Examination of Witnesses (Questions 80-87)
DANIEL FEAKES,
DR. BRIAN
JONES AND
NICHOLAS SIMS
19 NOVEMBER 2008
Q80 Chairman: Does that also include
assisting with the destruction of stocks? Do we put a lot of resources
into that?
Daniel Feakes: Yes. That is mainly
under the Global Partnership programme—the G8 programme—routed
mainly through the Ministry of Defence, which oversees that. It
is mainly to do with the Russians, as far as I know.
Q81 Chairman: We visited a civil
nuclear facility in Moscow two years ago that was getting money
from the Global Partnership.
Daniel Feakes: I think the UK's
main involvement in terms of chemical weapons is at Shchuch'ye,
which is a chemical weapons destruction facility in the Urals,
I think—a long way out anyway. The UK has put money there,
along with the US and a few others.
Chairman: I must apologise. I have to
go to another meeting. I am going to hand over the Chair to Sir
John Stanley, who will carry on for a little while longer.
[SIR JOHN
STANLEY in the Chair]
Q82 Chairman: The question that
I would like to ask you, which I thought that you might be referring
to in answer to Mr. Heathcoat-Amory's previous question about
the quantum, is whether the use made of chemical defoliants by
the United States during the Vietnam war is possible under the
present treaty arrangements. Certainly, the memories of those
living in North Vietnam at the time are absolutely seared by the
scale of the use of the extremely aggressive toxic chemicals,
which today still make it absolutely impossible to grow crops
on the areas that were subject to it and, allegedly, have led
to the birth of children with congenital deformities. I am not
a scientist, so I do not know whether or not the allegations are
correct.
Within the existing treaty arrangements, is
it still possible to use those very aggressive toxic defoliants
as, effectively, chemical weapons? [Interruption.] Have
we stumped the witnesses? If you do not know the answer, which
is fair enough, could you send us a note with your views on whether
that use of chemicals is within the treaty and, if it is not,
on whether it might be brought in and how?
Daniel Feakes: There is a reference
in the CWC to herbicides, in the preamble, so it is not in the
substantive articles of the CWC itself. I think that it refers
to the existing rules or prohibitions of the international law
on herbicides, but I cannot remember.[6]
Nicholas Sims: My impression,
Sir John, is that it was sidelined during the CWC negotiations
in order to get a CWC at all. The United States was understandably
very sensitive on the subject of anything at all being said about
herbicides or defoliants. My recollection of it being referred
to only in the preamble is very much the same as Daniel's, but
I will be very happy to send the Committee a note, as you suggest.[7]
Q83 Chairman: Obviously, a policy
point for the Committee will be whether that is indeed the case.
If it is merely in the preamble, is it a policy development that
the British Government should press for when we come to the next
review? We will be very glad to hear anything further that you
have to tell us on that.[8]
I have one further question on chemical weapons,
which arises from Mr. Feakes's memorandum. You say at the beginning
of paragraph 17: "More important will be deciding on an appropriate
response to the likely failure by both Russia and the USA to meet
the 2012 deadline for the total destruction of their CW stockpiles.
This eventuality could have extremely serious repercussions for
the OPCW." Why will there be such a serious shortfall, as
seems to be likely, in meeting the deadlines that the two major
powers signed up to?
Daniel Feakes: Again, I do not
have technical expertise in destroying these weapons, but, from
what I understand, in terms of Russia, a lot of it was to do with
financial resources. I think that the Russian programme was quite
poorly resourced from the beginning, but it is much better now
and has quite a lot of money from foreign donations under the
G8 Global Partnership. In the beginning, the Russian programme
was poorly funded, so a lot of the problems in Russia concerned
funding.
As I understand it, in the US, this is partly
to do with the technology, which applies to both countries. It
is very difficult, because these weapons were never designed to
be destroyed, other than through use. When they were being designed
back during the cold war, they were military weapons. They were
designed to be dropped from planes or fired from artillery guns.
No one gave much thought to how to take them apart and demilitarise
them. When the treaty was being negotiated, the 10-year deadline—extendable
to 15 years—was agreed. That was politically acceptable,
but I do not think that it was based on a full appreciation of
how difficult it would be to destroy them, because that had not
started to happen then.
Technologically, this is a very difficult thing
that they are doing. There are various different technologies.
You have incineration technologies or neutralisation technologies
and various others to do this. There is a choice to be made. Some
technologies are more expensive than others. Others can be done
faster, but less effectively. Various things have to be weighed
up there. In the US, you also have the issue of very strong environmental
regulations. If you are incinerating, there are strong environment
regulations on emissions. I think that the same applies to Russia.
You are not allowed to transport these weapons.
The logical thing in some instances would be
to have one destruction facility—or two—in the country
and move all the weapons from the dispersed stockpiles to that
one facility. I know for sure that there is legislation in the
US that says that these weapons cannot cross state lines. So you
are not allowed to move them from Alabama to Kentucky. That is
just not allowed to happen. They have to build one destruction
facility at each storage site, which in the case of the US means
eight separate destruction facilities. So, technologically, it
is difficult and that obviously costs money.
Q84 Chairman: When you go on to
say that this eventuality could have extremely serious repercussions
for the OPCW, are you alluding simply to OPCW credibility, or
are you alluding to something wider than that?
Daniel Feakes: It is definitely
to do with credibility. In some ways, the fundamental obligation
under the CWC is destroying the chemical weapons that you possess.
For two of the most important states parties to the CWC not to
meet that obligation will affect the credibility of the OPCW.
If the OPCW is seen not to do anything about it or to just let
the issue go, that would affect its credibility. But it also plays
with the internal politics of the OPCW itself. Other states that
do not possess these weapons will say, "Well, if they're
not destroying their weapons in time to the deadline, why should
we meet a deadline on submitting information on our legislation?"
Various arguments like that would go on within the OPCW, and they
have already been raised at the second review conference earlier
this year. Lots of states were saying that they cannot progress
on this issue until those two states have progressed on destruction.
Everything is being linked together, so it could slow down the
whole agenda in The Hague.
Nicholas Sims: Might I add to
that, Sir John? I agree with everything that Daniel has said.
I am struck by the contrast between the first and second review
conferences. The first review conference was six years into the
life of the CWC at the end of April 2003. The Russian delegate
announced, "We are proud to announce that we have completed
the destruction of the first 1% of our stockpile." Now six
years into the life of the convention, they should have been a
lot further on towards 100%, but there was little criticism then
of either Russia or the US.
Sitting suspended for a Division in the
House.
On resuming—
Chairman: We will resume our questioning
for a further 15 minutes. Mr. Sims, would you like to complete
what you were saying when the Division bell rang?
Nicholas Sims: Thank you. The
first review conference seemed to me to be amazingly indulgent
and tolerant towards Russia, which had only destroyed the first
1 % in the first six years. The second review conference was much
more robust, having said that it welcomed the assurances by the
states concerned that they would complete the process of destruction
by 29 April 2012 at the latest. There were absolutely no weasel
words on what to do if they do not reach that, and that is how
it should be.
The great majority of states that have either
already destroyed their chemical weapons or had no such weapons
anyway are entitled to expect the United States and the Russian
Federation, which is far behind the United States on the percentage
it has destroyed, to get a move on and devote far greater resources
to it. As Daniel has explained, it is not just a question of throwing
money at the problem, because there are real environmental problems
and choices to be made between incineration and neutralisation.
I think that the rest of the world and the other
parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, including the United
Kingdom, are entitled to expect the Governments of both the United
States and the Russian Federation to show great seriousness in
approaching the 2012 deadline.
Q85 Chairman: Thank you very much.
In the last few minutes we will turn to the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention. As we know, this whole area has been beset
by the issue of verification. I thought that the problems relating
to that were very well encapsulated in a sentence from Dr. Brian
Jones, who wrote in paragraph 49 of his paper: "Biological
weapons, by virtue of their greater potency, low cost, ease of
production, small size, ease of transport and difficulty of detection,
are a much greater challenge to detection by intelligence and
inspection."
The key questions I would like to put to all
of you are: given those indisputable and unavoidable facts about
the nature of biological substances and weapons, do you believe
that chasing after a comprehensive verification regime is effectively
chasing after the end of a rainbow or that some form of verification
regime can be negotiated and put in place? If so, what are the
key elements of that verification system that you think the Government
should be aiming at?
Dr. Jones: Well, I have raised
the challenges in the sentence you read. I became very aware of
those issues when trying to assess capabilities, and it seems
to me that when it comes to some sort of verification regime the
reliance must be on close national capabilities to monitor the
activities of the institutions that are within their realm. Quite
how one ensures that it is in the interests of the individual
nations establishing those regimes, I am not sure. I do not know
what thoughts my colleagues have.
Q86 Chairman: I think we all agree
that it will not be able to be done in any distant technical way.
Is there any form of inspection regime—obviously by virtue
of a treaty arrangement—that could be negotiable that countries
such as the United States will not view simply as a means of getting
access to the key commercial secrets of their biotech industry?
Nicholas Sims: Whether there are
or not, I do not think that the USA is likely to be persuaded
that its industry or its national security is safe with an inspection
regime. Therefore, I do not think that a verification regime for
the BWC involving inspection is a politically realistic goal for
the foreseeable future. I know the EU has to hold it as a distant
goal that it cannot retreat from, but realistically, it makes
much more sense to go for other compliance measures.
I am very attracted by the Canadian proposal
for an accountability framework. The idea at its simplest is that
the states parties should show that they are accountable one to
another in respect of demonstrating compliance, much more positively
than they have done hitherto. The compliance reports that have
been sent in up to now, additional to the confidence building
measures, have been few and haphazard. If they were made much
more systematic and searching, there could be regular accountability
sessions, as the Canadians proposed at the sixth review conference.
There could be regular accountability sessions
where questions of doubtful activities could be raised and where
there would be reassurance, if there can be reassurance, but also
a working out of real compliance ambiguities and calls for clarification
and all the rest of it. I know that it is not the same as a proper
on-site inspection verification regime, but I think that is more
likely to be politically feasible and acceptable even to the United
States. It already has support from quite a few countries in addition
to Canada.
When preparing for the seventh review conference
in 2011 I should like the UK to give priority to adopting a developed
accountability framework. Anything else on compliance measures,
such as sorting out the confidence-building measures, is all to
the good and we also need a comprehensive programme of action
which combines national implementation measures and the international
co-operation in the prevention of disease and other peaceful applications
of microbiology under article 10 of the BWC. That particular balance
between article 4 and article 10 was attempted by the president
of the sixth review conference, but too late in the day to be
successful. I think it stands a very much better chance if it
is carefully prepared for 2011 and the seventh review conference.
Q87 Chairman: I will just come
to Mr. Feakes for his contribution to this question. Do you think
that your accountability regime can stand alone as an agreement
between states, or do you think that in order to have teeth and
credibility it would require the setting up of an international
body that would act as the monitor or policeman for it? In other
words, it would be a biological convention equivalent body to
the OPCW.
Nicholas Sims: I see it as the
nearest that one can come in the short and medium term towards
an equivalent to OPCW. I see it being serviced by a small secretariat
based on the present implementation support unit, but somewhat
expanded by agreement at the next review conference. I see it
as essentially an agreement among those states parties to the
BWC that are willing to take that further step. In the absence
of any better compliance regime, I think that there is a good
chance that they will take that further step in 2011.
Daniel Feakes: I fear that Nicholas
is right about the political feasibility of a verification regime.
He said that the EU position is a kind of distant ambition, but
I still hold out a hope. So much work went into the whole concept
of verification, into the protocol during the 1990s. The UK in
particular put in a lot of work—the Foreign Office, the
Ministry of Defence, the DTI, Porton Down. People put a lot of
work into this; they spent weeks in Geneva over the course of
years. Lots of other countries did the same. To see all of that
go to waste would be a shame.
It is a question of how you would take verification
further. Obviously the protocol approach was not right for the
time, and I have my doubts that it would be right now, with the
massive diffusion of biotechnology that we will see in the 21st
century. I think that there still is a role for verification there.
A few years back, research institutes in the US did various reports,
and worked with the biotech industry to see what the industry
thought would be an effective verification mechanism for the BWC.
I think that something can be done; whether it would be politically
feasible for everyone I do not know, but I would hope that it
is worth exploring.
Perhaps with the new Administration in the US
there is an opportunity to start mentioning what for years was
just the V-word. In Geneva, verification could not be mentioned
after the collapse of the protocol in any official documents from
the BWC. It was off-territory, it was nowhere near the agenda.
Hopefully, it might start to come back onto the agenda. At the
end of the day, you need something with boots on the ground and
people on site. As Brian said, a lot of that will be national
responsibilities and regimes, which could perhaps be overseen
by some kind of international body.
Chairman: Dr. Jones, Mr. Feakes and Mr.
Sims, I am afraid that we have delayed you because of the Divisions.
Thank you very much for your evidence today. There are a few questions
that we did not reach. We will put those to you in writing, if
we may, and we would be very grateful for any replies that you
can send us.
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