West Bank development
104. A central element in the Quartet's strategy
for bolstering President Abbas and the Palestinian Authority government
has been to support Palestinian economic and institutional development
under their authority. Effectively, this means support for the
economy and Palestinian Authority institutions on the West Bank.
The Quartet has given significant weight to this aspect of its
strategy since mid-2007, when it appointed Mr Blair as its Representative,
with a mandate to "mobilize international assistance to the
Palestinians […]; help to identify and secure appropriate
international support in addressing the institutional governance
needs of the Palestinian state, focusing as a matter of urgency
on the rule of law; [and] develop plans to promote Palestinian
economic development".[261]
The emphasis of the Quartet and Mr Blair on Palestinian economic
development builds on work carried out by the British Government
before Mr Blair left domestic office, subsequently reflected in
particular in the report "Economic Aspects of Peace in the
Middle East" published by HM Treasury in September 2007.[262]
105. In addition to its potential impact in undercutting
Hamas and encouraging support for President Abbas and other non-violent,
pro-two-state Palestinian forces, Mr Blair argued that more effective
Palestinian Authority institutions would also aid the Israeli-Palestinian
track of the peace process. Mr Blair's argument applied primarily
to the development of civilian security forces and institutions.
He told us that:
you have to have a properly functioning security
capacity on the part of the Palestinians, to provide the Israelis
with justification for stepping back. The basic idea is that as
the Palestinians do more and the Israelis do less, eventually
you have the Palestinians back in charge of their territory.[263]
The US and the EU are both engaged in assisting the
development of Palestinian Authority security forces. Since 2006,
the EU has been operating a police mission to this end, known
as EUPOL COPPS, which is under the leadership of British Chief
Constable Paul Robert Kernaghan and which Mr Blair said was doing
an "excellent job".[264]
106. Mr Blair's support for the development of Palestinian
Authority security institutions formed part of his broader approach
to the Israeli-Palestinian situation, which he said was designed
to address the "on-the-ground reality" of both sides
as a way of building a credible peace process. For the Israelis,
he said, the fundamental problem was about security: "their
on-the-ground reality is [that] […] they will not agree to
a Palestinian state unless they are sure that such a state is
a stable and secure partner for peace", and that agreeing
to the establishment of such a state would not therefore jeopardise
Israeli security. For the Palestinians, Mr Blair said, their "on-the-ground"
problem was that they could "not see that a state is possible
with [the] network of restrictions" that Israel operates
as a result of its own security concerns.[265]
Mr Blair said that his strategy was therefore:
to try to create the circumstances in which we build
Palestinian security capability, particularly on the West Bank,
so that the Israelis can move out. The Palestinians can then have
the run of their territory and the access and movement restrictions
and so on can be eased.[266]
107. In our 2007 Report on Global Security: The
Middle East, we welcomed Mr Blair's appointment, and the Government's
focus on developing an economic track to the peace process.[267]
In his evidence to us two years on, Mr Blair pointed to a number
of indicators of progress. He told us that the Palestinian Authority
had received its largest-ever sums of international financial
support in 2008, that the West Bank economy grew "not insignificantly"
in that year, and that he had been able to make "some progress"
on "a whole set of specific issues around housing, industrial
parks, tourism and mobile telephony".[268]
108. On security and movement and access issues,
Mr Blair told us that the Palestinian Authority security forces
were "making a substantial difference" in the areas
of the West Bank where they had been deployed. For example, he
pointed to developments around Jenin, where US-trained Palestinian
Authority security forces were now deployed and the number of
Israeli roadblocks had been reduced as a result.[269]
He also stated that Israel had removed some restrictions on movement
and access around Nablus and Hebron. Mr Blair also told us that
there was now a plan for the development of the whole judicial
and penal system on the West Bank, probably to be implemented
in partnership with the EU, and that if it could be implemented,
"that is the way that we will get the weight of occupation
removed from the Palestinian territories".[270]
109. As regards Palestinian Authority finances, the
FCO's Director for the Middle East, Dr John Jenkins, told us that
Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Fayyad had, for example,
recovered around $1.2 billion which it was alleged had been diverted
from its proper use by former Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat.
Dr Jenkins said that "donors have absolute confidence in
a government headed by Salaam Fayyad".[271]
110. Addressing the House on the Gaza crisis on 19
January, the Foreign Secretary noted that there had not been major
unrest on the West Bank during the Gaza conflict. He linked this
to the fact that, in his view, Prime Minister Fayyad's government
"showed clearly in its management—political, economic,
security—that given half a chance Palestinian government
can be hugely effective and provide a real partner for peace".[272]
111. We conclude
that some progress has been made on Palestinian economic and institutional
development on the West Bank, and that this is to be welcomed.
We conclude that the Palestinian Authority government under Prime
Minister Salam Fayyad has shown improved capacity to deliver increased
security and manage the Authority's economy and public finances.
We further conclude that international assistance to the Palestinian
security sector, including the EU police mission, is fulfilling
an important role.
112. Despite its achievements, the work on Palestinian
economic development which is underway on the West Bank under
Quartet auspices is open to a number of criticisms which we encountered
during our inquiry. First, there is the risk that the focus on
economic development and improvements on the ground in the West
Bank may reduce pressure for progress on the political track,
partly by accommodating the political status quo. In its
2008 Report, the International Development Committee warned that
"the international community must take care that it does
not end up legitimising the occupation".[273]
Mr Blair acknowledged this argument in a discussion of whether
"to improve the checkpoints […] is, in a sense, to endorse
them". He implied that this argument should not override
the benefits that could flow from improving the situation on the
ground, saying that some of the checkpoints would be there "for
a time" and that "if they were carried out in a proper
way with some account taken of the dignity of the people, that
would be very helpful".[274]
113. The potential concern that economic development
might enjoy priority over the political track has been heightened
because the new Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has
couched his approach to the West Bank in terms of an "economic
peace", while initially declining to state explicitly his
commitment to a two-state solution. During his election campaign
in 2008, Mr Netanyahu said that the peace process had previously
focused only on intractable political issues, and that this had
"led to failure and [was] likely to lead to failure again".
Instead, Mr Netanyahu argued, it was necessary to:
weave an economic peace alongside a political process.
That means that we have to strengthen the moderate parts of the
Palestinian economy by […] rapid growth in those area[s],
rapid economic growth that gives a stake for peace for the ordinary
Palestinians. […] economic peace will support and bolster
the achievement of political settlements down the line.[275]
Since taking office, Mr Netanyahu has established
a ministerial committee—which he is to chair himself—to
take forward his economic agenda for the West Bank. Mr Blair welcomed
this development.[276]
The committee met for the first time in late May, and reportedly
expects to be presented with a large number of potential investment
projects.[277]
114. Giving evidence in February, Nomi Bar-Yaacov
characterised Mr Netanyahu's notion of "economic peace"
as "basically no peace process, but giving some economic
incentives to Palestinians on the West Bank".[278]
However, in March, Mr Rammell told us that there had already "been
movement beyond" Mr Netanyahu's exclusively economic focus.[279]
Mr Blair said that the economic and the political could "work
together", as long as "economic peace" was not
a substitute for a political one, and the two instead went together.[280]
In his major speech on Israeli-Palestinian issues at Bar-Ilan
University on 14 June, Mr Netanyahu said explicitly that "an
economic peace is not a substitute for a political peace, but
an important element to achieving it".[281]
115. Mr Blair's discussion of the "economic
peace" idea suggested that he was seeking to use Prime Minister
Netanyahu's desire for economic development on the West Bank as
a lever to press for the relaxation of Israel's movement, access
and administrative regime there. Mr Blair said that he had pointed
out to Mr Netanyahu "on many occasions, you cannot make economic
progress on the West Bank unless you deal with these issues of
access, movement and other sets of restrictions".[282]
Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs-Occupied Palestinian Territory (OCHA-oPt)
116. A second difficulty for Mr Blair's work on West
Bank economic development is precisely the obstacle represented
by the administrative regime which Israel operates in the territory
and the continuing restrictions on Palestinian movement and access
across it. In our 2007 Report, we concluded that "the expansion
of Israeli roadblocks and the growth of illegal settlements in
the West Bank are among the factors that have had a very damaging
impact on the economic situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories".[283]
The International Development Committee reached a similar conclusion
in 2008, calling "the continued restrictions on movement
and access" "one of the major barriers to the development
of a viable Palestinian economy".[284]
In addition to the physical obstacles to Palestinian economic
life in the West Bank, Mr Blair drew our attention to the administrative
ones—for example, pointing to the way in which the need
for Israeli permits blocked potential Palestinian development
projects.[285] He told
us that "if you do not deal with the access and movement
issues, the ability to revive the economy quickly will be limited".[286]
117. We conclude
that Quartet Representative Tony Blair is making an important
contribution to Palestinian economic and institutional development
which will be helpful to a future Palestinian state. However,
we further conclude that movement, access and administrative restrictions
on the West Bank continue to represent a major obstacle to further
Palestinian economic development. We recommend that the Quartet
Representative should seek to use the Israeli government's stated
wish to further economic development on the West Bank as a lever
to press for further and significant relaxation in the administrative
and security regime which it operates there.
118. A particular element in the economic regime
facing Palestinians is the Interim Association Agreement (IAA)
between the EU and the PLO (acting on behalf of the Palestinian
Authority). The Agreement was signed and came into force in 1997,
in the framework of the EU's "Euro-Med" process, which
is now folded into the European Neighbourhood Policy. The Agreement
was intended to enable the progressive liberalisation of trade
between the EU and the OPTs, as well as to establish institutionalised
political relations. However, Israel does not recognise the Agreement,
and obstructs Palestinians' access to the EU's preferential trade
regime through its control of administrative procedures and physical
access into and out of the West Bank—such that Palestinian
businesspeople there are reported sometimes to use "Israel"
rather than "West Bank" designations for customs purposes
and to request their EU partners to do likewise. The Centre for
European Policy Studies has noted that "Palestinian trade
with the EU has not taken off, hindered by Israel's non-recognition
of the EU-PLO Interim Association Agreement".[287]
Although it did not give a breakdown of figures between the West
Bank and Gaza, the European Commission has reported that total
Palestinian exports to the EU in 2008 fell by 49.1%.[288]
119. Bill Rammell told us that "the UK continues
to call, both unilaterally and through the EU, on the Israeli
Government to fully recognise, and facilitate the implementation
of, the EU-PLO Interim Association Agreement".[289]
We also asked the European Trade Commissioner, Baroness Ashton,
about the Agreement when she gave evidence to our separate inquiry
into "Developments in the EU" in March. In follow-up
correspondence, she told us that "current Israeli obstacles
to the full implementation of the Agreement need to be removed.
We are working on this by making any upgrading of EU/Israel relations
conditional upon progress on this issue".[290]
120. We conclude
that Israel's failure to allow the full implementation of the
EU-PLO Interim Association Agreement is placing significant obstacles
in the way of EU-Palestinian trade and thereby damaging both Palestinian
and EU businesses. We further conclude that the EU is correct
to make the future nature of its relations with Israel, under
the terms of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, partly conditional
on Israel's cooperation with implementation of the EU-PLO Interim
Association Agreement. We recommend that the Quartet Representative
should also press Israel on implementation of the EU-PLO Interim
Association Agreement as part of his work on Palestinian economic
development.
121. A third potential weakness of the Quartet-sponsored
work on Palestinian economic and institutional development is
that the evidence that it is achieving its stated political objectives
remains less than convincing so far. As we have set out above,
restrictions on access and movement in the West Bank remain a
significant obstacle to the Israeli-Palestinian track of the peace
process, and—as of early July 2009—serious negotiations
on the creation of a Palestinian state had yet to be re-launched.
As regards the intra-Palestinian balance, we have also outlined
the way in which Hamas continues to reject the Quartet conditions
and remains in control of Gaza, estranged from the Palestinian
Authority in the West Bank.
122. A fourth objection to which the Quartet's policy
remains vulnerable is that it is a 'West Bank first' policy, which
at most could deliver progress in relations between Israel and
the Palestinian Authority which applied only to the West Bank,
given the continued situation regarding Gaza. In our 2007 Report,
we concluded that "any attempts to pursue a 'West Bank first'
policy would risk further jeopardising the peace process".[291]
Nomi Bar-Yaacov reminded us that she had argued against a 'West
Bank first' strategy at that time, and she reiterated her position
in her evidence to our current inquiry. She called the 'West Bank
first' policy "part of the problem".[292]
123. Mr Blair told us that setting Gaza aside had
"always been a mistake that we have made in the past".
He warned that if the Quartet were to repeat it, it would "find
that Gaza will refuse to be left to one side".[293]
124. An issue related to the split between Gaza and
the West Bank to which we have previously drawn attention is the
development of a transport link between the two territories. The
establishment of bus and truck convoys between Gaza and the West
Bank was part of the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA)
between Israel and the PLO, but this has not been implemented.
When we were in the region in 2005, we met staff of the then Quartet
Representative, former World Bank President James Wolfensohn,
who was working on this issue.[294]
In his evidence to our current inquiry, Mr Blair told us that
the proposals developed by Mr Wolfensohn remained ready to be
activated, and that a solution to the issue could be found as
part of any process towards a final settlement.[295]
However, he warned that, at present, the issue was not "very
live" for people in the region and that raising it would
be seen as "somewhat rhetorical until other issues are dealt
with".[296]
125. We recommend
that the Government should continue to do all it can to further
the development of plans for a fixed transport link including
a road element between Gaza and the West Bank.
126. Finally, in remarks to the International Institute
for Strategic Studies (IISS) after the Israeli elections in February,
Professor Yezid Sayigh of King's College London highlighted two
further potential risks arising from the current situation.[297]
First, he warned that Prime Minister Salam Fayyad had "no
political base" and that his government was "totally
dependent on continued massive international assistance".
Although Professor Sayigh was speaking before the formation of
Mr Fayyad's second government in May, there may be a risk that
the premier and his immediate officials come to function as an
'island', with a closer relationship with international partners
than with local actors. Second, Professor Sayigh warned that:
The Fayyad model of governance, of security, of policing
[…] is evolving along a path that diverges every single day
further and further from the model that Hamas has developed to
deal with daily issues […] in Gaza. […] With every month
that passes we have two fundamentally different models of government
and of security evolving in these two bits. How these may be reintegrated
in future is going to pose an immense challenge.
127. We
conclude that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must now be understood
as essentially a three-way situation, comprising Israel, the West
Bank and the Palestinian Authority, and Gaza and Hamas. We further
conclude that the continued split in political authority between
the West Bank and Gaza represents a central obstacle to progress
towards a two-state solution—because of the way in which
it weakens the willingness and ability of both the Palestinian
and the Israeli sides to make deliverable commitments in peace
negotiations, and because of the divergent paths of institutional
and economic development on which it sets Gaza and the West Bank.
We therefore recommend that the UK Government and the Quartet
should reject any idea of a 'West Bank first' approach, and make
the ending of the West Bank-Gaza split an explicit and urgent
objective and work more actively to achieve it.
Palestinian elections
128. The ongoing split between Hamas and Fatah is
taking on heightened significance because of the approach of Palestinian
elections, to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and the
post of Palestinian Authority President, which are due by early
2010. As of early July 2009, the timing and conditions of the
elections remained unclear, owing to the complex and contested
constitutional situation within the OPTs. The European Commission
summarised the situation in its April 2009 "Progress Report"
on the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in
the OPTs:
Although Hamas has insisted that the Basic Law states
that the Presidential term is four years, and therefore questioned
the authority of President Abbas as of January 2009, the PA [Palestinian
Authority] Government and the Palestinian Legislative Council
Secretariat consider that the applicable legal basis is the Election
Law as amended in 2007, which provides for legislative and presidential
elections to be held simultaneously. In this context, and aiming
at overcoming the political deadlock in Gaza, the President announced
at the end of 2008 that he will call for Presidential and Parliamentary
elections as soon as possible and in any case before January 2010
when the term of the PLC ends. Since the President cannot dissolve
the Palestinian Legislative Council, agreement is needed between
Fatah and Hamas for elections to be called.[298]
As we noted in paragraph 57 in Chapter 2, as of early
July 2009 Fatah and Hamas have been unable to reach agreement
on the holding of elections.
129. The Foreign Secretary told the UN Security Council
on 7 January 2009 that "the unity of Palestine is essential
to any decent vision of the future. It is also a precondition
of a democratic politics of consent in which there is one legitimate
authority and in which every Palestinian has a voice in the only
process that counts—the peace process".[299]
130. We referred in paragraph 18 above to opinion
polling among Palestinians taken immediately after the Gaza conflict
which appeared to show Hamas and its leaders gaining ground in
comparison with Fatah and the Palestinian Authority. Such trends
have given rise to speculation that Hamas could win any Palestinian
elections held soon, just as it won the PLC elections in 2006.
However, Mr Blair told us that he did not think that a Hamas victory
in the next election was inevitable. Other, more recent, opinion
polling by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research
suggests that Fatah continues to hold its own. According to a
poll taken in the third week of May, President Abbas would win
by 49% to 44% in a presidential contest with Mr Haniyeh (53%-42%
in Gaza alone). In putative legislative elections, according to
this poll, Fatah would receive 41% and Hamas 33%, unchanged from
a poll in February. The Fatah-Hamas balance was 46%-35% in Gaza
and 37%-31% in the West Bank.[300]
131. Mr Blair suggested that the Quartet's policy
in the run-up to any elections would be to continue to focus on
ensuring a credible peace process, in order to create a "better
chance for people who want the peaceful solution to succeed".
Mr Blair said that he did not think that the Quartet was likely
to "insert" itself into the electoral process by making
a statement in advance about its post-election policy towards
Hamas or a Palestinian Authority government including it.[301]
For her part, Nomi Bar-Yaacov told us that she "hope[d] that
international actors would learn from past mistakes and respect
the results [of the elections], no matter which party wins".[302]
132. We conclude
that the current contested constitutional situation in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories creates an obstacle to the development
there of a united and democratic state. We therefore conclude
that the holding of free and fair elections according to procedures
accepted by all parties presents an important potential opportunity
for Palestinian state-building, with the possible prospect of
bringing the West Bank and Gaza back under a single political
authority. However, the elections could also become a source of
further political division and institutional break-up. We recommend
that the Quartet should do everything possible to facilitate the
holding of polls which are accepted by all parties, and should
make careful preparations for them so that its stance in light
of the results furthers its stated two-state goal.
230 "Quartet Statement on the Situation in the
Middle East", 30 January 2006, via www.state.gov Back
231
Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Security: The Middle East,
para 25 Back
232
Ibid., para 50 Back
233
International Development Committee, Eleventh Report of Session
2007-08, The Humanitarian and Development Situation in the
Occupied Palestinian Territories, HC 522-I, para 7 Back
234
Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Security: The Middle East,
para 36 Back
235
Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Security: The Middle East,
para 60 Back
236
Q 146 Back
237
Q 197; see also Q 182. Back
238
Q 24 Back
239
Q 25; Ev 53; we refer to Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal's 25 June
2009 speech in our final chapter, at paragraph 204. Back
240
Q 26 Back
241
Q 135 Back
242
Q 238 Back
243
Q 135 Back
244
Q 137 Back
245
Q 237 Back
246
Q 212; in a Parliamentary answer in March 2009, Mr Rammell said
that "Turkey, Syria, Qatar and others" were talking
to Hamas, besides Egypt; HC Deb, 2 March 2009, col 1243W; Russia,
a Quartet member, has also had contact with Hamas. Back
247
Q 42 Back
248
Qq 212, 237, 238 Back
249
Q 212 Back
250
"Six Mitchell principles", Irish Times, 27 January
1996 Back
251
Qq 96, 134 Back
252
Q 135; on this point, see Foreign Affairs Committee, Global
Security: The Middle East, paras 26-60. Back
253
Ev 50-51; we briefly consider recent developments in Lebanon in
paragraphs 175-180 in Chapter 6. Back
254
Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Security: The Middle East,
para 120 Back
255
FCO, Eighth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session
2006-07, Global Security: The Middle East, Response of the Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 7212, October
2007, para 71 Back
256
Ev 51 Back
257
Q 96 Back
258
HC Deb, 12 May 2009, col 211-5WH Back
259
Q 224 Back
260
Q 212 Back
261
Statement by Middle East Quartet, 27 June 2007, via archive of
Quartet statements at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rt/c9963.htm Back
262
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/int_middle_east.htm; see Foreign
Affairs Committee, Global Security: The Middle East, paras
80-81. Back
263
Q 233 Back
264
Q 190 Back
265
Q 181 Back
266
Q 181 Back
267
Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Security: The Middle East,
paras 67, 83 Back
268
Q 179 Back
269
Qq 190, 230 Back
270
Q 190 Back
271
Q 140 Back
272
HC Deb, 19 January 2009, col 501-3 Back
273
International Development Committee, The Humanitarian and Development
Situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, para 68 Back
274
Q 190 Back
275
"Netanyahu: Economics, not politics, is the key to peace",
Haaretz, 21 November 2008 Back
276
Q 192 Back
277
"PM Netanyahu convenes Ministerial Committee on improving
situation of the Palestinians of Judea and Samaria", statement
by the Prime Minister's Media Adviser, 27 May 2009, via www.mfa.gov.il Back
278
Q 48 Back
279
Q 147 Back
280
Q 225 Back
281
Speech at the Begin-Sadat Center at Bar-Ilan University, 14 June
2009, via www.pmo.gov.il Back
282
Q 192 Back
283
Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Security: The Middle East,
para 83 Back
284
International Development Committee, The Humanitarian and Development
Situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, para 47 Back
285
Q 198 Back
286
Q 226 Back
287
Michael Emerson, Natalie Tocci and Richard Youngs, "Gaza's
hell: Why the EU must change its policy", Centre for European
Policy Studies, 13 January 2009 Back
288
European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document accompanying
the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament
and the Council, "Implementation of the European Neighbourhood
Policy in 2008: Progress Report: The Occupied Palestinian Territory",
SEC(2009) 519/2, 23 April 2009, p 10 Back
289
Ev 53 Back
290
Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from Baroness Catherine
Ashton, European Trade Commissioner: Follow-up to the oral evidence
session on 11 March 2009, written evidence submitted to the Foreign
Affairs Committee's inquiry into Developments in the EU, 8 April
2009, published online at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/memo/deveeuro/contents.htm;
we consider the "upgrading" of EU-Israel relations further
in paragraphs 148-151 in Chapter 5. Back
291
Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Security: The Middle East,
para 60 Back
292
Q 39 Back
293
Q 196 Back
294
Foreign Affairs Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2005-06, Foreign
Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism, HC 573, paras
212-213 Back
295
Qq 221-222 Back
296
Qq 218, 220 Back
297
Remarks to the discussion meeting "The Gaza War and the Israeli
Elections: What Next?", 13 February 2009, recording available
on the IISS website, www.iiss.org Back
298
European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document accompanying
the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament
and the Council, "Implementation of the European Neighbourhood
Policy in 2008: Progress Report: The Occupied Palestinian Territory",
SEC(2009) 519/2, 23 April 2009, p 4 Back
299
"Statement to the United Nations on Gaza (07/01/2009)",
via www.fco.gov.uk Back
300
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, PSR - Survey
Research Unit Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No. 32, 21-23 May
2009, via http://www.pcpsr.org Back
301
Q 239 Back
302
Q 46 Back
