Examination of Witnesses (Questions 200-212)
MR DAVID
HAYES
28 JANUARY 2009
Q200 Chairman: If there was such
a treaty, do you think it would have made any difference to current
UK policy on selling arms to particular countries?
Mr. Hayes: Probably very little.
There is an EU embargo of sorts against China, for example. Yet
if you look at the UK statistics, most of the export licence refusals
for military equipment in relation to China have been made under
the EU consolidated criteria, not under the arms embargo. If an
arms trade treaty were in existence today, probably the preponderance
of licence refusals would still be made under the consolidated
criteria, not under the treaty.
Q201 Chairman: What about countries
such as Israel, which we have touched on, or Saudi Arabia, where
we sell quite a lot of arms? Do you think that the arms trade
treaty would have influenced that?
Mr. Hayes: It is hard to say until
we have an approved treaty and we see what the terms are. Fundamentally,
we see the concept as being one of raising the bar at the lower
end of the continuum of export control systems, rather than adding
another layer on top of systems that are already fairly rigorous.
I would not think, therefore, that an arms trade treaty would
make a significant difference in that area.
Q202 Chairman: To summarise, then,
and correct me if I have got this wrong, you are saying that the
UK already has a rigorous system of controls on arms exports?
Mr. Hayes: Yes.
Q203 Chairman: The arms trade
treaty will raise the international standard to somewhere below
that level, but higher than it is currently in the world as a
whole?
Mr. Hayes: Yes.
Q204 Sir Menzies Campbell: In
response to an earlier answer, you said that you had spoken to
your American equivalents. Did they share the same constructive
attitude towards the treaty that you have described other members
as having?
Mr. Hayes: As you would expect,
some do and some do not. You cannot draw a logical distinction
between them and say that one end of the political spectrum is
more in favour or that certain sectors of industry are more in
favour. It boils down to the individual preference of the person
to whom you are speaking. As and when the political climate in
the US changes and the new Administration give a lead in one direction
or another, I would expect to see a shift in what might be called
corporate positions on the arms trade treaty. I do not expect
to see it until that point.
Q205 Sir Menzies Campbell: Do
you think that they are waiting to see which way to jump?
Mr. Hayes: Yes.
Q206 Chairman: May I take you
back to some questions that were touched on earlier on the programme
of action on small arms and light weapons? Do you have any view
on whether the discussions on an arms trade treaty have influenced
that process? Has your organisation had a role in engaging with
that process?
Mr. Hayes: Our organisations have
very little engagement with that process when compared with the
arms trade treaty. Again, I echo Roy Isbister's comments on business.
I can see the two running in parallel, because the arms trade
treaty has a much broader potential scope than the other activity.
Q207 Chairman: Within that programme,
there is a so-called international instrument to enable states
to identify and trace illicit small arms and light weapons in
a timely and reliable manner. In other words, it is an international
tracing instrument. Has that had an impact on the UK defence industry?
Mr. Hayes: Not really, because
the UK already identifies and marks weapons. That is enforced
rigorously, so I would not expect such a requirement to have any
impact on the UK industry.
Q208 Chairman: Do you have a view
on the issue of brokering, which we have touched on?
Mr. Hayes: Brokering is a complex
area. As you know, UK legislation on brokering is, among other
things, under review. It almost becomes an issue of brokering
controls versus export controls. If we lived in an ideal world
where every country had an efficient, rigorous, well-enforced
export control system, there would be no need for brokering controls
by definition, because nearly every act of brokering is also an
export or an import somewhere. If those systems were working correctly,
there would be no need for brokering controls. It could almost
be said that the need for brokering controls is a measure of the
failure of export controls. Should we be looking to plug the gaps
in other countries' export control systems by exercising extraterritorial
control over activities that are difficult to police or should
the focus be on bringing other nations' export control systems
up to speed, so that the need for brokering controls is reduced?
There is little or no consensus around the world
on what constitutes an act of brokering or what is controlled
by brokering. The American definition of brokering under the international
traffic in arms regulations is completely different from the UK
definition of brokering under the Export Control Act 2002. The
Germans do not control everything on the German military list
for brokering purposes; they control only a subset of it. You
end up with a proliferation of different control regimes, which
could be absolutely horrendous for a global company.
Q209 Chairman: Is that not an
argument for stronger international institutions and regimes,
rather a reason to say that it is too complicated and that we
cannot do anything about it?
Mr. Hayes: That is the argument
that I am making, but the argument I am making is for stronger
regimes for export controls, as distinct from brokering controls.
Q210 Mr. Hamilton: There has been
some discussion about ATT and whether dual-use items would have
been exported to Israel. You said yourself earlier that a lot
of the dual-use items that may be exported to Israel are exported
back to the United Kingdom and other countries as finished products.
What is your view of an arms trade treaty? As well as raising
the bar internationally towards the kind of standards that we
have in the UK, surely it is not aimed at democratic and open
countries such as Israel, but at those countries with oppressive
regimes that might be using those weapons against their own people.
Is that not one of its purposes?
Mr. Hayes: Yes.
Mr. Hamilton: Thank you.
Chairman: We do not have time now to
go into a discussion of Gaza and all the other things—
Mr. Hamilton: No, I just wanted to make
the point about democratic and oppressive regimes.
Q211 Chairman: All right. Can
I finally raise the issue of the cluster munitions and the land
mines treaty? What is your assessment of that issue?
Mr. Hayes: They have both been
successful in different ways, but at the same time, they have
thrown up some unexpected problems for industry. For example,
I am aware of an issue where a company ran into difficulties demonstrating
its mine clearance equipment because of the restrictions of the
anti-personnel landmine convention.[5]
Q212 Chairman: They could not
actually export a landmine in order to show it in practice?
Mr. Hayes: Exactly.
Chairman: That is interesting. Perhaps
you could send us a note on that. Mr Hayes, thank you very much
for coming. It has been very valuable as a complement to what
we heard in the previous session; it will be extremely helpful
to us as we do our report. Thank you very much.
Mr. Hayes: We appreciate the opportunity.
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