Submission from Dr David Lowry
On 5 November I listened to three witnesses
give oral testimony before the FASC. These comprised respectively
Professor Malcolm Chalmers, Professor of International Politics,
Bradford University, and Professorial Fellow, Royal United Services
Institute, and Mark Fitzpatrick, Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation,
International Institute for Strategic Studies and Director, IISS
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme, presented together,
followed by an excellent and impressively incisive contribution
by Baroness Williams of Crosby, Adviser to the United Kingdom
Prime Minister on Non-Proliferation; Member, International Commission
on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament .
Mr Fitzpatrick, an American citizen, gave the
impression that the United Kingdom's own glacially slow progress
on meeting its own nuclear disarmament obligationsunder
the NPT and other treatieswould have no impact on Iran's
atomic aspirations, as he sees them. He said, in terms:
"I do not think that Iran would change based
on what the United Kingdom does with its own nuclear policy; Iran's
pursuit has nothing to do with the United Kingdom."
Based on some thirty years experience of nuclear
policy, nuclear security and nuclear proliferation analysis, some
of it as co-founder and director of the European Proliferation
Information Centre (now defunct), I disagree.
Below I have compiled a collection of my recent
writings on member state compliance with NPT, and related asymmetrical
obligations on States Parties to the NPT, to demonstrate that
what self-appointed nuclear weapons states such as the United
Kingdom does, has a material diplomatic impact on states such
as Iran, which have ambiguous atomic status.
I would be very pleased to give further evidence
if you would find that helped the Inquriy. Otherwise, please do
publish this evidence.
Dr David Lowry
Environmental Policy and Research consultant, specialising
in nuclear materials and security matters
20 November 2008