Conclusions and recommendations
CHAPTER 2: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
IN AFGHANISTAN
NATO, ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom
1. We
conclude that, particularly bearing in mind that this is the first
ever NATO deployment outside of NATO's 'area', this has now become
a most critical and seminal moment for the future of the Alliance.
We also conclude that the failure of some NATO allies to ensure
that the burden of international effort in Afghanistan is shared
equitably has placed an unacceptable strain on a handful of countries.
We further conclude that there is a real possibility that without
a more equitable distribution of responsibility and risk, NATO's
effort will be further inhibited and its reputation as a military
alliance, capable of undertaking out-of-area operations, seriously
damaged. We recommend that the British Government should continue
to exert pressure on NATO partners to remove national caveats
and to fulfil their obligations. We further recommend that where
NATO allies are unwilling to commit combat troops, they must be
persuaded to fulfil their obligations in ways which nevertheless
contribute to the overall ISAF effort, for example, by providing
appropriate support including equipment and enhanced training
for the Afghan National Army. (Paragraph 23)
2. We conclude that
no matter how difficult the circumstances facing the military
in Afghanistan, the use of air power and acts of considerable
cultural insensitivity on the part of some Coalition Forces over
an extended period have done much to shape negative perceptions
among ordinary Afghans about the military and the international
effort in Afghanistan. This problem has caused damage, both real
and perceived, that will in many instances be difficult to undo.
We further conclude that recent policy changes which aim to improve
procedures, combined with the commitment of senior military figures
to adopting better practices, are a welcome development. We recommend
that, in its response to this Report, the Government supply us
with detailed information on measures that are being taken by
Coalition Forces in Afghanistan to provide more pro-active and
appropriate protection of civilians in the future. (Paragraph
29)
3. We conclude that
the conditions under which prisoners and detainees are treated
once in the hands of the Afghan authorities are a matter of considerable
concern. We will deal with the issue of treatment of those detained
by British forces further in our forthcoming annual Report on
human rights. (Paragraph 33)
The role of the United Nations
4. We
conclude that while the British Government's support of the UN
and for proposals for the UN to play a more significant role as
the overarching co-ordinator of the international community's
efforts in Afghanistan are to be welcomed, it remains to be seen
whether this will involve significant improvements in practice.
We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government
states what evidence there is, if any, of actual improvements
in international co-ordination. (Paragraph 39)
The role of the European Union
5. We
conclude that the EU's effort in Afghanistan thus far has not
lived up to its potential. We further conclude that there is a
need for the EU and its Member States to address the lack of coherence
which exists within the EU effort if it is to have a greater impact
in the future. We recommend that in its response to this Report,
the Government should supply us with updated information on the
progress it has made in persuading EU Member States and the European
Commission to harmonise and co-ordinate their activities within
Afghanistan. (Paragraph 44)
The US and its policy on Afghanistan under the
Bush Administration
6. We
conclude that some, though certainly not all, of the responsibility
for problems in Afghanistan since 2001 must be attributed to the
direction of US policy in the years immediately after the military
intervention in 2001. The unilateralist tendencies of the US under
the Bush administration, and its focus on military goals to the
exclusion of many other strategically important issues, set the
tone for the international community's early presence in Afghanistan.
(Paragraph 49)
Regional neighbours
7. We
recommend that the Government continues to make clear to the Iranian
leadership the total unacceptability to the UK of Iran's direct
and indirect assistance to the Taliban in their operations against
Coalition Forces. (Paragraph 53)
8. We conclude that
the FCO should continue to use its influence to foster greater
co-operation between Afghanistan and its neighbours and recommend
that in its response to this Report it updates us on recent developments
in this respect. (Paragraph 61)
CHAPTER 3: WHERE AFGHANISTAN IS NOW: AN ASSESSMENT
The security situation
9. We
conclude that the security situation in Afghanistan, particularly
in the south where the majority of British troops are based, will
remain precarious for some time to come. We further conclude that
the current instability is having a damaging effect on Coalition
Forces and efforts to engage in reconstruction and development.
(Paragraph 65)
Afghan Security Forces
10. We
conclude that the steady progress being made towards the creation
of the Afghan National Army stands in sharp contrast to the disappointingly
slow pace on police reform, for which Germany was the 'lead nation'
before responsibility was transferred to EUPOL. As a consequence,
the United States has considered it has no option but to invest
a considerable amount of effort and resource in police reform,
with assistance and training provided by the US military. We further
conclude that military-led reform of civilian police institutions,
no matter how well-intentioned, must run the risk of creating
a paramilitary-style police as opposed to the civilian force which
was originally envisaged and which will be needed in the future.
(Paragraph 79)
Governance, justice and human rights
11. We
conclude that the failure to create an effective formal justice
system as promised in the Bonn Agreement means that many Afghans
remain reliant on traditional, informal mechanisms of justice.
We welcome the Government's policy of developing links between
formal and informal mechanisms of justice providing that full
access, including to decision-taking, is sought for women in both
mechanisms. However, we further conclude that the Government must
guard against inadvertently endorsing any measures which could
lead to the introduction, through informal mechanisms, of extreme
forms of justice which retard or even reverse the slow progress
that has been made towards promoting internationally accepted
standards of human rights in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 88)
12. We conclude that
almost eight years after the international community became involved
in Afghanistan, virtually no tangible progress has been made in
tackling the endemic problem of corruption, and that in many cases
the problem has actually become worse. We further conclude that
policy commitments, action plans and all manner of strategies
are of little value if they are not accompanied by the political
will on the part of the Afghan President and government to drive
forward change and tackle corruption at senior levels. Although
corruption is a worldwide problem, the situation in Afghanistan
is particularly bad and requires an Afghan-led solution if it
is to be significantly reduced. (Paragraph 94)
13. We conclude that
while much effort has been expended by Western governments on
promoting human rights in Afghanistan, the underlying dynamics
and cultural views in Afghanistan, amongst men in particular,
have not shifted to any great extent. As long as security remains
poor, human rights protection will not be considered a priority
by many Afghans. (Paragraph 100)
14. We conclude that
the proposed "Shia family law" which would have legalised
rape within marriage and legitimised the subjugation of Shia women
in Afghanistan, represented an affront to decent human values.
We further conclude that it is a matter for alarm that these proposals
were considered to be acceptable by President Karzai, by a majority
in the Afghan parliament, and by significant elements of Afghan
public opinion. This episode highlights the challenges that Afghan
women continue to face in realising their basic human rights nearly
eight years after the fall of the Taliban government. We conclude
that this proposed law has had a detrimental affect on international
perceptions of Afghanistan. We welcome the British Government's
announcement that it considers those aspects of the law which
undermine human rights to be wholly unacceptable. We recommend
that the Government keeps us fully informed if the Shia Family
Law takes legal effect and, if it does, provides us with an analysis
as to whether it has been brought in line with the Afghan Constitution,
which guarantees equal rights for women, and with the international
treaties to which Afghanistan is a party. (Paragraph 114)
Counter-narcotics
15. We
recommend that the Government continues to do its utmost to persuade
its ISAF partners in Afghanistan to give their full support and
co-operation to ISAF's expanded role of conducting operations
against drugs facilities and facilitators. (Paragraph 124)
16. We conclude that
in accepting the role of Afghanistan's 'lead' international partner
in respect of counter-narcotics, the UK has taken on a poisoned
chalice. There is little evidence to suggest that recent reductions
in poppy cultivation are the result of the policies adopted by
the UK, other international partners or the Afghan government.
While the British Government is to be commended for its broad-ranging,
holistic approach to tackling narcotics in Afghanistan, it is
clear that success depends on a range of factors which lie far
beyond the control and resource of the UK alone. The scale of
the problem, the drugs trade's importance to Afghanistan's economy
and its connection to corruption makes any early achievement of
the aspirations set out in the Bonn Agreement highly unlikely.
We further conclude that the lead international role on counter-narcotics
should be transferred away from the UK, and that the Afghan Government
should instead be partnered at an international level by the United
Nations and ISAF which are better equipped to co-ordinate international
efforts. (Paragraph 126)
17. We recommend that
if the Government accepts our recommendation to relinquish the
role of lead partner nation on counter-narcotics, it ought to
re-focus its effort on facilitating regional co-operation and
driving forward diplomatic efforts within international organisations
to tackle the trafficking and processing of drugs. (Paragraph
129)
Economic and social development
18. We
conclude that long-term investment in education for young people
of both genders in Afghanistan is both morally compelling and
strategically sensible. It will enable Afghanistan to create an
educated and skilled workforce equipped to develop the country
and reduce its dependency on foreign funding. We recommend that
the Government should consider extending educational twinning
programmes to students in Afghanistan in a bid to foster educational
opportunities and improve mutual understanding between students
and teachers in the UK and Afghanistan. (Paragraph 136)
19. We conclude that
in 2009 economic and social development in Afghanistan continues
to lag behind what international donors promised and what, consequently,
Afghans had a right to expect as a result of Western intervention
in their country. We further conclude, however, that the success
of recently initiated Afghan-led projects, such as the National
Solidarity Programme, which appear to offer a highly effective
model for delivering change, is encouraging. We welcome the British
Government's support of this and similar initiatives which are
having an impact on the lives of large numbers of people in rural
Afghanistan. We recommend that the Government continue to examine
how it can encourage other international donors to support Afghanistan
in this way. We further recommend that in its response the FCO
sets out what it considers the most important priorities of the
international community in Afghanistan to be. (Paragraph 140)
The international community's approach and impact
20. We
conclude that the international effort in Afghanistan since 2001
has delivered much less than it promised and that its impact has
been significantly diluted by the absence of a unified vision
and strategy, grounded in the realities of Afghanistan's history,
culture and politics. We recognise that although Afghanistan's
current situation is not solely the legacy of the West's failures
since 2001, avoidable mistakes, including knee-jerk responses,
policy fragmentation and overlap, now make the task of stabilising
the country considerably more difficult than might otherwise have
been the case. We recommend that in its response to this Report
the FCO sets out what lessons have been learned from the mistakes
made by the international community over the last seven years.
(Paragraph 145)
CHAPTER 4: PAKISTAN'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE AND
ROLE IN RELATION TO AFGHANISTAN
Pakistan's strategic importance
21. We
conclude that Pakistan's strategic importance derives not only
from the sanctuary that its semi-autonomous border areas provide
to extremists who seek to cause instability in Afghanistan, but
also because of connections between the border areas and those
involved in international terrorism. We further conclude that
it is difficult to overestimate the importance of tackling not
just the symptoms but the root causes that enable this situation
to persist. (Paragraph 158)
22. We conclude that
allegations raised during our inquiry about the safety of nuclear
technology and claims of possible collusion between Pakistan's
intelligence agency, the ISI, and Al Qaeda are a matter of deep
concern. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the
Government sets out its assessment of these allegations and the
extent of the threat that this poses. (Paragraph 160)
Recent Pakistani responses to militancy
23. We
conclude that there is a pressing need for the Pakistani government
to address the role that some madrassahs play in the recruitment
and radicalisation process in Pakistan. We recommend that the
British Government sets out in its response to this Report what
discussions it has had with the Pakistani Government about this
issue, and whether it has raised allegations of Saudi Arabian
funding of radical madrassahs with the Saudi authorities. (Paragraph
164)
24. We conclude that
Pakistan's civilian government has recently taken some important
steps to counter insurgency at a considerable cost in terms of
military lives lost. We welcome the increasing recognition at
senior levels within the Pakistani military of the need for a
recalibrated approach to militancy but we remain concerned that
this may not necessarily be replicated elsewhere within the army
and ISI. We conclude that President Zardari's recent remarks that
he regards the real threat to his country as being terrorism rather
than India are to be welcomed. However, we further conclude that
doubts remain as to whether the underlying fundamentals of Pakistani
security policy have changed sufficiently to realise the goals
of long-term security and stability in Afghanistan. (Paragraph
176)
Pakistan's relationship with Afghanistan
25. We
conclude that addressing long-standing concerns of the Pashtun
populace on either side of the Durand Line and the respective
governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan in relation to the Durand
Line itself, could, in the long term, help to increase bilateral
co-operation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, reduce sources
of political friction and help tackle the causes, and not just
the symptoms, of poverty and weak governance which Al Qaeda and
other insurgent groups have exploited so effectively in recent
years. Given the UK's close relationship with both Afghanistan
and Pakistan and its historical ties to the region (which include
the imposition of the Durand Line by British colonial administrators),
we further conclude that the UK has a moral imperative to provide
whatever diplomatic or practical support might be deemed appropriate
by the relevant parties to assist them in finding ways of addressing
the many problematic issues that are the Durand Line's legacy.
(Paragraph 182)
US attacks on targets in Pakistan
26. We
conclude that the use of US drones to attack Al Qaeda targets
in Pakistan may have resulted in serious damage to Al Qaeda's
network and capabilities. However, we also conclude that these
attacks have damaged the US's reputation among elements of the
Pakistani population who regard them as a violation of Pakistani
sovereignty. We further conclude that drone attacks remain a high-risk
strategy and must not become a substitute for the challenging
yet vital task of building a Pakistani civilian government counter-terrorist
capacity and army capable of conducting counter-insurgency operations
and dealing with extremist threats. (Paragraph 199)
India
27. We
reiterate our previous conclusion from our South Asia Report that
the UK should encourage India and Pakistan to make further progress
on the peace process, but that the Government should not get directly
involved in negotiations nor try to suggest solutions to the question
of Kashmir, unless requested to do so by both India and Pakistan.
(Paragraph 201)
28. We conclude that
the US plan marks an important and long overdue recalibration
of its relationship with Pakistan. Its emphasis on civilian aid,
with appropriate conditions attached, has the potential to ensure
that long term improvements in Pakistan's political, economic
and social capacity limit the appeal of extremism. We further
conclude that it is crucial that the US addresses Pakistan's fears,
both legitimate and perceived, relating to India and reassures
Pakistan about the extent and nature of the US's long-term commitment
to Pakistan. (Paragraph 211)
CHAPTER 6: THE UK'S MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN
The UK's expanding mission in Afghanistan
29. We
conclude that the UK's mission in Afghanistan has taken on a significantly
different, and considerably expanded, character since the first
British troops were deployed there in 2001. The UK has moved from
its initial goal of supporting the US in countering international
terrorism, far into the realms of counter-insurgency, counter-narcotics,
protection of human rights, and state-building. During our visit
we were struck by the sheer magnitude of the task confronting
the UK. We conclude that there has been significant 'mission creep'
in the British deployment to Afghanistan, and that this has resulted
in the British government being now committed to a wide range
of objectives. We further conclude that in its response to this
Report, the Government should set out, in unambiguous terms, its
first and most important priority in Afghanistan. (Paragraph
225)
The UK deployment to Helmand
30. We
conclude that the UK deployment to Helmand was undermined by unrealistic
planning at senior levels, poor co-ordination between Whitehall
departments and crucially, a failure to provide the military with
clear direction. We further conclude that as the situation currently
stands, the "comprehensive approach" is faltering, largely
because the security situation is preventing any strengthening
of governance and Afghan capacity. The very clear conclusion that
we took from our visit to Helmand is that stabilisation need not
be complicated or expensive, but it does require provision of
security, good governance, and a belief within the local population
that ISAF forces will outlast the insurgents. (Paragraph 236)
The role of, and impact on, the British armed
forces
31. We
conclude that the Government must ensure that our armed forces
are provided with the appropriate resources to undertake the tasks
requested of them, particularly in an environment as challenging
as Helmand. We further conclude that in spite of well-documented
difficulties, British armed forces are now gradually beginning
to create and sustain the conditions that make it possible to
extend good governance and the rule of law in the most heavily
populated areas of Helmand. We conclude that the support provided
by additional equipment and by the US 'surge' of troops in Helmand
will be of considerable assistance, and is greatly to be welcomed.
(Paragraph 248)
The role of FCO staff in Afghanistan
32.
We conclude that the ability to engage with Afghans in key local
languages is crucial to the UK's effort in Afghanistan and we
are concerned that nearly eight years after intervening
in Afghanistan, the FCO still has no Pashtu speakers. We recommend
that in its response to this Report, the FCO sets out why this
situation exists and what it is doing, as a matter of urgency,
to rectify the situation. (Paragraph 250)
33. We recommend that
in its response to this Report, the FCO provides details of the
length of Postings which it uses in Afghanistan and whether it
is considering introducing longer tour lengths to ensure continuity
of knowledge and experience. (Paragraph 252)
CHAPTER 7: THE UK'S NEW STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN
AND PAKISTAN: A WAY FORWARD?
Justifications for the UK's continued presence
in Afghanistan
34. We
conclude that while the drugs trade has an invidious effect on
governance on Afghanistan and ultimately, through the flow of
heroin to the West, has a damaging impact on the UK, the Government's
assessment that the drugs trade in Afghanistan is a strategic
threat to the UK which, in part, merits the UK's continued military
presence in Afghanistan, is debatable. (Paragraph 274)
35. We conclude that
the expansion of the stated justifications for the UK's mission
in Afghanistan since 2001 has made it more difficult for the Government
to communicate the basic purpose of the mission and this risks
undermining support for the mission both in the UK and in Afghanistan.
We welcome the Government's recognition that its strategy must
be grounded in realistic objectives. However, it is not easy to
see how this can be reconciled with the open-ended and wide-ranging
series of objectives which form the current basis for UK effort
in Afghanistan. We recommend that in the immediate future the
Government should re-focus its efforts to concentrate its limited
resources on one priority, namely security. (Paragraph 278)
36. We conclude that
there can be no question of the international community abandoning
Afghanistan, and that the issues at stake must therefore be how
best the UK and its allies can allocate responsibilities and share
burdens so as to ensure that the country does not once again fall
into the hands of those who seek to threaten the security of the
UK and the West. We further conclude that the need for the international
community to convey publicly that it intends to outlast the insurgency
and remain in Afghanistan until the Afghan authorities are able
to take control of their own security, must be a primary objective.
(Paragraph 279)
The UK's strategy for Pakistan
37. We
welcome the Prime Minister's announcement of £10 million
to support the Pakistani government's counter terrorism efforts
and we recommend that the Government intensifies its help to Pakistan
in this area. (Paragraph 289)
38. We conclude that
the Government is correct to place a heavy emphasis on Pakistan
in its new strategy for Afghanistan, published in April 2009,
and to seek to build on the broad engagement that the UK has had
with Pakistan in relation to counter-terrorism since 2001. We
welcome the focus on long-term solutions and the Government's
commitment to assisting Pakistan to strengthen its civilian institutions.
We conclude the balance of the UK's relationship with Pakistan
particularly regarding its co-operation on counter-terrorism has
to be improved. (Paragraph 294)
39. We recommend that
the Government should consider how best it can work with allies
to develop an international policy for assisting the Pakistani
government in dealing with the Taliban and Al Qaeda. (Paragraph
295)
40. We recommend that
it its response to this Report, the Government provides us with
an update on what measures it is implementing in Pakistan to strengthen
the integrity of its visa application and processing operations
against fraudulent applications and to what extent and in what
ways it is co-operating with the UK Borders Agency on this matter.
(Paragraph 297)
CHAPTER 8: TOWARDS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT?
41. We
conclude that a negotiated, Afghan-led political settlement with
broad popular support represents the only realistic option for
long-term security and stability in Afghanistan. However, we further
conclude that there can be no serious prospect of meaningful discussions
until Coalition Forces and the Afghan National Security Forces
gain, and retain, the upper hand on security across the country,
including in Helmand, and are then able to negotiate from a position
of strength. For these reasons we conclude that the current increased
military activity is a necessary pre-requisite for any long-term
political settlement. (Paragraph 311)
42. We welcome the
commitment of the US and UK governments to ensuring that human
rights are not undermined in any future reconciliation process
and we conclude that the meaningful participation of women is
an essential element in any negotiated reconciliation, as has
been the case in many other post-conflict peace processes. (Paragraph
318)
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