Submission by Sajjan M. Gohel, Asia-Pacific
Foundation
THE AFGHANISTAN—PAKISTAN BORDER AREAS:
CHALLENGES, THREATS AND SCENARIOS
SUMMARY
— The Pakistan-Afghanistan border region
constitutes a significant threat to Western national security
interests.— Undermining Afghan President Karzai's efforts
to build a truly national government is the resurgent Taliban,
backed by al-Qa'ida and its affiliates, which together are mounting
an increasingly virulent insurgency.— Afghanistan's
woes began with outside interference and though the Taliban was
dislodged from power in 2001, they were never defeated or dismantled
but in fact have proliferated, and this is being fuelled by those
who wish to see pro-Taliban and al-Qa'ida elements re-asserting
themselves.
— The Durrand Line divides the homelands
of the Pashtun tribes nearly equally between Afghanistan and Pakistan,
effectively cutting the Pashtun nation in half. This largely imaginary
boundary has been viewed since its inception with contempt and
resentment by Pashtuns on both sides of the line.
— The stabilisation of Afghanistan,
to a very large extent, depends on the nature of that country's
relations with Pakistan. There is an urgent need to resolve the
longstanding border dispute and the Pashtunistan issue in order
to improve the prospects of counter-terrorism cooperation between
the two countries.
— Forging alliances with Islamist parties
and their allies created what has subsequently proven to be an
enduring military-mullah nexus in Pakistan's politics which impacts
upon Afghanistan.
— The security challenge is not a social
problem, or a religious problem, or a generic "tribal"
problem. It is a unique cultural problem.
— Pakistan had gambled for strategic
depth in Afghanistan, but had conceded reverse strategic depth
to the Taliban in Pakistan and as a result is facing a growing
diverse array of threats in recent years to its legitimacy and
authority.
— The Taliban are proving to be increasingly
irrepressible. They seem to be adapting, faster than expected
to the challenges confronting them. In terms of propaganda, psyops
and operational reach they are proving to be a force to reckon
with.
— In addition to the Taliban, the Afghan-Pakistan
border area has proven particularly vital to other insurgent forces
that represent an existential threat to the Karzai regime, a growing
threat to the Pakistani government, and an enormous challenge
to regional stability.
— The Federally Administered Tribal
Areas have provided a sanctuary for a growing insurgent network
that has struck Afghanistan with a vengeance. It provides base
for command and control, fundraising, recruiting, training, and
launching and recovery of military operations and terrorist attacks.
— There is an urgent need to stop the
recruitment and radicalisation process by reforming the madrasas
in Pakistan that are most susceptible to the Taliban rhetoric
and doctrine.
— Any compromise or negotiation with
the Taliban in its current form would not be feasible and will
completely undermine the building and strengthening of civil institutions
in Afghanistan which will result in rival power centres being
created.
— The terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan
that benefits the Taliban will at the same time continue to act
as a recruiting ground for young Britons that are being drawn
and attracted by the ideology and doctrines that al-Qa'ida and
its affiliates articulate.
— It is, pertinent that the West further
strengthens the position of Kabul, and keeps the military pressure
on anti-government groups.
INTRODUCTION
1. During the last 36 years Afghanistan
has been in perpetual conflict, involving the 1973 communist coup;
Soviet invasion; Mujahideen counter-insurgency; Soviet defeat
and withdrawal; civil war; repressive Taliban takeover; al-Qa'ida
terrorism; the military operation by the US-led coalition following
the September 11 attacks and more recently the escalating insurgency
by a re-energised Taliban.
2. Afghanistan, after decades of fighting, has
also witnessed watershed democratic elections and important infrastructure
rebuilding. While much work still remains to be accomplished,
significant progress has been made in improving human rights,
political and economic reform, and strengthening of civil institutions.
3. However, a number of extremely disturbing
countervailing trends are evident. The actual influence and control
of the democratically elected government of President Hamid Karzai
extends only weakly beyond the outskirts of Kabul; ethno-linguistic
fragmentation is on the rise; an increasingly sophisticated insurgency
threatens stability; large areas of the country are still ruled
by warlords and drug lords and, possibly the most damning for
the long-term stabilization of Afghanistan, is that it is fast
approaching narco-state status with its opium crop representing
a substantial portion of the country's licit GDP. Estimates illustrate
that Afghanistan has become practically the exclusive supplier
of the world's deadliest drug. Approximately 93% of the world's
opium is produced in Afghanistan.1
4. Indeed, Karzai's government is encountering
extreme difficulty in extending control and mandate outside Kabul,
into the country's southern regions. Undermining Karzai's efforts
to build a truly national government is the resurgent Taliban,
backed by al-Qa'ida and its affiliates, which together are mounting
an increasingly virulent insurgency, especially in the east and
south, near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
5. It is difficult to ascertain the damage
inflicted upon the Afghan socio-political structure by decades
of continuous warfare, which not only destroyed the pre-war elites,
but also left massive numbers dead, wounded, or displaced.2 This
extended turmoil and hardship set the stage for the rise and entrenchment
of Afghanistan as a centre of conflict. At the same time, pre-existing
ethnic stratifications and cleavages have further polarized the
country, isolate it internationally, and also to insulate its
people from most efforts at centralized government.
6. Afghanistan's diverse present boundaries
were created to serve as a buffer between British and Russian
Empires as Afghanistan confronted modernity through its forced
integration into a Euro-centric state.3 These were not drawn along
ethnic, linguistic, or religious lines. The externally imposed
"state" comprised of a complicated mix of people mostly
living in small, kin-based communities outside of the limited
urban areas. Some of these groups are ethnically and linguistically
distinct, but are not necessarily different in terms of culture.
Afghanistan's governments have been unable to create a sense of
genuine national unity in times other than during crisis.4
7. Afghan society is deeply divided along
linguistic, sectarian, tribal, and racial lines. The social system
is based on communal priorities and emphasizes the importance
of local over central authority. Islamic identity, however, does
often take precedence over even local sentiment, as demonstrated
by the jihad-inspired solidarity against the Soviet invasion.
8. The traditional ethnic hierarchy begins
with the Pashtuns at the summit; Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmens
comprise the middle layers of society; and the Shiite Hazaras
have the lowest status. However, the Hazaras are the only major
ethnic group whose traditional territory does not overlap with
international borders. Afghanistan has a long-standing tradition,
facilitated by trans-national ethnic ties, of the movement of
people through informal border crossings into Pakistan. These
ties have operated in much the same way for centuries, back to
when the region was a trading hub in the heyday of the Silk Road.
9. Afghanistan's Pashtuns would like a strong
Pashtun-run central state; Tajiks focus on power sharing in the
central state, and Uzbeks and Hazaras desire recognition of their
identities and mechanisms of local government. Historically, the
more populous Pashtun tribes of the south have ruled Afghanistan,
yet unlike other ethnic groups, the Pashtuns emphasize tribal
structures and codes at expense of the state. Not until the Soviet
Union's invasion of Afghanistan did other ethnic groups truly
establish themselves as a political and military force. In the
past, fighting for control of the state had occurred primarily
among Pashtuns.
THE PASHTUN
DIMENSION
10. Among its immediate neighbours, Afghanistan
has had tense and strained relations with Pakistan. Much of the
history that has shaped the two countries' border area can be
traced to colonial fears of the British in India and of Russian
encroachment throughout Central Asia, coined as the "Great
Game" of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
11. The legacy of this era can be seen in the
two countries' border demarcation. The 1879 Treaty of Gandamak,
signed in the midst of the Second British-Afghan War, led to the
establishment in 1893 of the Durand Line as an arbitrary boundary
between Afghanistan and colonial British India. The Durand line,
was drawn by a team of British surveyors, led by Sir Mortimer
Durand. This border, which remains in place today, split both
Pashtunistan and Baluchistan, traditionally occupied by the Pashtun
and Baluch peoples, between Afghan rule and British colonial rule.5
12. To a great extent, the line followed
the contours of convenient geographical features, as well as the
existing limits of British authority, rather than tribal borders.
It divided the homelands of the Pashtun tribes nearly equally
between Afghanistan and Pakistan, effectively cutting the Pashtun
nation in half. This largely imaginary boundary has been viewed
since its inception with contempt and resentment by Pashtuns on
both sides of the line. As a practical matter the border is unenforceable.
In some places the position of the line is disputed; in others
it is inaccessible to all but trained mountain climbers. The majority
of the Pashtun tribes and clans that control the frontier zones
of eastern and southern Afghanistan along the Durand line have
never accepted the legitimacy of what they believe to be an arbitrary
and capricious boundary.
13. The division has led to decades of tension
along the border, which accelerated with the partition of British
India in 1947. No Afghan government has ever recognised the legitimacy
of the border. An Afghanistan unwilling to relinquish its irredentist
demands thus becomes a security issue for Pakistan and is used
to justify interventionist strategies, among them efforts to neutralise
and subvert Pashtun nationalist sentiment. These policies, so
consequential for Afghanistan, have also had a deep impact on
Pakistan.
14. On Pakistan's side of the border, the
territory in question is the Northwest Frontier Province, divided
into six tribal agencies, those of Khyber, Mohmand, Kurram, North
and South Waziristan, and Malakand. Local tribal groups were given
control of these agencies when the area was divided during the
partition. The area remains largely autonomous, and al-Qa'ida
and Taliban remnants are able to operate there with relative freedom.
15. Ironically, the unique underlying factors
that create this threat are little understood by most policymakers
in the West. The continuing instability lies in the fact that
the international effort has failed to address longstanding disagreements
between Afghanistan and Pakistan—the Durand Line border
dispute and the Pushtunistan issue—which in turn impairs
the two countries' cooperative capacity in the anti-Taliban campaign.
16. Indeed, relations between Pakistan and
Afghanistan bear the scars of 60 years of unresolved issues over
territory and national identity. Conflicting political alliances
and ideologies, especially those once associated with the Cold
War, have also helped define the relationship. In recent years,
the two countries have been cited for their intersecting roles
in the struggle against trans-national terrorism and their necessary
joint contribution for bringing about regional stability and economic
growth. Far less appreciated or understood are the domestic consequences
of their bilateral policies.
17. From Pakistan's founding, the country
has sought means to counter the demands of virtually every Afghan
regime for an independent state for Pakistan's Pashtun ethnic
population. The new state was to be carved geographically from
Pakistan's northwest and to be known as Pashtunistan.
18. Afghanistan's promotion of Pashtunistan
has brought retaliation from Pakistan. During the 1950s, Pakistan
prevented its alliance partner, the United States, from giving
military assistance to the Kabul Government, thus leading the
Afghan leadership to turn to the Soviet Union for equipment and
training. By periodically impeding the transit of goods from the
port of Karachi to landlocked Afghanistan, Pakistan seriously
impaired the Afghan economy. The promotion of a Pashtunistan policy
resulting in border tensions hastened the departure of Afghanistan's
Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud in 1963.6 In 1975, Pakistan Prime
Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto lent covert support to an insurrection
in Afghanistan by Pashtun militants. Islamabad also gave refuge
to several insurgent leaders, who, in just a few years, would
command Pakistan-based mujahideen groups opposing the Soviet occupation
of Afghanistan and indigenous communists.7
19. Pakistan's decision, following the Soviet
invasion in 1979, to assist Islamic resistance forces, undertaken
with massive support from the United States, Saudi Arabia and
others, had far-reaching effects on Pakistan's politics and strategic
planning. It gave new life to the military rule of General Zia
ul-Haq who, by the late 1970s, faced a serious domestic challenge
to his legitimacy following his overthrow and subsequent execution
of Bhutto. The jihad against the Soviets and Afghan communists
and the international support it received impeded any restoration
of democratic rule and sustained the Zia regime until the time
of his death in 1988.
20. An Afghan resistance sponsored by the
regime of Zia and his allies, designed to discourage Soviet offensive
ambitions in the region, and wear down the Soviet army also provided
Pakistan with an opportunity to blunt Afghan nationalism. Secular
and leftist parties, some of which had championed the idea of
a Pashtun state, were deliberately excluded from participation
in a mujahideen alliance fashioned by Pakistan's powerful intelligence
agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). By also giving
radical Islamist parties effective control over Pakistan's large
refugee camps, Islamabad hoped to stifle secular Pashtun nationalism
which rallied around the former King, Zahir Shah, who had been
living in exile since the communist coup in 1973.
21. Forging alliances with Islamist parties
and their radical allies created what has subsequently proven
to be an enduring military-mullah nexus in Pakistan's politics.
Zia's introduction of conservative religious policies in the country
gave a strong boost to this religious—military alliance.
In return for state support, the religious parties served as open
or covert electoral partners, and their affiliated groups were
used as a surrogate force against enemies of the military regime
domestically, and in India and Afghanistan. Zia's Afghan policy
has been responsible for boosting radical political Islam expanded
an intelligence apparatus that shored up radical groups to help
the government monitor and, when necessary, stifle its political
opposition.
22. A long-sought and perhaps outmoded goal
for Pakistan has been to see Afghanistan as an asset in providing
strategic depth in the event of a wide conflict with India. By
ensuring a safe haven for its forces, Pakistan would presumably
enhance its survivability and deterrent power. Another goal has
been to foster friendly if not subservient regimes in Kabul. This
has taken form in ways varying from cultivating leaders to supporting
insurgencies.
23. In pursuing these goals Pakistan's policies
are often viewed by Afghans as overbearing and over-reaching.
Having sheltered millions of Afghan refugees during the Soviet
occupation of the 1980s and civil war of the 1990s, governments
in Pakistan took for granted that the Afghans would feel deep
gratitude. Pakistan, therefore, repeatedly misjudged their relationship
and has engaged in short-sighted policies toward Afghanistan.
Perhaps the most serious has been a deliberate effort to exploit
Afghanistan's ethnic mosaic for strategic purposes through cross-border
clientalism. To ensure the dependence of a Pashtun-dominated
Afghan leadership on Pakistan, Islamabad stands accused of promoting
adversarial relations between Pashtuns and other ethnic groups.
24. The international community has no long-term
security problems or challenges with the Baluchis, the Chitralis,
the Tajiks, the Nuristanis, or any of the myriad tribal groups
along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, except for elements within
the Pashtun clans. Therefore the security challenge is not a social
problem, or a religious problem, or a generic "tribal"
problem. It is a unique cultural problem. Alone among the many
peoples and cultures of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, it is
the Pashtun people who have proven both susceptible to religious
extremist movements and resistant to the imposition of external
governance. This is very much the legacy of Zia ul-Haq.
25. The stabilisation of Afghanistan, to
a very large extent, depends on the nature of that country's relations
with Pakistan. There is an urgent need to resolve the longstanding
border dispute and the Pashtunistan issue in order to improve
the prospects of counter-terrorism cooperation between the two
countries. An amicable resolution of the Durand Line dispute and
the Pashtunistan issue will go a long way to help the campaign
against terrorism inasmuch as it would allay Pakistani fears that
a strong Afghanistan would revitalise past claims on the Pashtun
regions of Pakistan.
26. The primary issue of concern today is
the Taliban but to understand them it is important to look at
how they appeared on the scene and evolved.
THE TALIBAN:
PAST, PRESENT
AND FUTURE
27. Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989,
Afghanistan deteriorated into a brutal civil war between rival
mujahideen groups, many of which had spent much of their energy
fighting each other even during the height of the anti-Soviet
jihad. This civil war claimed thousands of lives and decimated
the country's infrastructure. The civil war intensified after
the mujahideen took control of Kabul in April 1992. Shortly afterwards,
violent fighting erupted in the streets of the capital between
rival ethnic factions, this conflict spread to neighbouring towns
and villages. The ensuing civil war eventually wreaked as much
if not more damage and destruction on the country than the Soviet
occupation. In Kandahar, fighting between Islamists and traditionalist
mujahideen parties resulted in the destruction of much of the
traditional power structures. In the rural areas, warlords, drug
lords, and bandits ran amok in a state of anarchy created by the
unravelling of the traditional tribal leadership system.
28. During this conflict for power between the
mujahideen factions and warlords, Saudi Arabia invested heavily
in the region, most notably funding madrasas (religious seminaries)
in Pakistan that sought to spread the conservative Wahhabi religious
code practiced in the Saudi kingdom.8 Pakistan's Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam
(Assembly of Islamic Clergy, or JUI) built a network of its own
to extend the influence of the indigenous Deobandi School of Islamic
thought. These madrasas would come to serve as an important educational
alternative for the numerous displaced refugees from the anti-Soviet
jihad and Afghan civil war as well as for poor families along
the frontier who could not afford the secular schools. Under the
oversight of Pakistan's ISI, the Taliban emerged from the madrasas
and refugee camps in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and
the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA).
29. In Afghanistan, the Taliban recruited
primarily from madrasas near Ghazni and Kandahar. It arrived on
the Afghan scene in 1994 with little warning and vowed to install
a traditional Islamic government and end the fighting among the
mujahideen. It overthrew the largely Tajik mujahideen government
in Kabul, capturing the capital in September 1996. The Taliban
considered this regime responsible for a continuing civil war
and the deterioration of security in the country, as well as discrimination
against Pashtuns. Afghanistan soon became a training ground for
fundamentalist activists and other radicals from the Middle East
and around Asia.
30. War-weary Afghans initially welcomed
the Taliban, which promoted itself under the banner of honesty
and unity. They were seen mainly by the Pasthuns as the most capable
of bringing peace and stability to the country. The Taliban immediately
targeted warlords who were deemed responsible for much of the
destruction, insecurity, and chaos that plagued Afghanistan since
the outbreak of the civil war. Like in Saudi Arabia, it also instituted
a religious police force, the Amr Bil Marof Wa Nai An Munkir (Promotion
of Virtue and Suppression of Vice) to violently uphold its extreme
religious doctrine, which were not previously known in Afghanistan.9
31. The people's optimism soon turned to
fear as the Taliban introduced a stringent interpretation of sharia
law, banned women from work, and introduced punishments such as
death by stoning and amputations.
32. While Tajik resistance to the Taliban
in the form of the Northern Alliance held out throughout the Taliban
period and retained Afghanistan's seat in the United Nations,
the Taliban eventually conquered 80 percent of the country. By
September 2001, it was poised to finish off the Northern Alliance.
However, the September 11 attacks led to U.S. intervention on
7 October 2001, aimed at destroying al-Qa'ida as well as removing
the Taliban from Afghanistan.
33. The Taliban primarily comprises of Pashtuns
from the Ghilzai group with some support from the Kakar tribe
of the Ghurghusht group. Taliban spiritual leader, Mullah Mohammed
Omar, and most of the surviving senior leadership of the Taliban
are from the Hotaki tribe of the Ghilzai. The Taliban represents
an ultraconservative Islamic front with an ideology derived from
the Deobandi School. The movement, however, took Deobandism to
extremes the school's founders would not have recognized.
34. While the Taliban's rise challenged
many traditional tribal institutions, the eventual leadership
consisted almost exclusively of Ghilzai Pashtuns. The Ghilzai
have historically been at odds with the smaller Durrani group
of tribes, which is represented to some extent in the current
Karzai Afghan government. Ghilzai Pashtuns are concentrated in
the southeast in Oruzgan, Zabul, Dai Kundi and Gardez provinces
and in the Katawaz region of Paktika province and extending eastwards
towards the Suleiman Mountains into Pakistan. They also have communities
in the centre and north of Afghanistan as a result of resettlement,
both forcible and encouraged, under Durrani Empire in the early
19th century.10
35. Tribalism in Afghanistan and across
the border in Pakistan can be seen as a separation of ethno-linguistic
groups, giving primacy to ties of kinship and patrilineal ancestry.
The tribe is a kind of amalgamation of mutual assistance and support,
with members cooperating on defence and maintaining order.11
36. At the strategic level, the Taliban
is currently fighting a classic "war of the flea", largely
along the same lines used by the mujahideen against the Soviets,
including fighting in villages to deliberately provoke air strikes
and inflict collateral damage.12 The death of a Taliban fighter
invokes an obligation of revenge among all his male relatives,
making the killing an act of insurgent multiplication, not elimination.
The Soviets learned this lesson painfully as they killed nearly
a million Pashtuns during their occupation of Afghanistan but
inadvertently increased the number of Pashtun mujahideen by the
end of the war.
37. The Taliban centre of gravity is the
Pashtun heartland along the Afghan-Pakistan border and not just
indoctrinated impressionable teenage boys, mid-level commanders
or even Mullah Omar and no amount of killing them will terminate
the insurgency. For every individual that is captured or killed,
there are at least another five coming along the assembly line.
It is this infrastructure which replenishes the ranks of the Taliban
that needs to be addressed and systematically dismantled.
TRIBAL POLITICS
38. The Pakistani state has seen a growing
diverse array of threats in recent years to its legitimacy and
authority. These challenges have included a substantial surge
in religious militancy, mounting provincial and tribal unrest
and the weakening of the institutional capacity of the state to
govern effectively. All three factors are present in its western
border areas with Afghanistan and can be traced in large part
to its Afghan policies. By encouraging and supporting extremists,
like the Taliban, as a tool to retain and hold influence in Afghanistan,
Pakistan introduced changes that undermined its own ability to
maintain its writ within its own borders. Policies on Afghanistan
that altered traditional power structures in the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) have resulted in wider domestic instability.
Not inconsequentially, the reputation of Pakistan's military has
suffered.
39. Pakistan had gambled for strategic depth
in Afghanistan, but had conceded reverse strategic depth to the
Taliban in Pakistan. Even then, as long as such elements looked
away from Pakistan and engaged themselves in Afghanistan, the
authorities thought they were safe in Pakistan. However, that
was not to be. The tribal political system was to undergo a complete
overhaul when in the post-9/11 context Pakistan was forced to
reverse its Afghan policy. It was then that the pro-Taliban Pakistani
radicals came home to roost. Soon afterwards some of these elements
asserted themselves in North and South Waziristan, Bajaur, Mohmand,
Dir and Swat, and Khyber in the tribal areas and emerged as the
Pakistani Taliban.
40. No politician in Islamabad appears to
be ready to take upon himself the stigma of fighting the militants
within Pakistan on behalf of the international community. The
Pakistani state has to stop approaching the issue of tribal insurgency
through the narrow prism of assuming that maintaining law and
order will alone resolve the problem. It has to be acknowledged
that the old system of controlling the area through obliging tribal
maliks (leader of a village or tribe) patronized by the state
is falling apart. The state is now up against a rigid, inflexible,
fearless, and defiant group of militants who are winning the battles
against the state and filling the power vacuum in the area.
41. Rather than addressing these tribal
leaders separately as sheikhs of small independent emirates, Islamabad
must work out a comprehensive offer to all of them and compel
them to join the political mainstream. The policy, since Pakistan's
independence, of buffering the tribal areas and keeping them out
of the spotlight of representative politics has created a space
for regressive forces which are now threatening to take even the
stable areas under their control.
42. Politicians and especially military
rulers for more than a quarter-century have gradually placed religion
in a more central role in Pakistani politics on all levels. As
a part of the support for the mujahideen, Zia ul-Haq gave the
ulema a more powerful position in the Pakistani state. In the
tribal areas, the support for the 1980s' Afghan jihad and the
backing for the Taliban regime in the 1990s resulted in the usurpation
by Islamist militants of the traditional secular tribal leadership.13
The old and largely non-religious system of governance, which
was in place in the FATA, was "Islamisized". Previously,
the malik was the local political authority. He was elected by
a jirga (tribal assembly of elders) in the village, and through
an Islamabad-appointed political agent received government funds
and handled relations with the state. The local mullah (Muslim
religious cleric) was clearly subordinate, and in most cases completely
apolitical.
43. From Zia's rule onward, the state began
to fund the mullahs directly, giving them financial control and
independence. Over the years the mullahs took on an enhanced political
role in the community and gradually became more powerful and influential
than the malik. With new resources and status, the local religious
figures were able to emerge as key political brokers and, very
often, promoters of religious militancy.14 Empowering the mullahs
made these border areas more hospitable to radicalised local tribesmen.
With the malik significantly undermined it became harder, if not
impossible, for disillusioned locals to protest the presence of
the Afghan fighters and foreign terrorists occupying their land.
44. The gradual change in the power structure
from the malik to the mullah united the people under the banner
of Islam, giving less prominence to national and ethnic allegiances.
This susceptibility of the people of the region to religious insurgencies,
and their resistance to external governmental control, have been
ascribed by some observers to tribal culture, or simply a response
to chronic poverty and underdevelopment. Yet all of the ethnic
groups of the border region have in common the same key elements
of tribal organization.15
45. The Taliban are proving to be increasingly
irrepressible. They seem to be adapting and evolving faster than
expected to the challenges confronting them. Although in terms
of weaponry they cannot match the vastly superior Western forces,
in terms of propaganda, psyops and operational reach they are
proving to be a force to reckon with. In hindsight one can say
that the Taliban made good use of the time made available to them
by the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq in 2003. The Taliban seized
the opportunity to implement important structural and operational
transformations, which made them a much more formidable and effective
force. While the Taliban still retain some of their fundamental
characteristics, they have tactfully improvised on many other
areas, especially their military tactics and approach towards
media and propaganda.
46. The ambiguity over the ongoing efforts
for national reconciliation in Afghanistan seems to be growing.
A sense of confusion prevails due to differing ways and means
of a whole range of diverse entities now involved in reconciling
the anti-government groups, especially the Taliban. Talking to
the Taliban is being increasingly considered as a realistic option
as a way of containing the proliferating insurgency. Often "deals"
and "pacts" with local Taliban commanders are projected
as the only effective means of ensuring a semblance of peace and
development. The idea of gradually co-opting the Taliban in the
ongoing political process is being mooted as a possible solution
for the Western forces. However, some naive policy makers in the
West, in their attempts to make peace overtures to the Taliban,
do not seem to factor in the long-term impact, nor its immediate
consequences for the Afghan polity.
47. The fighting with the Pashtun clans
in the FATA during most of 2004-07 was very costly in terms of
military casualties and pride for the Pakistani army. Anxious
to salvage something from its failed policy, the Pervez Musharraf
regime concluded a truce, the North Waziristan accord on 5 September
2006. According to the terms of the deal, the tribesmen agreed
to cease attacking the army and to stop crossing the border to
fight in Afghanistan. The government agreed to halt major ground
and air operations, free prisoners, retreat to barracks, compensate
for losses and allow tribesmen to carry small arms. The thorny
issue of foreign fighters was left ambiguous. The militants promised
that all non-Pakistanis would leave North Waziristan, or stay
and respect the deal. But the government did not insist that they
be registered.16
48. British NATO commanders were quick to
strike a similar pact the following month in the Taliban-infested
Musa Qala district in the southern province of Helmand. The strategy
suffered a fatal blow when the pact was soon violated by the Taliban
who overran the town, disarming the local police, burning government
buildings and threatening officials and residents.17
49. In spite of the Musharraf regime's efforts
to sell the accord as a step towards stability and peace, it was
a deal very much on the militants' terms. They were handsomely
"compensated" for their losses and allowed to retain
their weapons stocks. Since the Musharraf deal, U.S. troops on
Afghanistan's eastern border have seen a threefold increase in
attacks. The tribal deal has also contributed to the Taliban's
overall resurgence as ethnic Pashtun rebels are no longer fighting
Pakistani troops and are using the North Waziristan border area
as a command-and-control hub for launching attacks in Afghanistan.
Peace continues to elude both North Waziristan and Helmand.18
50. The Taliban and al-Qa'ida militants
are using the lands of the Pashtun as a launching pad for attacks
to destabilize Afghanistan, as well as a training ground for terrorist
attacks worldwide. In addition to the Taliban, the Afghan-Pakistan
border area has proven particularly vital to other insurgent forces
led by Afghan Islamist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami (HIG)
Party, the Haqqani Faction of Maulawi Jalaluddin Haqqani, the
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan led by Baitullah Mahsud.19 The Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi
(Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law or TNSM) led by Maulana
Fazlullah, also known as Mullah Radio for the illegal radio channel
he operates. These insurgent forces represent an existential threat
to the Karzai regime, a growing threat to the Pakistani government,
and an enormous challenge to regional stability.20
51. Since 2002 the FATA has also provided
a sanctuary for a growing insurgent network that has struck Afghanistan
with a vengeance. It provides an almost impregnable base for command
and control, fundraising, recruiting, training, and launching
and recovery of military operations and terrorist attacks. Growing
outward from the FATA, extremism has spread across the Pashtun
belt, and Pashtun tribal areas in both Pakistan and Afghanistan
are increasingly falling under the de facto political control
of the extremists. The Taliban and its associated groups have
used murder, arson, intimidation, bombings, and a sophisticated
information campaign to subvert traditional tribal governance
structures.
52. Justice, education and social policies
in North Waziristan and South Waziristan, are decided by the Pakistani
Taliban, who are ideologically similar to the Afghan Taliban and
also comprise of local Pashtuns. Their reach has in fact been
felt across the NWFP, notably in the northern districts of Swat
and Malakand. Swat was once a popular tourist destination with
the Malamjabba ski resort being the only one in the whole of Pakistan.
The entire Swat valley has now been devastated by the spread of
radicalism. Fazlullah's TNSM has established a "parallel
government" through Islamic courts to enforce Sharia law
which have issued edicts banning girls from attending schools.21
This has drawn an eerie parallel to the policies of the Taliban
in Afghanistan. The extent of the militant Islamist influence
became apparent with the assassination of the former Pakistani
Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto on 27 December 2007.
53. Quetta, located in western Pakistan,
is the capital of Baluchistan, the largest and poorest of Pakistan's
provinces. Unlike the rest of the province, Quetta has a Pashtun
majority and is also considered the sanctuary of the Taliban leadership.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai claims Taliban leader Mullah Omar
is living there. Quetta is also home to the Command and Staff
College, one of the premier schools of the Pakistani military
and the headquarters of the Frontier Corps of Baluchistan.22
54. What may seem like a paradox, the co-existence
of extremists and radicals with the Pakistani military in the
same place, is emblematic of the challenge that exists in Pakistan
which then rebounds and impacts on Afghanistan. This is perhaps
best explained by the Shaldara madrasa in the Pashtunabad district
of Quetta which has been accused of acting as an incubator for
recruiting and radicalising young easily susceptible men who end
up joining the ranks of the Taliban as suicide bombers in Afghanistan.
55. There is an urgent need to stop the
recruitment and radicalisation process by reforming the madrasas
that are most susceptible to the Taliban rhetoric and doctrine.
Madrasas have a long history in Pakistan and they serve socially
important purposes. Therefore it is reasonable for a government
to seek to modernise and adapt rather than totally abolish them.
56. International assistance should focus
heavily on rebuilding an education system that has been allowed
to decay for three decades and should be closely tied to proof
that it represents a genuine commitment to promote moderate, modern
education and on the condition the government identifies and closes
madrasas affiliated with banned extremist groups like the Taliban.
It is also essential for all madrasas to disclose their sources
of income and declare dissociation from any militant activity
or group. Funding for reform projects should be suspended if the
government fails to do so. International financial institutions
providing, or intending to provide, financial assistance for madrasas
reform should also make their grants conditional on the above
criteria.
THE BRITISH
CONNECTION
57. The Pakistan-Afghanistan border region
constitutes a significant threat to Western national security
interests. On 14 December, 2008, British Prime Minister, Gordon
Brown, revealed that three-quarters of the most serious terrorist
plots being investigated by U.K. authorities have links to Pakistan.23
Indeed, terrorist related events over the last few years in the
UK have seen increasing international interest in the connections
between radicals in the UK and their counterparts in the Pakistani
tribal areas that border Afghanistan. Attention has focused on
how such groups and individuals could link up and cooperate to
carry out attacks in the UK.
58. On 30 April 2007, the longest ever al-Qa'ida
linked terrorism trial in the UK, known as the Ammonium Nitrate/Crevice
Plot, concluded with guilty verdicts for five of the seven defendants.
The convicted men had purchased and stored half a ton (600 kg)
of ammonium nitrate fertiliser for the purposes of constructing
bombs to launch attacks on diverse targets such as shopping centres,
nightclubs, electricity companies, football stadiums, the utilities
network, and the British Parliament.24
59. The defendants, all of Pakistani origin
except one who was of Algerian extraction, were young British
men, born or brought up in the UK but had established links to
al-Qa'ida in the tribal areas along the Afghan-Pakistan border
where some went for terrorist training. The plot became the first
major one aimed at the UK, post-September 11.
60. Omar Khyam, the ring leader of the Ammonium
Nitrate cell, portrayed an all too common yet disturbing trend
of individual, born and brought up in the UK, but becoming radicalised,
travelling abroad and willing to turn against their own society.
During his court trial Khyam illustrated his ideological journey
from secular British schoolboy to global terrorist.25
61. In 2001, Khyam attended a training camp
in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) near Afghanistan before
crossing the border to meet Taliban members. In 2003, he travelled
to Malakand, in Pakistan's NWFP, together with some of his cell.
They had established contact with a warlord in Malakand, NWFP.
It was there that some of the Crevice cell trained and honed their
skills in putting together an explosive device. Khyam and his
co-conspirator Salahuddin Amin also received training in explosives
in Kohat, NWFP.26
62. On 8 August 2008, one of the biggest
ever terrorist trials in the UK, known as the Liquid Bomb/Operation
Overt Plot, concluded where three men were convicted of conspiring
to commit mass murder but the jury failed to reach a verdict on
the allegation they were plotting to bring down trans-Atlantic
flights by using liquid explosives.27
63. By majority verdicts, the jury convicted
the three men of conspiracy to commit murder. They were the cell's
ringleader, Abdulla Ahmed Ali, the bomb-maker Assad Sarwar, and
Tanvir Hussain. They had also pleaded guilty to conspiracy to
cause explosions and conspiracy to commit public nuisance. The
three admitted plotting to detonate a small device at Heathrow's
Terminal 3 because it was used by several US airlines. They had
earlier aborted plans to explode a home-made bomb at the Houses
of Parliament due to the tight security at Westminster.28
64. Ali travelled frequently to Pakistan,
staying for long periods between 2003 to 2006. It is believed
his travels led to South Waziristan. His co-conspirators, Assad
Sarwar and Tanvir Hussain also travelled to Pakistan. Ali claimed
many of his trips were as a volunteer for an Islamic medical charity.
However, in reality he was attending training camps and meeting
senior figures in terrorist groups.29
65. It is pertinent to look at the places
where these British individuals have been recruited and trained.
Kohat, Malakand and South Waziristan are the same places that
the Taliban and their affiliates are operating. There is a clear
nexus that exists which in addition to being a base of operations
for the Taliban is also a recruiting ground for Britons. This
has obvious security concerns and challenges.
66. Though the tribal areas represent a
significant security concern, other major terrorist plots in Britain
have emanated from areas of Pakistan that extend beyond the Afghan-Pakistan
border like the 7 July 2005 suicide attacks and the follow up
failed plot (21/7) two weeks later.
67. Pakistan has fallen victim not to terrorism
directed against it by external forces, but rather to the corrosive
effects of extremist groups, many with a trans-national ideological
orientation, that have flourished within its own borders. Therefore,
the remedy for the security dilemma must and can only lie primarily
within Pakistan itself.
68. The terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan
that benefits the Taliban will at the same time continue to act
as a recruiting ground for young Britons that are being drawn
and attracted by the ideology and doctrines that al-Qa'ida and
it's affiliates articulate.
CONCLUSION
69. Afghanistan's woes began with outside
interference and though the Taliban was dislodged from power in
2001, they were never defeated or dismantled but in fact have
proliferated, and this is being fuelled by those who wish to see
pro-Taliban and al-Qa'ida elements re-asserting themselves. The
key point to understand is that the Taliban is no longer a political
movement or even a militia. They have now become a terrorist group
adopting the tactics and strategies of the insurgency in Iraq,
killing with stealth and unflinching in their agenda. The ill-conceived
perception that there is a "moderate Taliban" is completely
misguided. Perhaps the only difference between the "moderate
Taliban" and "fundamentalist Taliban" is that the
"moderate Taliban" may use smaller weapons and bombs
and their militant tactics may not be so well thought out.
70. The key questions here are whether, or to
what extent, the Taliban are interested in negotiating with Kabul
and the West? To what extent are Kabul and the West in a position
to lay down terms and conditions for negotiations? If the Taliban
are a decentralized entity, then which Taliban faction or affiliate
should Kabul be talking to? On what terms and conditions would
the Taliban be willing to share power with the Karzai government?
What would be its impact on the country's constitution, state
structures, and foreign policy? Is Kabul willing to integrate
Taliban guerrillas into the armed forces? How would it impact
on the position of minority ethnic groups? These are some of the
issues of far-reaching consequence which are not being thought
of, especially as Kabul, in the given circumstances, cannot speak
from a position of strength.
71. Any compromise with the Taliban in its
current form would not be feasible and will completely undermine
the building and strengthening of civil institutions in Afghanistan
which will result in rival power centres being created. It is,
therefore, pertinent that the West further strengthens the position
of Kabul, and keeps the military pressure on anti-government groups.
It is also imperative to the struggle against the Taliban, al-Qa'ida
and their affiliates that the West and its regional partners stay
together and help Afghanistan build strong state institutions.
Any stopgap measure or short-term approach to contain the Taliban
insurgency would act adversely on people's perception about the
seven-year-old political process. A weak Kabul and a divided Western
coalition certainly do not offer a perfect recipe for engineering
divisions within the Taliban or for winning the cooperation of
the Afghan people. It will perpetuate Taliban militancy and, worse,
growing Talibanization on the Pakistan-Afghan frontier and beyond.
72. The symptoms are evident in Afghanistan
but the disease is located in Pakistan. Indeed, the root lies
in the inability of the Pakistani state to decipher the problem
correctly. The situation can no longer be easily reversed and
the Pakistani state has to move beyond the colonial policy of
segregating the tribal areas and leaving the people to the mercy
of the redundant tribal maliks, Islamists or the warlords. Islamabad
tends to fight the symptom while the disease is left undiagnosed
and untreated. Pakistan has to now ready itself for a long-term
effort to integrate these areas and mainstream its population
through political consensus. Parts of Pakistan too are in the
process of Talibanisation which is gathering momentum and the
influence of radicals is fast spreading beyond the tribal areas,
where groups calling themselves Pakistani Taliban are operating.
73. Pakistan's Afghan policies over the
past 30 years, whether pursued for domestic, political, or strategic
reasons have come at the expense of the country's own political
stability and social cohesion. These policies carry heavy responsibility
for intensifying Pakistan's ethnic fissures, weakening it economically,
fuelling religious radicalism, and bringing about an attenuation
of the state's legitimate authority. They have affected the balance
of political power within Pakistan, most of all by reinforcing
military ascendance. While Pakistan's policies toward Afghanistan
have attracted foreign resources, this assistance has regularly
been a source of domestic controversy and dissent.
74. In formulating its Afghan policies,
Pakistan's leaders seem often to ignore the long-term and wider
implications of their decisions both at home and abroad. Preoccupied
with tactical policy goals such as achieving foreign military
aid and gaining strategic depth, Islamabad has nevertheless turned
a blind eye to domestic radicalisation and the impact this is
having on its ability to govern within its own borders. It has
acted too often out of convenience rather than conviction in choosing
its allies, with the government's credibility among its own people
a frequent casualty. Pakistan has also failed to recognise the
inherent contradictions of its two-track policy, between reserving
a Pashtun card in the event of a failing Afghanistan and normalising
its economic and political relations for the benefit of both countries.
75. In Pakistan, the permissive conditions
enabling the Taliban must be confronted, not with rhetoric and
empty promises, but with action and not vacillating, half-hearted
measures, but strong and consistent Pakistani military action
wherever required and at whatever cost. Because Pashtuns never
negotiate from a position of strength, any negotiations and "peace
deals" are simply seen as a sign of weakness by the radicals.
The United Kingdom, European Union and United States need to press
the Pakistan government to take action against pro-Taliban elements
in Quetta, FATA and NWFP and publish monthly NATO figures of cross-border
incursions into Afghanistan to encourage Islamabad to do more
on its side of the border. It is notable that President Barack
Obama's administration has said that Pakistan will be held "accountable
for security in the border region with Afghanistan".30
76. Western support for the previous Musharraf
regime has been a total failure, whose legacy is being painfully
felt with the substantial increase of violence in South Asia over
the last few years. Western governments undermine their own interests
by invoking the "Islamist threat" to justify support
of military regimes. This approach has contributed to the perception
in the Muslim world in general, and in Pakistan in particular,
that democracy is something to be applied selectively. Supporting
and empowering the democratic infrastructure and civil institutions
in Pakistan should be a priority. Contrary to popular perceptions,
a civilian government is better placed than a military regime
to tackle the rise in extremism in their own country which is
also seeping into its eastern and western neighbours.
77. In equal measure, without a major change
in counter-insurgency strategy and a major increase in manpower,
equipment and especially reconstruction funding to Kabul, the
West may fail to achieve their objectives in Afghanistan.
78. Despite extreme poverty, a landmine-littered
landscape, endemic corruption, a weak central government, a virulent
insurgency, a damaged economy, booming opium production, and a
host of other daunting concerns, Afghanistan nevertheless remains
geo-strategically vital. The West cannot repeat its post-Soviet
abandonment of the country, or naively assume that some stillborn
peace deal can be achieved with the Taliban, because the results
of that will continue to have negative consequences for the region.
By abandoning Afghanistan once, the West allowed the country to
become a refuge for terrorist groups to recruit, train, and wage
war globally. The effect on Afghanistan, the region, and the rest
of the world was dramatic and terrifying. This time, if the West
leave, or lose, the results will be even worse.
22 January 2009
ENDNOTES1 "Afghanistan
Opium Survey 2007", United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime, p iv,
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/AFG07_ExSum_web.pdf
[accessed 20 January, 2009]
2 Larry P Goodson, Afghanistan's Endless War:
State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban,
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), p 97.
3 Barnett R Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), p 5.
4 John C Griffiths, Afghanistan: Key to a
Continent (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), p 78.
5 Sir Percy Sykes, The Right Honourable Sir
Mortimer Durand—A Biography, (London: Cassell &
Co. Ltd, 1926)/
6 Amin Saikal, Ravan Farhadi and Kirill Nourzhanov,
Modern Afghanistan, (London: I B Tauris, 2006), pp 117-130.
7 Marvin G Weinbaum & Jonathan B Harder,
"Pakistan's Afghan policies and their consequences",
Contemporary South Asia, Volume 16, Issue 1 March 2008, pp 25—38.
8 Rizwan Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence
of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing,
2005), pp 139-140.
9 Jeanne K Giraldo & Harold A Trinkunas,
Terrorism Financing and State Responses, (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2007), p 95.
10 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam,
Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2001), pp 18-19; Michael Griffen, Reaping the World
Wind: Afghanistan, al-Qa'ida and the Holy War, (London: Pluto
Press, 2003), p 70.
11 Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1980).
12 Robert Taber, War of the Flea: The
Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Potomac,
2002).
13 Husain Haqqani, "Pakistan—Between
Mosque and Military" (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment For
International Peace, 2005), pp 145-146.
14 C Christine Fair, Nicholas Howenstein, and
J Alexander, "Their, Troubles on the Pakistan—Afghanistan
Border" (Washington DC: US Institute for Peace, December
2006), p 5.
15 Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, Ethnicity, Islam,
and Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North-West Frontier Province,
1937-47, (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999).
16 "Peace Pact North Waziristan", Frontline,
PBS,
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17 Declan Walsh, "Taliban overrun town as
peace deal fails", The Guardian, 3 February, 2007.
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[accessed 20 January, 2009].
18 "Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing the
Militants", International Crisis Group, 11 December
2006,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4568
[accessed 20 January, 2009];
Tarique Niazi, "Pakistan's Peace Deal with Taliban
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http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=924
[accessed 20 January, 2009]
19 Thomas H Johnson & M Chris Mason, "No
Sign until the Burst of Fire", International Security,
International Security, Vol 32, No 4 (Spring 2008), pp 41-77.
20 Owen Bennett-Jones, "US Policy Options
Toward Pakistan: A Principled and Realistic Approach", The
Stanley Foundation, February 2008, http://stanleyfdn.org/publications/pab/JonesPAB208.pdf
[accessed 20 January, 2009].
21 "Diary of a Pakistani schoolgirl",
BBC News Online, 19 January, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7834402.stm [accessed
20 January, 2009];
Nasir Khan "Taliban bans education for girls in Swat Valley",
The Washington Times, 5 January, 2009,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jan/05/taliban-bans-education-for-girls-in-pakistans-swat/
[accessed 20 January, 2009].
22 Susanne Koelbl, "Headquarters of the
Taliban", Spiegel Online, 24 November, 2006,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,450605,00.html
[accessed 20 January, 2009].
23 "Pact targets Pakistan terror link",
BBC News Online, 14 December, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7782125.stm [accessed 20 January,
2009].
24 "UK fertiliser bomb plot", BBC
News Online,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/guides/457000/457032/html/nn3page1.stm
[accessed 20 January, 2009].
25 "Profile: Omar Khyam", BBC News
Online, 30 April, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6149794.stm
[accessed 20 January, 2009].
26 "UK fertiliser bomb plot", BBC
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[accessed 20 January, 2009].
27 Dominic Casciani, "Airline urges liquids
review after trial", BBC News Online, 9 September
2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7564184.stm [accessed 20 January,
2009].
28 Ibid.
29 "Airline urges liquids review after trial",
BBC News Online, 8 September, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7604808.stm [accessed 20 January,
2009].
30 The White House, The Agenda—Foreign
Policy, http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/foreign_policy/ [accessed
21 January, 2009].
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