Letter to the Committee from the Head,
Parliamentary Relations Team, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Thank you for your letter of 9 February, which
outlined a number of additional points on which the Committee
would like further clarification.
Q1. Mr Rammell
indicated that he would "reflect on" the question (Q227
and 228) in which the Chairman asked whether the term "Weapons
of Mass Destruction" was helpful because it does not distinguish
between nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The Committee
would be grateful for further details of the way in which the
Government uses this term and Mr Rammell's considered view on
how helpful a term it is?
The Government regards the term "weapons
of mass destruction" as generally being understood now to
mean nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. It recognises that
there are of course distinctions between each of these types of
weapon, both in terms of their nature and their effects. But the
term "weapons of mass destruction" has long been used
in common parlance to embrace all three types of weapon and to
distinguish them from "conventional" weapons. It is
the Government's view that it is therefore unlikely to be possible
to avoid using the term, though it is certainly important to be
aware at the same time of the differences between nuclear, biological
and chemical weapons.
Q2. What role does the Government foresee
for the EU and NATO in the area of non-proliferation and disarmament,
particularly in light of its stated long-term aim to pursue the
abolition of all nuclear weapons and the fact that all NATO members
are effectively covered by the extended deterrence of the US nuclear
umbrella? How does the European Security Strategy relate to the
UK's National Security Strategy in this regard?
The UK National Security Strategy states that
"providing security for the nation and for its citizens remains
the most important responsibility of government"... "The
Cold War threat has been replaced by a diverse but interconnected
set of threats and risks, which affect the United Kingdom directly
and also have the potential to undermine wider international stability.
They include international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction,
conflicts and failed states, pandemics, and trans-national crime."
Non-proliferation and disarmament are two key objectives in tackling
this threat and both NATO and the EU have a significant role to
play in this context.
The NATO summit of Heads of State and Government
in Bucharest last year saw the approval of a paper on "Raising
NATO's profile in the field of arms control, disarmament and non
proliferation". NATO has several groups that meet regularly
to discuss non-proliferation and disarmament issues and the Alliance
continues to ensure that—as an important part of its broad
approach to security—defence and arms control, disarmament,
and non-proliferation objectives remain in harmony. There has
been a 90% reduction in the nuclear forces attributed to NATO
since the end of the Cold War and the Alliance seeks to enhance
security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces
consistent with the ability to provide for collective defence
and to fulfil the full range of its missions.
The EU's December 2008 report on the implementation
of the European Security Strategy states that "Proliferation
by both states and terrorists was identified... as potentially
the greatest threat to EU security. That risk has increased in
the last five years..." On the basis of the EU WMD Strategy,
adopted in 2003, the EU has been active and at the forefront of
international efforts to address proliferation concerns; is a
key donor to multilateral initiatives, including the IAEA Nuclear
Security Fund; and by working with third countries and regional
organisations makes an important contribution to building national
and regional capacities to prevent proliferation.
Q3. What is the UK's policy with regards to
the future of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention's Implementation
Support Unit (ISU)? Does the Government support an expansion of
the remit, budget and staffing of the ISU? Is there any prospect
of creating an organisation in this field which resembles the
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons?
Since its inception (and most recently at the
Meeting of States Parties in December 08), the ISU has been widely
acclaimed by States Parties including the UK. The UK has worked
with and supported the ISU through the offices of the FCO and
the UK Disarmament Mission in Geneva. The UK has also contributed
financially and technically to one-off events held by the ISU
in the margins of BTWC meetings aimed at raising awareness of
technical aspects of the Convention and its implementation.
There has been an ongoing debate over the role
of the ISU—some states initially expressed reservations
about its creation but have since acclaimed its work. In preparation
for the 2011 Biological Toxin and Weapons Convention Review Conference,
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and other key stakeholders
will review the UK's position. Expanding the ISU's mandate would
require an increased budget; there would be implications for the
UK's contribution.
Under the BTWC an organisation similar to the
OPCW could be created if States Parties were able to reach agreement
on a verification protocol. As Mr Rammell said when giving evidence
to the FAC "we are long-standing supporters of a verification
regime| we would want both universality and effective verification
regimes". In the absence of such an agreement or any expansion
of its mandate, the ISU is likely to remain sufficient to manage
the day to day administration of the BTWC.
Q4. How does the Government intend to persuade
sceptics that the Arms Trade Treaty should be based on the applicability
of international human rights and international humanitarian law?
The UK will continue to argue for an Arms Trade
Treaty that includes provisions which relate to international
human rights law and international humanitarian law. These laws
enjoy wide acceptance and States have already undertaken obligations
and commitments in this respect. We would make it clear that an
ATT does not create new obligations in these areas, but that by
signing and ratifying an ATT States would confirm that they would
take into account these existing obligations when considering
arms export controls.
We hope that when this is clarified and understood
by all States, they will feel able to agree to include these provisions
within an ATT.
Q5. Can the Open Ended Working Group be an
effective mechanism for advancing negotiations on an Arms Trade
Treaty? Will an overwhelming majority approach help or hinder
negotiations and is the UK supportive of such an approach in general?
If not, why is it in this specific case?
The Open Ended Working Group model has a number
of anticipated benefits:
We want an ATT that enjoys broad and deep support
so that there is shared ownership. The Open Ended Working Groups
(OEWG) will broaden discussion from the 28-member Group of Government
Experts which met in 2008 to include all members of the UN General
Assembly. We think this will enrich the discussion to take account
of the various aspects of arms export controls that different
regions think should be addressed within an ATT to make it robust.
It will also facilitate wider ownership and understanding of the
benefits of an ATT, making it a treaty that we hope will be not
only be widely ratified but also effectively enforced by individual
States, who see that it is in their interests to do so.
An OEWG will also provide a broader forum for
all UN Member States to further consider those elements in the
2008 Group of Government Experts' report where consensus could
be developed for their inclusion in an eventual legally-binding
treaty. This includes ideas on how to strengthen existing export
controls, for example through the provision of technical assistance,
and information-sharing.
Our general approach will be to seek wide support
for UK positions, and to take account of the views of others in
so doing. We cannot predict at this stage how each negotiation
and discussion will develop but we are sure that achieving as
close to universal support as possible is a goal worth pursuing.
We are confident that the OEWGs provide further momentum towards
our goal of achieving an effective ATT as soon as possible.
Q6. Mr Rammell indicated that he would provide
the Committee with further details of the contracts for de-mining
in the Falkland Islands.
I understand that this question has been answered
already in separate correspondence.[407]
I hope that the information provided above is
useful and answers the Committee's questions fully. As always,
our officials would be happy to provide any further details which
could help the Committee in their inquiry.
24 February 2009
407 GS(NP)81-Letter from Bill Rammell, Minister of
State. Back
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