3 British arms exports to Israel
78. In the light of the concerns about the conduct
of the conflict in Gaza which we outlined in paragraphs 61-73,
there has been renewed discussion of foreign arms transfers to
Israel and the OPTs. In a report published in February, on the
basis of the findings of a team which visited Gaza after the conflict,
Amnesty International concluded that "both Israel and Hamas
used weapons supplied from abroad to carry out attacks on civilians"
during the December-January violence.[202]
79. By definition, Hamas and other Palestinian armed
groups do not receive officially approved arms transfers from
the UK. In this chapter we therefore exclusively consider UK arms
exports to Israel. We refer to the issue of arms supplies to Hamas
in the context of our discussions of access into Gaza (in paragraphs
41-45) and the role of Iran (in paragraph 161).
80. British arms export policy is scrutinised in
the House of Commons by the Committees on Arms Export Controls
(CAEC), a concurrent meeting of four select committees, including
the Foreign Affairs Committee. CAEC has taken a longstanding interest
in British arms export policy regarding Israel. It is examining
the subject again as part of its current annual inquiry.
81. The British Government grants arms export licences
on the basis of the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing
Criteria. Among other provisions, these specify that the Government
may not authorise an arms export where there is a "clear
risk" that it may be used for internal repression (Criterion
2), or which would "provoke or prolong armed conflicts or
aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final
destination" (Criterion 3), or where there is a "clear
risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed export
aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial
claim" (Criterion 4). The criteria also require the Government
to "exercise special caution and vigilance" in issuing
licences to countries where serious human rights violations have
been established (Criterion 2), and to take into account the purchasing
country's compliance with its international commitments (Criterion
6). The criteria further require the Government to take into account
the potential effect of the proposed export on the UK's defence
and security interests, although they specify that this factor
cannot affect consideration of the human rights and regional security
criteria (Criterion 5).[203]
In his statement to the House on the Gaza conflict on 12 January
the Foreign Secretary summarised the way in which the Government
applies the criteria in relation to Israel: he said that "no
arms exports are granted where there is a clear risk that those
arms could be used for internal repression or external aggression."[204]
82. According to successive editions of the Government's
Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls, for military
exports to Israel in recent years the value of approved Standard
Individual Export Licences and of exported military equipment
was as follows:
Value of British military exports to Israel, 2002-2008 (£ million)
| 2002
| 2003 |
2004 | 2005
| 2006 |
2007 | 2008
|
Military equipment exported
| 2.17 | 0.24
| 0.84 | 0.58
| 1.82 | 6.3
| Not yet available
|
Standard Individual Export Licences approved
| 10.0 | 11.5
| 12.0 | 22.5
| 16.5 | 10.5
| 27.6 |
Source: BERR/FCO/MOD/DFID, successive Annual Reports
on Strategic Export Controls, available via www.fco.gov.uk. The
2008 Annual Report had not been published when we completed this
Report. As a result, no figure for equipment exported in 2008
was yet available, and the figure given here for Standard Individual
Export Licences approved was summed from the four 2008 Quarterly
Reports. See also House of Commons Library Standard Note SN/IA/4931,
"Arms Exports to Israel", 13 January 2009.
83. After further questioning by ourselves and CAEC
following the conflict in Gaza, and after NGOs and the media had
continued to raise a number of specific issues in connection with
British arms exports to Israel in the context of Israel's military
campaign in the territory, the Foreign Secretary issued a written
ministerial statement on 21 April. One issue which had been raised
was the Government's decision in 2002 to authorise the export
of components to the US for incorporation there into aircraft
for onward export to Israel, when it would not authorise the export
of the relevant components or aircraft to Israel direct from the
UK.[205] Under the
2002 decision, the UK has supplied components to the US for incorporation
into F-16 fighter aircraft and Apache attack helicopters. In his
21 April statement, the Foreign Secretary said that F-16s and
Apache helicopters used by Israeli forces during Operation Cast
Lead "almost certainly" contained British-supplied components.[206]
The Foreign Secretary also identified, as equipment used by Israel
during Operation Cast Lead which "almost certainly"
included British-supplied components, Saar 4.5 naval vessels and
armoured personnel carriers. The UK authorised the export direct
to Israel of gun components for the former. The latter included
converted British Centurion tanks sold to Israel in the late 1950s.[207]
Apart from those relating to the Saar naval vessels, all the British
export licences for items which were "almost certainly"
used during Operation Cast Lead were issued before the war in
Lebanon in 2006: Bill Rammell told CAEC in April that the Government
had not authorised any exports relating to F-16s, helicopters
or armoured personnel carriers for Israel, including for incorporation
in a third country, since that conflict.[208]
84. In his 21 April statement, the Foreign Secretary
also said that the UK had supplied "minor components"
for reconnaissance satellites which "might" have been
used to prepare Operation Cast Lead, but which "would not
have played a significant part in the operation itself."[209]
85. In its February 2009 report, Amnesty International
had drawn attention to the issue of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
A Lichfield firm supplies engines to Israel for inclusion in the
Hermes 450 UAVs which are manufactured there by Elbit systems.
The IDF used Hermes 450 aircraft during Operation Cast Lead.[210]
However, according to Elbit, Hermes 450 aircraft containing British
engines are manufactured in Israel exclusively for export and
are not used by the IDF.[211]
The Government has said similarly that British export licences
have only been issued for the engines to be incorporated in Israel
and then exported.[212]
Of British export licences for equipment for Israel's UAV industry,
the Foreign Secretary said in his April statement that "the
great majority are subject to further incorporation in Israel
for onward export and a small number approved for demonstration,
research, testing and our own 'Watchkeeper' UAV programme".[213]
The latter is the UK's major contract, awarded in 2005, for new
UAVs; Hermes 450 aircraft provided under the programme by a consortium
of Elbit and Thales were declared 'in service' in July 2007.[214]
The Foreign Secretary told the House in his April statement that
the FCO had "no evidence that goods licensed by the UK [for
UAVs] were diverted within Israel for use by the IDF."[215]
The case of Israeli-made UAVs seems to us to raise issues about
any end-use restrictions that may have been placed on the British
engines exported to Israel for incorporation into Israeli UAVs,
and about the relationship between British arms export policy
and the importance to the UK's defence interests of the imported
Israeli-made aircraft.
86. The Foreign Secretary concluded his 21 April
statement by saying that the Government was reviewing all extant
export licences to Israel, to see if any needed to be reconsidered
in the light of the conflict in Gaza. This confirmed what Bill
Rammell had already indicated to us.[216]
Bill Rammell also told both us and CAEC that licences would be
revoked if necessary.[217]
The Foreign Secretary told the House that the Government would
take the conflict in Gaza into account in assessing all future
licence applications.[218]
87. On 13 July, there were media reports that the
Government had decided to revoke five licences for arms exports
to Israel, reportedly for exports of components for Saar 4.5 naval
vessels. The decision would appear to be the result of the review
which the Foreign Secretary announced in his April statement.
The FCO was quoted as saying that, as a result of Israel's action
in Operation Cast Lead, the exports would now contravene the licensing
criteria.[219]
88. In its February report, Amnesty International
called on the UN Security Council to impose an immediate and comprehensive
arms embargo on all parties to the conflict in Gaza. In the meantime,
Amnesty urged exporting states to suspend all arms transfers to
the relevant parties.[220]
It noted that, among EU member states, nine already claim to export
no arms to Israel.[221]
The Campaign Against the Arms Trade has similarly called for a
UK arms embargo on Israel, on the grounds that it was "not
credible to believe" Israeli assurances that weapons and
components received from the UK were separated from other equipment
and not used in offensive actions outside Green Line Israel.[222]
89. We and CAEC have heard a number of arguments
against a UK arms embargo on Israel:
i. The UK is not a major arms supplier to Israel,
so a British embargo would have little impact on Israel's ability
to mount offensive operations.[223]
Israel sources around 95% of its defence imports from the US;[224]
in its latest Yearbook, the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) put the US share of Israel's conventional
weapons imports in 2004-08 at 99%. According to SIPRI, the UK
was among the suppliers which collectively accounted for less
than 0.5% of Israel's conventional weapons imports over the period.[225]
ii. The Government already refuses a considerable
number of applications for export licences for Israel: Bill Rammell
told us that the Government had refused between nine and 26 licence
applications each year over the last five years.[226]
In the view of those who oppose an arms embargo, this suggests
that the Government is implementing its stated restrictions on
transfers to Israel, in line with the consolidated criteria; and
it reinforces the argument that a formal embargo would have little
practical impact on Israel's capacity to take military action.[227]
iii. Banning the export of components for incorporation
in the US and onward export to Israel would damage the UK-US defence
relationship. This is the argument that the Government put forward
at the time of its 2002 decision on incorporation.
iv. It is possible that a British embargo on
Israel might disrupt arms transfers from Israel to the UK. The
Chairman of the Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD),
David Hayes, told CAEC that the Ministry of Defence was procuring
equipment from Israel and that an arms embargo "would have
a devastating effect on the operational capability of [UK] Forces
and put [UK] military personnel at increased risk."[228]
v. There is the political argument that, as Bill
Rammell put it to CAEC, the imposition of an arms embargo on Israel
would not help the UK to achieve its broader political aims in
the Middle East.[229]
90. We
welcome the Government's investigation into Israel's use of UK-sourced
military items during its campaign in Gaza. We conclude that it
is regrettable that components supplied by the UK were "almost
certainly" used in a variety of ways by Israeli forces during
the most recent conflict in Gaza, and that this constitutes a
failure of past Government arms export control policy. We recommend
that the Government should continue to do everything possible
to ensure that this does not happen again. We welcome the Government's
decision to revoke some arms export licences to Israel for components
for Saar 4.5 naval vessels. We further recommend that the Government
should provide its assessment of the impact on the UK-US defence
relationship of its decision since 2006 to cease licensing the
export of components for incorporation into F-16s and Apache helicopters
in the US; and specify any end-use restrictions which it places
on exports of components for unmanned aerial vehicles for incorporation
in Israel for onward export.
202 Amnesty International, "Fuelling conflict:
Foreign arms supplies to Israel/Gaza", 23 February 2009,
pp 30-31 Back
203
BERR/FCO/MOD/DFID, United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls
Annual Report 2007, Cm 7451, July 2008, pp 37-39 Back
204
HC Deb, 12 January 2009, col 29 Back
205
Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade
and Industry Committees, First Joint Report of Session 2001-02,
Strategic Export Controls: Annual Report for 2000, Licensing
Policy and Prior Parliamentary Scrutiny, HC 718, paras 136-147;
Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade
and Industry Committees, Second Joint Report of Session 2002-03,
Strategic Export Controls, Annual Report for 2001, Licensing
Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, HC 474, paras 130-154 Back
206
HC Deb, 21 April 2009, col 8WS Back
207
Ibid. Back
208
Oral evidence taken before CAEC on 22 April 2009, HC (2008-09)
178-iii, Qq 126, 136 Back
209
HC Deb, 21 April 2009, col 8WS Back
210
Ibid. Back
211
Amnesty International, "Fuelling conflict: Foreign arms supplies
to Israel/Gaza", 23 February 2009, pp 30-31 Back
212
Ev 52; oral evidence taken before CAEC on 21 January 2009, HC
(2008-09) 178-i, Q 19 [Ian Pearson MP, Economic and Business Minister,
Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR)
and Ms Jayne Carpenter, Assistant Director, Export Control Organisation,
BERR] Back
213
HC Deb, 21 April 2009, col 8WS Back
214
HC Deb, 26 January 2009, col 40W Back
215
HC Deb, 21 April 2009, col 8WS Back
216
Q 117 Back
217
Q 117; oral evidence taken before CAEC on 22 April 2009, HC (2008-09)
178-iii, Q 124 Back
218
HC Deb, 21 April 2009, col 8WS Back
219
"UK cuts Israel weapons contracts", BBC News,
13 July 2009, via www.bbc.co.uk/news; "Foreign Office halts
sale of parts for Gaza warships", The Times, 14 July
2009 Back
220
Amnesty International, "Fuelling conflict: Foreign arms supplies
to Israel/Gaza", 23 February 2009, p 35 Back
221
Ibid. Back
222
Written evidence to CAEC, January 2009, published online at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmquad/memo/strategic/ucam0702.htm Back
223
Oral evidence taken before CAEC on 11 March 2009, HC (2008-09)
178-ii, Q 69 [Roy Isbister, Saferworld] Back
224
Q 117; HC Deb, 21 April 2009, col 8WS; oral evidence taken before
CAEC on 22 April 2009, HC (2008-09) 178-iii, Q 138 [Bill Rammell];
House of Commons Library Standard Note SN/IA/4931, "Arms
Exports to Israel", 13 January 2009 Back
225
SIPRI Yearbook 2009 (OUP 2009), p 332 Back
226
Q 117 Back
227
Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD), written evidence
to CAEC, January 2009, published online at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmquad/memo/strategic/ucam0602.htm;
oral evidence taken before CAEC on 21 January 2009, HC (2008-09)
178-i, Q 6 [Ian Pearson]; oral evidence taken before CAEC on 22
April 2009, HC (2008-09) 178-iii, Q 139 [Bill Rammell] Back
228
Oral evidence taken before CAEC on 11 March 2009, HC (2008-09)
178-ii, Q 100 Back
229
Oral evidence taken before CAEC on 22 April 2009, HC (2008-09)
178-iii, Q 142 Back
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