Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40-60)
PROFESSOR SHAUN
GREGORY AND
SEAN LANGAN
25 FEBRUARY 2009
Q40 Sir John Stanley: Did you
have a concluding point?
Professor Gregory: I suppose I
want to slightly condition what Sean just said by saying that
the question that we need to ask at some point is: what is preventing
the Pakistan army and the ISI from going decisively after the
Afghan Taliban and other Taliban-related groups on their side
of the border? The answer is that they still believe that the
Taliban will serve their regional, strategic interests. They do
not believe, therefore, that they have lost full control of those
groups or that those groups now imperil the state of Pakistan.
Q41 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: Some
of the terrorist attacks in this country, especially in London,
have been linked to the troubled areas and to al-Qaeda or associated
groups. Is the threat still a very real one? How worried should
we be?
Professor Gregory: Let us look
at the figures in the public domain. As the Prime Minister repeated
recently, we have some 75% of those who the security services
are watching in relation to planned or intended plots in this
country. That number seems to float somewhere between 1,600 and
2,000 individuals in the UK about whom the security services know.
Some 75% of those are of Pakistani origin. The interesting figure
is that only 43% of UK Muslims are of Pakistani origin, so clearly
something is going on here in relation to the flow of expertise,
training and so on. I think that there are some 400,000 movements
of individuals between the UK and Pakistan each year, so it is
an enormous two-way flow. Of course, not everyone going to Pakistan,
or vice versa, is a terrorist. However, the conduits are in place.
The FATA has become so important not only because of the presence
of al-Qaeda and related groups, but because many of the groups
to which UK-based terrorists have been linked in the past, such
as the 7/7 bombers, spent time at Lashkar-e-Taiba training camps
in Azad Jammu and Kashmir as part of their training in Pakistan.
Many of those groups, as I mentioned at the outset, have relocated
to the FATA, so not only is it completely beyond the reach of
the west and, perhaps, of the Pakistan army, but we need to see
it as a tremendous concentration of militancy and of knowledge
and skills. The paradox is that many of the groups that are passing
on this knowledge on insurgency, terrorism and so on are the ones
that, in the past, were trained in insurgency by the Pakistan
army or by the ISI: Afghan, Taliban, LET, Jaish-e-Mohammed, etc.
Sean Langan: From my own experiences
on the ground, first in Kashmir in 1998 and then in Afghanistan,
where I visited training camps during the Taliban regime, including
Pakistan militant Jaish-e-Mohammed training camps, and in my last
few years in Afghanistan, I would concur with British intelligence,
which has said that it poses the greatest strategic threat to
British national security.
This is where it is slightly separate to the
Afghan Taliban. Afghans do not travel well. It is much more in
Pakistan. All the Pakistan militant groups that were set up initially
to fight Indian forces in Kashmir signed up to al-Qaeda in 1998,
including Harkat al-Ansar. They changed their names, but these
Pakistan militant groups, which were initially configured to fight
in that region, have signed up to the global jihad. They are in
the tribal areas. I have met members of Lashkar-e-Taiba, which
was held largely responsible for the Mumbai attacks. It is said—I
have seen it on the ground and I concur—that al-Qaeda, logistically,
has tapped into these Pakistan militant groups, which now provide
the logistical ability and capability of al-Qaeda. Lashkar-e-Taiba
has a desire to be on the global stage. Because of the problems
with America, Britain is seen as the soft underbelly. It is the
Trojan horse—the way to get into the west, because of the
close links between Pakistan and Britain, the high number of dual
nationality passports and the numbers of people crossing and going
between the two countries every year. On average, visitors from
Britain spend 40 days a year in Pakistan, which is enough to go
to a wedding, but also to receive training in the tribal areas.
These people are very focused. They have time and space, and they
are planning the next attacks in London. If someone asked me,
I would say that when the next attack occurs in mainland Britain
it will be linked back to these groups in the tribal areas. It
is a case of when, not if.
Q42 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: It sounds
as though we have invaded the wrong country. Does it follow from
what you say that if we succeeded in Afghanistan in pacifying
the country, supporting the Government there and driving out the
training bases and so on, that would not do any good, because
the real threat comes from the Pakistani side of the border and,
in fact, there could be a switch from Afghanistan to the tribal
areas? So Afghanistan is not the key to our security.
Sean Langan: Certainly not. It
was only ever a host to al-Qaeda and the host has changed—it
is now Pakistan. Al-Qaeda and the Pakistan militant groups, which
always had links, are very close now. In fact, I would question
the point, even if we stabilise Afghanistan. My impression of
what Shaun has said, and what I feel very strongly, is that we
cannot pacify Afghanistan or solve any of the problems there without
first dealing with Pakistan. We need bases, primarily for British
national security interests, but the threat comes from within
Pakistan not Afghanistan. Even with the problems in Afghanistan
we must first deal with the tribal areas. I have read Shaun's
written evidence and we are both speaking today. I am not saying
this only to salvage any small chance I have of ever getting a
visa again from the British High Commission here in London—
Chairman: You mean the Pakistani High
Commission.
Sean Langan: The Pakistani High
Commission. It is worth mentioning that the policy of using terrorist
groups as proxies was not dreamt up by Pakistan. It was developed
and funded by America, Saudi Arabia and the UK during the jihad
against the Soviet Union. That is when Inter-Services Intelligence
was created, or reconfigured, to become an organisation that ran
a jihad. I wanted to say that, but not only for visa reasons.
It is worth mentioning.
Q43 Chairman: It is 30 years on.
We can look at the origins, but we are dealing with the situation
now.
Sean Langan: It is interesting
that you mention 30 years. What do we do now? The Islamisation
process of the ISI, and dealing with those proxy forces has fed
back into the Pakistan establishment. It thought that it could
hold these proxy forces at arm's length, but there has been a
cross-fertilisation. The problem of Pakistan and the strategic
threat to Britain will not be dealt with in Afghanistan or by
mowing the lawn—mowing down young Taliban in Helmand province.
It will take a concerted effort and needs to counterbalance 30
years of the process whereby billions and billions of dollars
have been funnelled into Pakistan and the madrassahs from Saudi
Arabia.
Q44 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: Could
I ask Professor Gregory about the possibility of nuclear terrorism
having its origins in Pakistan? You gave some interesting written
evidence and I would like you to expand on that, particularly
if you can give any evidence for it.
Professor Gregory: When I first
went to Pakistan, my background in no small measure was on the
nuclear side. I looked at that very carefully over a number of
years with the close collaboration of the Pakistan strategic plans
division—the organisation within the army that deals with
the command and control, and safety and security of Pakistan's
nuclear weapons. After Pakistan became an overt nuclear weapons
state with the weapons test in '98, it was keen to reassure the
west that it had tight control of those weapons. It therefore
opened the door to people like me with a degree of nuclear expertise
and I had access to people at the very highest levels inside the
SPD. I can report that the Pakistanis have in place very robust
measures for the safety and security of their nuclear weapons.
It is important to put on the record what that means for us in
the west. A second reason—there are many others—why
we cannot leverage or put serious meaningful pressure on Pakistan
is not only because it has its hands on our jugular through the
logistics, but because the Pakistan army and the ISI are all that
stands between nuclear weapons and the terrorists. I have called
this a custodial strategy. In other words, the Americans will
put up with almost anything the Pakistanis do—within limits—as
long as they keep tight control of their nukes and stop those
weapons from getting into the hands of terrorists. Do I think
that the Pakistanis have completely secured their nuclear weapons
against the terrorist threat or nuclear-related technologies?
The answer to that is a firm no. I have written extensively about
this; there is a short paper on my website should members of the
Committee want to have a look. It essentially boils down to a
number of issues. First, paradoxically, is the very interesting
geographical issue that when the Pakistanis developed their nuclear
weapons, their principal concern was that they would be subject
to being overrun by the Indian army if it poured across the Pakistan-Indian
border, across the Lahore plains. They therefore moved all the
nuclear weapons infrastructure to the north and west of Islamabad,
so that the key centres are at Wah, Taxila and so forth. There
are one or two exceptions, such as Sargodha, which is not in that
area. But a substantial proportion of Pakistan's nuclear weapons-related
infrastructure is to the north and west of Islamabad, which is
of course close to the tribal areas and precisely the instability
that we have been discussing this afternoon. That was not on Pakistan's
agenda when it was making early decisions about its nuclear weapons.
There are two or three areas of concern for
us. One is that there is evidence in the public domain of there
being direct contact between some of those who have nuclear weapons-related
experience and know-how, and al-Qaeda.
Q45 Chairman: Are you referring
to A. Q. Khan?
Professor Gregory: No, I am not.
A. Q. Khan is a side issue which I would be more than happy to
talk about. There is a documented example of two very senior Pakistan
atomic energy commission individuals—Chaudhry and another
one, whose name I forget.
Sean Langan: I know about them
meeting Osama bin Laden.
Professor Gregory: They went to
meet bin Laden in 2001. The Pakistanis tried to dismiss this as
irrelevant, but A. Q. Khan tells us that it is not knowledge of
specific individuals that matters; what matters is the relationship
between those individuals and the networks that they can reach—that
is a very important meeting. One of the dynamics that we need
to be worried about is the risk of transfer in that way. Another
is the direct physical threat to these weapons and weapons-related
infrastructure. They could, for instance be blown up, or catch
fire and could certainly create a radiological hazard. If that
sounds implausible, last year suicide bombers attacked one of
the entrance points to Wah cantonment—a weapons production
facility where part of nuclear weapons are thought to be assembled.
Another huge issue of concern—certainly in my research—was
the possibility of collusion between those with extremist, Islamist
sympathies inside the army and the ISI, with terrorists or extremists.
The Pakistanis have put a huge amount of effort into trying to
mitigate that problem. But they recognise, as we all do, that
you cannot have 100% assurance that the people who have day-to-day
control over nuclear weapons are wholly reliable in that way.
As Sean said earlier, one of the key dynamics here is what might
broadly be called the Islamisation of the Pakistan army and of
the ISI, which has been under way since the time of Zia-ul-Haq.
There are at least three or four major areas of concern for us
in this nuclear-terrorist relationship.
Chairman: We could obviously explore
these matters in greater detail, and if you would like to send
us a note afterwards, we would be happy to receive it. However,
we need to move on to some other areas.
Q46 Ms Gisela Stuart: That leads
very nicely to what I wanted to ask. To what extent do you think
that the policy aims of the ISI and the military are the same?
Much more to the point, what degree of control do you think the
new Pakistani Government have over the military?
Professor Gregory: My own view
is that there is virtually no separation any more. I know that
during the 1980s and the years of the Soviet-Afghan war, huge
amounts of American and Saudi money poured directly into the ISI
and, as a consequence, the ISI to some extent became empowered
as a state within a state. Actually the situation has changed
profoundly since then. It began to change after the end of the
Soviet conflict, but it has certainly been tightened up since
the military coup in 1999. When President Musharraf came to London
in September 2006, he gave an interview to The Times in
which he was quoted as saying that the ISI is a disciplined force
doing what the military Government tell it to do. That is virtually
verbatim. What were Musharraf's grounds for saying that? I have
written a lengthy paper about the ISI.
Q47 Ms Stuart: That was Musharraf.
I am worried about post-Musharraf and the current Government.
Professor Gregory: Of course.
Let me go through this bit, and I will then get to that. Musharraf
introduced the notion of rotation, or at least he developed the
notion of rotation, so 80% of the ISI is comprised of army officers
who rotate into the ISI for between two and three years. Not only
that, but there has a been a series of changes in terms of the
leadership of the ISI away from individuals such as Hamid Gul
and others who are deeply sympathetic to Islamists to people who
are considered to be more pro-Western. When it comes to post-Musharraf,
Kiani is chief of staff, and you may have noticed that in the
immediate aftermath of Kiani's appointment, an individual called
Taj was appointed director-general of the ISI. The Americans did
not like Taj, and put the army under intense pressure to replace
him with someone called Pasha, who is now the director-general
of the ISI. That tells me that the Pakistan army wants at least
to convey to the west that it is serious about keeping pro-west
individuals and being responsive to the west, and particularly
the American agenda. My view is that the practical changes that
have been introduced, particularly rotation—by the way,
that still leaves the other 20% of the ISI who are career servers
and operatives and so on—essentially tied the army and the
ISI extraordinarily closely together under Musharraf. I am not
saying that at the fringes of the organisation, individuals are
not acting alone or even under the influence of foreign intelligence
agencies, or have not seen local opportunities in relation to
drugs and so on to do a little on the side, but the ISI and the
Pakistan army are broadly one and the same beast.
Q48 Ms Stuart: What about the
Government?
Sean Langan: After the atrocities
in Mumbai, Zardari immediately announced that he was sending the
head of the ISI to India, and that was an incredibly critical
moment between the two countries and neighbours. He announced
that he was dispatching the head of the ISI, and it then turned
out that that was a clerical error, and that the Prime Minister
had not asked permission from the right people, so it was vetoed
and someone else was sent. That is a clear indication of who tells
what to whom. The ISI has been described as a state within a state,
but, even on paper, I think it remains a fact that the political
Government have no control over foreign policy and nuclear policy.
The most important strategic areas of government are under the
direct control of the military, and there is no pretence that
they are otherwise. From my experience in Pakistan over the years—I
spent a lot of time with Benazir Bhutto—I cannot imagine
that the situation is very different with her husband running
things. He is seen in the same light by the military establishment.
Benazir Bhutto had very little control and was pretty powerless.
By all accounts, the same state of affairs exists today. Turning
to the other side of the question that you asked me, I am not
sure how monolithic the situation is. There is hope for British
efforts to convince elements of the Pakistan military that the
future lies with closer ties with India and in the Commonwealth,
because a strong Anglophile strain of influence exists in the
military. Although ISI it is made up of military people, it has
its own ethos and cadre, and I would not say that it is a monolithic
block. Clearly, politicians are in office, but not in power.
Q49 Ms Stuart: I have two questions
on FATA and dealing with militancy. First, to what extent are
the Government committed to dealing with it? Secondly, and more
to the point, do they have the money, given the resources that
are needed and the poverty of the area?
Sean Langan: There was a recent
large-scale operation in Bajaur, which I would say is the classic
safe haven. The fact that hundreds of thousands of refugees left
the area and crossed the border was, to me, a sign that the Pakistan
military operation must have been real. Unlike previous operations
in other areas, the scale of the fighting was such that people
left the area in large numbers. That began last August or September,
I think, and it is ongoing. The fighting or the Taliban moved
to Swat because it was like pressing down on one part of a balloon—it
reappeared somewhere else. The Pakistan military have said that
they were being provided with weapons for those operations on
that occasion. I think the figure is $12 billion that they have
received under Bush—since Bush—most of which has been
in military aid. Bajaur is just one agency out of the seven, and
I am sure that what I saw there is not dissimilar from the other
agencies, where there are not such operations. Before that operation,
there was a complete lack of Pakistan military presence. The Frontier
Corps and the military and police stations were flattened, as
if a joint direct attack munition had been dropped on them. That
was a clear sign from the Taliban that that is Taliban country.
You would have seen no sign of the Pakistan military in the streets.
I am talking about not the middle of the mountains, but tarmac
roads. There would be a checkpoint, manned by two men, but even
as a British man in a land where foreigners are banned, being
driven there by a mullah and a Taliban, I was waved through the
checkpoints. So the security is pretty tight.
Professor Gregory: We must not
get seduced by the idea that if we can simply give the Pakistanis
more money or material, they can or will make a difference in
Bajaur. As Sean said, they have had billions of dollars, but look
where they have gone. They have gone into the kind of military
hardware that is useful only in relation to India. They have gone,
to some extent, on propping up Pakistan's balance of trade. Paradoxically,
they have also gone towards expanding the economic presence and
role of the military. The military has been buying up half of
Pakistan—land, ports, companies, fishing and so on.
Q50 Mr. Illsley: I think you have
covered most of the questions I was going to ask about the Pakistani
military and how it has selected targets in FATA and so on. What
are the consequences, or the effects, of the recent decision to
impose Sharia law in the North-West Frontier province? I know
that in the west and the UK, the phrase "Sharia law"
conjures up all manner of images, but what have been the practical
effects?
Professor Gregory: I would say
a couple of things about that. We need to keep in our minds the
kind of dispensation that existed in Swat and elsewhere before.
In other words, there is a track record of Sharia and other local
forms of justice and law being tolerated and accepted. The introduction
of Sharia is not, on one level, a great capitulation in its own
terms. But that is not the significant thing, really—it
is to whom the Pakistanis have ceded this area. Fazlullah, in
particular, who has taken de facto control over the region, is
a murderous thug, at the end of the day. The forms of Sharia that
have been introduced and have been operating there in the past
few months are brutal and barbaric. It is hugely significant not
so much that we worry about Sharia per se, but how that Sharia
is expressed and who is in control of the region. It is important
in another way: Swat is not part of FATA, but is in what is termed
the settled areas. That is hugely important, because for this
to have taken place in part of the settled areas, relatively close
to Islamabad in real terms, is very significant. One other issue
to introduce is the notion of the Indus River, which runs down
through Pakistan and which serves in a way as a mental metaphor,
I guess, for the elite that runs Pakistan. As long as the violence
is on the west side of the Indus, to some extent, it can be tolerated
and dealt with—as long as it is not impacting Punjab, Islamabad
and other places on the eastern side of the Indus. That is why
the Marriott bombing last year was so hugely important: it was
a major shock to Pakistan's elite, and it explains to some extent—as
I have said before—the way in which Pakistan, to some degree,
has now become dependent on Omar's ability to check the TTP and
the TNSM.
Q51 Chairman: May I ask you a
couple of quick questions about the US role in Pakistan—the
air strikes that took place? What are the consequences in terms
of both the impact on any threat to US and western interests from
al-Qaeda, and the consequences in Pakistan?
Sean Langan: I have been on the
ground a lot there. A congressional hearing last week, I think,
described as a colossal foreign policy failure the support that
Bush provided for Musharraf. I believe Britain is already paying
the price, with the attacks on the British mainland, and will
continue to pay the price for following that failed Bush policy,
which was to prop up Musharraf, who had a very blatant dual policy
to support and fund the Taliban. Some of the $12 billion—it
has been commented on by the American military, and I have seen
it myself—has wound its way back into funding the Taliban,
and ended up being spent on killing British and American soldiers.
The years of the US policy of propping Musharraf while quashing
democracy and the civil society in Pakistan—Musharraf had
a policy of funding, as Sean has pointed out, using the Taliban
as a proxy force, and I have seen direct evidence of the supply
lines—has been a failure.
Q52 Chairman: But specifically,
in the Obama transition period, we have seen continuation of the
policy of using air strikes.
Sean Langan: Can I finish on that?
On one level they have been incredibly successful with the Predator
drone and Hellfire missile strikes, which Obama has continued.
There are always military successes and their wider implications.
It is playing with fire and I think Osama bin Laden is more popular
in Pakistan among the average people, when these surveys are done,
than Bush was. That is perhaps a question of degree. Part of me
thinks it is diplomacy by fire. But at the same time, it sent
a very clear message to Pakistan. These people were there and
everyone knew they were there. These missiles have been hitting
their targets. It is perhaps too early to tell. What with everything
else in Pakistan, everything is on the brink.
Q53 Chairman: But what impact
has it had on al-Qaeda?
Sean Langan: I think it has had
an impact on al-Qaeda.
Professor Gregory: I was going
to echo some of what Sean said. Essentially there is a real conundrum
here. You can understand from an American military point of view
why, in the face of obfuscation of the Pakistan army and in the
knowledge of certain al-Qaeda assets in the FATA, they feel the
need to use air strikes. I can see the military imperative for
this, but it is absolutely clear that these air strikes are radicalising
young Pakistanis. There is a very well known quote that Baitullah
Mehsud gave in an interview to The News or Dawn
last year. He said that he would come into a town or village and
he struggled to get 10 to 15 fighters, but if he came in the aftermath
of an American air strike, he could get 150.
Sean Langan: I would disagree.
For three months I am sitting in a house, and the tribal family
can hear the CIA drones flying overhead. On one night I would
hear a drone and a faint sound of the missile being fired and
a little poof. Two days later on the World Service, I heard how
an al-Qaeda house had been hit in Damadola, just across from where
I was. I am sitting with a bunch of tribal people and they are
completely acclimatised to the hum—the deep bee-like sound—of
a drone. They do not have television, but they are used to hearing
CIA drones every night. They are aware of it. It is precision
bombing. It is not like the munitions being dropped in Afghanistan
where there are civilian casualties. There have been civilian
casualties, but it is not the same as the aerial bombing of Afghanistan
on compounds. Many civilian lives have been lost.
These are accurate munitions and there have
been 29 strikes. What I have heard on the ground is that people
are aware that these are precision strikes and they are hitting,
to use the American parlance, the bad guys. I do not think that
it is adding much more to the anti-American feeling that already
exists. It is happening anyway. I do not know whether it has made
a big difference.
Q54 Chairman: Perhaps, Professor
Gregory, you can confirm my interpretation of what you said: the
perception in wider Pakistani society is that it acts as recruitment
for radicalisation?
Professor Gregory: Absolutely.
I have given you the quote from Mehsud. I accept some of what
Sean has said, but I disagree with other elements of it. There
are two other issues that we must not lose sight of here. First,
this is seen as a violation of Pakistan's sovereignty. That plays
very badly in terms of western and anti-western sympathies, particularly
in the Pakistan army and ISI. They resent this. It is fuelling
that sentiment, which obviously has the knock-on effects that
we have been talking about.
The other concern is that although Sean is right
that some of these strikes have been very good in terms of the
intel. They have killed al-Qaeda leaders and possibly Rashid Rauf
and so on. Others have not done that. Others have fallen on villages
and killed innocent people. Indeed, one of them struck Pakistani
soldiers and killed 11 of them. That played very badly indeed
inside the Pakistan army, I can tell you. That is an issue. The
third point about these strikes, aside from fanning general anti-western
and pro-Islamist sympathies in Pakistan in the army and ISI, is
the danger that they will provoke wider unrest in the tribal areas.
At the moment, there are thousands of potential fighters there
who are staying out of this for one reason or another. There is
just a possibility of the so-called rising of the Lashkar.
Chairman: I have to bring in the last
questioner because we have gone way over time.
Q55 Mr. Horam: My question is
simple. In the light of the dangerous situation that you have
described graphically, what is the right US and UK strategy towards
Pakistan?
Sean Langan: Thank you for asking
that question. It is not military. My answer goes back to the
quotation from the US general about what NATO is doing in Afghanistan
being like mowing the lawn. It will not be achieved by Predator
missile strikes. I believe that the key is Pakistan. It will need
an enormous diplomatic effort on the part of Britain and America
to convince Pakistan to support them and not to use a stick, or
the modern day equivalent of a stick.
Q56 Mr. Horam: To convince them
that there is an existential threat to the Pakistan state?
Sean Langan: I think that there
is finally hope on the horizon after so many years. Let us not
forget that ISI was itself attacked in Rawalpindi last year by
the militants. I genuinely believe that the wider public in Pakistan
are aware that an existential threat is posed by this Frankenstein's
monster.
Q57 Mr. Horam: So the Americans
have to convince them of that. What policy should they have? Is
it a matter of finance or of diplomacy?
Sean Langan: This is the key.
They have been talking about Petraeus's success in Iraq and the
Sunni Awakening, in which Sunnis were turned against al-Qaeda.
The key to Afghanistan and Pakistan is to turn ISI, first and
foremost, rather like the Sunnis were turned.
Q58 Mr. Horam: Is that doable?
Sean Langan: That is the question.
There has been a de-Islamicisation process under Musharraf. He
sacked a number of groups. It must be put in harsh terms to Pakistan
that it is in a do-or-die situation. I believe that the American
military has been speaking in harsh terms vis-a"-vis the
strikes. It is for Parliament to ask what the FCO is doing—vis-a"-vis
the strategic threat in Britain—to tell the Pakistan Government
that they have to make stark choices for their future and survival.
ISI needs to be turned, but I do not know if that is possible.
On the wider level, the diplomatic route works. As we have said,
this process has been going on for 30 years. We have spent £12
billion buying F-16 fighter jets that have not been used and it
is costing Britain money to station forces in Helmand. Some money
and an enormous effort should be put into state education in Pakistan
to start to close down the madrassahs.
Q59 Mr. Horam: Are the Saudis
still funding the madrassahs?
Sean Langan: There are hundreds
of thousands of madrassahs.
Mr. Horam: That is Saudi charitable money;
not Government money.
Sean Langan: I think more and
more it is private money. The Saudi official policy previously
was to export the Wahhabi, anti-American, anti-western view. I
have been to madrassahs. They get children at the age of 5 and
by 15 they are—
Chairman: Members of the Committee went
to a madrassah on a visit to the region.
Sean Langan: An enormous effort
is needed. I would not want to sit here and—
Q60 Chairman: Do you agree with
that Professor Gregory?
Professor Gregory: No. I agree
with the diagnosis, but the treatment is not practical. ISI cannot
be turned in that way. Anybody who reads about Pakistani history
and about the Pressler sanctions will know that it cannot be done.
I would suggest four ways forward. First, NATO and the United
States have to reduce their strategic dependence on Pakistan to
enhance their leverage over it. As long as we are vulnerable,
we cannot exercise leverage.
Chairman: Professor Gregory, Mr. Langan,
I regret that we must conclude our discussion because of other
meetings. We have run over our period of time. I thank you both
for coming. It has been extremely valuable. If you wish to follow
up with any notes on issues that have not been communicated, you
can do so through our Clerk and we will deal with them.
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