Examination of Witnesses (Questions 280-299)
BILL RAMMELL
MP, PAUL ARKWRIGHT
AND MARIOT
LESLIE
4 FEBRUARY 2009
Q280 Mr. Illsley: On what Ming said,
the article about Obama seeking to cut nuclear warheads has been
referred to. Thursday's press carried the headline "Russia
ready to shelve missiles plan in conciliatory gesture to Obama".
There is no reduction, but a commitment not to deploy more. The
point is that there seems to be a consensus breaking out. In the
light of what Ming said and with the Americans and others signing
up to the initiatives, does our decision on Trident look a little
premature? I am not arguing that we should or should not have
Trident, but that our decision to renew years before we needed
to was a bit premature.
Bill Rammell: I desperately hope
that the multilateral process works and that we can get to the
stage of a world free from nuclear weapons. If we had not taken
a decision on Trident, we would have been deciding on unilateral
disarmament if the multilateral process does not work. If in 13
or 14 years the multilateral process had not worked, we would
have been left with an ineffective and inoperable nuclear deterrent.
Q281 Sir John Stanley: Minister,
when you refer to the multilateral process, will you confirm that
you are saying that Government policy is that British nuclear
weapons will be put on the table in that process only if every
other nuclear weapon-holding state—including the French,
Americans, Israelis, North Koreans and Iranians—also puts
its nuclear weapons on the table at the same time?
Bill Rammell: Mariot, do you want
to pick up on the context for that?
Sir John Stanley: I would like a ministerial
answer to my question.
Bill Rammell: Okay, I will restate
for you what I have said previously. Such negotiations will be
detailed and challenging and it is difficult to prescribe in advance
how the process will work. However, if there was genuine multilateral
progress on disarmament, we would consider putting our nuclear
weapons into the mix as part of the negotiations. In advance of
such circumstances, it is difficult to go beyond that.
Q282 Sir John Stanley: I am sorry
Minister, you have not answered my question. Are you saying that
British nuclear weapons go on the table when, and only when, every
other nuclear weapon-holding state puts its weapons on the table?
Bill Rammell: Multilateral progress
and negotiations that will get to the situation where we can eradicate
nuclear weapons will require action on all fronts.
Q283 Sir John Stanley: By all fronts
do you mean all other nuclear weapon-holding states?
Bill Rammell: Yes.
Chairman: Can we move on to some questions
on ballistic missile defence?
Q284 Sir John Stanley: Minister,
I think that you will agree that as far as we and Europe are concerned,
the most important arms control agreement was the intermediate
nuclear forces agreement in the 1980s, which led to the removal
of thousands of nuclear weapons from European soil. You will be
aware that the Russians have threatened that if the European component
of ballistic missile defence goes ahead, they will repudiate that
agreement. You will also be aware that the European deployment
constitutes only a very limited protection against Iranian ballistic
missiles. There will be 10 interceptors in Poland. I was briefed
at the Missile Defence Agency in Washington last week that each
warhead requires two interceptors. It was repeatedly stressed
that ballistic missile defence represented a net and not a shield.
Given those circumstances, why are the British Government so committed
to the European component of ballistic missile defence, which
they have already made clear through their commitment to carry
out the crucial radar upgrading at RAF Fylingdales, when the European
deployment will have only a very limited additional defence capability
against Iran but could leave Europeans hugely worse off in terms
of nuclear weapons deployed against European soil by the Russians?
Bill Rammell: First, we need to
be clear, as you have underlined, that there are 10 interceptors
compared with an arsenal the size of Russia's—the Americans
have repeatedly made it clear that is not where it is directed.
Secondly, the evidence in 2007 was that the number of non-US ballistic
missile launches was 100, which was 30% more than the previous
year. There is genuine concern about the spread of capacity in
terms of ballistic missiles. I think that the solution to this,
to ensure that ballistic missile defence can genuinely help us
in defence terms and that it does not lead to the kind of escalation
that you are talking about, is the kind of arrangements with the
Russians that Miche"le Flournoy, the Under-Secretary of Policy
at the Pentagon, talked of in terms of US-Russia co-operation.
Already there has been a more accommodating response—for
want of a better phrase—from the Russians to the comments
and views that the Obama Administration have been setting out.
There clearly needs to be intense dialogue and discussion, but
if we could end up in a situation where there was co-operation
between the US and Russians on this issue that would be a positive
outcome for both those countries and also for us in Europe.
Q285 Sir John Stanley: Yes, but is
it not the case that the Russians have so far been wholly unimpressed
and unconvinced? You may say "entirely irrationally"
and I would agree with you, but the public posture is that they
do not believe the Americans when they are told that the situation
does not represent any degradation of their nuclear capability.
Given that is the case, surely it can make no sense for those
of us in Europe to have a fractional improvement in our defences
against Iran at the expense of a very major reduction of our security
against Russia?
Bill Rammell: I genuinely do not
believe that is what it should come to. If you look at the dialogue
that has taken place between the US and Russia and the Russia-NATO
dialogue, there have been detailed discussions about how you might
reassure Russia on this front—maybe, for example, in terms
of federating Russian sensors into the overall ballistic missile
defence structure. That might be a way forward.
I do not want to overstate things, as I think
Barack Obama has enormous hopes—probably too great—resting
on his shoulders, but the fact of his election has injected possibilities
and new ways forward in a number of different areas. Already,
based on what he and his appointees have been saying and the response
from Russia, I think the prospects are greater of reaching a situation
where those concerns on the part of Russia can be addressed and
we can still go forward with a system that would give us some
greater defence.
Q286 Sir John Stanley: May I turn
to the key element behind ballistic missile defence? As you rightly
pointed out, the key issue is the huge proliferation of ballistic
missile technology. At the start of your evidence you rightly
said that our worst expectations about nuclear proliferation had
not occurred, but I think you will agree that our very worst expectations
about ballistic missile technology have occurred and we now have
20-plus states with operational ballistic missiles. What is the
Government's policy to try to halt the proliferation of ballistic
missiles, all of which are potentially able to take conventional,
biological, chemical or nuclear warheads? What are the Government
going to do to try to reverse the incredibly dangerous large-scale
proliferation of ballistic missiles throughout the world? As there
is also a terrorist dimension, what are the British Government
doing to try to enhance the security given to existing ballistic
missile holdings?
Bill Rammell: One response is
what we have just been talking about, in terms of ballistic missile
defence. We also need to work through the relevant international
forums, whether it is the missile technology co-operation group—a
co-operative arrangement whereby states declare what they are
doing and that it can be verified—or another initiative.
We need to do more on that front. The issue is about competing
priorities, however, and the NPT is an absolute priority, but
we need to do more on conventional weapons and I am sure that
we will come on to that. It remains a priority for us, but I cannot
say that we have automatic solutions on every front to deal with
the threats and challenges. One strong reason why we have argued
as we have on missile defence, however, is that, potentially,
it does give us a defence.
Q287 Sir John Stanley: Would you
not agree that the proliferation of ballistic missile technology
is one of the major cancers in terms of proliferation? Would you
also agree that, at the moment, no significant international structures
have any prospect of introducing an element of control? Should
not that be given far higher priority not only by the British
Government but by other Governments? Unless that is gripped, 30-plus
countries may have ballistic missiles at their disposal—alongside
the serious risk that, sooner or later, some could fall into the
hands of terrorist parties.
Bill Rammell: First, the missile
control regime, of which we are strong supporters, provides a
way forward, but arguably it needs strengthening and we are looking
into that. The defensive system that we have discussed is also
part of the solution, but there is some merit in what you say.
We are focused on a range of threats and challenges, and that
is a significant one. By telling you that the missile technology
control regime needs strengthening, I accept your point that we
need to do more in that area.
Q288 Mr. Moss: Minister, may I take
you back to your answer to an earlier question, about the international
dimension of civil nuclear power? Will you outline to the Committee
the operation of the Government's proposed nuclear fuel bond and
tell us how it would complement other proposals in the field?
Bill Rammell: We have stopped
calling it a bond, because there was—
Mr. Moss: A financial implication?
Bill Rammell: Yes, we felt that
there was a financial implication. The commitment to nuclear fuel
assurance is absolutely firm, however. It is an attempt to produce
a creative response to the worldwide civil nuclear renaissance,
and it is about guaranteeing the sourcing and disposal of nuclear
fuel, which will bluntly undermine one of the reasons why states
seek proliferation. We remain absolutely committed to that, we
will take a proposal to the IAEA board of governors later this
year, we have engaged with other countries on it, and we will
shortly—on 17 and 18 March—host a conference on a
range of multinational initiatives to deal with the nuclear fuel
cycle. Through the European Union, we are also committed to the
nuclear fuel bank, under IAEA auspices, which would create a real
fuel bank that countries would be able to access if they experienced
fuel shortages for reasons other than proliferation.
I said earlier that there are about 12 different
initiatives. I do not have the sense that they are contradictory
or competing with each other, but we work actively at ensuring
that all those approaches can work. In our view, the nuclear fuel
assurance still has real merit and that is why I shall be taking
it to the IAEA board.
Q289 Mr. Moss: Is it incompatible
with any of the other proposals that you mentioned? I thought
you said earlier that there were 13.
Bill Rammell: There are 12. I
thought that I said 12 earlier.
Q290 Mr. Moss: Okay. Is there a risk
with the proliferation of all the different proposals that we
will sign up globally to a key component?
Bill Rammell: No. You face difficulty
in international relations in a number of areas. We are dealing
with sovereign states, all of which have their own views and their
own determination to find ways forward. That sometimes means that
different initiatives come forward from different states or groups
of states. I do not perceive at the moment that there is a contradiction
between those approaches, but we certainly need to watch the position
carefully to ensure that that is not the case.
Chairman: Let us be brief on this one,
and then we must move to other areas.
Andrew Mackinlay: You have not heard
from me much.
Chairman: No, and that is good.
Bill Rammell: I should like to
hear from a fellow Essex MP.
Q291 Andrew Mackinlay: On what used
to be called the enrichment bond, it would be done commercially,
but nation states would have an interest in the commercial aspects
because it could mean enormous wealth and power. The Russian Federation
first canvassed the idea, so perhaps copyright should go to it.
Surely the idea is that, geographically around the world, there
would be four or five centres of excellence. If not, what is in
your mind's eye? Clearly, everyone could sign up and say that
it was a good idea, but the $64,000 or more question concerns
where the places are located. There would be potential for enormous
wealth generation for the states in which either that facility
or facilities are located. There is also a powerful, logical case
for it to be in four places around the globe.
Bill Rammell: The difference between
our nuclear fuel assurance and the nuclear fuel bank is, first,
that the first element of guarantee within the nuclear fuel assurance
is the market, and the market actually has a good track record
of delivering. The second difference is a guarantee on the part
of the signed-up states whereby in extremis that support would
be provided. I am not ducking the question, but it is also the
case that we are working on the detail of the matter through discussion.
It will be part of the discussion that takes place at the conference
in London in a few weeks' time to take the proposal to the IAEA
board. The issue is about getting the maximum number of countries
signed up to the principle, so the content and the detail will
evolve.
Q292 Chairman: May we now move briefly
to the other areas of WMD? In an earlier answer, you touched on
the relative importance of chemical and biological weapons, but
can I ask you specifically about the chemical weapons convention?
There are 184 signatories to the convention, but only 177 national
authorities and 126 state parties have informed the central organisation
of what they are doing legislatively and only 82 have introduced
the key legislation in their national Parliaments, so clearly
there is a long way to go to make it universal. What are the Government
doing to strengthen the chemical weapons convention and ensure
that other countries fully implement it?
Bill Rammell: First, we are one
of the strongest supporters of the chemical weapons convention
and, through all forums and particularly bilaterally, we are urging
states to sign up. The recent support from and signing by Iraq,
given the history, was a very positive step forward.
In terms of the commitment to eradicate chemical
weapons stockpiles by the 2012 deadline, we have been doing a
lot financially to support states in achieving that. For example,
specifically, with Russia we have committed about £23 million
to help develop the necessary facilities for destroying chemical
weapons stockpiles. We also, across the board, advise and help
states with the legislative requirements necessary for them to
comply with the convention.
Q293 Chairman: You have referred
to the 2012 deadline—in just three years' time—but
it is quite clear that both the United States and Russia are not
going to comply with that timetable. What are we doing to deal
with that problem?
Bill Rammell: There is a risk
of self-fulfilling prophecies. Our intention remains that every
state should get there by 2012. In respect of the United States
and Russia, there is commitment and there has been considerable
progress. Russia has reduced by about 25%; I cannot recall the
exact figure for the US, but certainly it has made significant
progress—there is the sheer quantity for both countries,
in terms of the volume. There are difficult issues to overcome
in both those countries. For example, setting up chemical weapons
destruction facilities in what are both democracies, given the
environmental concerns, is a challenge that needs to be overcome.
Nevertheless, our strong view remains that we need to get there,
and we shall provide whatever support we can—as I said,
with Russia we have used £23 million to try and help. I do
not want to get into the realms of what happens if in 2012 the
deadline has not been achieved, but the end game has to be the
eradication of all the stockpiles.
Q294 Chairman: Is there not also
a problem in the United States with the presidential veto, and
the presidential record in the past? Is that likely to change
with the new Administration?
Bill Rammell: My instinct is that
the Obama Administration will be very strong supporters of the
chemical weapons convention.
Q295 Chairman: So, the difficulties
that we had with the US under the Bush Administration are likely
to be removed?
Bill Rammell: With the caveat
that support in Congress is required, as well as in the presidency.
Q296 Chairman: Presumably—hopefully—our
diplomats in Washington are doing all they can to influence the
US, not just the Administration, but also the key players in the
Senate and the House of Representatives.
Bill Rammell: Certainly.
Chairman: Good. Now let us touch on the
biological and toxin issues.
Q297 Sir John Stanley: As we know,
biological weapons are infinitely more difficult to detect than
chemical weapons, which are usually stockpiled, and they have
the capacity to cause loss of life on a hugely greater scale than
chemical weapons, yet we have a verification regime for the chemical
weapons convention but, sadly, none as yet for the biological
weapons convention.
We did of course spend seven years negotiating
a verification protocol. Sadly, that was torpedoed by the Bush
Administration and their arms control Minister, Mr. John Bolton,
with whom the Committee had a number of interesting and vigorous
exchanges, so we still have no verification regime for this critically
important arms control convention. What are the British Government
doing to try to establish a verification regime? Should we be
going down the route of inspections or of the Canadian alternative
of accountability regimes?
Bill Rammell: Both have a role
to play. In terms of the decisions taken, we have are long-standing
supporters of a verification regime. As I said at the beginning
about our treaty-based approach, we would want both universality
and effective verification regimes.
In terms of the proposals that were put forward,
the United States took the view that it did. It was not only the
US—China, Libya, India and Pakistan also objected to that
approach. Our view remains that in the longer run—or in
the short run if we could achieve it—we need a verification
tool. However, we should not underestimate the difficulty that
because of the dual-use nature of virtually all the know-how,
materials and equipment used in biological weapons, getting a
verification regime and compliance measures in place is fraught
with real intellectual, scientific and political difficulties.
Nevertheless, that is what we have to remain focussed on.
The 2011 review will give us an opportunity
to make further progress. The fact that since the last review,
seven additional states have become party to the convention is
progress, as is the fact that the implementation support unit
has been created, which gives us further impetus. However, this
is a difficult and challenging area—and I am being absolutely
straight with you—to establish the kind of verification
regime that we want.
Q298 Sir John Stanley: I understand
all the difficulties, but I am asking whether the British Government
have a policy as opposed to just generalities? Do they have a
proposal? What are they rooting for? What type of verification
regime are they going for? Do they still want to try to go for
inspection, or do they want to go for some of the alternatives
that have been offered, such as the Canadian alternative based
on accountability?
Bill Rammell: Certainly we are
in favour of inspection, and we promote that. You asked me specifically
what we are doing to try to push this agenda forward. We are supporting
financially legislative analysis and assistance to states that
do not have comprehensive national implementing measures in place
to help them comply with the regime as well.
Inspection has a key role to play. I have set
out for you the challenges and the difficulties, which are real
but, nevertheless, there is still a determination to find a way
through. I hope and believe that we can do that in the foreseeable
future. Certainly moving forward to the next review in 2011 has
to be a priority.
Q299 Sir John Stanley: Are the British
Government considering adding to the arrows in their quiver a
policy of name and shame? Should the UK not be doing more to highlight
those countries that we believe are holding biological weapons
stocks, or researching to try to achieve a biological weapons
capability? Should not such countries be pilloried publicly?
Bill Rammell: Part of me is instinctively
attracted to that proposition. However, given the difficulties
and political challenges, ultimately with this kind of issue,
if you want states to move with you, you have to provide the right
framework to achieve that. I am open to debate, but I am not sure
that that approach would get us there sooner than the routes we
are pursuing at the moment.
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