Examination of Witnesses (Questions 260-279)
BILL RAMMELL
MP, PAUL ARKWRIGHT
AND MARIOT
LESLIE
4 FEBRUARY 2009
Q260 Mr. Hamilton: But here we are,
we go to Iran as parliamentarians and sit before the members of
the Majlis. We tell them that they have no right to have nuclear
weapons and that they must not develop those weapons—which
of course are un-Islamic anyway. They will turn round to us and
say, "You are just renewing the vehicles for your own independent
nuclear deterrent. Who are you to tell us that we should not have
these weapons? If you have them because it is important for your
own defence and security, why is it not equally important for
ours?"
Bill Rammell: I will turn that
argument on its head. There is an argument that comes across implicitly
on the liberal left—I am not saying that that is your view—which
almost says that because some states have got these weapons, how
do we have any moral basis not to say that everyone should have
them? At one level we could argue that, but it is an extraordinarily
dangerous proposition to advance. If we were making the case against
proliferation in the context of increasing our level of nuclear
capability, that argument, even though I would still reject it,
would have more plausibility. Taking our example of a state that
has reduced its arsenal by three quarters and is one of the strongest
advocates internationally for the treaty-based approach to get
genuine further reductions in nuclear capability, I do not think
that that argument is justified.
Q261 Mr. Hamilton: What further steps
can we now take? You said that we have reduced our arsenal by
75 per cent. What more can we do to reduce it further, as is our
obligation under the NPT? Furthermore, if we continue to retain
these weapons, as the Government and Parliament have agreed we
should, what use are they against not the rogue states particularly
but the terrorist groups that would wish to acquire them? How
on earth could we defend ourselves with nuclear weapons against
that kind of attack?
Bill Rammell: Given the range
of threats that exist at the moment it would be wrong, and certainly
not prudent, for us to unilaterally give up that capability. In
terms of further action—and this is where the NPT conference
next year is so critical—we want a coming together of the
nuclear weapons states and the non-nuclear weapons states to re-inject
energy into that process. The fact that Barack Obama has committed
to ratification of the comprehensive test ban treaty is a very
positive step forward. We want to commence down the path of the
fissile material cut-off treaty and we want further multilateral
efforts to reduce the number of nuclear warheads. A reinvigorated
strategic arms reduction treaty process to see further major reductions
between the United States and Russia would be very positive in
that regard as well.
Q262 Mr. Hamilton: Finally, how do
you react to the suggestion that cancelling the Trident programme,
not building these incredibly expensive vehicles to transport
these weapons around and dismantling our nuclear arsenal would
make us safer because we would have far more resources to spend
on conventional weapons, ships, submarines, vehicles, men and
equipment, which would make our Army and our armed forces a lot
more effective both in the UK and worldwide?
Bill Rammell: I remember putting
forward that argument as a Labour activist on the doorsteps in
the 1983 general election. It was not convincing. The prevailing
view now is still that given the scale of the risks that we face,
yes we need to push as strongly as we can for disarmament, but
to take that step now to unilaterally disarm would be wrong. I
am not accusing you of this, because I know your views and we
have talked about this, but in some quarters there is an underlying
dishonesty in this debate. People say that we should do that,
with the underlying knowledge that we would still be protected
by the American nuclear umbrella. I want to see progress across
the board. I do not think that we could achieve that at the moment
by that unilateral gesture.
Q263 Mr. Purchase: You were unembarrassed
by the dilemma or paradox that my colleague presented to you.
Let me tell you that every time we have asked this question on
our travels from the United Nations in New York and Geneva to
many other places, they are all quite perplexed by Britain's decision
to renew, improve and modernise the platform. I agree entirely
with my colleague: the likelihood of any of the rogue states or
anyone else targeting Britain with a nuclear weapon is almost
beyond belief. However, it is likely that at some stage terrorists—religious
fundamentalists, as they should truthfully be called—will
obtain a means of attacking other countries with nuclear weapons
of some kind. We will not have, and no one else will have, any
serious defence in terms of a response, because there is no country
to attack with anything. The colossal expenditure that we are
now entering into should be spent more properly—if it is
to be spent on defence at all—on improvements to the conditions
of our armed services. We hear all the time that they do not have
the right equipment on time, in the right way, and that they often
do not even have decent living conditions in our military bases
here in Britain.
The Government have a very serious problem.
It is true that on the doorsteps in 1983 no one was convinced
by Labour's arguments, and the Conservatives had the finest propaganda
ever of Labour's defence policy—a soldier with his arms
up. It is absolutely true that we could not compete with that.
But I do not think that this is 1983 and, besides which, even
if all the press barons are warmongers in disguise, people are
getting smarter. We face a genuine dilemma in both the Ministry
of Defence and foreign policy, and we appear to be in what I would
call "a bugger's muddle" over this whole business of
whether or not we should be developing—I will finish in
just a second. Should we be developing further our capabilities
when pleading with everyone else to reduce them? It is simply
is not principled, and at best it could be called eclecticism,
but at worst it could be described as totally unprincipled.
Chairman: We will not get through the
rest of our business if we have long speeches, rather than questions.
Mr. Purchase: I just thought—
Chairman: I know. You have made yourself
feel better, now the Minister can respond.
Bill Rammell: You and I have talked
about this long and hard before, and I know and respect your view.
I acknowledge that we are not in 1983. I could be wrong, but my
gut instinct is that ultimately, in a debate, a majority of British
people, despite wanting disarmament, will not conclude that the
circumstances are right, even now, to unilaterally disarm. The
ongoing costs, with renewal, are about 5% or 6% of the overall
defence budget, which is roughly what it is costing at the moment.
On your point about equipment, the Ministry
of Defence makes strenuous efforts to ensure that our military
is properly equipped. I also do not agree with you that the threat
from rogue states is negligible. I think it is much more substantive—
Mr. Purchase: It is nil. By the way,
I have never been a member of CND, Bill.
Bill Rammell: Neither have I,
for the record.
Q264 Mr. Keetch: Just for the record,
Minister, you suggested that if Britain gives up its nuclear weapons,
we would somehow be shielding under the American umbrella. Let
us be clear: every NATO country that does not possess nuclear
weapons is in the same position—effectively protected by
the American nuclear umbrella. If there was a nuclear attack from
Russia on Lithuania, for example, then America would be obliged
to respond.
Bill Rammell: Yes, but those countries
did not take, rightly or wrongly, the historic decisions that
this country took to be a nuclear weapons state. You cannot uninvent
the reality. We do have that capability and there is an issue
about integrity—that we can give it up in the full knowledge
that we will still be protected.
Q265 Mr. Keetch: I would perhaps
disagree. I want to talk about the Obama Administration, and I
would also like to come back to something that Ken Purchase said
because it follows on from what we have just been discussing.
Am I correct in interpreting what you said earlier—that
the biggest threat of chemical or biological attack on Britain,
at the moment, comes from a terrorist organisation and not from
a rogue state or an actual state? Is that effectively what you
said?
Bill Rammell: Yes.
Q266 Mr. Keetch: Secondly, did you
say that if a terrorist organisation possessed a nuclear weapon,
then the biggest threat we would face from a nuclear attack would
come from a terrorist organisation, and not a rogue state or an
actual state?
Bill Rammell: In terms of nuclear
capability, we are projecting too far forward. However, your analysis
in terms of chemical or biological is accurate.
Q267 Mr. Keetch: To follow on from
the questions of my two colleagues, how would we use Trident against
al-Qaeda? I am the commander of HMS Vanguard, you are the Secretary
of State for Defence, or the Foreign Secretary. The Taliban plants
a nuclear weapon and blows up Hereford. How would we respond?
Bill Rammell: It is much more
challenging, but it is not the only threat that we face.
Mariot Leslie: I was perhaps just
going to remind the Committee of what was said about Trident in
the 2006 White Paper, because it is sometimes misquoted or misinterpreted.
What the Government said then about the rationale for wanting
to retain the nuclear deterrent was that terrorists have an aspiration
to get their hands on nuclear materials. The only route by which
they would acquire that capability would be via proliferation
from a state, and what we would be holding to account would be
the state that might be tempted in the direction of that sort
of proliferation. The only route by which they would acquire that
capability would be via proliferation from a state, and what we
would be holding to account would be the state that might be tempted
in the direction of that sort of proliferation. The Government
have never said that they intended to direct nuclear weapons against
a terrorist; they were simply setting out a wide range of ways
in which they might want to retain a nuclear deterrent against
the possibility of a nuclear state misusing its own nuclear weapons.
Q268 Mr. Keetch: To be clear, al-Qaeda
launches a nuclear attack on a UK city, and we believe that it
has acquired that nuclear technology from say, pick a country—
Mr. Hamilton: Russia.
Mr. Keetch: We will then respond by launching
a nuclear attack on Russia.
Mariot Leslie: The Government
have never said under what circumstances exactly they would use
their nuclear deterrent—that ambiguity is part of the deterrent.
We do not believe that al-Qaeda has the capability to launch a
massive attack with a normal militarised nuclear weapon on this
country, as we sit at the moment.
Q269 Mr. Keetch: Let me move on to
the Obama Administration—slightly happier news, we hope.
Minister, you said earlier that you believed that the comprehensive
nuclear test ban treaty would be ratified by the Obama Administration.
Are you confident of that? Do you think that it would go though
the Senate?
Bill Rammell: The prospects for
disarmament under President Obama are much greater and stronger
than they were under President Bush. How do I adduce that in evidence?
You can look, for example, at Hillary Clinton's confirmation hearings,
when she talked about the importance of rebuilding staffing and
financing the relevant bureaus within the State Department. Obama
has made it clear that he wants to ratify, and have negotiations
on, the fissile material cut-off treaty. All that I see and hear
is very positive and I have belief in President Obama, but there
is a caveat: in the American system, you have to get those treaties
through the Senate as well. I think that with the degree of support
that the President has and the political make-up of the Senate
at the moment, the grounds for that are optimistic, but it is
not as simple as saying that the President decrees and it happens.
Q270 Mr. Keetch: I am sure that our
excellent embassy in Washington would help to achieve that. Do
you think that China would then follow?
Bill Rammell: I would not want
to presume to state Chinese intentions, but certainly when I was
in Beijing a couple of weeks ago interesting discussions were
taking place and there was a desire to know what the intentions
of the Obama Administration were. I would hope that in those circumstances
China would follow.
Q271 Mr. Keetch: We read in The
Times today that the President will establish a non-proliferation
office, which I am sure we would support, and there is a suggestion
of a new treaty with Russia to cut their warhead numbers to 1,000
each. Presumably the UK Government would want to support that
and do everything possible to encourage it.
Bill Rammell: I have not seen
that confirmed. I understand that it is based on a leak, and I
do not comment on our leaks or anybody else's. Our very clear
position is that we want a renegotiation of START and further
efforts and impetus towards disarmament. If that means substantial
further reductions in the arsenal of both the United States and
Russia, we would welcome that.
Q272 Mr. Keetch: Presumably the situation
of the missile defence programme, particularly the siting of radars
in the Czech Republic, would look to remove one of the obstacles
that possibly was there under the previous Administration. The
new Administration seems to be moving in the correct direction
on that.
Bill Rammell: No, I think that
that is a different issue. I know that there are different views.
I think that missile defence has some merits. It was interesting
when Obama's nominee for the policy Under-Secretary at the Pentagon
went before the armed forces hearing. She articulated the view
that co-operation with Russia might be a way forward on this issue.
The record of what President Obama said shows that he supports
ballistic missile defence but would want to ensure that it is
developed in a way that is pragmatic and effective and does not
divert resources from other national security priorities until
it is clear that the technology works. What does all that mean?
We will clearly talk to the Americans and work with them. My gut
instinct is that they probably will go ahead, but maybe with a
slower time frame.
Q273 Chairman: We will come on to
John Stanley in a minute with more questions on this. Before we
move away from President Obama and the strategic arms reduction
proposal, if the Americans and Russians get to 1,000, does that
not mean that the several hundred warheads in British, French,
Chinese, Israeli, Indian, Pakistani and—question mark—North
Korean and Iranian possession will become a big problem? Is there
not, therefore, an argument that at least the fellow NATO countries'
nuclear warheads should be taken into consideration within the
US total, or at least be added in, as part of a negotiation on
a wider, strategic agreement?
Bill Rammell: I am not going to
get drawn into the detail of a front- page newspaper article.
Q274 Chairman: Whether that newspaper
article is true or not, the principle of reductions by the Americans
and the Russians going ahead to such low levels, without having
an impact on other states, is a problem, is it not?
Bill Rammell: We have always said
that our long-term aim remains to create the conditions where
we could establish a nuclear-free world. If substantial, genuine,
multilateral progress is really being made, we have made it clear
that we would be willing to look at our weapons within those multilateral
negotiations.
Q275 Chairman: Given that we have
only one system, and that there is a certain minimum number of
missiles and warheads that you have to have before it becomes
completely ridiculous, there is the question—not to take
Mr. Hamilton's line—that at some point, potentially in the
foreseeable future, we could move down the road whereby neither
Britain nor France have national nuclear weapons systems because
the total global stockpiles have been reduced so much.
Bill Rammell: I am going to restate
what I have already said. We have substantively reduced our arsenals.
We want further multilateral reductions. We have made it clear
that, in the future, if those multilateral negotiations are genuinely
taking place, we would consider involving our weapons as part
of them. I am not in a position to commit.
Q276 Chairman: I know that you are
not in a position to do that, but I am interested to know what
point we are moving to. Potentially, in the next few years, this
is a dilemma—a choice—that the British Government
will have to confront.
Bill Rammell: Our long-term aim
remains to create the conditions for a nuclear-free world, and
there are all sorts of difficult decisions that we will have to
face up to in getting there.
Q277 Sir Menzies Campbell: It comes
to this: if your avowed policy, as set out in the document, is
successful, then a point will arise at which our weapons will
have to be on the table.
Bill Rammell: I have made it clear
that, in future multilateral negotiations, if the circumstances
were right, we would include those weapons as part of those multilateral
negotiations.
Q278 Sir Menzies Campbell: The more
successful we are, and the quicker we are successful, with this
policy, the sooner the British deterrent would have to be a part
of the discussion.
Bill Rammell: With respect, I
will restate what I have said. We have made it abundantly clear
that we want a world free of nuclear weapons. We have a very good
track record—probably acknowledged to be the best, internationally—in
terms of reducing our nuclear arsenals. If there is genuine, multilateral
progress, we would consider putting our weapons on the table as
part of that.
Q279 Sir Menzies Campbell: I have
some sympathy with you on the point that we have been pretty good
at getting rid of systems. I just wrote down, "nuclear artillery",
"depth charges", "no short-range weapons",
"freefall bombs"—the WE177. These are all unilateral
actions taken by successive British Governments. In that regard,
I think that you are quite right to claim that our record in this
matter is a pretty good one.
May I just ask you this last question? You have
Kissinger, Shultz, Perry and Nunn on the other side of the Atlantic;
you have Hurd, Rifkind, Robertson and Owen on this side—no
shrinking violets any of them. This debate is moving on very,
very fast, and that critical moment of decision, as you have agreed
with my colleague, Mr. Keetch, may come rather more quickly than
many of us anticipate. In that case, policy formulation is a matter
of urgency, not of leisure.
Bill Rammell: Absolutely. And
the fact that all those eminent people that you mentioned are
putting forward the views that they are, indicates a view that
we share—and that I strongly share—that this is a
critical and fundamental challenge. One of the original questions,
from Mr. Horam, I believe, was whether this has gone off the boil
in terms of international opinion and NGOs. Nothing could be further
from the reality. We must re-inject urgency into this matter,
which is why the NPT review conference next year is so critical.
That is one of the reasons why we published the document today.
It underlines the huge importance of the issue and is an attempt
to engage people in that debate.
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