Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan - Foreign Affairs Committee Contents


Submission from British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group

BACKGROUND

BAAG

  1.  The British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group is a network of 25 NGOs that work in Afghanistan providing humanitarian relief and supporting reconstruction and development. In existence since 1987, BAAG has established a strong network of NGOs and civil society organisations in the UK and Europe. It hosts and supports the European Network for NGOs in Afghanistan—a group of 15 NGOs from the mainland Europe. BAAG also works closely with the Afghanistan based Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) which represents over 90 international and Afghan NGOs, and the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC).

Many of the BAAG members have been active in the country for well over two decades. BAAG's strength lies in the collective knowledge of these agencies which have a long standing relationship with Afghan communities in most parts of the country.

OVERVIEW

  2.  Afghanistan is undoubtedly facing a serious crisis. Insecurity is at its worst since 2001. Whilst the south and east have seen a major escalation of fighting, more security incidents are also reported from previously stable areas. Civilian travel on all major highways has become fraught with risks of attacks by the anti-government forces and criminal groups. There is an unprecedented level of criminal kidnapping. It has once again become extremely dangerous to live, travel and do business in the country.

3.  Afghans' faith in the government and in the international community has not been lower since the fall of the Taliban in 2001.[167] Unemployment is high with almost no prospects in sight. Many of the millions, including girls, who went back to school after 2001 and graduated in 2008, have no chance to further their education or find jobs. There is a widespread anger among Afghans over civilian casualties caused by excessive use of force and air strikes, and the conduct of some troops. Endemic corruption within the police force and government officials at large has had a crippling effect on business, social life and travel leading to growing concerns that many Afghans now perceive the armed opposition groups as "the lesser of the many evils" and therefore may actually decide to support those rather than the government.

  4.  Consecutive droughts and harsh winters have left millions in need of humanitarian assistance. The humanitarian situation has been exacerbated by insecurity leading to poor access to those most in need, the untimely return of thousands of refugees from the neighbouring countries and high food prices. As a result "many Afghans are facing some of the worst conditions they have experienced in 20 years".[168]

  It has become increasingly difficult to deliver aid to those in need. As aid agencies have had to restrict their travel due to insecurity, thousands of communities across the south and east, but also in other areas, have limited access to assistance. In 2008 Afghanistan was the most dangerous place for aid workers. 38 aid workers were killed in 2008 and 130 were kidnapped. This would appear to be in part as a result of a lack of distinction between the military and civilian aid worker, as the international military continues to provide humanitarian and development assistance even in areas where civilian agencies, including departments of the Afghan government are present.

  5.  Against this background members of the British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group welcome the opportunity to raise their concerns with the Foreign Affairs Committee. We believe that, although some important opportunities may have been lost, a renewed commitment to work, in a compact with the Afghan people, towards a clear and coherent strategy and vision could turn the situation around. As a group of agencies that have worked with the Afghan communities for over 25 years and have witnessed the prolonged conflict Afghans have experienced, we make the following observations and recommendations. We would be happy to discuss these issues in greater detail with the UK Parliamentarians and HMG.

  6.  Taking this opportunity we would also like to commend the British Government for its continued commitment to Afghanistan. The United Kingdom has made an important contribution to security and development assistance since the fall of the Taliban and in many respects its policies are often regarded as among the most effective in terms of good practice and taking a long term view of the country's needs. However, we believe, that given the scale of the international interventions, particularly the number of actors involved, good policy and practice on the part of the UK alone are unlikely to bring about the much needed change for which we all, but particularly the Afghan population, long. We also believe that certain parts of UK policy should be revised in order to enhance the focus on meeting the immediate security and humanitarian challenges as well as creating the conditions for sustainable development.

Address effectively the root causes of insecurity and instability: poverty, poor governance and lack of rule of law

  7.  The causes of insecurity are complex. Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world.[169] The three decades of conflict have left the country practically in ruins: economic infrastructure in key development sectors, such as agriculture, has seen extensive damage and much of the small industrial base that the country had developed has been almost totally demolished. As a result, unemployment is high with many Afghans seeking income through labour migration or from the drugs market. It would also appear that for some Afghans joining the anti-government insurgency or organised criminal gangs provides the only means of survival.

8.  There is evidently a crisis of governance in many parts of the country. The police and judiciary, where they exist, are widely regarded as inept and corrupt. Reports of "shadow government" are widespread and Afghans are thrown back on using traditional ways to solve grievances or even to resort to the insurgents to seek justice and redress for them. The capacity of the provincial government departments responsible for key services remains worryingly low. As a consequence the government, whether central or provincial, is seen as incompetent—an image that has seriously undermined its legitimacy and credibility. The problem has been exacerbated by a heavy involvement of the international military through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in governance, reconstruction and development. In the eyes of many Afghans the PRT commanders, who are often in charge of more resources than the provincial governors, have more power and influence and are therefore perceived as a parallel, if not the actual, government.[170]

  9.  Former militia commanders retain influential positions within and outside the government of Afghanistan. The US and some other military forces would appear to have made significant use of those commanders in their operations, including for force protection purposes, rendering the DDR and DIAG programmes less effective. Former militia commanders in many areas are perceived by local Afghans to have the same amount or more weapons in their possession than four years ago. Many Afghans emphasise the direct link between the presence of arms in society, as well as a lack of reintegration of ex-combatants, and continued insecurity in their areas.[171]

  10.  The setting up of tribal militia groups under the Afghanistan Public Protection Force (APPF) appears to be another attempt to find a quick fix to a security challenge that requires a coherent and nation wide strategy. Afghans have had a bitter experience of armed militias and are rightly concerned about inter-ethnic and inter-communal tensions that have almost always followed initiatives aimed at "making communities responsible for their security".[172] Programmes, such as the APPF, with weak state control and accountability are prone to serious abuse of power and may in the long run be counter-productive. There is a real danger that communities involved in APPF would face significant additional security risk resulting from their association with the pro-government forces. The Taliban have reportedly already warned communities against taking part in the APPF.[173] Similar initiatives in the past have led to a widespread proliferation of weapons. Instead of strengthening the state they have undermined it and in the case of the post-Soviet regime it led to its demise. It therefore comes as no surprise that even the authorities in the Wardak province where APPF is going through a pilot phase doubt its wisdom. It also appears that the programme is yet to establish benchmarks for how its success would be measured. However, even if the pilot programme in Wardak is judged by those piloting it to have produced satisfactory results in that province, the complex and diverse nature of Afghanistan's political, tribal and social structures means that what works in one province may not work in another. We believe that resources spent on APPF should be directed to reform and strengthen the Afghan security forces, particularly the police.

  11.  Seeing improved governance in an essentially "counter-insurgency" light runs the risk of a highly militaristic approach to many of the issues that would be better addressed by using civilian methods and capacities. A serious lack of clarity surrounds the current strategies of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance, particularly that of the Afghan Social Outreach Programme (ASOP) in their relationship with counter-insurgency, the APPF and the existing community based structures developed to involve communities in the development process. Furthermore, concerns have been raised that the selection processes within the ASOP programme for Social Outreach Councils may merely exacerbate problems linked to political patronage and thereby increase tension at a local level.

  12.  It is self-evident that insecurity in Afghanistan cannot be addressed by military means alone. Creating a framework for security and stability through developing effective state institutions and a vibrant civil-society with active participation of women is equally important. Although important steps have been taken to resolve the "crisis of capacity", the process of reform and capacity development would appear to have been painfully slow and is rarely subject to evaluation. Many departments lack the capacity and resources to deliver services. As a result the government is seen as weak and incompetent—an image further aggravated by perceptions of widespread and endemic corruption within the police force and judiciary—the very institutions that are meant to enforce the rule of law and order.[174]

  13.  Afghanistan arguably may have always had a weak central state, but it has also been one of the poorest countries in the world. It was poverty as much as the failure of the central state resulting from decades of conflict that turned the country into an ungoverned space in which factions with competing interests and armies have been fighting for power and money. As a result there have been fundamental changes in the way power is distributed. The concept of "working with tribes at the local level" with the so called "grain of the Afghan traditions"[175] is therefore largely misunderstood, short-sighted and misses the point on several levels.

  14.  Throughout the conflict rural Afghanistan has seen an abundance of chiefs, commanders, warlords, etc. whose power has gone unchecked by a centralised authority. They have been rulers unto themselves; have built and broken alliances at will and have profited from foreign support to wars and trade in weapons and drugs, and therefore have a vested interest in the continuation of conflict. Many of them are known to have committed serious crimes and human rights violations. These individuals have almost entirely replaced the traditional tribal leaders as local power-holders. With ambiguous allegiances they "mostly see their power [and survival] in the failure of a centralised state control"[176] and are therefore an unlikely ally in stabilising Afghanistan.

  15.  There are currently 40 countries involved in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force and OEF with as many as 10 contributing large numbers of troops. Some would appear to have sought to engage with local power-holders in an attempt to pacify their provinces or probably to ensure the protection of their troops. These moves may have tactical advantages. However, given the highly fragmented local power system making local "deals" runs the risk of causing a chaos of the scale that Afghanistan experienced in the years following the Soviet withdrawal. It will entrench localised fiefdoms further reversing the progress made to date, and deny the country of its chance to build an effective state which can provide security and the rule of law.

  16.  The British government's policy of strengthening state institutions has produced noticeable outcomes. Some of the central or provincial departments that were hardly functional in 2001 are making slow, but gradual progress, performing some of their functions, albeit with less efficiency than one would expect given the length of time that has passed and the amount of resources that have been spent.

  17.  Yet, for various reasons the central government has not been able to extend its authority over the provinces. Although this has never been considered an easy task, the international community has sought localised solutions to fill the governance void at the province level often undermining the central government in the process.

  18.  A number of studies reveal that the present government system is over-centralised with central line ministries controlling planning, allocation and management of resources. The provincial departments of those ministries have little autonomy and their relationship with the provincial governors' offices is unclear. As a result governance at the sub-national level remains very weak: rule of law is evidently poor and departments are either absent or extremely ineffective.

    "...like the rest of the Afghan state, the entire SN (sub-national) structure is afflicted by the sorts of problems which are characteristic of the Low Income Countries Under Stress: severe human resource weaknesses, an absence of properly functioning operational systems, shortages of equipment, and sparse supporting infrastructure necessary to get things functioning properly. Afghanistan is particularly badly affected by these and reform and strengthening of the SN system will be no less affected by them than any other significant institutional reform in the society".[177]

  19.  The impact of the work that has so far been undertaken to reform the civil service sector overall remains broadly inconclusive. Many government employees, particularly in the provinces, would appear to have very vague or poorly conceived job descriptions and therefore barely understand their roles. Without defined terms of reference, clear job descriptions and an understanding of the skills required for the job and the skills gaps in those recruited, providing training and support, that is real and measurable, is greatly hindered. Interviews found this to be a major problem at the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock in the north and south. Furthermore, existing efforts to build government capacity are too often disjointed and tend to focus overly on the macro-level, which is of course a necessary component of a more integrated strategy. What has been missing to date is a more level-appropriate attention to the actual existing skills and capacities of the rest of the government apparatus, particularly the very interface that is presented to and affects the majority of Afghans.

  20.  The current debate on corruption remains largely rhetorical and lacks a proper contextual analysis. The problem is neither new to the present-day Afghanistan nor unique to countries where states are ineffective. Underlying entrenched corruption is a vicious circle of insecurity, underdevelopment and state ineffectiveness. Afghanistan is at the bottom of the scale on the World Bank index because it has one of the weakest states in the world and for as long as the public administration, law enforcement and public accountability agencies remain unreformed, underdeveloped and therefore ineffective, the problem is likely to continue. The Afghan government's anti-corruption strategy, as a comprehensive framework for addressing the issue, rightly identifies it as a cross cutting issue needing attention across governance, rule of law and human rights sectors.

  21.  At a political level the need for dialogue and reconciliation should not be overlooked. It would appear that the major troop contributing countries that are fighting the anti-government forces in the south and east have made attempts to negotiate with elements from those forces. The outcomes of those negotiations are either unclear or perceived as questionable and counter-productive. A major weakness of these initiatives is a lack of a common strategy and of Afghan perspectives. The role that Afghan civil society could play in these processes should be recognised and promoted and resourced.

  22.  There is a need to integrate what is sometimes known as "bottom-up" approaches to building peace in Afghanistan. Experience from Afghanistan and elsewhere has shown that local disputes have the tendency to flare up into violence and lead to wider conflict. Disputes over water, land and family constitute a major source of tension. Regional and ethnic divisions, until settled through effective conflict resolution and prevention mechanisms, have the potential to become a major source of political instability or widespread conflict. Some Afghan NGOs and civil society groups with support from international NGOs have done useful work in this regard. Their capacity needs to be further strengthened.

  23.  The key to gaining Afghans' support for and their confidence in the state-building exercise is in improving their perception of how their needs, including for security and personal safety, are being met and their rights protected. Girls' return to school and women's ability to work outside their homes were widely welcomed, as was the return of the freedoms and choices Afghans in general had enjoyed before the Taliban emerged. However, serious failings on the part of the Afghan government and the international community diminished the confidence of the population. As noted earlier many commanders whom the majority of Afghans despised and the Taliban had removed from power were brought back and "accorded legitimacy". This has led to widespread public resentment and suspicion. Equally important in damaging perceptions has been the issue of civilian casualties caused by the international military forces and the culturally insensitive conduct of some troops. According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), airstrikes were responsible for 25% of all civilian casualties in 2008. According to Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission "large airstrikes resulting in tens of civilian casualties were a national focal point of anger toward PGF [pro-government forces]. While night-time house searches resulted in fewer deaths, night raids frequently involved abusive behaviour and violent breaking and entry at night, which stoke almost as much anger toward PGF as the more lethal airstrikes. In areas where night raids are prevalent, they were a significant cause of fear, intimidation, and resentment toward PGF".[178]

  24.  Despite some progress in the communication sector, such as roads and mobile phones, and lately energy, infrastructure remains extremely weak. Revenue collection is abysmally low; in 2007 the total income generated by the central government through taxes amounted to just over 600 million US Dollars.[179] As a result the government continues to depend on foreign assistance to provide basic services, such as health, education and policing. With an estimated 80% of Afghans depending on agriculture for their livelihoods the sector is key to food security and economic recovery.[180] Yet since 2002 only 5% and in 2007 just 1% of the USAID budget was spent in the sector.[181]

  25.  Afghanistan has a major shortage of qualified personnel in almost every sector and this is stifling development. "If the availability of future qualified extension agents and management personnel does not match the demand of a modernized agricultural system, all other strategic plans will be in vain".[182] Yet, there is a continuing lack of investment in secondary and tertiary education. The international community claims it is committed to Afghanistan for the long haul; and therefore it should focus its funding in projects that build the human capital that is sorely lacking. Long term strategy means investing heavily in the young people in Afghanistan making sure that by the time they reach the age of 25 they will be well equipped to lead the continued development of their country. Failing to do that now means to condemn Afghanistan to dependency on foreign funds and external leadership for the future.

  26.  Major troop contributing countries have concentrated their reconstruction and development funds and efforts in the provinces where their troops are primarily stationed, apparently to promote their national profile and priorities. This has resulted in large amounts of development funds being spent in the most insecure provinces of the east and south often with dubious outcomes. In contrast the more stable provinces with "poorer" PRTs have received significantly less resources despite significant needs and being more conducive to development. Many see this discrepancy as a disincentive for security and equally worryingly that donors are only concerned about their own immediate political objectives. There is a clear need for the UK government and other donors to review the current policy to ensure that humanitarian and development aid is delivered on the basis of need and not purely in response to political/stabilisation objectives.

  27.  Politicians and military officers from NATO countries place significant emphasis on "winning hearts and minds" in Afghanistan through aid and reconstruction. Commentators routinely equate government "presence" with infrastructure projects and services. To cite Senator Biden, "How do you spell `hope' in Dari or in Pashtu? A-s-p-h-a-l-t. Asphalt. That's how you spell hope, in my humble opinion".[183] Research shows that a "development brings stability and security" thesis is simplistic. Following a long history of aid and military intervention, including during the Soviet occupation, Afghans are familiar with and suspicious of "hearts and minds" strategies.

  28.  As involvement by the military in development can place beneficiaries, projects and project implementers at risk and given doubts about the cost effectiveness and sustainability of military "quick impact" projects, it is imperative that military assets are used in areas where they have a comparative advantage in terms of expertise and knowledge, for example in developing the capacity of the Afghan security and law enforcement agencies. The role of PRTs should therefore be redefined accordingly. Their resources should be devoted to build up the capacity of the security and law enforcement agencies by providing adequate and sustained training and mentoring, material and logistics support.

  29.  It is important that the commitments that were made in the Paris Conference and through the Afghanistan Compact to improve aid effectiveness are honoured. NGOs have written extensively on this issue and in spite of some improvements particularly after the appointment of Kai Eide as the UN SRSG, serious problems continue to persist in aid coordination, focus and prioritisation. BAAG's written submission to the International Development Select Committee (2007) provides a useful analysis of those issues and suggestions for ways forward.

  30.  Chronic underdevelopment aggravated by decades of conflict, years of drought, harsh winters and high food prices have left millions in need of humanitarian assistance with the country remaining vulnerable to a humanitarian crisis. About eight million people are considered high-risk food insecure.[184] The government of Afghanistan and the United Nations have duly acknowledged the problem by launching two humanitarian appeals in the last six months. As of January 09 only 50% of the appeal launched in July had been funded.[185] Whilst we acknowledge the British government's contribution, we believe they should use their position and influence with other major donors to raise support for those appeals.

  31.  The humanitarian community has widely welcomed the decision of the United Nations to establish a separate Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Afghanistan. We believe that OCHA's role in monitoring and coordinating humanitarian assistance is crucial and should be supported and expanded.

  32.  Due to insecurity humanitarian agencies find it increasingly difficult to reach large parts of the country to provide assistance. Aid workers are facing more risks and challenges now than they have been throughout the conflict. Not only were 38 aid workers killed in 2008 but the threats of abduction and intimidation are a constant source of fear. Sadly, community acceptance and protection as the fundamental and most effective strategy that aid agencies have relied upon during the Afghan conflict appear to be diminishing, largely due to their perceived association with the military and donor-country strategic political objectives. For example, research shows that fearing reprisals by the anti-government forces, a local community has warned an aid agency that they could no longer guarantee their safety because troops have been seen visiting the agency's office.[186]

  33.  The safety of aid workers and humanitarian access appears to have been further compromised by the continuing involvement of the military in delivering assistance. According to international guidelines for situations of hostility the use of military assets for providing assistance should only be kept as a last resort, ie where civilian alternatives do not exist. In Afghanistan those guidelines have been continually breached, raising serious questions about the donor countries' commitments to the principles enshrined under the International Humanitarian Law.

  34.  Many of the issues currently facing Afghanistan cannot be resolved if its neighbours, particularly Pakistan and Iran, and other key players in the region do not subscribe to and support efforts aimed at bringing security and stability to areas affected by the conflict. The spread of violence in the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan is a cause for concern. Hundreds of thousands have left their homes and at one point thousands from Pakistan crossed the border into Afghanistan. Reports that Iran has resumed the deportation of Afghans is also deeply worrying.[187] Areas affected by the movement of people from Pakistan and Iran as well as those coping with internally displaced people resulting from conflict within Afghanistan remain extremely vulnerable to humanitarian crisis.

  35.  The Afghanistan Compact benchmark 7.5 highlights the need for the right conditions for returning Afghans.[188] Specific needs that are crucial for a sustainable return strategy include housing, access to safe drinking water, education, health facilities and employment opportunities. Many Afghans who returned to rural areas in 2007 are still not being adequately supported to rebuild their lives. Continued financial support for housing is critical, as is support for livelihoods programmes for returnees if their sustainable return is to be achieved.

  36.  There is an obvious need for a common European policy in relation to Afghanistan—one that goes beyond being a good donor—and focuses on a more effective debate with the United States, better involvement in regional diplomacy and having a more concerted and co-ordinated influence over national political issues within Afghanistan. The United Kingdom could play a leading role in trying to promote a European consensus on Afghanistan with the aim of creating greater harmony across security, humanitarian and development sectors, as well as exerting more influence on the United States on issues such as aid effectiveness, human rights and civilian protection.

RECOMMENDATIONS

  We ask HMG:

Overarching Recommendation

37.  To play a leading role in trying to promote a European consensus on Afghanistan with the aim of creating greater harmony across security, humanitarian and development sectors, as well as exerting more influence on the United States on issues such as aid effectiveness, human rights and civilian protection.

Security and Governance

38.  To help improve security by reinforcing, and investing more in, the Afghan security forces, particularly the Afghan National Police, through adequate and sustained training, and by providing the necessary material and logistical support.

39.  To oppose defence initiatives that will further strengthen the power base of local warlords, will increase the proliferation of weapons among civilians and that will divert funds away from reforming and strengthening the Afghan security forces.

  40.  To ensure that security or local community empowerment initiatives, such as Afghan Social Outreach Programme, do not heighten local tensions by empowering those who are recruited to carry them out to manipulate them to their own benefit or to the benefit of those within their own patronage system. In this context, HMG needs to ensure that it has a deep understanding of the dynamics and power relations within communities and conducts regular conflict mappings.

  41.  To encourage international donors to conduct an independent review of disarmament programmes and to demonstrate a renewed and tougher implementation of DDR and DIAG processes.

  42.  To step up measures aimed at improving local governance by reforming and developing the capacity of the public service departments and addressing the issue of multiple structures. Review the impact of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams on governance. In supporting programmes, such as ASOP, HMG should be aware of, and take measures to minimise, their potential for exacerbating local level political tensions.

  43.  To work with other donors and the Afghan government to take adequate measures toward the implementation of the anti-corruption strategy and to recognise that civil society and parliament have a crucial role to play in this respect and that their monitoring and accountability roles need further strengthening.

Capacity Development and Civil Society

  44.  To acknowledge that the pace of capacity building within local government is not sufficient at present to match the range of challenges faced. In this context we call on HMG to give particular attention to NGO capacity to provide basic services and livelihoods support for populations outside of the government programmes as well as to play a part in developing the capacity of government staff.

45.  To encourage bottom-up approaches to peace-building in Afghanistan through the provision of support to civil society organisations engaged with local communities to strengthen conflict resolution and prevention mechanisms.

  46.  To invest in promoting the role of civil society organisations in both holding the government to account, especially in the area of human rights, and in building government capacity and to give greater attention to the sustainable development of national and local civil society.

Aid Effectiveness and Humanitarian Assistance

  47.  To continue to advocate strongly for improved donor coordination to ensure an integrated approach to support national development priorities.

48.  To allocate aid according to levels of humanitarian need and the potential for sustainable development; ensuring a more geographically balanced, inclusive and broad-based approach and not one driven by strategic political and military objectives.

  49.  To encourage a comprehensive review, across all troop contributing countries, of the impact of the military led and implemented assistance projects.

  50.  To acknowledge the valuable role of the British Non-Governmental Organisations in continuing to deliver humanitarian, reconstruction and development assistance and the risks they are taking in doing so. To encourage a serious discussion within Whitehall about funding for NGOs and support for them to put in place effective measures to minimise risks to their staff.

  51.  To continue to contribute to, and encourage funding for, the humanitarian appeals and support the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to deliver on their mandate to improve humanitarian coordination and access.

  52.  To monitor the impact of the escalation of the conflict in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan to ensure that those who have become displaced have access to assistance.

Human Rights

  53.  To promote a renewed commitment among donor and troop-contributing countries and the Government of Afghanistan to the implementation of international instruments regarding the protection and promotion of human rights. In line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 we recommend that the Afghan Government reaffirms its commitment to putting an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for crimes against humanity; war crimes, including those relating to sexual violence against women and girls; and to exclude such crimes from amnesty provisions.

54.  Jointly with other troop-contributing countries to continue to look into ways in which the danger to civilians as a result of air strikes and other military operations are minimised and that those operations are conducted with utmost respect for the rights enshrined under the International Humanitarian law and Afghan customs. Similar measures should be taken to protect civilians who become caught in the conflict on the Pakistan side of the border.

5 March 2009




167   BBC/ABC opinion poll at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/05_02_09afghan_poll_2009.pdf Back

168   Oxfam Memo to the US President see at http://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressrelease/2009-01-31/obama-new-strategy-must-avert-humanitarian-crisis-afghanistan Back

169   Forty thousand people die every year in Afghanistan from hunger and poverty, UN Security Council (Dec 2008), "Report of the Security Council mission to Afghanistan", 21-28 November 2008. S/2008/782 Back

170   Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds-Exploring Afghan perceptions of civil-military relations in http://www.baag.org.uk/publications/reports.htm (2008) and Service Delivery and Governance at the Sub-National Level in Afghanistan http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/Publications/448813-1185293547967/4024814-1185293572457/report.pdf, (2007) Back

171   Fight Poverty to End Insecurity-Afghan perceptions of insecurity, Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium (HRRAC)-http://www.afghanadvocacy.org.af Back

172   For more information see BAAG paper on Community Defence Volunteer Units (CDVU) in www.baag.org.uk Back

173   http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7902093.stm Back

174   For more on Afghan perceptions of corruption see a report of the same title in http://iwaweb.org/index_en.html Back

175   David Miliband, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090205/debtext/90205-0014.htm Back

176   Norah Niland, "Justice Postponed-the marginalisation of human rights in Afghanistan", in Nation Building Unravelled (Kumarian Press, Inc, 2004) 61-82 Back

177   http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/Publications/448813-1185293547967/4024814-1185293572457/report.pdf, 2007 Back

178   From Hope to Fear-an Afghan perspective on operations of pro-government forces in Afghanistan, Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, December 2008, http://www.aihrc.org.af/2008_Dec/PDF_Pro_G/Eng_Pro_G.pdf Back

179   http://www.afghan-web.com/economy/revenue.html Back

180   http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/countries/afghanistan/agriculture.html Back

181   Oxfam Memo to the US President see at http://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressrelease/2009-01-31/obama-new-strategy-must-avert-humanitarian-crisis-afghanistan Back

182   The MAIL Implementation and Investment Plan for Programme Seven: Develop Institutional and Human Capacity for Sustained Growth-Page 3 Back

183   http://www.cfr.org/publication/15600/conversation_with_senator_joseph_r_biden_jr_rush_transcript_federal_news_service.html Back

184   http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=82718 Back

185   http://ocha.unog.ch/fts/reports/daily/ocha_R3_A827___0903051156.xls Back

186   Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds-Exploring Afghan perceptions of civil-military relations, http://www.baag.org.uk/publications/reports.htm Back

187   http://www.rferl.org/content/Iran_Said_To_Resume_Deportation_Of_Afghan_Refugees/1370585.html Back

188   Table III Executive Summary of Afghanistan Compact Benchmarks, JCMB annual report May 2007 Back


 
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