EU Member States have sought to implement
UNSCR 1803 through the adoption of a revised Common Position
on 8 August 2008 and an EC Regulation currently being
finalised. The new Common Position reinforces financial vigilance,
extends the EU ban on certain dual-use goods, includes provisions
for carrying out cargo inspections on Iranian shipping lines and
calls for restraint in export credits for Iran.
5.29 The Director General of the IAEA issued
his latest report on Iran on 15 September. As he did in his
May report, the Director General reported that Iran has continued
to fail to answer the IAEA's questions relating to studies with
a military dimension, which he notes are of "serious concern".
This was followed up by a new UN Security Council Resolution 1835,
unanimously adopted on 27 September, which reaffirmed the
call on Iran to comply with its international obligations. The
Foreign Secretary welcomed the resolution, emphasizing that it
"is designed to send a very particular signal … that
our resolve has not weakened on this issue … and
that a very clear message needs to go out around the world that
the two-track policy—of engagement on the one hand, including
on economic and scientific matters, but also sanctions in the
face of Iranian defiance of the UN and the IAEA inspectors—remains
very much in play and it's important that the unity that does
exist about this issue is not clouded."
5.30 Iran needs to establish, in an open
and transparent manner, that its ambitions are, as it claims,
entirely peaceful and to suspend uranium enrichment. Once that
has been achieved we will be able to forge a more productive and
positive relationship between Iran and the international community.
Until it is achieved, we will seek to increase the international
pressure on Iran.
North Korea
5.31 The DPRK's nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles programmes are the most immediate threat to security
in the region. Besides the potential threat to the DPRK's neighbours
and the wider risk from onward proliferation, an unchecked DPRK
nuclear programme would undermine global non-proliferation norms
weakening our ability to counter proliferation elsewhere.
5.32 By conducting a nuclear test in 2006,
North Korea contravened its international legal obligations under
Article II of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, whereby it
undertook not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.
The UK recognises the sovereign right of every state to withdraw
from its Treaty obligations. However, this withdrawal must take
place within the requirements of the Treaty (Article X in the
case of the NPT). We do not believe that the DPRK has fulfilled
these obligations. We continue, therefore, to regard it as a State
Party, bound by the provisions of the Treaty.
5.33 On 3 October 2007, in return for
political and financial concessions from the other parties to
the Six Party Talks (US, Japan, China, Republic of Korea, and
Russia), the DPRK agreed to disable its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon
and to make a declaration of its nuclear programmes. Although
the North Koreans missed the original deadline of 31 December
2007 for the declaration, they finally produced it on 26 June
2008. In a symbolic gesture, the cooling tower at Yongbyon was
destroyed on the 27 June in front of the media. In return
for the declaration, the US has instigated the procedure necessary
to remove the DPRK from the Trading with the Enemy Act, and the
State Sponsors of Terrorism List.
5.34 But Washington has made clear that
sanctions can be re-imposed, depending on satisfactory verification
and on the DPRK's actions and that it would not take the final
steps in this process until arrangements to verify the DPRK's
declaration were agreed. When no such agreement was reached, and
the US therefore refused to take the final delisting step, the
DPRK retaliated by suspending the removal of spent fuel from the
Yongbyon reactor that had hitherto been taking place and have
started to restore some facilities, had IAEA staff remove the
seals within the fuel reprocessing plant and barred access to
the plant by the IAEA and US monitoring teams. The focus now is
on trying to find a way forward out of this impasse.
5.35 There are concerns that the DPRK is
being allowed to move towards normalisation while falling short
of the "complete and correct" declaration promised last
October. But the deal is a compromise in order to pursue the central
goal of dismantling the DPRK's plutonium production capability
and removing their existing plutonium stockpile, based on an assessment
that any past HEU programme is probably defunct, and that extracting
an accurate account of past DPRK proliferation activities and
clandestine programmes is less important than depriving them of
the fissile material which we know they have actually produced.
5.36 The next phase will involve the DPRK
giving up its plutonium stockpile in exchange for normalised relations
with the US—and this will demand unprecedented levels of
trust on both sides, and robust and intrusive verification arrangements
inside the DPRK.
5.37 While not a member of the Six Party
Talks, the UK strongly supports the process. We remain in touch
with all the parties, urging the North Koreans to fulfil their
obligations, and encouraging the Chinese (including through the
EU) to keep up their pressure on the DPRK. We also continue to
urge DPRK to adhere to UN Security Council Resolutions 1695 and
1718. We will consider seriously any request for UK practical
assistance. At the same time, we continue to keep close to partners
about any requirements that are beyond the IAEA's remit, including
possible future dismantling of weapons. We are working closely
with EU partners to maintain support for the Six Party Talks and
to keep up international pressure on human rights in DPRK.
Syria
5.38 In April, the CIA presented compelling
evidence to Congress and the media on clandestine Syrian activity
to build a nuclear reactor with North Korean help (the Israeli
Airforce destroyed the site in September 2007). From 22-24 June
an IAEA team inspected the Al Kibar site and had meetings in Damascus
with the Syrian Government. In his opening statement to the IAEA
Board of Governors in September, the Director-General said that
samples taken from the site are still being analysed but so far
no indication of any nuclear material had been found. In order
to assess the veracity of information available to the IAEA, they
asked the Syrian authorities in July to provide access to additional
information and locations. Syria has not yet responded to this
request but has indicated that any further developments would
depend on the results of the samples taken during the first visit.
The Director General encouraged Syria to show maximum cooperation
and transparency and to provide all the information needed by
the Agency to complete its assessment. It is clearly vital that
the IAEA should be able to verify that Syria has remained compliant
with its legally binding obligations as a State Party to the NPT
and not broken UNSCR 1718.
Libya
5.39 The example of Libya demonstrates what
can be achieved by concerted joint diplomatic efforts. In December
2003, Libya announced that it intended to give up its covert WMD
programmes including a covert nuclear weapons programme and to
restrict its ballistic missile programmes. This followed nine
months of secret discussions between Libya, the UK, and the US
and was followed in 2004 by a further period of intense tripartite
work, now with IAEA and the Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) involvement as well, to make sure the
Libyan decision was implemented and met with due recognition.
As a result, Libya has seen genuine benefits including the lifting
of EU sanctions and the US removing Libya from the State Sponsors
of Terrorism list. Both decisions have enabled redevelopment of
political, commercial, scientific and technical contact. We are
currently funding a Strategic Programme Fund project to assist
Libyan former nuclear weapons specialists to establish new and
sustainable business streams based on the nuclear facilities at
Tajura. This process has also led to the Libyan accession to the
Chemical Weapons Convention, which is leading to the conversion
of its chemical weapons production facility into a pharmaceutical
plant which will manufacture drugs for Africa On 24 September,
the IAEA Board adopted a resolution (co-sponsored by the UK) highlighting
Libya as a model of co-operation and transparency and supporting
the recommendation of the Director-General to implement safeguards
in Libya as a routine matter.
Working to bring the remaining three states into
the NPT
5.40 We are committed, including through
the EU Strategy Against Proliferation Of Weapons Of Mass Destruction,
to the universalisation of multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation
treaties and agreements. Together with our European Union partners,
we have carried out extensive lobbying activity to secure adherence
by all states to key non-proliferation agreements, particularly
the NPT and in the meantime, we are working to bring them closer
to conformity with its rules.
India
5.41 The EU Common Position and UNSCR 1172 call
on India and Pakistan to accede to the NPT as Non-Nuclear Weapons
States without conditions and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). That is and remains the basis
of the UK Government's position. At the same time, we are working
to draw India into the broader non-proliferation framework. Hence
we have actively supported the US/India Civil Nuclear Initiative
in the context of which India has agreed to put its civil nuclear
facilities and material under safeguards and to make a number
of important non-proliferation commitments. This initiative involved
the negotiation and approval of a new India/IAEA safeguards agreement
(achieved in August 2008) and an exemption by the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) to its Guidelines to allow civil nuclear exports to
India.
5.42 A number of NSG Participating Governments,
as well as UK domestic commentators, had concerns over the implications
of the Initiative for the international non-proliferation regime.
The UK worked hard in the NSG for consensus on key issues such
as the provisions for a review mechanism, making clear that the
NSG would regularly discuss all matters relating to the implementation
of the decision, and undertake urgent consultations if circumstances
required; and how to handle the issue of the export of enrichment
and reprocessing technology (any such exports would remain subject
to the relevant provisions of the NSG Guidelines).
5.43 In a statement by its Foreign Minister
on 5 September (a copy is at Annex 3), India reiterated its
"long-standing, steadfast commitment to the universal, non-discriminatory
and total elimination of all nuclear weapons", to maintain
its voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing, to the conclusion
of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, to an effective and comprehensive
system of national export controls and all necessary steps to
secure its nuclear materials and technology, and to sign and adhere
to an Additional Protocol with the IAEA with respect to India's
civil nuclear facilities.
5.44 The Foreign Secretary warmly welcomed
the NSG agreement on 6 September: "We believe it will
make a significant contribution to energy and climate security,
as well as developmental and economic objectives, for India and
the International Community. India's clear commitment to a voluntary
unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing is also important. Today's
result represents a gain for the non-proliferation regime by bringing
India further into the broader non-proliferation framework, a
framework the UK firmly supports."
5.45 We look forward to building on our
engagement with India on a full range of non-proliferation and
arms control issues. We believe the agreement between the US and
India will have a positive impact on the broader nuclear non-proliferation
framework. We remain committed to the objective of universal NPT
adherence, but recognise this is a long-term objective.
Pakistan
5.46 Pakistan's strategic posture, including
nuclear, is clearly framed around its perception of the threat
from India. We are working to reduce the risk of a nuclear conflict
between Pakistan and India by supporting Indo-Pakistan rapprochement,
including through the Composite Dialogue, and encouraging dialogue
and trust building initiatives.
5.47 We continue to pursue our long-term
objective, which is for Pakistan to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear
weapon state. In the shorter term, we are looking for ways in
which we can ensure Pakistan aligns itself more closely with NPT
principles. In particular, we continue to argue that it is in
Pakistan's interests to agree to start negotiations on a Fissile
Material Cut-Off Treaty (see below) in the Conference on Disarmament
without preconditions.
5.48 We want to work with Pakistan and others
(possibly using the offices of the IAEA) to improve civil nuclear
security and to encourage Pakistan's continuing active participation
in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. We also
need to work to ensure that any civil nuclear power new-builds
are put under safeguards alongside existing facilities and that
more nuclear power does not result in an increased proliferation
risk. A Civil Nuclear Initiative with Pakistan on the lines of
that agreed with India is not under consideration, particularly
given concerns over the AQ Khan clandestine supply network.
Israel
5.49 Israel has never admitted to having
nuclear weapons but there is a widespread assumption that it does.
Its neighbours believe Israel should renounce such weapons by
acceding forthwith to the NPT (which it can only do as a non-nuclear-weapon
State) and to a Middle East Zone Free of WMD (which the UK has
actively supported, see below). Led by Egypt, they regularly seek
to highlight this issue at international gatherings, in particular
at NPT Preparatory Committees and Review Conferences. Israel,
for its part, while never wholly rejecting the possibility of
eventually acceding to the NPT, has made it clear that it will
not do so before a comprehensive peace settlement is in place.
5.50 The UK has consistently urged Israel
to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear
weapon state, and to sign a full-scope safeguards agreement with
the IAEA. Under such an agreement, Israel's nuclear facilities
would be subject to regular inspection to detect any diversion
of nuclear materials for weapons production.
Supporting Nuclear and WMD-free zones
5.51 The UK remains fully committed to the
negative security assurances we gave to the Non-Nuclear Weapon
States Parties to the NPT in our 1995 letter to the UN Secretary
General, subsequently noted in United Nations Security Council
Resolution 984. These assurances state that the UK will not use
nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear States Parties to the NPT,
except in the case of attack on the UK, or its allies, carried
out by such a state in alliance with a nuclear weapon state.
5.52 We believe that the most appropriate
way to give further effect to the stated desire of the Non-Nuclear
Weapon States for treaty-based security assurances is to make
further progress with Nuclear Weapons Free Zones. This will provide
credible, regional, internationally binding legal instruments
on negative security assurances, which many are looking for. The
UK has achieved this through our ratification of the relevant
protocols to the treaties of Tlatelolco (Latin America and Caribbean),
Raratonga (South Pacific) and Pelindaba (Africa—not yet
in force) establishing nuclear weapon-free zones in those particular
regions and has, as a consequence, granted treaty-based negative
security assurances to almost 100 countries.
5.53 We are keen to help resolve outstanding
differences that will enable the Nuclear Weapons States to sign
protocols to the Treaties of Bangkok (South East Asia) and Semipalatinsk
(Central Asia) and thereby bring into force the South-East Asia
and Central Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones.
5.54 The UK Government fully supports the
principle of establishing a Middle East Zone free from all weapons
of mass destruction. We co-sponsored the resolution on the Middle
East, which called for the establishment of a Middle East Zone
free from Weapons of Mass Destruction, at the 1995 Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference and have consistently
supported similar resolutions at the First Committee of the UN
General Assembly. But we also recognise that the achievement of
a MEWMDFZ is unlikely in the absence of a comprehensive regional
peace settlement in which Israel is recognised by all its neighbours.
It will also require confidence in Iran's compliance with all
its treaty and other international non-proliferation obligations:
the unanimously adopted UN Security Council Resolution 1747 recalled
that a solution to the Iran nuclear issue would contribute towards
the objective of a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction.
6. PILLAR TWO:
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
6.1 The UK is committed to working towards
the ultimate goal of a world free from nuclear weapons. The UK
Government does not regard this as simply a theoretical obligation
under Article VI of the NPT; rather, it is a legally-binding obligation
which we must strive to achieve as soon as practically possible.
However, regrettably, the conditions for total nuclear disarmament
do not exist today. Hence the Government's decision to retain
our ability to have an independent nuclear deterrent beyond the
2020s. The continuing risk from the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
and the likelihood that a number of other countries will still
have substantial nuclear arsenals, mean that our minimum nuclear
deterrent capability, currently represented by Trident, remains
a necessary element of our security although, as described below,
we have been able to further reduce this minimum capability.
6.2 But we remain absolutely committed to
working actively to create the conditions under which a nuclear
weapons free world can be achieved and to moving more decisively
towards it. We want to see a renewed political determination to
that goal.
6.3 While there is no conditionality between
progress on disarmament and non-proliferation, progress on one
reinforces the other and the disarmament obligations enshrined
in Article VI of the NPT are a vital element of the global nuclear
arms control regime. To build and sustain international consensus
for non-proliferation, we need to ensure progress on the interests
of all parties. We have to recognise that, despite the substantial
reductions made in nuclear arsenals since the Cold War, there
is nevertheless a widespread perception by many states that the
five recognized Nuclear Weapons States are not living up to their
obligations under Article VI to pursue nuclear disarmament, in
part because of the absence of a clear forward plan. Renewing
the credibility of this commitment will be critical to reinvigorating
the commitment of Non-Nuclear Weapons States to essential WMD
counter-proliferation measures.
6.4 UK action to take forward nuclear disarmament
lies primarily in four areas:
(i) Reductions in existing stockpiles of nuclear
weapons;
(ii) UK technical work as a "Disarmament
Laboratory";
(iv) At a global level: the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.
(i) Reductions in nuclear weapons
6.5 The UK has made significant progress
in respect to its disarmament obligations as set out in Article
VI of the NPT. Since the end of the Cold War we have:
(i) withdrawn and dismantled our maritime tactical
nuclear capability and the RAF's WE177 freefall bomb;
(ii) significantly reduced the operational status
of our nuclear weapons system. Normally, only one Trident submarine
is on deterrent patrol at any one time. It has a maximum of 48 warheads
on board, and is normally at several days "notice to fire".
Its missiles are not targeted at any country;
(iii) now met the commitment outlined in the
2006 White Paper on the future of the United Kingdom nuclear
deterrent to reduce the number of operationally available warheads
to fewer than 160. The explosive power of our nuclear arsenal
has been reduced by 75% since the end of the cold war;
(iv) not conducted a nuclear test explosion since
1991. We ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in
1998;
(v) ceased production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and increased
our transparency with regard to our fissile material holdings.
We have produced historical records of our defence holdings of
both plutonium and highly enriched uranium.
6.6 The UK holds only a small fraction of
the global stockpile of nuclear warheads. Our consistent position
remains that when it will be useful to include these in any negotiations
to reduce warhead numbers, we will willingly do so.
6.7 The US has similarly reduced its total
arsenal by over a half since the Cold War. It plans a further
reduction of 15% by 2012. This brings its stockpile to less than
one quarter of its Cold War high, the lowest level for 50 years.
France, before Easter, announced its intention to cut its arsenal
to below 300 warheads. Russia too has made significant reductions
under START. Overall, over 40,000 nuclear warheads have been
destroyed by the US and Russia since the end of the Cold War.
6.8 But further urgent steps to reduce the
numbers of nuclear weapons are essential. The US and Russia retain
some 95% of the total. START, the mainstay of their bilateral
arms control effort, will expire in 2009. We welcome their commitment
to work for a successor agreement, and hope that this will achieve
greater reductions to come, going beyond the reductions already
agreed in the 2002 Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions.
We will continue to work closely with the US Administration, current
and future, to strengthen US confidence in the international rules-based
system and commitment to multilateral action.
(ii) The UK as a "Disarmament Laboratory"
6.9 In parallel, we are undertaking analysis,
as a "disarmament laboratory", of what the commitment
to a world free of nuclear weapons means in practice. We want
the UK to act as a role model and testing ground for measures
on disarmament, to determine the requirements for verifiable elimination
of nuclear weapons, enabling us all to have confidence that when
a state says it has fully and irrevocably dismantled a warhead,
we can all be assured it has. We want to help clarify what verification
and enforcement regimes may be necessary to enable the practical
attainment of that goal without creating new instabilities.
6.10 Whilst acknowledging that verification
of multilateral nuclear disarmament is a political as well as
technical issue, the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) is developing
technical expertise in this area. It has also undertaken a cooperation
initiative with several Norwegian defence laboratories, which
is already providing valuable insights into how future multilateral
discussions might proceed at a technical level. The challenge
is to develop technologies which strike the right balance between
protecting security and proliferation considerations and at the
same time providing sufficient international access and verification.
The sensitivities in verifying the dismantlement of warheads are
considerable. Access to nuclear warheads is tightly restricted—for
good reasons. Not only are national security concerns at stake,
but the NPT itself prohibits any transfer of information relating
to nuclear weapon design. The AWE reports its latest conclusions
to the international community at meetings of the parties to the
NPT.
(iii) P5 discussions
6.11 We must continue to foster greater
confidence and build relationships on a number of levels, both
political and technical, between the five Nuclear Weapons States.
In February 2008, the Secretary of State for Defence proposed
a conference of the P5 nuclear weapons laboratories to discuss
the issues on verifying nuclear disarmament. Discussions on the
scope and format of this conference are moving forward with P5 colleagues.
6.12 We also want to engage the other members
of the P5 in deepening our discussions on transparency and
confidence building measures (CBMs) to promote greater trust and
confidence as a catalyst for further reductions, without undermining
the credibility of existing nuclear deterrents. We co-sponsored
a report by the International Institute of Strategic Studies on
the practical steps required for the elimination of nuclear weapons
which has recently been published. This work has been valuable
in identifying a wide range of issues, both of a practical and
a policy nature, which will need to resolved if the goal of a
nuclear weapons free world is to be realised. Discussion of these
and other issues amongst the Nuclear Weapons States needs to begin.
(iv) Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
(CTBT) and Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)
6.13 The UK continues, in good faith,
to pursue multilateral negotiations toward disarmament within
the NPT and other disarmament fora. At the global level, the next
key steps towards a nuclear weapons free world are already clear:
early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) and the start of negotiations, without preconditions, on
a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).
6.14 The entry into force of the CTBT would
constrain the development of new types of nuclear weapons and
would therefore represent an important step towards global disarmament.
The UK and France were the first Nuclear Weapons States to ratify
the CTBT and we are working for its entry into force at the earliest
possible date. On 24 September, a CTBT Ministerial Meeting
was held in New York to reaffirm commitment to the CTBT and to
promote its entry into force; Dr Howells made a statement to underline
the UK's support. Following the adoption of its third Joint Action
in support of the CTBT's international monitoring system, the
EU also plan a new round of diplomatic demarches to promote entry
into force. Both US Presidential candidates have indicated readiness
to take forward the US debate on CTBT ratification, and this is
something on which we will seek to build.
6.15 In the meantime, the UK is committed
to furthering the development of the CTBT's verification regime,
including completion of the international monitoring system, in
support of which the EU has recently adopted a third Joint Action.
The CTBTO Provisional Technical Secretariat ran a major on-site
inspection exercise in Kazakhstan at the former Soviet nuclear
test site from 27 August to 30 September; UK experts
from AWE Aldermaston, University of Keele and the FCO participated.
6.16 In addition to the CTBT, a key priority
remains the negotiation of a treaty banning the future production
of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices, an FMCT. This is an essential step towards the global
elimination of nuclear weapons. The start of negotiations in the
Conference on Disarmament remains blocked. We continue to argue
forcefully that allowing negotiations to begin does not undermine
any country's position on a final treaty. We have been very active
at high levels in making the case to reluctant states that it
is in their interests to enable the negotiations to go ahead without
preconditions.
6.17 The UK is legally entitled to hold
stocks of nuclear materials needed for national security outside
international safeguards. But we have declared details of the
size of these stocks and placed those not required for national
security under EURATOM safeguards and made them liable for inspection
by the IAEA. All planned future reprocessing and enrichment in
the UK will take place under international safeguards. In the
Strategic Defence Review in 1998, we announced that we would forego
our right as a recognized Nuclear Weapons State to withdraw fissile
material from these safeguarded stocks, except for small quantities
of material unsuitable for weapons purposes (and this would be
made public).
7. PILLAR THREE:
PEACEFUL USES
OF NUCLEAR
ENERGY
7.1 We remain absolutely committed to upholding
the inalienable right of all States Party to the NPT under Article
IV to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination and in accordance with
the relevant provisions of the Treaty and the relevant principles
on safeguards. We are working to create a viable regime of nuclear
fuel assurances under IAEA auspices to guarantee supply of nuclear
fuel to reinforce that right.
7.2 Recent years have seen a resurgence
of interest in civil nuclear power across the globe for sound
economic, energy and security reasons. Nuclear power can make
a significant contribution to meeting commitments to mitigate
damaging climate change whilst at the same time meeting increasing
demands on energy supplies. Although there is limited proliferation
concern over States running nuclear reactors, there are proliferation
risks in attempting to master the entire fuel cycle, in particular
enrichment and reprocessing. These technologies could be misused
to produce materials suitable for weapons.
7.3 In order to provide attractive and secure
alternatives to States contemplating going down the route of developing
their own fuel cycle technologies, and thereby mitigate the above
proliferation risks, some in the international community have
begun to develop initiatives whereby security and assurance of
supply of the relevant fuel products would be guaranteed.
7.4 In 2005, and with the Director-General
taking a lead, the IAEA published a report that looked at the
proliferation risks of a growth in civil nuclear power. A subsequent
report in 2007 set out 3 main approaches that would
help minimise the proliferation risks but improve assurance of
supply. These approaches are:
(i) the reinforcement of existing market mechanisms;
(ii) involvement of governments and the IAEA
in the assurance of supply, including the establishment of low-enriched
uranium stocks as reserves;
(iii) conversion of existing national uranium
enrichment and reprocessing enterprises into multilateral ones
under international management and control, and setting up new
multilateral enterprises on regional and international levels.
7.5 We welcome the work of the IAEA on multilateral
approaches to address this challenge. Such an approach would support
implementation of the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy
in a safe and secure fashion, preserve the existing competitive
open market, respond to the real needs of recipient countries
and simultaneously strengthen the non-proliferation regime.
7.6 HMG's work in this area continues to
expand. The UK and our Urenco partners Germany and the Netherlands
co-hosted a conference in Berlin in April 2008 to follow-up
on our joint declaration entitled "Multilateral Cooperation
in Energy Security". 35 countries were represented,
including both countries considering civil nuclear power for the
first time and those which supply nuclear fuel and enrichment
services, to discuss the practical implementation of Article IV
of the NPT. We intend to use the major international conference
in London (the date is yet to be confirmed but is likely to be
early 2009) announced by the Prime Minister in Parliament on 19 March
to take this work forward. We are now working on the scope, timing
and objectives of the conference.
7.7 One of the key challenges we face is
to secure agreement from NAM states which have been sceptical
of these proposals and the EU is looking at ways in which it can
assist. Many see them as an attempt to maintain the current supplier
monopoly or as violating their rights under Article IV of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty to the peaceful exploitation of nuclear
technology. We need to reassure them that these proposals are
in fact intended as affirming their Article IV rights rather than
undermining them.
Nuclear Fuel Cycle proposals
7.8 A number of proposals addressing the
issue of the nuclear fuel cycle are already on the table. Many
are complementary rather than in direct competition. We aim to
develop a viable regime of proposals that will support States'
rights to the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear technology.
We anticipate this will draw on a number of the initiatives that
have been put forward. The four main sets of ideas currently under
discussion are:
(i) Enriched Uranium Reserves/Fuel Bank
7.9 Proposals from the US, Russia and the
Nuclear Threat Initiative (an influential US NGO) would create
stockpiles of nuclear fuel under IAEA control (though the host
country would still exercise control over the release of the fuel).
Such stocks would be drawn down if the commercial market failed
to deliver for other than commercial or non-proliferation reasons.
This is instinctively attractive to many in the international
community. We recognise that an international nuclear fuel bank
has the potential to offer genuine benefits in terms of energy
security and reduced proliferation risks. Challenges which will
need to be addressed include the costs (a typical reactor takes
100 tonnes of low enriched fuel whose raw value, without
fabrication into fuel rods, is around US$ 20 Million at current
rates); coping with demands for fuel for any type of reactor,
all of which require different enrichment levels; where the reserve
would be situated; how national legal issues would be resolved;
and who would be responsible for security.
(ii) Multinational Enrichment Facilities
7.10 This German proposal involves the concept
of ceding land to the IAEA on which to build a new fuel-cycle
facility. Likewise this is instinctively attractive but with some
practical difficulties. Such a facility would only be justifiable
from a proliferation perspective if the region in which it sits
has sufficient nuclear power stations to use the output of the
centre. Further discussion is needed to clarify who would operate
the plant and how the staff would be selected so that they do
not present an additional proliferation risk, and what would be
the impact on the commercial market of the operation of the centre.
(iii) Global Nuclear Energy Programme (GNEP)
7.11 This US proposal seeks to develop new
technologies to provide proliferation-resistant nuclear power.
It also contains aspects of fuel assurances through the concept
of fuel leasing and take-back. Its intention to limit developing
states to yet-to-be-developed proliferation-resistant reactor
technology is questioned by some NAM states. But it has attracted
positive engagement from both well-established civil nuclear power
countries (including the UK—we joined earlier this year—the
other P5, Japan, South Korea) as well as some states aspiring
to develop civil nuclear power industries. Some 21 partner
States have now signed up to the GNEP principles. The Programme
has the potential to draw together experts who are able to discuss
and identify ways forward in a cooperative manner which other
forums, such as the IAEA, would find difficult in this potentially
contentious area.
(iv) Enrichment Bond
7.12 This UK proposal is intended as a key
component in any international agreed regime of nuclear fuel assurances.
As such we do not see it as the sole proposal to be adopted, but
as one of several different proposals that would complement each
other. For example, the Enrichment Bond could be adopted in the
short term while others, such as the German proposal, are likely
to take longer before they become practical realities.
7.13 The idea is based on assurance of supply
and relies on the commercial market to continue to provide the
actual fuel and enrichment, but backs this with a "bond"
between the supplier state and the customer state, overseen by
the IAEA. This "bond" would guarantee the supply of
fuel services if the Customer State had its normal commercial
supplies withheld for other than commercial or non-proliferation
reasons. The customer would still be expected to pay the commercial
going rate for its fuel under the "bond". This approach
does not need any physical buffer, costs of set up are minimal
and, with the IAEA acting as the Guarantor, the international
community should have confidence in the "bonds". Any
other supplier state could also offer equivalent "bonds";
this would be beneficial in both sharing the risks and increasing
confidence in the supply market. States are not asked to explicitly
forego developing indigenous enrichment capabilities, although
the Bond provides an economic and proliferation incentive not
to do so and the Supplier State(s) can choose which State they
sign a bond with.
7.14 We are engaging with potential recipient
and supplier states to develop the proposal further. We will also
be working on the legal framework within which the enrichment
bond will operate. We aim to have this in place soon and to have
at least one recipient State signed up to the Bond by the 2010 NPT
Review Conference. We have asked many NAM States for their views
on the proposal. The feedback so far has been mostly positive
with many key NAM states expressing their interest to know more
about the proposal.
Memoranda of Understanding
7.15 At the same time as pursuing the Enrichment
Bond proposal, we have also been working bilaterally with states
such as the UAE and Jordan in support of their plans for civil
nuclear energy, which they hope will meet their domestic energy
needs. The UAE announced plans to develop a civil nuclear programme
on 20 April 2008. The announcement emphasised UAE's intention
to be transparent and committed to safety and full compliance
with IAEA obligations and international co-operation. Domestic
enrichment and re-processing has been specifically forsworn and
the UAE have additionally said that they will adopt the Additional
Protocol and the Convention on Nuclear Safety, Spent Fuel Management
and the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. We hope the UAE
will provide a model for countries embarking responsibly on the
civil nuclear path. A final UAE decision is likely in mid-2009,
but in the meantime a UK-UAE MOU was signed by Lord Digby Jones
during his visit to the UAE on 15 May in support of the UAE's
goal of developing civil nuclear power.
7.16 A similar agreement was signed with
Jordan on 29 June. Jordan has a solid non-proliferation record
having implemented the Additional Protocol and signed up to the
full range of relevant international agreements. Jordan signed
up to the US led Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) shortly
after signing a civil-nuclear agreement with the US in September
2007. The GNEP principles include long term commitments to promote
the development of more proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors
and the responsible disposal of nuclear waste. Given Jordan's
clear commitment to non-proliferation the UK Government is working
closely with the private sector to support all aspects of Jordan's
development of nuclear civil power, in line with existing international
obligations.
7.17 A number of other Middle Eastern countries
are interested in developing civil nuclear energy plants in the
near future. These include Egypt (2018), Turkey (2015), Morocco
(2017), and Saudi Arabia (which have signed an MOU on civil-nuclear
cooperation with the US).
8. CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
8.1 The CWC entered into force on 29 April
1997. It bans the development, production, stockpiling and the
use of chemical weapons, and requires the destruction of existing
stockpiles by no later than 29 April 2012. It has a rigorous
verification and inspection regime, thus making it the first multilateral
disarmament agreement that aims to ban an entire category of WMD
in a verifiable manner.
8.2 184 states have acceded to the
CWC, with only 11 remaining outside (Angola, Barbados, Burma,
DPRK, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Somalia
and Syria). One-third of the 8.6 million chemical munitions
and containers covered by the Convention and one-third of the
world's declared stockpile of approximately 71,000 metric
tonnes of chemical agent have been verifiably destroyed. Since
the CWC entered into force, two States have completed destruction
of their entire CW stockpile; a further four States are following
agreed destruction plans.
8.3 The UK is strongly committed to the
Chemical Weapons Convention and to the Organisation for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and attaches the utmost importance
to the full implementation of the CWC. Since entry into force
in 1997, the UK has played a full and active role in the CWC's
policy and decision-making bodies within the OPCW. The Second
Review Conference took place in April 2008 and agreed a comprehensive
final document reaffirming the strong commitment of all States
Parties to achieve universality, complete the destruction of chemical
weapons, further strengthen verification measures to ensure non-proliferation,
provide assistance and protection, and promote the uses of chemistry
for peaceful purposes.
8.4 UK priorities include the promotion
of universality and the full and effective national implementation
of all the Convention's provisions. The UK works bilaterally and
with the EU and other partners to coordinate diplomatic activity,
such as lobbying all States not yet party to sign and ratify the
Convention as soon as possible, and implementation assistance
efforts. Bilateral assistance has included the provision of National
Authority training courses, contributions to the OPCW's "Associate
Programme", support for Protection Assistance courses (against
the use of chemical weapons), and support to the OPCW's verification
activities, including the Challenge Inspection mechanism.
8.5 We are also committed to providing practical
assistance where possible to help States meet their obligations
to complete the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, for
example, by providing assistance to Russia's destruction programme
through the Global Partnership. We have also provided technical
advice to Libya and have participated in workshops organized by
the OPCW to assist Iraq's preparations for CWC accession.
8.6 The UK is also involved in outreach
to other stakeholders, including business, academia and NGOs.
A CWC National Authority Advisory Committee created in 1997 advises
Ministers on the actions taken by the National Authority (BERR)
to ensure UK compliance with the CWC and the Chemical Weapons
Act. The UK is also conducting a series of outreach seminars to
regional universities to raise awareness of the CWC and of potential
dual-use issues.
8.7 The CWC's forthcoming challenges include
securing consensus on the future priorities of the OPCW once all
declared stockpiles have been destroyed; addressing the potential
failure by one or more State Party to fully comply with the 2012 deadline,
ensuring that the CWC remains relevant in the face of scientific
and technological advances and is able to respond to new challenges
including that of terrorism, and making progress towards universalisation.
The UK is engaged in detailed discussions with partners and the
OPCW on ways to address these challenges.
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
8.8 The BTWC, which entered into force in
1975, bans the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition,
retention or transfer of biological and toxin weapons. Upon ratification
or accession, each State Party "undertakes to destroy, or
to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later
than nine months after entry into force of the Convention, all
agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery…which
are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control…".
Unlike the CWC, there are no declared stockpiles of biological
weapons, and the BTWC has no effective provisions to verify compliance.
The dual-use nature of virtually all the know-how, materials and
equipment used in biological weapons means that identifying and
agreeing workable and acceptable verification and compliance measures
for biological arms control is fraught with formidable intellectual,
scientific and political problems. Between 1995 and 2001 an
Ad Hoc Group of States Parties attempted to negotiate a draft
verification Protocol but was unable to reach consensus on a text.
Since then UK efforts have focused on identifying and implementing
other measures to strengthen the BTWC.
8.9 The UK believes that international cooperation
in the framework of the BTWC is key to defeating the threat from
biological weapons, and we are committed to strengthening the
BTWC. The Intersessional Work Programme 2007-10, agreed at the
Sixth BTWC Review Conference in December 2006, is advancing work
on agreed topics such as national implementation (2007), biosafety
and biosecurity, awareness-raising, education, oversight of science,
and codes of conduct (2008), capacity building in the fields of
disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and containment of
infectious diseases (2009) and assistance in cases of alleged
use of biological or toxin weapons (2010). The UK promotes discussion,
common agreements and the sharing of best practice on these topics
through the contribution of working papers and active participation
in BTWC and other meetings.
8.10 The UK (not least as one of the three
depositories of the Convention) also continues to play an active
role in promoting the universality of the BTWC. The UAE acceded
to the BTWC in June, bringing the number of States Parties to
162 (the seventh accession since the 6th Review Conference
in December 2006). Despite this steady progress, the BTWC remains
significantly behind the CWC, so promoting universal adherence
and effective national implementation remain key UK priorities
(notable non-ratifiers include Israel, Egypt, Syria and Burma).
The UK works bilaterally and with the EU and other partners to
coordinate diplomatic action and assistance activities in these
areas. Current FCO-funded activity is focused on legislative analysis
and assistance to states which do not have comprehensive national
implementing measures in place (a multi-year project worth £623,000 delivered
through the Verification Research and Information Centre—VERTIC)
and support to the Bio Weapons Prevention Project to develop a
strategy to promote universal adherence to the BTWC. Through the
EU we are supporting a Joint Action in support of WHO activities
on laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, and Joint Action assistance
in the areas of Confidence Building Measures, and support to the
Intersessional work programme, as well as ongoing activity in
support of universality and national implementation.
8.11 Scientific and technological advances
in the life sciences, increasing international cooperation in
research, public health, agriculture and the pharmaceutical and
biotechnological industries, and the availability of knowledge
through the internet bring huge benefits. But the wider dissemination
of knowledge and skills in dual-use scientific applications also
increase the potential for their misuse in biological weapons.
We therefore monitor advances in such technologies and assess
their implications to raise awareness among the scientific and
research communities of their ethical and legal obligations. Since
2003 the UK has held five BTWC related seminars for academics,
research councils, professional and trade organisations, and the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. The most recent event
took place in March 2008 and was devoted primarily to oversight,
education and awareness-raising.
Australia Group
8.12 The Australia Group (AG) is an informal
forum of countries which, through the harmonisation of export
controls, seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the
development of chemical or biological weapons. Coordination of
national export control measures assists Australia Group participants
to fulfil their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention
and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to the fullest
extent possible. At the annual Plenary meeting in April, there
was considerable interest in the UK's presentation on the Academic
Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) and in a UK proposal to enhance
Australia Group industry outreach. The Ministry of Defence are
pursuing the outreach initiative.
9. BALLISTIC
MISSILES
Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD)
9.1 In the coming years, it is likely that
a small number of states will further develop their ballistic
missiles, improving their range, accuracy and also their supporting
infrastructure. In particular, both Iran and North Korea continue
to develop their ballistic missile capabilities and both may have
the capability to strike Europe within the next 20 years.
There were some 100 non-US ballistic missiles launches around
the world in 2007, some 30% more than the previous year, reflecting
the determination of many countries to acquire and develop ballistic
missile capabilities.
9.2 In the light of this potential threat,
in 2002 NATO Heads of State and Government commissioned a
Missile Defence Feasibility Study to examine options for protecting
Alliance territory, forces and population centres against all
ranges of missile threats. The study was completed in 2006 and
further work, examining the political and military implications
of acquiring missile defence for the Alliance, was requested at
the NATO Riga Summit in November 2006.
9.3 Separately, in February 2007, the US
announced that it intended to begin formal negotiations to place
missile defence assets in Poland (interceptor missiles, which
will be manned and operated by a garrison of US military personnel)
and the Czech Republic (radar facilities) which would provide
coverage for most of Europe, including the UK, from a limited
ballistic missile threat from a country of concern, such as Iran
or North Korea. On 19 September, the US and Czech Republic
signed a Status of Forces Agreement covering the basing of US
troops in the Czech Republic to operate the radar. US negotiations
with the Poles are nearing conclusion.
9.4 The UK Government has welcomed these
developments, and the consequent benefits for European security.
We are clear that ballistic missile defence is a response to the
current proliferation and strategic uncertainty, and not the cause.
HMG will continue to support US ballistic missile defence plans,
including through the use by the US of facilities in the UK at
RAF Fylingdales and RAF Menwith Hill.
9.5 At the April 2008 Bucharest Summit,
NATO leaders recognized that ballistic missile proliferation poses
an increasing threat to Allies' forces, territory and populations;
that missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter
this threat; and that the planned deployment of European-based
US missile defence assets will make a substantial contribution
to the defence of NATO allies. The Summit also agreed a plan of
work to: explore ways in which to link the US BMD capability with
NATO's missile defence efforts; and tasked NATO to develop a range
of options for a missile defence architecture that covers those
parts of Alliance territory not otherwise covered by the US system.
This work has begun, and it is anticipated that a paper containing
recommendations for NATO Ministers will be presented at the 2009 Summit
in Strasbourg.
9.6 Although the US has made clear that
its plans to place missile interceptors in Poland and radar in
the Czech Republic are not aimed at countering Russian strategic
nuclear forces, Russia has reacted adversely, claiming this would
upset the existing strategic balance. They have also linked missile
defence with a threatened withdrawal from, and the suspension
of, their obligations to legally binding treaties.
9.7 The US missile defence system does not
threaten the nuclear strategic balance: a defensive system with
ten interceptor missiles cannot undermine an arsenal of many hundreds
of missiles, such as that held by Russia. Nevertheless, Russia's
concerns have been addressed directly through high level bilateral
discussions between the US and Russia. Both sides have suggested
a number of practical measures to resolve the concerns which have
been raised, in particular: including Russian radar sensors in
a joint missile defence architecture; the creation of joint missile
defence data exchange centres in Russia and Europe; and the phased
activation of the Europe missile defence system, commensurate
with the emerging ballistic missile threat from the Middle East.
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
9.8 The Missile Technology Control Regime
is an informal and voluntary association of countries which share
the goals of non-proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable
of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and which seek to coordinate
national export licensing efforts aimed at preventing their proliferation.
While concern has traditionally focused on state proliferators,
after the tragic events of 11 September 2001 it became
evident that more also has to be done to decrease the risk of
WMD delivery systems falling into the hands of terrorist groups
and individuals. One way to counter this threat is to maintain
vigilance over the transfer of missile equipment, material, and
related technologies usable for systems capable of delivering
WMD.
9.9 The MTCR rests on adherence to common
export policy guidelines applied to an integral common list of
controlled items. All decisions are taken by consensus, and MTCR
partners regularly exchange information about relevant national
export licensing issues. National export licensing measures on
these technologies make the task of countries seeking to achieve
capability to acquire and produce unmanned means of WMD delivery
much more difficult. As a result, many countries, including all
MTCR partners, have chosen voluntarily to introduce export licensing
measures on rocket and other unmanned air vehicle delivery systems
or related equipment, material and technology.
Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation (HCOC)
9.10 The HCOC is aimed at bolstering efforts
to curb ballistic missile proliferation worldwide. It consists
of a set of general principles, commitments, and limited confidence-building
measures, including annual declarations by each subscribing state
on its space and ballistic missile policies and pre-launch notifications.
It is intended to supplement, not supplant, the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR). It was brought into effect in 2002. The
UK is one of the original Subscribing States. HMG's objectives
in HCOC are to promote the universalisation of the Code by increasing
the number of subscribers, and to encourage all members to meet
their commitments under the Code. As of July 2008, 130 countries
had subscribed to it.
10. TERRORISM
10.1 Terrorists using WMD or radiological
weapons poses a global threat and requires a global response.
The UK Government takes extremely seriously the potential threat
from terrorists acquiring chemical, biological, radiological or
nuclear weapons and we are working actively, across UK Government
Departments and agencies and with the international community
to take robust and urgent measures to prevent such weapons or
their related materials, equipment, technology and expertise falling
into the wrong hands.
10.2 The need to ensure the physical protection
of fissile material is central to these efforts. Through substantial
financial contributions to the Global Partnership, the Global
Threat Reduction Initiative and the IAEA's nuclear security fund,
the UK, in addition to providing high level technical and project
management expertise to international partners, has made a long
term commitment in helping to address the potential risks associated
with proliferation and terrorism issues.
10.3 Many of the steps set out elsewhere
in this paper, to help ensure compliance and to detect non-compliance
with NPT and other treaty obligations, such as the work under
UN Security Council Resolution 1540, are relevant and form part
of a comprehensive strategy to deny WMD to terrorist organizations.
But these steps have also been complemented with a number of specific
initiatives.
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
(GICNT)
10.4 The GICNT was launched jointly by the
US and Russia in July 2006. Twelve initial Partner Nations subsequently
agreed a Statement of Principles "to develop partnership
capacity to combat nuclear terrorism on a determined and systematic
basis." Since then there have been further meetings of a
gradually-widening number of subscribers (now over 70) to the
Statement of Principles. The focus is on providing help to states
which need it to:
— ensure the accounting, control and
physical protection of nuclear materials and radioactive substances;
— detect and suppress illicit trafficking
of nuclear materials;
— respond to and mitigate consequences
of nuclear terrorism;
— co-operate in the development of
technical means to combat nuclear terrorism;
— deny safe haven to terrorists who
wish to acquire or use nuclear materials;
— strengthen national laws to prosecute
and punish terrorists and their supporters.
10.5 The UK contributes to partner capacity-building
efforts through this initiative and others. UK experts attend
workshops and seminars on the full range of issues in a bid to
raise awareness, share information and advise partners on best
practise. The UK also hosts activities and expert events, such
as the Anti-Nuclear Smuggling Assistance Workshop in London (September
2007).
INFCIRC 225, the Convention on the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material and Amendment
10.6 IAEA recommendations for the physical
protection of nuclear material are set out in INFCIRC 225, first
published in 1975 and revised four times since then; a fifth
revision is currently underway in a Working Group chaired by the
Deputy Director of the UK's Office of Civil Nuclear Security.
These recommendations reflect a broad consensus among IAEA Member
States on the requirements which should be met by systems for
the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities.
10.7 Although many states are obliged under
various Conventions and Agreements to take them into account,
the IAEA recommendations are not legally binding. The Convention
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which
entered into force in 1987, imposed such legally binding obligations,
based on INFCIRC 225. But these apply only to civil nuclear material
and only to the standards to be met in the international transport
of such material. The Convention does not contain any mechanism
for verifying the application of these standards, it being the
view of states that responsibility for physical protection within
a state rests entirely with that state. The UK is a party.
10.8 The Amendment to the CPPNM was opened
for ratification in July 2005. This will, for the first time,
impose a legal obligation to establish and maintain a legislative
and regulatory framework to govern physical protection and to
designate an authority to implement the framework. It will come
into force when two-thirds of the parties to the original Convention
have ratified. The necessary legislation to enable the UK to ratify
(contained in the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008) received
Royal Assent on 8 May; an Explanatory Memorandum on the Amendment
is being prepared and will be laid before Parliament to obtain
approval for UK ratification. BERR has the policy lead on this.
International Convention on the Suppression of
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
10.9 This Convention entered into force
in 7 July 2007. It requires States Parties to make every
effort to adopt appropriate measures to ensure the protection
of radioactive material. It is principally concerned with identifying
a number of terrorist offences relating to attacks involving the
use of radioactive material (which it defines as including nuclear
material), obliging States Parties to establish these as criminal
offences under their national laws, and requiring them to cooperate
in preventing the commission of these offences. It also contains
provisions for mutual judicial cooperation in the event of such
terrorist offences, to help ensure that there is no hiding place
for terrorists who use WMD or radiological weapons. The UK has
signed the Convention but not yet ratified it. The Home Office
has the policy lead for achieving this.
IAEA's Nuclear Security Plan
10.10 Following 9/11, the IAEA's physical
protection activities were brought together into a Nuclear Security
Plan (NSP). Activities carried out include the issuing of a range
of guidance documents on nuclear security beyond just INFCIRC
225 (the Agency launched a new Nuclear Security Series in
2006); the holding of training courses in nuclear security; encouraging
the establishment of Nuclear Security Support Centres in member
states; the provision of advisory services to states by the IAEA;
the formulation of Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans for
individual States to help implement recommendations from the Agency's
range of nuclear security missions in a coherent way; and the
development of the Illicit Trafficking Database.
10.11 While there is no obligation on Member
States to engage with the IAEA on nuclear security, experience
has shown that its services are highly sought after. Its programme
is heavily supported by Member States who provide experts to participate
in its advisory missions and training activities as well as helping
to develop guidance documents. The programme has expended some
$15 million in each of the past three years. This is financed
from a Nuclear Security Fund, which relies on voluntary extra-budgetary
contributions. The EU is one of the major donors.
10.12 Thought is now being given to the
development of a new NSP to run from 2010 to 2013. There
is to be a major International Symposium on Nuclear Security in
Mar/Apr 2009 and the discussions there will feed into the
finalisation of the new NSP at the IAEA's September 2009 Board
of Governors meeting. We are considering how best to ensure an
effective British input to this Symposium.
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of
Radioactive Sources
10.13 Radioactive sources are used throughout
the world for a wide variety of peaceful purpose in industry,
medicine, research, and education as well as in military applications.
Because of their high level of radioactivity, some of these radioactive
sources could pose a significant risk to safety or security, in
particular if they were used in a radiological dispersion device,
also known as a "dirty bomb"—ie, a bomb that would
use conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material but
would not involve a nuclear explosion.
10.14 The Code of Conduct on the Safety
and Security of Radioactive Sources has been developed by the
IAEA to address this risk. It sets out basic principles that every
State should follow, including taking appropriate measures necessary
to ensure that radioactive sources are safely managed and securely
protected; having an effective national legislative and regulatory
system; establishing a national register of radioactive sources
and ensuring that any transfers are undertaken in a manner consistent
with the provisions of the Code.
10.15 The Code is not legally binding but
States have been urged to write to the IAEA Director General expressing
their support for it. 92 had done so as of 24 July 2008,
including the UK. Supplementary Guidance to the Code of Conduct,
relating to the import and export of radioactive sources, has
also been developed and approved by the IAEA. Again, this is not
legally binding but States have been encouraged to notify the
Director General of their intention to support it, to designate
a point of contact, and to send the IAEA a completed version of
the specimen self-assessment questionnaire annexed to the Guidance.
The UK has done all three. (DEFRA is responsible for the Code's
implementation within the UK.)
Forensic science
10.16 The UK Government has made clear that
we will hold states accountable if they assist terrorists in acquiring
WMD. World-leading forensics work by the AWE, in cooperation with
other leading nuclear laboratories overseas, will help us identify
the source of nuclear materials in any device used against us
so that we will be in a position to respond appropriately. Our
ability to do so should constitute a powerful deterrent against
any state considering assisting terrorists in the use of WMD against
the UK or our allies.
11. CONVENTIONAL
WEAPONS
11.1 While strictly outside the scope of
this Inquiry, an important part of UK counter proliferation work
is aimed at tackling the threat posed by conventional weapons
to humanitarian interests, to UK, regional and global stability,
and to sustainable development. The following briefly summarises
our current efforts on three sets of issues in particular: an
Arms Trade Treaty, cluster munitions and small arms and light
weapons.
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
11.2 According to research by Oxfam, globally
an estimated 1,000 people die every day due directly to the
use of small arms and Africa loses around $18bn per year due to
wars, civil wars and insurgencies.
11.3 The aim of an Arms Trade Treaty is
to establish a globally-agreed set of common standards for the
trade in all conventional arms. It would make it a legal obligation
for all countries to adopt uniform and high standards against
which they would assess their arms exports, including the recipient
country's respect for human rights and international humanitarian
law. The Treaty would thereby contribute to preventing imported
arms being used for human rights abuse, repression, terrorism,
and undermining social and economic stability and development.
11.4 In 2006, the UK worked with Argentina,
Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan and Kenya to introduce a
draft UN General Assembly resolution calling for a global Arms
Trade Treaty. This was supported by 153 countries. In 2007,
there was an unprecedented level of response to calls from the
UN Secretary General for views on the scope and feasibility of
this treaty; over 100 countries submitted their views. A
UN Group of Government Experts has concluded its review of these
submissions and their conclusions will be discussed at the UN
General Assembly in October. We are working to ensure that the
UN agrees to maintain the momentum that has been generated so
far.
11.5 We also want to generate more support
and understanding of the issues surrounding this proposal and
to broaden the discussion. It is an issue that should be important
not just to governments and NGOS, but to industry, academics,
"think tanks" and religious leaders. With this in mind,
on 9th September the Foreign Secretary met a broad constituency
of stakeholders from the wider business community, NGOs, and from
a range of religious communities to discuss the issues and the
benefits that such a treaty would offer, and to explain how stakeholders
in the wider community can contribute to the achievement of this
goal.
11.6 We are also working very closely with
a core group of NGOs and UK industry through the Defence Manufacturers'
Association and Society of British Aerospace Companies in support
of the ATT process, to galvanize a broader global coalition to
act as multipliers and to act directly to influence the sceptics
and opponents by raising awareness more widely of what an ATT
would be and the benefits that could accrue.
Cluster Munitions
11.7 The Dublin Conference (19-30 May),
which brought the Oslo Process to an end, adopted a Convention
that defined cluster munitions and imposed a ban on the use, production,
stockpiling and transfer of them. The Prime Minister's announcement
on 28 May that we would withdraw from service all the UK's
cluster munitions with immediate effect was instrumental in bringing
about this result. The UK intends to sign the Convention when
it is opened for signature in Oslo on 3 December. We are
already implementing key norms ahead of signature, such as putting
the remaining UK cluster munitions into a disposal programme and
introducing new export controls. All Cluster Munitions have been
classified as Category "A" goods, making them subject
to the most stringent level of trade controls and thereby taking
an immediate step to prevent proliferation.
11.8 We will continue to work within the
UN framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
(CCW) to secure the strongest possible new Protocol on cluster
munitions and thereby add to the humanitarian benefit we have
achieved. It is in this forum that the major users and producers
(eg the US, China, Russia, India, Pakistan and Israel) who have
remained outside the Oslo Process are actively engaged. The Group
of Governmental Experts established in November last year has
had productive meetings in January, April, July and September
this year taking forward work on drafting a new Protocol that
includes restrictions on transfers. In November they will hold
their final meeting before reporting back to the Meeting of States
Parties later that month.
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)
11.9 The Biennial Meeting of States (BMS)
for the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate
the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
(UNPoA) took place in New York in July. It achieved a reasonable
outcome, with a final document agreed, albeit by a vote. We continue
to fund a range of SALW projects undertaken by the UN, EU, OSCE
and other international and regional organisations, NGOs and civil
society more widely.
12. CONCLUSION
12.1 The UK Government's goal is a more
secure UK in a more secure world. We believe that a world free
of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons would be a more secure
place. Conversely, the proliferation of such weapons, both to
states and to terrorists, poses one of the most significant threats
to global security. Accordingly, the National Security Strategy
and the FCO attach high strategic priority to our work to counter
proliferation and to pursue nuclear disarmament.
12.2 The UK, from the Prime Minister down,
is providing vital leadership to the international community,
in setting out the vision of where we need to go, in working bilaterally
and in concert with our partners and allies to persuade others
to join us, and in doing the hard diplomatic and technical work
at official and expert level to find effective ways forward and
to build consensus around them. We do not underestimate the considerable
challenges involved nor the time and sustained commitment which
will be required to resolve them. We would welcome the views of
the Select Committee and its recommendations for how our efforts
might be further enhanced or focused.
1 October 2008
Annexes
1. Chairman's Summary from NPT Preparatory Committee
meeting, May 2008
2. P5 Statement at NPT Preparatory Committee
meeting, May 2008
3. Statement by the External Affairs Minister
of India, 5 September 2008
Annex 1
CHAIRMAN'S
SUMMARY OF
NPT PREPARATORY COMMITTEE
2008
NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.43
Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons
9 May 2008
Original: English
08-34927 (E) 270608
Second session
Geneva, 28 April-9 May 2008
CHAIRMAN'S
WORKING PAPER[188]
1. States parties[189]
reaffirmed that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty) was the cornerstone of the
global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for
the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. In the face of grave challenges
to the non-proliferation regime, preserving and strengthening
the Treaty was vital to international peace and security.
2. States parties noted the positive outcome
of the first session of the 2007 Preparatory Committee and
expressed the need to lay a solid basis for a successful Review
Conference in 2010. They also noted that the 2008 session
of the Preparatory Committee had taken place in the year of the
fortieth anniversary of the Treaty's opening for signature. Recent
public and political momentum towards a world free of nuclear
weapons was noted. The need for concrete and practical steps to
achieve that goal was highlighted.
3. States parties reaffirmed that the Treaty
rested on three pillars: nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation
and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The importance of the balanced,
full and non-selective application and implementation of the Treaty
was stressed. Emphasis was placed on the mutually reinforcing
nature of disarmament and non-proliferation, and due respect for
the right of States parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy
in conformity with the Treaty.
4. States parties continued to attach great
importance to achieving compliance with the Treaty. The importance
of compliance by all States parties with all the provisions of
the Treaty at all times was stressed. Non-compliance with the
Treaty's provisions by States parties undermined non-proliferation,
disarmament, universality and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
5. States parties reiterated their commitment
to the effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty,
the decisions and resolution on the Middle East of the 1995 Review
and Extension Conference, adopted without a vote, and the final
document of the 2000 Review Conference, adopted by consensus.
6. States parties reaffirmed the importance
of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international
nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes in ways consistent with
the non-proliferation goal of the Treaty. A number of proposals
for establishing multilateral mechanisms that guaranteed the provision
of nuclear fuel under strict international control were presented.
7. States parties stressed that continued
support to achieve universality of the Treaty remained essential.
They expressed concern about the lack of progress in the achievement
of universality, which seriously undermined the Treaty. States
parties called upon India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the
Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, promptly and without conditions.
Those States were also called upon to bring into force the required
comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with Additional
Protocols, for ensuring nuclear non-proliferation, to reverse
clearly and urgently any policies to pursue any nuclear weapons
development, testing or deployment, and to refrain from any action
that could undermine regional and international peace and security
and the international community's efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament
and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation. States parties
called upon India and Pakistan to maintain moratoriums on nuclear
testing, and called upon India, Israel and Pakistan to become
parties to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
8. States parties expressed concern that
non-State actors could gain access to weapons of mass destruction
and their means of delivery. The gravity of the dangers of weapons
of mass destruction being acquired by terrorists further reinforced
the need to strengthen the Treaty and its implementation. In addition,
States parties noted the need for adherence to existing legal
instruments, especially the International Convention on the Suppression
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and for full compliance with Security
Council resolution 1540 (2004).
9. States parties expressed the need for
multilateralism and mutually agreed solutions, in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, as the only sustainable method
for dealing with the multiplicity of disarmament, non-proliferation
and international security issues. Multilateralism based on the
concept of shared commitments and obligations provided the best
way to maintain international order.
10. States parties remained committed to
implementing article VI of the Treaty. The full implementation
of the 13 practical steps, including the unequivocal undertaking
contained in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference,
was called for. Recent moves towards nuclear disarmament by some
nuclear-weapon States were recognized. Concern continued to be
expressed, however, about the slow pace of progress made in implementing
the practical steps. A forward-looking review of the 13 steps
and of progress towards their implementation was urged.
11. States parties stated that the total
elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee
against their proliferation or use or threat of use. Despite achievements
in bilateral and unilateral reductions by some nuclear-weapon
States, concern was expressed that the total number of nuclear
weapons deployed and stockpiled still amounted to thousands. It
was stressed that the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty did not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear arsenals.
There were calls for a time-bound framework for achieving the
total elimination of nuclear weapons.
12. The advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice regarding the obligations of nuclear-weapon States
(96/23 of 8 July 1996) was recalled and support was
voiced for the development of a nuclear weapons convention. A
subsidiary body dealing with nuclear disarmament at the 2010 Review
Conference was sought.
13. Concerns were also voiced about the
increased role of nuclear weapons in some strategic and military
doctrines, and the apparent lowering of the threshold for the
use of nuclear weapons. Calls were made for the re-evaluation
of the strategic utility of nuclear weapons and their role in
national security policies in the post-Cold War context.
14. Concern and disappointment were voiced
about plans of some nuclear-weapon States to replace or modernize
nuclear weapons and their means of delivery or platforms, and
about the development of new types of nuclear weapons. In response,
France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and the United States of America provided clarifications and explanations
on their efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. The need to foster
an environment conducive to nuclear disarmament was underlined.
Considerable concern was also expressed about nuclear cooperation
of States parties with States not parties to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
15. States parties also attached significance
to reducing the deployed status of nuclear weapons through de-alerting
and de-targeting, to reducing reliance on nuclear weapons and
to securing greater information from nuclear-weapon States on
the active and reserve status of nuclear arsenals with a view
to increasing confidence among all States parties. They welcomed
the efforts of some nuclear weapon States in that regard, noting
such practical measures could raise the threshold for uses of
nuclear weapons and help avoid the risk of accidents and miscalculation.
16. Nuclear weapon States reiterated their
commitment to nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty.
The more forthcoming way in which some nuclear weapon States were
treating their article VI commitments was recognized. A number
of nuclear weapon States outlined their respective measures taken
in accordance with article VI, underscoring actual and projected
reductions in nuclear weapons arsenals, an accelerated programme
of dismantlement, reduced reliance on nuclear weapons and reductions
in their status of alert. France referred to its concrete plan
of action on disarmament, to which the nuclear-weapon States should
commit by 2010. The importance of transparent verification for
nuclear disarmament measures was stressed, and the initiatives
of the United Kingdom to explore the technical aspects of verifying
nuclear disarmament through greater cooperation among nuclear-weapons
States and with non-nuclear-weapon States were welcomed. It was
noted that strategic conditions could have an impact on the pace
of nuclear disarmament. Concerns were also voiced about apparent
re-interpretations of nuclear disarmament obligations.
17. States parties underlined the special
responsibility of the two States possessing the largest nuclear
arsenals and acknowledged the progress made under the Treaty on
Strategic Offensive Reductions (the Moscow Treaty). While noting
those achievements, States parties called for further reductions
beyond those required by the Moscow Treaty and stressed that reductions
in deployments and in operational status could not be a substitute
for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear
weapons. States parties noted that START I and the Moscow Treaty
were due to expire in 2009 and 2012, respectively, and called
for bilateral follow-up agreements. They welcomed the Russian
Federation-United States declaration in Sochi regarding a legally
binding post-START arrangement. It was stressed that the principles
of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency should guide
all nuclear disarmament measures.
18. States parties welcomed the more detailed
information provided by most nuclear-weapon States on the number
of weapons in their arsenals and progress in reducing those numbers.
All States parties were called upon to increase transparency and
accountability with regard to their nuclear weapons arsenals,
implementation of disarmament measures and security doctrines.
The establishment of mechanisms for standardized reporting and
progressive recording of reductions in nuclear arsenals was urged.
19. Reporting by all States parties on the
implementation of article VI was urged. Reporting by non-nuclear-weapon
States in regional alliances with nuclear-weapon States on their
efforts to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in collective
security arrangements was encouraged. It was noted that routine
reporting would promote increased confidence in the overall Treaty
regime by increasing transparency and at the same time would help
address compliance concerns.
20. States parties welcomed the impetus
that had developed in the Conference on Disarmament under the
six Presidents for 2006 and 2007 and that had continued
in 2008. The positive contribution of cooperation and coordination
of the six-President mechanism was noted and calls were made for
its continuation. With reference to proposal CD/1840, it was widely
emphasized that the Conference should commence substantive work
as a matter of urgency.
21. Strong support was expressed for the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The importance and urgency
of its early entry into force were underscored. In that regard,
the recent ratifications by Bahamas, Barbados, Colombia, the Dominican
Republic, Malaysia and Palau were welcomed. States that had not
ratified the Treaty, especially the remaining nine whose ratification
was necessary for its entry into force, were urged to do so without
delay. The Joint Declaration of the Article XIV Conference, held
in Vienna in 2007, was welcomed.
22. The testing of a nuclear weapon by the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea had highlighted the need
for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty. States parties reaffirmed the importance of maintaining
a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear
explosions. They commended the progress made by the Preparatory
Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
in establishing the international monitoring system. States parties
were called upon to support the Preparatory Commission of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization by providing
adequate resources and expertise.
23. The abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty and the development of missile defence systems
drew concern as adversely affecting strategic stability and having
negative consequences on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
Concern was also expressed about the risk of a new arms race on
Earth and in outer space. In the latter regard, States parties
noted the tabling in the Conference on Disarmament of a proposal
for a treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in
outer space.
24. States parties highlighted the need
to address non-strategic nuclear weapons, including their withdrawal
to the possessor's territory. The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives
of 1991 and 1992 by the United States and the Russian
Federation were welcomed and calls were made for the formalization
of those initiatives. The importance of further reductions in
non-strategic nuclear weapons in a transparent, accountable, verifiable
and irreversible manner was stressed. The proposal by the Russian
Federation to transform the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty into a multilateral instrument was noted, as was the importance
of continuing to fulfil existing commitments. The need to deny
terrorists access to non-strategic nuclear weapons was also noted.
Moreover, concerns were expressed about the ongoing proliferation
of ballistic missiles. The reference to the elimination of the
means of delivery in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
was noted, and States parties were invited to adhere to the Hague
Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.
25. The importance of the immediate commencement
of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty concerning
fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices was stressed. Calls were made to address the verifiability
of such an instrument and the need for coverage of existing stocks.
The urgent conclusion of such a treaty would be beneficial to
the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Several proposals
for progress on that issue were put forward, including a phased
approach perhaps beginning with a framework treaty that could
be strengthened and elaborated in protocols, the establishment
of a group of scientific experts within the Conference on Disarmament,
joint declarations to stop production of such material, a fissile
material control initiative and the convening of a high-level
expert panel. States that had not yet done so were called upon
to declare moratoriums on the production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
26. The importance was emphasized of arrangements
by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable,
fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required
for military purposes under the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) or other relevant international verification, and on arrangements
for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes. Some
nuclear-weapon States reported on the actions they had taken in
that regard. In that context, the Trilateral Initiative was regarded
as an important measure. The ongoing efforts of nuclear weapon
States to convert excess highly enriched uranium for civilian
use was commended and encouraged.
27. States parties recognized the positive
contribution of various initiatives towards cooperation in reducing
threats from all weapons of mass destruction. They included the
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Global Partnership
against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,
the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the Proliferation Security
Initiative.
28. States parties welcomed other new initiatives
by Governments and within civil society aiming at achieving the
vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, including the five principles
and 10 recommendations developed at an international disarmament
conference held in Oslo in February 2008, the Weapons of Mass
Destruction Commission and the call from four United States elder
statesmen.
29. The importance was stressed of education
on disarmament and non-proliferation to strengthen the disarmament
and non-proliferation regime for future generations. In that regard,
States parties were encouraged to undertake concrete activities
to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the
Secretary-General on disarmament and non-proliferation education
(see A/57/124) and to share information thereon. Steps and means
as well as new initiatives to implement the recommendations were
reiterated at the meeting.
30. States parties noted that, pending the
elimination of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon States should provide
security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States that they would
not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. Security
assurances could serve as incentives to forgo the acquisition
of weapons of mass destruction and to achieve universality of
the Treaty. It was recalled that both the 1995 Review and
Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference had underscored
the importance of security assurances. It was further recalled
that the final document of the 2000 Review Conference called
upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the
2005 Review Conference on security assurances. It was emphasized
that negative security assurances, an element that contributed
to the 1995 extension decision, remained essential and should
be reaffirmed and implemented. The view was expressed that it
was a legitimate right of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to
the Non-Proliferation Treaty to receive such assurances. Reaffirmations
were expressed of commitments under Security Council resolution
984 (1995). Some States parties emphasized the importance
of a no-first use policy as maintained by China.
31. States parties stressed that efforts
to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument
on negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should
be pursued as a matter of priority, without prejudice to security
assurances already given bilaterally or under nuclear-weapon-free
zone treaties. In that regard, references were made to pursuing
a protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the prospect
of substantive discussions envisaged by the current draft decision
put forward by the six Presidents of the Conference on Disarmament.
Pending the conclusion of any new instrument, nuclear-weapon States
were called upon to honour their respective commitments under
Security Council resolution 984 (1995), nuclear-weapon-free
zone treaties and bilateral arrangements. The view was expressed
that commitments under resolution 984 (1995) were not legally
binding or unconditional, falling short of meeting non-nuclear-weapon
States' security requirements. Concern was expressed that recent
developments in respect of nuclear doctrines might, in any event,
undermine the aforementioned commitments. An international conference
under the auspices of the United Nations to discuss the issue
of security assurances was proposed. There were calls for the
establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances at the
2010 Review Conference.
32. It was stressed that the non-proliferation
of nuclear weapons was a fundamental goal of the Treaty. Concern
was expressed that grave proliferation challenges strained the
Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, eroding confidence in the compliance
by States parties with their obligations under the Treaty. The
need to effectively address proliferation issues within the Treaty
was stressed. States parties were called upon to exert maximum
effort to bring about diplomatic solutions to concerns about compliance
and strengthen confidence among all States parties.
33. States parties reaffirmed that IAEA
was the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and
assuring, in accordance with the statute of the Agency and the
IAEA safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements
with States parties undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations
under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, with a view to
preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses
to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. States
parties underlined the need for strengthening the role of IAEA
and reaffirmed that nothing should be done to undermine the authority
of the Agency in verifying non-diversion. They noted the need
for effectively addressing violations of safeguards obligations
in order to uphold the integrity of the Treaty.
34. States parties welcomed the efforts
of the Agency in strengthening safeguards and its completion of
the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards, as well as
the steps taken towards their application. They stressed the importance
of IAEA safeguards as a fundamental part of the nuclear non-proliferation
regime and commended the important work of IAEA in implementing
safeguards to verify compliance with the non-proliferation obligations
of the Treaty. The IAEA safeguards thereby promoted further confidence
among States, helped to strengthen their collective security and
played a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons
and other nuclear explosive devices.
35. States parties expressed the need to
strive towards the universalization and strengthening of the IAEA
safeguards system. While welcoming the recent entry into force
of comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols
with a number of States parties, concern was expressed that some
30 States parties had yet to bring into force safeguards
agreements, as required by article III, and that only 87 had
Additional Protocols in force. States that had not yet concluded
comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA were called upon
to do so without further delay.
36. The importance of the Additional Protocol
as an essential and indispensable tool for effective functioning
of the IAEA safeguards system was underlined. It was stressed
that States parties must have both a comprehensive safeguards
agreement and an Additional Protocol in place for IAEA to be able
to provide credible assurance of both the non-diversion of declared
material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities
in the States concerned.
37. States parties reaffirmed the need for
the Additional Protocol to be universalized, and noted that further
efforts in promoting that goal were needed to increase confidence
in the compliance by States parties with their non-proliferation
obligations. States parties that had not yet concluded Additional
Protocols were called upon to do so as soon as possible. Efforts
to achieve universal application of the Additional Protocol should
not hamper efforts towards achieving universality of comprehensive
safeguards agreements.
38. Views were expressed that the strengthened
safeguards system—a comprehensive safeguards agreement coupled
with the Additional Protocol—constituted the Non-Proliferation
Treaty's verification standard and that that standard should be
used as a precondition for new supply arrangements. In that regard,
views were also expressed that concluding an Additional Protocol
should remain a voluntary confidence-building measure. New arrangements
on the Small Quantities Protocols agreed in 2005 at IAEA
were welcomed and considered an important step in the process
of strengthening safeguards. All concerned States were called
upon to adopt that new standard.
39. It was reiterated that export controls
were a key element of the non-proliferation regime under the Treaty.
In the light of revelations regarding clandestine proliferation
networks, States parties underlined that effective export controls,
together with IAEA safeguards, were an integral part of the regime.
Their legitimate role in ensuring compliance with articles I,
II and III, and in facilitating peaceful nuclear cooperation was
emphasized, as was the need for all States to exercise vigilance
in the transfer of sensitive equipment and technology. The important
role played by the international export control framework for
nuclear related materials and technologies, namely the Zangger
Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, was noted, in particular
their utility in guiding States in setting up their national export
control policies. States parties were urged, however, to implement
export controls in a transparent, non-discriminatory and cooperative
manner. It was further stressed that the inalienable rights under
article IV should not be undermined.
40. Support was expressed for internationally
recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones established on the basis
of arrangements freely arrived at among States in the regions
concerned and on the basis of established United Nations guidelines.
The contribution of such zones to enhancing global and regional
peace and security, including the cause of global nuclear non-proliferation,
was emphasized. It was noted that the number of States covered
by the nuclear-weapon-free zones exceeded 105. The establishment
of such zones under the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok,
Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk was considered a positive step towards
attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. The importance
of the entry into force of all the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties
was stressed. In that regard, States parties welcomed the recent
ratifications of the Pelindaba Treaty and the Plan of Action endorsed
by the South East Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Commission to
strengthen the implementation of the Bangkok Treaty. Nuclear-weapon
States' renewed efforts to resolve the pending issues on the protocol
to the Bangkok Treaty were seen as encouraging. Nuclear-weapon
States were called upon to provide security assurances to members
of nuclear-weapon-free zones by signing and ratifying protocols
to those treaties.
41. Continuing and increased cooperation
among the parties to the zones was encouraged, as was the development
of a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere. States parties welcomed
the conclusion and the recent ratifications of the Central Asia
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The need for further consultations
among concerned countries in accordance with the 1999 United
Nations Disarmament Commission guidelines to resolve outstanding
issues regarding the Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone was
expressed. Support for the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia
was reiterated. Efforts to institutionalize that status were noted.
States parties underlined the importance of establishing
new nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in the Middle East and
South Asia.
42. States parties reaffirmed the importance
of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review
and Extension Conference, and emphasized that the resolution remained
valid until its goals and objectives were achieved. The resolution
was both an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference
and an essential part of the basis on which the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had been indefinitely extended
without a vote in 1995. States parties reiterated their support
for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons
as well as other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
systems. Strong concern was voiced at the lack of measurable implementation
of the resolution. Renewed, action-oriented determination to implement
the resolution was strongly urged. States parties affirmed the
importance of establishing practical mechanisms within the review
process to promote the implementation of the 1995 resolution
on the Middle East, in particular by reporting to the Secretary-General
on the steps they had taken to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free
zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives
of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. A subsidiary body
within Main Committee II of the 2010 Review Conference was
sought, together with a specific period of time during the Preparatory
Committee and the establishment of a standing committee of the
members of the Bureau of that Conference to follow up inter-sessionally
the implementation of recommendations concerning the Middle East.
The convening of an international conference on the establishment
of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, with the participation
of nuclear-weapon States and all States in the region, was sought.
43. States parties noted that all States
of the region of the Middle East, with the exception of Israel,
were States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Great concern
was expressed regarding the nuclear capability of Israel. States
parties called upon Israel to accede to the Treaty as soon as
possible as a non-nuclear weapon State, conclude a comprehensive
safeguards agreement and place its nuclear facilities under full
scope IAEA safeguards. Concern was also expressed about nuclear
cooperation with States outside the IAEA safeguards system, especially
Israel. The need for monitoring compliance by States parties with
articles I, II and III, in particular obligations regarding transfer,
was stressed.
44. The importance of creating an environment
conducive to implementation of the Middle East resolution was
emphasized. The presence of nuclear weapons in the region was
seen as an impediment to aspirations for the Middle East to become
a nuclear-weapon-free zone. States parties welcomed the voluntary
decisions by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to abandon its programmes
for developing weapons of mass destruction and their means of
delivery, as well as its ratification of the Additional Protocol.
All States in the region that had not yet done so were urged to
accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, conclude with IAEA comprehensive
safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols, and become parties
to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. More generally,
States parties also expressed full support for achieving a comprehensive,
just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The view was expressed
that the lack of progress in the Middle East peace process should
not inhibit implementation of the 1995 resolution. It was
also noted that the accession of all States in the region to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty would contribute to the objective of
establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well
as of other weapons of mass destruction.
45. States parties reaffirmed the importance
of the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards
agreement of the Islamic Republic of Iran and insisted that that
country comply fully and without further delay with all the requirements
in Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006),
1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) as well as the relevant
resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors. States parties noted
that IAEA had reported that it continued to verify the non-diversion
of declared nuclear material in the Islamic Republic of Iran and
that it remained unable to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear
material and activities in that country; and that certain questions
and verification matters were resolved while yet others, including
some of serious concern, were not. The completion of the work-plan
to resolve some outstanding issues between the Islamic Republic
of Iran and IAEA was noted. States parties noted further that
IAEA would continue, in accordance with its procedures and practices,
to seek corroboration of its findings and to verify, as part of
its verification, the completeness of that country's declaration.
States parties believed the issue should be resolved peacefully
through diplomatic efforts and negotiations. Questioning the need
for the involvement of the Security Council, the Islamic Republic
of Iran indicated its readiness to continue to resolve the outstanding
issues within the framework of IAEA. It underscored its intention
to continue to cooperate with IAEA in accordance with its legal
obligations envisaged in the IAEA statute and the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. It reiterated the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme
and declared its resolve not to suspend enrichment and reprocessing
activities.
46. States parties recognized that the nuclear
activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea presented
a grave challenge to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and noted the
progress achieved under the 13 February 2007 initial
actions and the shutdown of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. They
welcomed the monitoring and verification arrangements implemented
by IAEA with the agreement of the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea. They also welcomed the continuing verification by IAEA
of the shutdown status of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. States
parties noted that the disabling of some of the Yongbyon nuclear
facilities by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was currently
under way. They were concerned that the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea had not yet submitted a complete and correct declaration
of all its nuclear programmes and activities, and urged it to
do so promptly. They urged that country to comply with Security
Council resolutions 1695 (2006) and 1718 (2006) and
the joint statement of September 2005, to abandon all nuclear
weapons and existing nuclear programmes as well as associated
ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible
manner, and to return promptly to compliance with the obligations
under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA comprehensive
safeguards agreement. States parties stressed the importance of
achieving the goal of the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula. They underlined the need for a peaceful solution to
that issue and welcomed the diplomatic efforts undertaken in the
framework of the six-party talks.
47. There was concern about reports of alleged
clandestine nuclear activities by the Syrian Arab Republic, and
calls were made for prompt clarifications regarding those activities
in cooperation with IAEA. The unilateral actions taken in response
to those alleged activities prompted some States parties to highlight
the need for early involvement of IAEA in cases of suspected proliferation
activities. The Syrian Arab Republic reiterated its commitment
to compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and safeguards
agreements with IAEA, rejecting the validity of any information
suggesting otherwise.
48. States parties reaffirmed their inalienable
right under article IV to develop research, production and use
of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination
and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. It
was noted that, as part of the fundamental bargain, nothing in
the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be interpreted as affecting
that right. It was stressed that participating in and facilitating
the exchange of nuclear technology for peaceful uses must be consistent
with the Treaty's non-proliferation obligations.
49. In view of climate change and the growing
demand for nuclear energy and sustainable development, a call
was also made to fully ensure the free, unimpeded and non-discriminatory
transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The proliferation
risks associated with the growing global energy demand were noted.
The importance of assisting States parties to develop safeguards,
safety and security was emphasized. The development of internationally
agreed criteria for transfers of proliferation-sensitive nuclear
equipment and technology was suggested. It was reiterated that
additional restrictions should not be applied to the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy, especially in developing countries or
for political purposes.
50. In that context, States parties emphasized
the value and importance of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme,
underlining that technical cooperation played an important role
in further developing the application of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes. States parties acknowledged the wide application of
nuclear technology for areas in health, industry, agriculture
and environmental protection. Appreciation was expressed for the
assistance rendered, in particular for developing countries, through
the programme. It was stressed that States parties should take
measures to ensure that the programme was adequately and predictably
financed. There was some concern that the programme could be used
as a political tool.
51. Attention was drawn to the significance
of developing proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies, including
through the international project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors
and Fuel Cycles (INPRO). In that regard, references were made
to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership.
52. The importance of strengthening nuclear
safety, radiation protection, the safety of radioactive waste
management and the safe transport of nuclear and radioactive materials,
including maritime transport, was highlighted. The need for maintaining
the highest standards of safety at civilian nuclear installations
through national measures and international cooperation was also
emphasized. Concern was expressed about the environmental consequences
of uranium mining and assistance was sought with radiological
assessment and remedial measures in the affected areas in accordance
with the appeal made in the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.
53. The role of IAEA in the promotion of
safety in all its aspects was underlined and it was noted that
further efforts were needed in that regard. States parties that
had not yet done so were called upon to accede to all relevant
conventions on nuclear safety, safe waste management and physical
protection of nuclear material and the IAEA Code of Conduct on
the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. States parties
supported efforts to enhance the security of existing stockpiles
of highly enriched uranium, while minimizing its use in the civilian
nuclear sector.
They called for the acceleration of efforts
to develop and implement a fully effective global nuclear security
framework. Support was expressed for the work undertaken by the
International Expert Group on Liability (INLEX). The importance
of maintaining dialogue on facilitating safe maritime transport
of radioactive material was stressed.
54. States parties noted the importance
of combating nuclear terrorism and strongly supported existing
IAEA initiatives in that regard. The IAEA action plan on protection
against nuclear terrorism was widely noted and supported. States
parties called for full implementation of Security Council resolutions
1540 (2004), 1673 (2006) and 1810 (2008). In addition,
the entry into force of the International Convention for the Suppression
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, in July 2007, was noted and States
parties were called upon to accede thereto.
55. Other initiatives, including the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism were also noted. IAEA work
in support of States' efforts to prevent the illicit trafficking
of nuclear and other radioactive material was commended. In that
context, States noted the new proliferation threat posed by clandestine
activities and networks for the supply of nuclear goods and technologies.
It was emphasized that only through proactive and full cooperation
and assistance to the Agency could such proliferation threats
be addressed. States parties were encouraged to enhance cooperation
among themselves and with international organizations, in particular
IAEA, to prevent, detect and respond to suspected proliferation
activities and illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, equipment
and technology. States parties stressed the importance of contributions
to the Nuclear Security Fund of IAEA. States expressed support
for measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass
destruction and related material and welcomed the principles of
the Group of Eight in that regard.
56. States parties urged the strengthening
of the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities
as an element of the non-proliferation regime that should be emphasized,
in particular in the light of the heightened risk of nuclear terrorism.
They welcomed the amendment to the Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material and urged States that had not yet
done so to accede to the amended convention. All States were urged
to implement the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security
of Radioactive Sources.
57. States parties emphasized the need to
increase international cooperation in respect of the promotion
of multilateralism in the nuclear fuel cycle and the supply of
nuclear fuel. The numerous existing proposals, including the establishment
of a fuel bank of low enriched uranium and multilateral enrichment
centres, as well as the ongoing discussions in IAEA on fuel supply
assurance mechanisms, were welcomed. States parties expressed
their willingness to participate in and contribute to such discussions.
It was stressed that such proposals should be addressed in a multilaterally
negotiated, comprehensive, economically viable and non-discriminatory
manner under the auspices of IAEA, without restrictions on access
to nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.
It was noted that a balanced multilateral mechanism could significantly
contribute to confidence-building in the field of non-proliferation,
to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to the overall strength
of the non-proliferation regime. It was emphasized that the multilateralization
of the fuel cycle should not deny States parties choices regarding
the development of national fuel cycles and should be consistent
with the Treaty.
58. States parties reaffirmed the sovereign
right of each State party to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, as provided for in article X (1). It was noted that article
X envisaged that withdrawal would be exercised only in the face
of extraordinary events. It was stated that the goal was not to
deny the right to withdraw, but to make it more difficult for
violators to use withdrawal to escape accountability for their
violations. Importance was attached to the need for any withdrawal
to be made in a manner consistent with the requirements, purposes
and objectives of the Treaty. The view was expressed that because
of its potential to undermine the Treaty, a withdrawal would warrant
international scrutiny, as envisaged in article X. The elaboration
of effective and prompt modalities under which States parties
could collectively respond to notifications of withdrawal was
urged.
59. Views were expressed that a State that
withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty should not be able
to benefit from nuclear materials, equipment and technology acquired
while party to the Treaty. States parties urged supplier countries
to make arrangements to retrieve from the withdrawing State any
nuclear material, facilities and equipment transferred prior to
withdrawal or ensure an end to their use. It was emphasized that,
under international law, a withdrawing party was liable for breaches
of the Treaty that occurred prior to withdrawal. It was also stressed
that nuclear material, equipment and technology acquired by States
parties for peaceful purposes prior to withdrawal must remain
subject to peaceful uses under IAEA safeguards. Concerns were
expressed that some proposals on article X went beyond the provisions
of the Treaty.
60. The need was noted for States parties
to undertake consultations and conduct every diplomatic effort,
including on a regional basis, to encourage a party to reconsider
its sovereign position to withdraw. Given the particular circumstances
envisaged in article X for the exercise of the right to withdraw,
the role of the Security Council, as provided for in that article,
was also underlined.
61. The need to strengthen the Treaty and
its review process was expressed. A range of views was expressed
on the need for institutional improvements, such as annual or
extraordinary meetings of States parties, consideration of national
reports, a small standing bureau or standing committee, streamlining
of documentation and an enhanced secretariat.
62. Views were expressed on rotation among
regional groupings of the chairpersonship of the preparatory committees
and the review conferences for future cycles. The issues of financial
assessments and adequate financial support for the Non-Proliferation
Treaty review cycle were also raised.
63. Noting the contributions from civil
society in promoting the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons
and in developing proposals on practical measures to achieve this
vision, States parties emphasized the value of the involvement
and contribution of civil society in the process of reviewing
the Treaty. Substantive proposals were made for the enhanced participation
of non-governmental organizations.
Annex 2
P5 Statement to the NPT Preparatory
Commission 2008
THE NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION
TREATY
NPT PrepCom 2008
Statement by the Delegations of China, France,
the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the United States of America delivered by
UK Ambassador John Duncan to the 2008 NPT PrepCom, Geneva,
9 May 2008.
1. The delegations of China, France, the
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm the strong and
continuing support of our countries for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on the occasion of the second Preparatory
Committee of the eighth NPT review cycle.
2. The proliferation of nuclear weapons
constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The
NPT has served the global community well over the last four decades.
It remains a key instrument for collective security and the bedrock
on which the international architecture to prevent proliferation
of nuclear weapons is built. We wish to see the NPT thrive and
therefore affirm our unequivocal commitment to strengthening the
Treaty and to a successful outcome to the 2010 Review Conference.
We welcome the constructive and substantive discussion that has
taken place at this year's Preparatory Committee meeting and will
work to reinforce the positive dynamic that has been established.
3. We wish to address the proliferation
challenges through Treaty-based multilateralism and through partnerships
and relevant initiatives in which we all participate. The NPT's
central role in promoting security for all depends on concerted
action by all States Party to ensure compliance and respond quickly
and effectively to non-compliance. We attach great importance
to achieving the universality of the NPT and call on those countries
remaining outside to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon
States.
4. We stress the importance of the IAEA
Safeguards system, which should be adequately funded. We seek
universal adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards, as provided
for in Article III, and to the Additional Protocol and urge the
ratification and implementation of these agreements. We are actively
engaged in efforts toward this goal, and are ready to offer necessary
support.
5. We reaffirm that all States Party must
ensure strict compliance with their non- proliferation obligations
under the NPT. The proliferation of nuclear weapons undermines
the security of all nations, imperils prospects for progress on
other important NPT goals such as nuclear disarmament, and hurts
prospects for expanding international nuclear co-operation. The
proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme
continue to be a matter of ongoing serious concern to us. We recall
that the United Nations Security Council recently sent for the
third time a strong message of international resolve to Iran by
adopting sanctions resolution 1803 on Iran's nuclear programme
under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter
as part of a dual-track strategy. We call for Iran to respond
to the concerns of the international community through prompt
and full implementation of the relevant United Nations Security
Council Resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA. We are fully
behind the E3+3 process to resolve this issue innovatively
through negotiations on the basis of the offer agreed in London
on 2 May 2008. We also restate our support for the Six-Party
Talks process moving towards the verifiable denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula, urge the implementation of relevant United
Nations Security Council Resolutions and call on the relevant
Six-Party members to continue their cooperation through the full
implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005.
We confirm our determination to achieve satisfactory resolution
of these dossiers through dialogue and negotiation.
6. We reiterate our enduring commitment
to the fulfilment of our obligations under Article VI of the NPT
and note that these obligations apply to all NPT States Party.
We note the unprecedented progress made by Nuclear Weapon States
since the end of the Cold War in the field of nuclear disarmament,
which has enhanced global security and advanced the goals of the
NPT. Our individual contributions to systematic and progressive
efforts in nuclear disarmament, including the reduction of the
number of nuclear weapons in the world, have been and will be
highlighted by each of us nationally.
7. We restate our support for the 1995 NPT
resolution on the Middle East, which, inter alia, advocates
a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons
of mass destruction. We welcome efforts to support the principles
and objectives of the Middle East peace process, which contribute
toward this end. We note that significant security challenges
remain in the region.
8. We reaffirm our determination to abide
by our respective moratoria on nuclear test explosions. We recognise
that one element in the effective implementation of Article VI
and in the prevention of nuclear proliferation is a treaty banning
the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons
or other explosive devices. We urge all members of the Conference
on Disarmament to show the necessary flexibility to get the Conference
back to work.
9. We reaffirm the inalienable right of
all States Party to the NPT under Article IV to develop research,
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination and in accordance with the relevant provisions
of the Treaty and the relevant principles on safeguards. We note
that a growing number of States Party is showing interest in developing
nuclear programmes aimed at addressing their long-term energy
requirements and other peaceful purposes. We are ready to co-operate
with States Party in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful
uses and we emphasise the requirement for compliance with non-proliferation
obligations and for development of research, use and production
of nuclear energy to be solely for peaceful purposes. We believe
such international co-operation should contribute to the full
implementation of the NPT and enhance the authority and effectiveness
of the global non-proliferation regime.
10. We welcome the work of the International
Atomic Energy Agency on multilateral approaches to the nuclear
fuel cycle and encourage efforts towards a multilateral mechanism
to assure access for all countries to nuclear fuel services as
a viable alternative to the indigenous development of enrichment
and reprocessing. We note the various proposals that have been
put forward. Such an approach would support implementation of
the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a safe and secure
fashion, preserve the existing competitive open market, respond
to the real needs of recipient countries and simultaneously strengthen
the non-proliferation regime. We hope States Party will contribute
to discussion and development of this agenda in an open-minded
and constructive manner. We stress the necessity for the 2010 Review
Conference to address this issue.
11. We support, and will work to uphold
and strengthen, the framework for the safe and secure uses of
nuclear and radioactive materials for peaceful purposes. We reaffirm
our commitment to safe and secure regulatory infrastructures,
and our determination to develop innovative nuclear energy systems
via our respective joint and national initiatives, which will
underpin clean and affordable nuclear development, increase energy
security, minimise the impact on the environment and the production
of radioactive waste, and provide greater protection against proliferation
through the provision of reliable fuel services, proliferation-resistant
reactor technologies and strengthened international safeguards.
Annex 3
Statement by India's Minister of External
Affairs, 5 September 2008
STATEMENT BY
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
MINISTER OF
INDIA SHRI
PRANAB MUKHERJEE
ON THE
CIVIL NUCLEAR
INITIATIVE
05/09/2008
To reiterate India's stand on disarmament and
nonproliferation, EAM has made the following statement:
A Plenary meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group
to consider an exception for India from its guidelines to allow
for full civil nuclear cooperation with India is being held in
Vienna from 4-5 September 2008.
India has a long-standing and steadfast commitment
to universal, non-discriminatory and total elimination of nuclear
weapons. The vision of a world free of nuclear weapons which Shri
Rajiv Gandhi put before the UN in 1988 still has universal
resonance.
We approach our dialogue with the Nuclear Suppliers
Group and all its members in a spirit of cooperation that allows
for an ongoing frank exchange of views on subjects of mutual interest
and concern. Such a dialogue will strengthen our relationship
in the years to come.
Our civil nuclear initiative will strengthen
the international non-proliferation regime. India believes that
the opening of full civil nuclear cooperation will be good for
India and for the world. It will have a profound positive impact
on global energy security and international efforts to combat
climate change.
India has recently submitted a Working Paper
on Nuclear Disarmament to the UN General Assembly, containing
initiatives on nuclear disarmament. These include the reaffirmation
of the unequivocal commitment of all nuclear weapon States to
the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons; negotiation
of a Convention on the complete prohibition of the use or threat
of use of nuclear weapons; and negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons
Convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling
and use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, leading to
the global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear
weapons within a specified timeframe.
We remain committed to a voluntary, unilateral moratorium
on nuclear testing. We do not subscribe to any arms race, including
a nuclear arms race. We have always tempered the exercise of our
strategic autonomy with a sense of global responsibility. We affirm
our policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons.
We are committed to work with others towards
the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
in the Conference on Disarmament that is universal, non-discriminatory
and verifiable.
India has an impeccable non-proliferation record.
We have in place an effective and comprehensive system of national
export controls, which has been constantly updated to meet the
highest international standards. This is manifested in the enactment
of the Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems
Act in 2005. India has taken the necessary steps to secure nuclear
materials and technology through comprehensive export control
legislation and through harmonization and committing to adhere
to Missile Technology Control Regime and Nuclear Suppliers Group
guidelines.
India will not be the source of proliferation
of sensitive technologies, including enrichment and reprocessing
transfers. We stand for the strengthening of the non-proliferation
regime. We support international efforts to limit the spread of
ENR equipment or technologies to states that do not have them.
We will work together with the international community to advance
our common objective of non-proliferation. In this regard, India
is interested in participating as a supplier nation, particularly
for Thorium-based fuel and in establishment of international fuel
banks, which also benefit India.
India places great value on the role played by
the IAEA's nuclear safeguards system. We look forward to working
with the IAEA in implementing the India-specific Safeguards Agreement
concluded with the IAEA. In keeping with our commitment to sign
and adhere to an Additional Protocol with respect to India's civil
nuclear facilities, we are working closely with the IAEA to ensure
early conclusion of an Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement.
5 September 2008
188 Paragraph 7 of the section entitled, "Improving
the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty"
in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT/CONF.2000/28, Parts I and II), vol. I, part I) states, "The
consideration of the issues at each session of the Preparatory
Committee should be factually summarized and its results transmitted
in a report to the next session for further discussion." Back
189
Any reference to "States parties" in the present summary
is not intended to imply unanimity among States parties.
NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.43
2 08-34927 Back
| 
