Submission by Colonel (retired) Christopher
Langton OBE, Senior Fellow for Conflict, the International Institute
for Strategic Studies
The United Kingdom's military involvement in
the conflict in Afghanistan began in 2001. The original objective
and rationale for the deployment of troops was in order to dislodge
the Taliban regime which was hosting international terrorist organisations
which posed, and still do, a direct threat to UK national security.
The need to remain involved in order to prevent a return to the
"status quo ante bellum" has meant that other missions
have emerged. Principally these involve nation-building in order
to allow a legitimate government to take full control of all aspects
of governance and the rule of law; and dealing with aspects of
counter insurgency such as the illicit trade in drugs.
The ousted Taliban and other non-state militant groups
with jihadist tendencies have been able to re-locate themselves
in "safe havens" in Pakistan with relative ease. In
the same way it should be considered probable that international
terrorist elements would return to Afghanistan should the opportunity
arise. Although there is a question—"how likely is
it that a new Taliban regime in Afghanistan would allow itself
to host al-Qaeda and affiliates given the consequences it suffered
before in 2001?" But if the assumption is that there is a
high probability that this would happen, the deployment of international
forces remains essential as a buffer against the re-emergence
of Afghanistan as a state held hostage by terrorist groups. The
question is "are international forces, military and civilian,
being used correctly with emphasis being placed in the right areas?"
A second question is "what if the UK objective is to prevent
Afghanistan returning to its previous state". It must be
expected that troops will have to be committed in significant
quantities for some time to come. Such is the nature of counter
insurgency operations which aim to capture human rather than geographical
territory. Troops are enablers in this respect and not the deliverers
of a final result. This lies in the hands of other agencies which
provide the means for a nation shattered by 30 years of war to
govern itself.
The UK military component is stretched. It is
less obvious that the civilian agencies are operating at the levels
of commitment on the ground, which are required by the mission.
It is appreciated that this is easier said than done. However,
it is the civilian component which provides the means that will
eventually enable a reduction in military effort.
The UK remains the lead G8 partner nation in
the fight against the illicit trade in drugs. So far there has
been little real progress towards a sustainable reduction in poppy
cultivation and heroin production. One reason is that, yet again,
there is disagreement among donors on how to deal with the problem.
A common strategy has to be found and implemented. At the same
time it is argued that the whole trade has to be tackled and not
just the "production" end. More should be invested in
dealing with the problem in transit and in the market. To attack
the "business model" of traffickers is more likely to
produce results than an attempt to reduce cultivation alone. Neighbouring
countries such as Iran have a vested interest in this respect
and should be involved. But drugs are not the sole means of income
for the insurgency; the "black market" generally produces
the income needed by the Taliban and other insurgent groups. This
includes human trafficking, and trafficking in luxury goods amongst
other forms of revenue production. Perhaps a holistic approach
to the financing of the insurgency should be examined. Furthermore,
corrupt officials and others not involved directly with insurgents
receive a large percentage of the money made through the traffic
and have yet to be dealt with. Trafficking benefits from weak
border security. The borders of Afghanistan are poorly controlled.
Due to topography total security can never be achieved. But it
can be considered feasible that the main trade routes used by
an increasing volume of container traffic can be better managed.
This requires co-operation with neighbours and particularly with
Pakistan which hosts the emerging container port of Gwadar.
Afghanistan's poor relations with Pakistan make
this difficult and heighten tensions making cross-border insurgency
and smuggling easier. It can be argued that the UK is uniquely
positioned to improve the poor relationship with Pakistan being
a member of the Commonwealth and closely connected to the large
diaspora in this country. Yet this fact heightens Kabul's suspicions
of UK intentions—at least rhetorically. However, the UK
relationship with both Pakistan and India is important too with
respect to Afghanistan as Islamabad accuses New Delhi of establishing
a presence in what it calls its "strategic depth"—namely
Afghanistan. The role of the UK in calming tensions between India
and Pakistan remains increasingly vital in this context as well
as the historical sense.
There is confusion in Afghan governmental circles
over the myriad of policies and strategies being adopted by different
international donors. The lack of a common strategy hinders progress
and a unified military command is long overdue. The adoption of
unilateral country approaches to aspects of the overall mission
confuses and gives rise to suspicion. For example, the UK has
been criticised for its approach to operations in Helmand and
for negotiating with insurgent elements.
It was hoped that the appointment of Kai Eide
as UN Special Representative would bring more cohesion to the
international effort. This has not happened to date and the profile
of the UN as the one international body capable of energising
nation-building remains small. Questions have been asked as to
why some of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) do not
fall under the UN. It is possible that a "blue beret"
presence would provide less grounds for insurgents to claim they
are fighting "invaders" and thus remove one of their
main recruiting slogans.
A political settlement in Afghanistan is a long
way from being achieved. The Taliban have some constituency and
eventually an accommodation may have to be found as is frequently
the case in this type of conflict. But the current terms of the
Quetta Shura are unacceptable to Kabul. Attempts to find common
ground should continue to be sought as an outright victory is
unlikely to be brought about by the current Afghan government
and its allies. This year is likely to be crucial in deciding
a political future for Afghans; and it is essential that elections—if
held—are successful. The Taliban will concentrate on disrupting
the process and it is assessed that there is voter fatigue as
well as dissatisfaction with the failures of government to improve
the lives of people. Perhaps a more flexible approach to the electoral
process should be found. The Single Non-Transferable Voting system
is vulnerable to disruption. Afghans have their own form of traditional
democracy based on the Shura at village level. This system has
lost its traditional power during the period since 2001; but to
allow some voting through this mechanism could bring back authority
at a local level and allow more people to vote.
Finally, a crucial role for the UK is in its
diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions between India and Pakistan,
and Pakistan and Afghanistan. There is a growing sense that these
tensions could run out of control. For this reason and the prevention
of a re-emergence of international terrorist bases the UK and
allies have to remain committed to the Afghanistan mission. This
will take time and resources and some re-examination of policy
and strategy. Arguably that policy and strategy should be better
co-ordinated with allies.
14 January 2009
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