Submission from Peter Marsden
US POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN UNDER THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION
A key element in President Obama's policy on
Afghanistan is what is widely referred to as a troop surge—yet
there are many who regard an increase in the number of US troops
in Afghanistan as highly problematic. So what is the thinking
behind this? Is it simply that the surge in US troops in Iraq
was apparently successful (although this can be questioned) and
may, therefore, work in Afghanistan? Or is it based on a view
that the Bush administration was diverted by Iraq and that the
war in Afghanistan should have been given greater resources from
the beginning.
While both of these considerations are likely to
have influenced the policy of the incoming US administration,
there are other important factors. Not least of these is the fact
that the situation in Pakistan is becoming increasingly precarious.
Structures such as the Pakistan-based Taliban and Tehrik Nifaz-e-Shari'a
Mohammed are thus challenging the liberal consensus of Pakistan's
ruling elite and establishing geographical power bases of their
own within which a much more conservative vision of Islamic society
is being applied.
This shift in power dynamics within Pakistan
is, arguably, a product of the US-led military intervention in
Afghanistan of October 2001. Not only did this result in an insurgency
which was able to operate from Pakistan but it also led to pressure
being applied, on President Musharraf, to send Pakistani troops
into the tribal areas in order to both inhibit the operations
of the insurgents and search for key individuals thought to be
linked to Al-Qaida. This military intrusion into a region of Pakistan
which had, historically, enjoyed fierce independence of any central
authority immediately aroused the anger of the Pushtun tribes
and created a situation in which they were willing to support
a new Taliban movement under local leadership. Thus, while there
was one Taliban movement which was seeking to undermine what was
seen as a US-led military occupation of Afghanistan, there was
another which was actively confronting the willingness of the
Pakistan Government to cooperate with the US.
The US Government therefore has good reason
to fear a de-stabilisation of both Afghanistan and Pakistan in
the face of insurgencies in the two countries. It will also be
concerned at the possibility of increased Pakistan-based terrorism
in India, exemplified in the attacks in Mumbai of November 2008.
These led to increased tension between India and Pakistan and,
from the US point of view, a worrying diversion of Pakistani troops
from the border with Afghanistan to the Indian border.
These concerns inevitably give rise to a view
that the situation in Afghanistan cannot be divorced from that
of the wider region and that a comprehensive approach to the complexities
of the region, including those relating to Iran, Russia, China
and the Central Asian Republics needs to be adopted. This would
take on board the active involvement of Pakistan, India and Iran
in Afghanistan in support of their respective strategic interests.
Within Afghanistan, the US Government is mindful
of the growing strength of the Taliban since 2006 and of
their expansion to the very borders of Kabul. While it is very
clear, in its statements, that there is no military solution to
the conflict with the Taliban, it may hope, through an increase
in the number of US troops, to, at least, contain the insurgency.
Thus, the decision to give initial priority, in despatching additional
troops, to the provinces of Wardak and Logar, to the immediate
south of Kabul, may represent an effort to protect the capital
from armed incursions and, at the same time, provide greater security
to the northern stretch of the Kabul to Kandahar highway. It has
also stated that it seeks, through the provision of more troops,
to buy time while it reviews existing approaches. A further stated
objective of the increased US troop presence is to reduce the
need to call in air power in stabilisation operations.
The US Government has also made it clear that
it seeks to increase the capacity of both international military
forces and Afghan National Army troops in order to hold territory
which has been captured. It will be aware of the poor performance
of the Afghan National Police, in this regard, in the light of
many examples of the police abandoning captured ground under pressure
from the insurgents. The extremely high death rate of police engaged
in counter-insurgency operations is a clear indication that they
are neither resourced nor sufficiently trained to take on such
a role. Their use, for this entirely inappropriate purpose, also
takes them away from their primary role of providing an effective
rule of law for the population.
Careful thought will need to be given, by the
US Government, to the relative priority accorded to stabilisation
operations, aimed to free specific geographical areas of Taliban
fighters, as opposed to the search for individuals in key leadership
positions within the Taliban. It is the efforts of the US military
to actively target those who are suspected of playing a leadership
role which has proved to be among the most problematic. While
the US has the technology to pinpoint the exact positions of suspects
and to precision-bomb them, its intelligence is often flawed and
innocent civilians are frequently killed in the process. The high
level of civilian casualties arising from air power has become
a major political issue within Afghanistan and has led President
Karzai to publicly express his concerns to the US Government on
many occasions. It has also greatly strengthened the support given
to the insurgency. The US therefore needs to weigh up whether
any success that it is having in taking out high value suspects
is sufficient to justify the inevitable civilian casualties or
the significant political fall-out. It is also far from clear
that the successful targeting of some high profile individuals
has weakened the Taliban movement.
Further public anger has been aroused over the
continued resort, by US forces in particular, to forced entry
into the homes of suspects. There is also widespread concern over
the detention of suspects, at Bagram air base and elsewhere, under
conditions which do not conform to international human rights
standards. The recent decision of President Obama to support the
expansion of the detention facilities at Bagram air base and to
exclude detainees from the right to challenge their detention
in US/courts is of serious concern, in this regard. Thus, while
he has made positive changes in relation to Guantánamo
Bay and with regard to the extraordinary rendition process, these
changes do not extend to Bagram.
Many reports from the field also speak of public
concern that the arrival of international forces, to stabilise
an area, simply provokes a response from the insurgents and creates
instability in place of the security, albeit of a fragile nature,
which had hitherto existed. The ability of the Taliban to create
a climate of fear and to intimidate the population links with
a perception that international forces will not remain for ever
and a consequent conclusion that cooperation with international
forces will place the individual at risk once the international
forces have departed.
The hope, frequently expressed by the US, that
it will be able to detach part of the Taliban support base away
from the leadership through reconstruction assistance therefore
has to be set against the fact that the level of outrage felt,
by the population, over the actions of international forces may
far outweigh any positive response to the construction of a clinic
or a school, particularly if these are presented, by the Taliban,
as vehicles for Western and, potentially, Christian values to
be imparted. The value placed on material benefits may also be
insignificant in the face of the loss of honour or dignity arising
from an armed intrusion, by US forces, into the family home.
The US may also find it difficult to generate
a sufficient reconstruction effect to create a significant difference
to the average Afghan while so much of the country is too insecure
for the aid community to operate in. It cannot be stressed enough
that Afghanistan is one of the very poorest countries of the world
and that the population depends heavily on labour migration for
its survival. The new US administration will also need to review
the previous arrangements through which much of its reconstruction
assistance was channelled through major US contractors. These
have fuelled a public perception that only a small proportion
of the aid provided to Afghanistan has benefited those on the
ground.
Efforts to build a professional police force
and therefore meet the frequently-expressed need for security
and an end to police corruption continue to face very considerable
obstacles. Public disenchantment with the police is said to be
a major factor in the provision of support to the Taliban. However,
the hope expressed in the Interim Afghanistan National Development
Strategy that a fully professional police force would be in being
by 2010 is far from being realised.
The recent initiative to support the creation
of local community-based defence forces may also founder in the
face of highly complex power-holding dynamics at the local level.
It should be stressed, in this regard, that the tribal structures
which used to ensure a degree of stability, at the local level,
have been very much weakened over the thirty years of conflict,
giving way to multiple commanders and other power holders. The
relative order created through the traditional justice system
has therefore been replaced by the rule of the gun, with the more
self-interested agendas of younger men replacing the collective
judgement of the elders.
The international military is thus not only
failing to gain ground against the insurgency by military means
but it is also losing the hearts and minds battle. The Taliban
are able to benefit from the fact that Afghanistan is seen as
a major cause, within the wider Islamic world, in relation to
a perceived US-led Christian crusade. They are therefore able
to draw volunteers from the wider Islamic world who are simultaneously
fired up by developments in Afghanistan, Gaza, Iraq or Pakistan.
Thus, while the recent speech by President Obama on Al-Arabiya
Television, in which he stressed his wish to have a relationship
of respect with the Islamic world, represented a positive overture,
the continued use of drones to attack targets in Pakistan, even
under the Obama administration, has provoked strong reactions
from an already hostile Pakistan public.
The international military is also facing major
difficulties in ensuring that both its forces and those of the
Afghan National Army are adequately supplied. The insurgents have
thus launched a significant number of attacks on fuel tankers
entering Afghanistan from Pakistan. In addition, a major depot
containing NATO military vehicles in Peshawar was torched in December
2008, resulting in very significant damage. Most recently, a bridge
on the main route over the Khyber Pass was blown up. The US Government
is therefore feeling increasingly uneasy about supplying its forces
through Pakistan and has been actively exploring options for delivering
supplies through Russia and the Central Asian Republics. This
has had positive outcomes. It is not clear, however, whether the
US will be able to persuade the Kyrgyz Government to reverse its
recent decision to halt the use, by the US military, of the military
base at Manas.
The ability of the US Government to make progress
in Afghanistan may also be constrained by growing tensions with
President Karzai. It is extremely unfortunate that the tone used
and attitudes adopted by President Obama, Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton and President Obama's envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan,
Richard Holbrooke, towards President Karzai have been perceived
as insulting by the Afghan public at large. The highly publicised
debate as to whether the US will back him, as opposed to other
candidates, in the elections to be held in August has therefore
caused him to be increasingly critical of the US as well as defiant.
Further, it has led him to make public overtures to Russia. If,
therefore, President Karzai is re-elected in August, his administration
will be even weaker than it is now in that it will no longer have
the backing of the international community but will continue to
be seen as a product of the US-led military intervention.
However, any successor will have very little
room for manoeuvre in a situation in which the international community
and, particularly, the US Government determine outcomes to a significant
degree. It will be important that the choice of the next President
is not perceived, by the Afghan population, to have been decided,
in advance, by the US Government. It should be stressed that,
irrespective of whether the electoral process is seen as free
and fair, perceptions are everything in Afghanistan. At the same
time, both the Afghan population and the international community
would be more likely to lend their support to a President who
clearly has the necessary qualities for the role and who is not
open to criticism in relation to any previous human rights abuses.
Yet the US will rely on the Afghan Government
to reach the political settlement with the Taliban on which the
counter-insurgency operation depends. The US has made it clear
that any such negotiations should be Afghan-led and that the Afghan
Government is the primary vehicle for these. If the hand of President
Karzai is further weakened, the political dynamics of Afghanistan
will continue to be dominated by the deals that are being struck
on a daily basis by the many other actors in Afghanistan, some
of whom, including those involved in the drugs trade, have a vested
interest in continuing instability and the absence of an effective
state. The international community may thus find it difficult
to achieve a political settlement in Afghanistan and, therefore,
a means through which it can establish a face-saving exit from
its military involvement.
It is far from clear what form a political settlement
should take. The Taliban leadership has made it clear that it
is not willing to negotiate while international forces remain
in Afghanistan. The Afghan Government, on its side, has stated
that it will only negotiate with those members of the Taliban
who are willing to accept the Afghan constitution. Formal negotiations
were held last year in Riyadh under the auspices of the Saudi
Government but these proved to be inconclusive. A number of Jirgas
have been held drawing in tribal representatives and other power
holders from both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, but
the outcome of these is also uncertain. There is widespread concern
that any political settlement in which conservative forces dominate
would risk reversing the small gains that women have made in terms
of political involvement and their greater access to health care,
education and employment.
The principal hope continues to lie in the capacity
of the international military to train and strengthen the Afghan
National Army. If the international military increasingly withdraws
to barracks and supports Afghan security forces to respond to
the insurgency, under the direction of the Afghan Government,
there would inevitably be a difference in approach which may prove
to be more sensitive to the complexities of the situation on the
ground. It is important to note, in this regard, that the Afghan
Government has recently submitted a formal request to NATO that
it should have greater control over international military operations.
It has also sought a ban on the searches of homes by international
military personnel and has insisted that only the Afghan security
forces should be involved in the detention of suspects.
Thus, the US cannot stand idly by and allow
both Afghanistan and Pakistan to become de-stabilised. However,
its ability to make significant headway in the face of insurgencies
in both countries is heavily constrained. The key question, therefore,
is whether a pronounced reduction in the operations of international
forces from Afghanistan in favour of those of the Afghan National
Army, in combination with a cessation of US military action on
Pakistani territory, would lower the political temperature in
the region sufficiently for the Taliban or other radical groups
to lose a significant part of the support base which their call
for jihad has given them.
Such a lowering of the political temperature
would inevitably create a new political space. The hope is that
this might enable a more active dialogue, aimed at the achievement
of a consensus, to take place between the many actors in Afghanistan
and Pakistan, including those who are currently supporting the
Taliban. Such a consensus would certainly build on the inherent
conservatism of Afghan and Pakistan societies and on the centrality
of Islam within them but it would not need to incorporate the
more radical perspectives that the call for jihad has brought
to the fore.
Of course, any intra-Afghan or intra-Pakistani
dialogue would be very much influenced by indications, from the
international military, of their willingness to link a broad-based
political settlement in Afghanistan with an exit strategy. If
it appears that the international military presence in Afghanistan
is likely to be relatively indefinite, this would not only undermine
the political process but it would also undermine the efforts
of both the Afghan and Pakistani governments to assert their authority.
The continuation of international military bases on Afghan soil
can reasonably be expected to be a contentious issue, in this
regard. Such a continuing military presence would also influence
any dialogue with Iran.
While the international community weighs up
the various risks that it faces, it may also want to assess the
risk of taking a back seat and allowing the Afghan and Pakistani
governments to make more of the running. In so doing, it will
need to take on board the very limited ability of both governments
to influence outcomes within a very complex political environment.
Expectations of what the two governments can achieve should, therefore,
be realistic. Pakistan has good reason to feel aggrieved at the
very critical stance that the US Government has taken towards
its considerable and, in terms of human life, costly efforts to
address the use of its territory as a base for the Afghan insurgency.
At the same time, the US should recognise that both governments
are attuned to the society around them and can be expected to
approach the situation with a greater degree of sensitivity than
is possible for an outsider, however well informed. The relationship
of respect referred to in President Obama's speech to Al-Arabiya
television should therefore underpin his administration's dealings
with their leaders. The recent invitation to the Foreign Ministers
of the two countries to talks in Washington was a positive step,
in this regard.
The US should also take on board the existence
of a very vibrant civil society in both countries. Women's organisations,
together with bodies such as the Afghan Independent Human Rights
Commission and the various peace-building initiatives, have an
important role to play.
Thus, while there will inevitably be considerable
risks in respecting the ability of the two governments and societies
to find appropriate ways forward, there may be value in exploring
the potential costs and benefits of such an approach. In a situation
in which the international community has proved able to aggravate,
rather than alleviate, the ongoing crisis, it may prove to be
a risk worth taking.
11 March 2009
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