Submission by Daniel Korski, Senior Policy
Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations
INTRODUCTION
After eight years of war and the biggest NATO
operation in history, Afghanistan remains in the throes of insurgency
and President Hamid Karzai's government is perilously weak. There
is little prospect of a swift victory; even the most optimistic
assessments point to the necessity of a long-term international
presence. In Helmand, the military and the civilian efforts have
improved since the original UK deployment in 2006. Despite matters
remaining fragile, Afghanistan is not yet lost. Working with the
Afghan authorities, Europe governments can help turn the tide.
Britain has a special role in bridging U.S demands and European
capabilities.
To help the U.S the British government first needs
to ask its European allies to do what is feasible, not to echo
unrealistic demands that European governments will not, cannot,
and probably should not fulfill. This will require a much greater
UK understanding of what European allies are already doing—and
knowledge of what they are able to offer. It will also require
a change in tone. Though no Cabinet ministers publicly chastise
their European allies for their (lack of) commitment, as U.S Defence
Secretary Robert Gates did in the run-up to NATO's Bucharest Summit,
the tone and attitude of senior British officials is, at times,
unhelpful.
It may also require a much longer-term investment
in helping European governments build the necessary capabilities.
That may sound like too long-term a prospect, but many European
governments do not have the capacity to increase even their civilian
contribution (to compensate for any lacking military commitment).
British policy therefore needs to take in initiatives to build
capacity in European administrations eg to recruit, train and
deploy police officers and civilians. Offering to convert part
of the UK Defence Academy into a training facility for all Europeans
civilians deploying to Kabul may be an option.
Another key issue is to look at ways to ensure
that the European troops who form Operational Mentor and Liaison
Teams, or OMLTs (known as "omelets"), which are used
to stand-up the Afghan forces, are provided the best pre-deployment
training possible. To this end, the British government should
lobby for a standing NATO Military Advisory Force, which can improve
European capabilities to train and support the Afghan security
forces.
Finally, there is no avoiding the diplomatic
linkages between various policy issues. If the British government
wants European allies to do more in areas they consider important,
then it may have to give in other areas. Nobody may want to admit
the linkages outright, but they are a feature of international
politics. A key linkage would be helping to develop, and support,
a more European approach to Pakistan.
THE BRITISH
EFFORT IN
HELMAND
Before dealing with the broader European effort,
it is important to zoom in on the British strategy, particularly
in Helmand province. The British government is one of the largest
donors and has been a key ally of the U.S in developing and supporting
the broad-based, post-2001 state-building project. But it is in
Helmand province the British government has, since spring 2006,
invested most resources and political capital. In April 2006,
the British government sent a brigade into Helmand province. Initially,
the deployment was hailed as an important improvement on the small
US-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the main city of
Helmand province, Lashkar Gah, which only had a limited capacity
and a few hundred soldiers.
But as has been widely documented, despite a joined-up,
inter-departmental planning process, once British forces were
deployed, splits emerged between the military and the FCO and
DfiD (as well as between civilian departments). Instead of building
stability in Lashkar Gah and slowly expand outwards, the British
forces—led by 16 commando brigade—deviated from this
and established the so-called platoon houses in district centres
throughout the province. This stretched British resources, and
allowed large insurgent forces to surround and isolate the British
outposts. At the same time, the strategy did not take into account
the time it took for the FCO and DfiD to staff up the UK Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) let alone before all government departments,
including the MoD, realised the nature of the fight. The town
of Musa Qula fell to the Taliban, and NATO forces came close to
losing Operation Medusa, a Canadian-led offensive in September
2006 in neighbouring Kandahar province.
Gradually, however, matters have improved. In
October 2006, 3 CDO Bde deployed two battlegroups and all the
required supporting arms. In December 2007, 4,000 British, Afghan,
and American forces cleared Musa Quala town of Taliban forces
thanks in part to the defection of Mullah Abdul Salam, a veteran
of the anti-Soviet resistance. Among other things, the PRT was
upgraded to include a "two-star level" senior civilian
representative placed above the "one-star level" military
commander of Task Force Helmand. All operations now needed to
have a specific long-term objective in support of the civilian
and political development goals.
But matters remain fragile and the Taliban remain
strong throughout the province. Much rests on Abdul Salam, who
was appointed district commissioner of Musa Qala and the newly
appointed governor. NATO and Afghan troops repulsed a Taliban
attack in Lashkar Gah in October last year, and many analysts
believe the town will fall (even if just for a few days) at some
point in 2009. It will certainly be difficult to hold presidential
elections in large parts of the province.
The problems of integrating economic reconstruction
with military operations have decreased with every update of the
so-called Helmand Road Map, the main UK plan. More civilians are
now working in the PRT and civil-military structures have improved.
Moreover, a new governor has been appointed and more of the economic
assistance is now targeted against the insurgency. Yet the security
situation is such that it is difficult for civilians to move around
the province and many of the non-security projects have become
less relevant. As counter-insurgency expert Peter Dahl Truelsen
writes: "The local population is still waiting to see which
is the stronger and more determined party—the insurgents
or the counterinsurgents".[159]
In the meantime, corruption and opium production are flourishing;
local militias are still armed; and the legitimacy of the central
and local administration is low.
THE EUROPEAN
EFFORT, SO
FAR
The European effort in Afghanistan has been
multi-faceted, covering development aid, military contributions
and political reporting, with the EU represented in Kabul by a
Special Representative, the EU Commission delegation, the EUPOL
mission, and Embassies of member states. Short-term EU missions
have also observed the Afghan parliamentary and presidential elections.
The EU Commission and member states together have
contributed a third of Afghanistan's total reconstruction assistance.
Of the total pledged at the Tokyo conference, €1 billion
was pledged by the European Commission over five years—averaging
some €200 million per year. In 2002, the EC exceeded its
Tokyo pledge, providing €280 million to help Afghanistan
meet its reconstruction and humanitarian needs. In the years since
2002, the EC continued to commit funding of about €200 million
per year and is on track for realising its original €1 billion
pledge by the end of 2006. The EC—which has been present
in Afghanistan since the mid 1980s, with an office in Peshawar,
in western Pakistan—has made available a package of development
aid worth €610 million for the period 2007-10. It focuses
on three key priority areas: reform of the justice sector; rural
development including alternatives to poppy production; and health.
However, the European offer is uneven and lacks
the coordination and prioritisation needed to combine the different
strands into a coherent whole. The EU and European nations have
in fact added to the problem of a lack of international coherence
by pursuing policies independently of each other, most damagingly
in the overlapping areas of policing, justice and counter-narcotics.
The European military contribution, both to
the UN-mandated and NATO-commanded International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) and the US-led Coalition Forces, has been varied.
European troops now account for more than half of ISAF's total
deployment. And many EU governments have bulked-up their contribution
to ISAF in the past years, with the last six months seeing a steep
increase in contributions.
European states are also in command of 11 Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) across the country. But while the
UK, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Denmark and Estonia have
been willing to commit war-fighting forces deployed to the South
and East of Afghanistan, Germany remains constrained by the more
limited reconstruction mandate afforded its troops by the Bundestag,
and Spain's 700 troops can only perform limited tasks. Finland,
Greece, Portugal, Romania, Ireland and Luxembourg have seen their
troop contribution to ISAF drop. And few countries have deployed
a large part of their forces.
The Afghan mission is also increasingly unpopular
among the European public. When ten French soldiers were killed
outside Kabul last summer, it shocked France and led to the first
real debate about the country's involvement in Afghanistan—and
loud calls for a quick withdrawal. The same kinds of sentiments
are now prevalent in Germany, but also in Britain, Sweden, Denmark,
the Netherlands, Italy and Spain. Opinion polls from all these
countries show greater numbers of people in favour of a pull-out,
and a clear downward trend over the last couple of years. In 2007,
42% of Britons, 49% Germans and 51% of Frenchman wanted NATO to
withdraw from Afghanistan. Today, the figures are 68, 55 and 62%
respectively.
The EU's police mission is seen as the EU's
weakest mission. It did not have a lot to work with as even General
Hans-Christoph Ammon, head of Germany's special forces, admitted
when he called his own country's efforts to train the Afghan police
"a miserable failure".[160]
Upon taking over, EUPOL's new head, Klai Vittrup, called the assignment
"his toughest job yet". Two years after EUPOL's establishment,
it has struggled to attract staff, deploy into the provinces or
make any discernable difference to policing standards. No less
than fourteen calls for contributions have gone on deaf ears.
Many European governments—though keen to emphasize the need
for non-military instruments—have not deployed any staff
into the UN mission or EUPOL. Malta, Ireland, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Slovenia, Portugal, Greece, Latvia, Austria have no staff in EUPOL.
Others, like France, Estonia and Sweden have only one person seconded
to the mission.
Though EC's aid to Afghanistan is sizeable,
year-by-year since 2004 it is practically the same as EC aid to
Iraq, a country that has plenty of resources, and where U.S expenditure
is 3.8 times higher than in Afghanistan, totalling $653.1 billion
over six fiscal years.[161]
 [162]
Reports often compare the amount of funding
spent by the international community as a whole in Afghanistan
since the 2001 ouster of the Taliban to that spent in previous
post-conflict missions, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and
East Timor. But looking at EC expenditure alone tells a similar
tale of underinvestment. Though Afghanistan is poorer and more
populous than both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, on average all
three countries received almost the same in external post-conflict
EC assistance.
WHAT TO
DO
European governments can do a lot more. Instead
of lamenting the uneven burden-sharing practice mega-phone diplomacy
or ask European allies for things they will never deliver—like
German troops in Helmand—the British government should develop
a keen idea of what to ask for.
Improving PRTs
First, the need is to take the PRT model and work
out how European countries can help expand its scale, especially
in the south and east. In Kabul, the PRT Executive Steering Committee
should be bulked-up, with the EU committing to provide pre-trained
staff for its management. This should include a pool of civilian
experts—numbering at least 100—to be deployed into
all PRTs for short and long-term assignments as well as the necessary
policy support (eg database of funding, data about government
programmes, and "best practice" material).
The EU should tailor and run pre-deployment for all
civilians to be deployed into PRTs—and, over time, for all
Europeans, including NGOs, who are about to be deployed to the
theatre. The EU should set-up an evaluation process, which can
feed lessons into all PRTs on an on-going basis. The European
Commission must be partners in the effort, to ensure the full
integration of the development dimension, and the full use of
available budgets. Close consultation with NATO, UNAMA and the
U.S is essential.
Securing Kabul
Second, the EU should offer to take a special
role in the reconstruction of Kabul. There has been a sharp deterioration
of security in Kabul and the belt of towns surrounding it. The
Taliban know that instability in the capital has an outsized psychological
impact on the resolve of the country and the international community.
The Taliban may not be about to over-run Kabul, but they are trying
to create panic, and show that the government cannot control the
land it sits on.
With the Afghan government having taken over responsibility
for Kabul's security the city's further development will be a
major test for President Kazai and NATO. Renewed support for Kabul's
reconstruction is needed; the EU has experience in city reconstruction
from its administration in Mostar, Bosnia. It should offer the
Afghan government a cross-disciplinary team, led by an experienced
European city administrator, to help adjust existing political,
military and reconstruction plans for Kabul.
With a two-year mandate, a Kabul C-PRT—Capital
Reconstruction Team—would ensure that civilian development
goes hand-in-hand with the security transition to the ANA from
ISAF. If the method works in Kabul, it could even serve as a model
for Afghanistan's other large cities like Kandahar or Jalalabad.
Urgent work will be required to reach a timeframe on roles, size,
locations and contributors. The Council Secretariat of the European
Union—led by its civilian planning unit, the CPCC—should
be tasked to form a working group with the European Commission
and those member States who have significant experience of PRTs
and military operations to date. Once the working group is established
it should come up with recommendations on "C-RTs" and
on how the EU could enhance the management of all the PRTs.
Enhance security
Nothing can be achieved in Afghanistan unless
the security situation improves. However, guaranteeing security
cannot be an international task. The U.S and Europe are unlikely
to deploy sufficient troops to achieve the doctrinally recommended
20:1,000 security force density ratio necessary for counter-insurgency
operations. In the southern provinces alone this would require
over 280,000 personnel, which is much more than the U.S and Europe
could supply, even if the U.S draws down in Iraq. Therefore, the
key is, to build operationally efficient Afghan forces.
The ability to build efficient Afghan forces will
depend on improving the effectiveness of the NATO troops, particularly
those in ISAF Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams, or OMLTs,
whose role is to train and mentor their Afghan counterparts. The
OMLTs suffer from a number of problems. The Afghan army is fielding
units faster than NATO can supply OMLTs to train them. Few NATO
countries have the manpower to supply more than one or two OMLTs.
Fewer troops still arrive with the training required to make a
success of a six-month tour. As it takes an average OMLT four
to six months before they become effective, little time is left
to leverage the skills learnt and the relationships created given
that the military rotations are usually six months.
To deal with these problems, European countries
should offer up to 2000-person Military Advisory Force under NATO
auspices. The force could consist of multinational forces committed,
on a rotating basis, to a six months' period of joint training
prior to the start of an operational stand-by period. Joint training
would continue through-out the stand-by period. This would ensure
that NATO has a highly flexible, standing OMLT-style capability
and it will maximize the experiences of the trainers deployed
to ISAF. In the first instance, soldiers who have served in OMLTs
will be identified, offered train-the-trainers courses and committed
to an alliance-wide database. They can then serve as a virtual
force and be brought in to help tailor and deliver courses, act
as support for those deployed as well as make up the force most
experienced staff.
To ensure the necessary standards of readiness,
the summit should declare an intention to create a purpose-built
Military Advisory Centre to gather training. The centre—which
could be built on an existing training facility—would teach
prospective advisors the tricks of the advising trade and language
skills to be effective in-country.
In addition, a European Police Capital Investment
Fund should also be established, which would give the EUPOL head
of mission access to funds for technical improvements either directly
or through the Afghan budget, or the Law and Order Trust Fund
(LOTFA). Resources should come from the European governments and
the European Commission. Plans should also be put in place for
a twenty-year support programme to the Kabul Police Academy and
its regional equivalents in Mazar-e Sharif, twining the institution
with a number of European academies, like CENTREX, so that a regular
rotation of trainers and teachers can be assured. Finally, plans
ought to be drawn-up for the EU to take over the funding and management
of the U.S police programmes in the event that European governments
withdraw soldiers from ISAF.
Politics
European governments should help the Afghan
authorities to reach a sustainable political settlement, which
can provide the various levels of the Afghan government with the
necessary legitimacy to draw people away from the Taliban insurgency.
The Taliban have not publicly participated in talks and haven't
shown any signs they are serious about negotiating, but the availability
of talks as a political solution should be considered as means
to obtaining a modicum of stability.
The looseness of the Taliban organization makes the
insurgency vulnerable to division through a combination of pressure
and inducements. To exploit this division positively, it requires
a combination of military pressure and hope for a better life
within Afghanistan. In this, the EU has advantages that the U.S
will never have; several Taliban commanders have pronounced themselves
willing to see the EU play a role as an intermediary.
At the lowest levels, the Afghan Government's
reconciliation program (PTS) is able to appeal to non-ideological
insurgents—such as farm-boys and foot-soldiers—who
are tired of the fight and ready to return to a more peaceful
daily life. But the programme has not been well-funded, well-led
or imbued with the necessary support. The EU Special Representative
should take the lead, on behalf of European governments, to develop
a comprehensive plan to assist the re-launch of the PST process.
Support must include a realistic appraisal, monitoring and follow-up
mechanisms to ensure that resources go to bona fide insurgents
and that they are enabled to live peacefully.
A step above the farm-boys and foot-soldiers
targeted by the PTS process are governor-led efforts designed,
through social outreach and the delivery of services and development
opportunities, to raise the Government credibility among tribes
and communities who have tolerated or supported the Taliban.
At the top level is an on-off effort initiated
by President Karzai and supported by the Saudi government to reconcile
with the most senior members of the Taliban leadership. In this,
the EU should offer President Karzai help with the development
of an unofficial dialogue process, to engage the insurgents and
those influencing them. The process itself could be undertaken
through a third-party or a mediator, such as Kofi Anan, Maarti
Ahtisaari or Lakhdar Brahimi. Though it would not amount to formal
negotiations, such a dialogue could be used to identify parts
of the insurgency prepared to move to a suspension of violence;
and identify a possible basis for cooperation and movement into
the political arena.
REGIONAL INITIATIVES
The Afghan-Pakistan border area remains among
the greatest challenges to a stable, integrated region. The Canadians
are working through the Group-of-Eight on an ambitious border
strategy, which includes security, development, economic and other
measures. The U.S and other donors are assisting Afghanistan and
Pakistan to expand and regularize border crossing which will improve
security, cut down on smuggling and increase tax revenues. European
governments should offer to take on the non-military aspects of
the Canadian-sponsored plan for the Afghan-Pakistan border region.
Then the EU needs to facilitate a broader set of
regional confidence building measures. To undertake the high-level
diplomacy, the EU should appoint a full-time EU Envoy who can
work with a U.S counterpart, much like Cyrus Vance and David Owen
collaborated in the Former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The
EU should also consider ways to create an institutionalized "hot
line" between New Delhi, Islamabad and Kabul to help them
share information on threats and activities. This "hot line"
will provide the region's leaders with a focal point where they
could call to get accurate information or relay their security
concerns.
CONCLUSION
Europe cannot alter the coalition strategy alone,
but neither can Britain. Coordinated European response to a new
U.S administration's request for more support is far better than
the "each-one-for-himself" policy, which is usually
practiced. Working together, European governments can act as a
powerful advocate for a better and more coordinated international
approach. The U.S rightly argues that more troops are needed to
dominate the terrain, and lambasts European allies for their failure
to step up their effort. European countries are right to criticise
the current U.S military strategy and to fear that an increase
in troop numbers might only lead to greater civilian casualties,
alienating the local population. Both will have to change their
approach. Yet European governments can do a lot more than they
are currently doing—and it is incumbent upon the British
government to find creative ways to maximize European allies'
existing capabilities and to help them do more.
26 January 2009
159 Peter Dahl Thruelsen, "Counterinsurgency and
a Comprehensive Approach: Helmand Province, Afghanistan",
Small Wars Journal. Back
160
"German general breaks silence on Afghanistan", Judy
Dempsey, IHT, November 30, 2008. Back
161
Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global
War on Terror Operations Since 9/11 Congressional Research Service,
RL33110, Updated July 14, 2008, pp 16 and 19. Back
162
The figures were taken from: European Commission State of Play
30 June 2008: Major Milestones towards reconstruction and Peace
Building in Afghanistan:
(http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/documents/state_of_play_afghanistan_june_2008_en.pdf);
European Commission State of Play 31 July 2008, republic of Iraq:
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/gulf-region/documents/state_of_play_2008_07_en.pdf). Back
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