Examination of Witnesses (Questions 80-101)
JONATHAN GOODHAND
AND ELIZABETH
WINTER
25 MARCH 2009
Q80 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: Let me ask
you about human rights, in particular the attitude of ordinary
Afghans towards what may be seen as western human rights ideals.
The UN has been critical of the failure to protect women's rights
in Afghanistan, and we know that there is widespread discrimination
against women. Indeed, girls are attacked if they attempt an education,
so it is obviously highly desirable to spread respect for woman.
Does that resonate widely in a traditional society or are we in
danger of putting a lot of effort into something that is not a
priority for ordinary Afghans?
Elizabeth Winter: The way in which
we did it was at fault. Westerners found it very difficult to
do it in an effective manner. Very often, they appointed women
to do the job—very young, inexperienced Afghan women at
that—who were told that they were focal points for gender,
and human rights were often just seen as women's rights. You had
grandstanding by many senior members of the international community
in their own countries. In fact, in my experience, some of the
people who most respect women are Afghans, so it is not the case
that Afghans do not respect women. Traditional customs militate
against women having the rights that we would like them to have,
but it is a much more complex issue. Doing things slowly and using
Islam as the pointer is going to be more effective. Men in this
country and in the international aid agencies also get extremely
uncomfortable when these things are brought up, sometimes finding
it easier to hear from men what it is that they ought to be doing,
but men are often frightened about the whole issue and how to
deal with women here, never mind in Afghanistan. It is a complicated
business and, as I said, I do not think that we have dealt with
it particularly well. Afghanistan has signed all the major protocols,
but it has not put a great deal of effort into actually following
them. The Ministry of Women's Affairs was very under-funded, and
usually in charge was a Minister who had very little experience
or clout. That has changed now. You now have the United Nations
Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and it is more active than
it was before. Maybe the Ministry is going to be more able to
do things. The Human Rights Commission is certainly very active
in trying to do something about it, but it is going to be a long-term,
uphill struggle. The people who are going to get their rights
are the women who fight for them. There is a very good history
of Afghan women human rights defenders who are fighting for their
rights and for the rights of the women and children with whom
they are working, whether it is in shelters for women, or by talking
to the Chief Justice or whoever and persuading him that what has
happened to this or that woman is unfair, and that he therefore
needs to do something to ensure that she has a better life from
now on. There are small, incremental gains. BAAG is applying to
the Foreign Office for money for a human rights development strategic
programme to do something about this and to help those human rights
defenders in their advocacy and policy development and so on.
It is going to take time, but it will happen. Any of you who have
been privileged to hear Afghan women talk about this here will
have been very impressed.
Dr. Goodhand: This is a reflection
of a wider question about modernisation and reform in Afghanistan,
which has a long history. Historically, attempts to fast-track
modernisation have always come unstuck. The key words that Elizabeth
used were "incremental" and "slowly" in relation
to change. The other thing is that this has been a highly internationalised
effort at state building. Internationalisation has very paradoxical
effects. With human rights and gender, the perception that this
is internationally driven has had perverse effects for Afghans
who are interested in pushing the questions and pushing the boundaries.
Women have become a banner issue that is being used by the Taliban
and the mujaheddin to mobilise legitimacy. When international
actors engage in these questions, they are hitting some very sensitive
nerves. The key issue is looking historically and moving carefully
without becoming an apologist for the essentialist view that culture
never changes.
Q81 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: Can I ask
you about the death penalty? I understand that it is now in use
again after a moratorium. The Foreign Office told us in its evidence
that the resumption of executions has been a highly popular move
among Afghans, although we continue to raise concerns about its
use. It is slightly odd for us to oppose something that is popular
when we are unpopular out there. I happen to be against the death
penalty over here, but I would be very hesitant about telling
other people how to deal with their own criminals when so many
innocent people are being blown up and killed and otherwise abused
in a holocaust of weak government and so many other problems.
Are we slightly in danger of imposing our own values? Again, that
creates resentment among Afghans who are not Taliban but who nevertheless
think that it is a matter for them.
Elizabeth Winter: Apart from the
fact that I am obviously not in favour of the death penalty, the
crucial issue is that you do not have the rule of law. Even those
Afghans who, actually, would ask for the death penalty, feel that
it is not appropriate right now, because you cannot prove that
a person has done whatever they are accused of doing. I had a
very interesting round-table meeting—I am researching civil
society development in Afghanistan—on various things. The
people with whom I had the meeting had just been at a meeting
that Karzai attended in which the death penalty and, in addition,
public executions, were called for. It was explained to me that
the reason was that everybody was so terrified about kidnappings.
There was a particularly horrible one: an elderly man and a non-related
young boy were stuck down a drainage hole for about a week and
given a glass of water and a piece of bread once a day. In addition,
there have been civilian and other casualties. People felt that
the death penalty was the only answer. We had a long discussion
about it. At the end, all the Afghans bar one were in favour.
The one who was not was a woman who had done research overseas.
She had looked into this, and she said that research showed that
having the death penalty did not decrease the incidence of events
such as murder, but increased it. It is going to be a long-term
issue before people come to our view that it is not appropriate.
Everybody in the room said, "We cannot think of any alternative.
If people are being kidnapped and beheaded, what can we do except
impose the death penalty?" They had the proviso that they
must have the rule of law to ensure that people are guilty.
Q82 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: So you are
rather making my point that if people want something, we should
allow that.
Elizabeth Winter: No, I am sorry
if I gave that impression. We should continue to have the discussion
and to look into research that shows it is not the appropriate
thing to do. Above all, we should ensure that there is the rule
of law in Afghanistan so that if, God forbid, people are found
guilty and executed, at least there is a proper process to get
to that point. I think it is a matter of education, lobbying and
advocacy. There will be human rights defenders in Afghanistan
who do not want to bring about the death penalty. It was just
this particular group of people I was with, who were civil society
activists.
Q83 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: The point
about playing into the Taliban's appeal is that people see a lot
of westerners coming in and the first thing they try to do is
to stop tribal justice and impose their own values. You do not
think that that is a danger.
Elizabeth Winter: Not particularly.
The danger we have with the Taliban and others is that we have
allowed them to win the propaganda war. Their PR is much better
than ours. We are not transparent enough. We do not confront head-on
the fact that they have caused a lot of civilian casualties through
their activities. We need a much more nuanced approach in our
dealings with them. We need to be much more public about why we
are in Afghanistan and what we are doing. I am waiting with bated
breath, presumably like everybody else, to see what the Obama
Administration's plan is for Afghanistan. I fear that it will
be more of the same: more soldiers and more money into reconstruction,
but what they will actually want to do is to safeguard their own
interests and get out. I think that would be very short-sighted
indeed and would upset everybody all over again. Let us wait and
see. As I said, I think we need to be more nuanced in our dealings
with the opposition and to bring them on board.
Dr. Goodhand: Can I just make
one point? When the Taliban emerged in '94 and '95, they had quite
a level of popularity. That was born out of their ability to bring
a brutal level of security and law and order. They are trying
to deliver that now in the areas of Afghanistan over which they
are attempting to assert control. I am not saying that there is
a demand for what the Taliban delivered then, particularly in
the north of the country, but we should reflect on what kind of
state is realistic in Afghanistan and what kind of state people
want. They want a state that is able to give a level of predictability
and security to their lives so that they can go about their economic
business and so on. I am essentially saying that there is a need
for much more modest ambitions about what an Afghan state is able
to deliver in the medium term.
Chairman: Thank you. Sir John Stanley
has some questions on this, then we will move on.
Q84 Sir John Stanley: You will have
seen the extensive publicity that has been given—probably
most conspicuously in The Independent, which has been running
a campaign on it—to the young man who accessed things on
the internet about women's rights. He was handed down an appalling
sentence in the local court and appealed to the Supreme Court
of Afghanistan. About a fortnight ago, he was handed down a 20-year
sentence in the Supreme Court. When people in this country see
that, they ask themselves what we are doing in Afghanistan. We
have been there for all these years and still the official Supreme
Court is handing down utterly monstrous sentences for things that
would not be contemplated as criminal offences in most parts of
the world. Do you regard this as something that is immutable or
unchangeable in Afghanistan?
Elizabeth Winter: No, I do not
think it is immutable or unchangeable. I think it gives us even
more reason to be there, to try to support the people who do not
want that kind of thing to continue. It is a minority—that
is a local political squabble that that unfortunate chap was bound
up in. I think it was his brother they were actually after. I
was told it was highly unlikely that he would be executed. In
fact, his death sentence was commuted.
Q85 Sir John Stanley: Even so—20
years?
Elizabeth Winter: Yes, it is appalling,
of course. But at some point, I am told, they will probably allow
him to leave the country and go somewhere else. Not that that
is a good result either. Being forced to leave your country is
not a good result at all. Several people have been forced to leave
Afghanistan because they are in danger. It just shows even more
that we have to stay there: we have to help them develop an education
system that is going to bring people into the country who are
able to manage in a way without these miscarriages of justice
and bring in the rule of law that prevents that kind of thing
happening.
Q86 Ms Stuart: Elizabeth Winter,
I think you mentioned in relation to the death penalty that it
is supported because of the absence of the rule of law.[1]
Is it not also the absence of any prisons capable of holding anybody,
or has that changed?
Elizabeth Winter: There are prisons,
but they are in an appalling state. There have been attempts at
prison reform, but at the moment that is very small beer compared
to what is actually needed. One or two people were brought in
to advise on prison reform and how to improve the prisons. That
probably has not received the international funding it needs.
One person who was brought in was assassinated. I think that has
stopped it for a bit. I am not up to date on it, however, and
if you would like more information I would be happy to try to
get it for you.
Q87 Ms Stuart: It would be helpful
to know if there are any prisons which are secure enough so that
anybody that the rule of law wished to detain could be kept there.
Elizabeth Winter: It isn't only
the prisons that need to be secure—it is also about the
people who have clout to get people out. Once someone has been
convicted, a week later you find they are out again. I will follow
up on that.
Q88 Ms Stuart: What I wanted to pursue
a little more is the fact that we have evidence that Afghanistan
was used for extraordinary rendition. We know there are memorandums
of agreement between the allied forces and the American Government.
Currently, the understanding is that anybody captured will be
handed over to the Afghan authorities. Can we be certain that
they will not be tortured?
Elizabeth Winter: I do not think
we can be, no. Experience has shown that we cannot be sure. However
much one might like to think that negotiations and keeping a watching
brief would prevent it, I think it would be much better not to
hand them over, to be honest.
Q89 Ms Stuart: Could the UK Government
be more robust in this area?
Elizabeth Winter: Yes.
Q90 Ms Stuart: How would that show
itself? How would robustness display itself?
Elizabeth Winter: By publicly
and privately making sure that people realise that this Government
do not support it, are not going to support it and will do all
they can to keep people out of that kind of situation.
Dr. Goodhand: The obvious point
is that the UK could have been more critical of the US, particularly
in the early days post-2002.
Q91 Ms Stuart: If we say we cannot
be sure about torture, can we be sure it is no longer a base for
extraordinary rendition?
Elizabeth Winter: I could not
be sure about that. I wouldn't know. Again I can try to find out
from people who might, and what the rumours are. Whether I could
get you any actual information I don't know. My guess is that
everybody, including the British Government, is going to be fairly
careful now about what they do and try to avoid it because they
do not want bad publicity, to put it at its crudest.
Q92 Mr. Horam: On health, education,
general welfare and, to some extent, the infrastructure side of
things, do you think the progress that has been made can be sustained?
Elizabeth Winter: On health care
it probably can. I go back to education, of course, which is needed
to ensure that you have good people at all levels and that progress
is maintained. Many Afghans have learned on the job. Some came
up through the NGO world, where they learned to manage programmes,
and perhaps there will be an increased demand from civil society
for services to be maintained. If, however, the international
community is really going to abandon the country—I do not
think that the British Government are going to do that, and we
commend them on that—and if the Americans, with all their
money, decide to pull out, it might be more and more difficult,
because the income that the Afghan Government have to play with
is relatively small for the services they need to provide for
their people.
Dr. Goodhand: Can I come in on
that? I disagree slightly with Elizabeth. I do not think that
it can be maintained if the current trends continue. For a start,
the Taliban are targeting infrastructure, health centres and schools—the
visible symbols of the Afghan state. It is a clear strategy. Secondly,
the costs of aid delivery are going up all the time, particularly
in the south. It is becoming much more expensive to deliver aid,
because it is so insecure, so aid organisations are having to
get protection or work under the shelter of provincial reconstruction
teams and so on. A third factor that means it might not be sustainable
is that—I need to check my facts on this—roughly a
third of the aid going to Afghanistan goes to the Government budget,
and the rest is delivered off-budget through contractors and non-governmental
organisations and essentially is not contributing to the state-building
exercise. That leads to questions about how sustainable those
projects will be in the future.
Q93 Mr. Horam: So what do we think
will be the right policies in this set of circumstances where
there is a kind of conflict between security and sustainability?
Dr. Goodhand: Security first.
There is no empirical evidence, either historically or presently,
to support the notion that development will win hearts and minds
and help play a pacifying role. It is completely wrong-headed
to think that. Bringing a level of security means addressing the
insurgency, not just militarily, but politically. That seems to
be a precondition for any kind of sustainable development. Secondly,
I think that Ashraf Ghani, the former Finance Minister, basically
got it right in arguing for aid donors to work with the Government
and make state building their priority, and this kind of fractured
aid response, such as going through consultancy firms, is not
contributing to the building of a legitimate political authority,
which is what state building is about.
Q94 Mr. Horam: Is that recognised
locally, and do people realise the mistake there, or is it just
carrying on as it always did?
Dr. Goodhand: It has been recognised
to an extent, but I would argue, as Elizabeth did earlier, that
the insurgency has shifted the thinking much more into responding
in the short term.
Q95 Mr. Horam: From what you have
said, and if security is the sine qua non of all this, one can
understand that people will think we should deal with the insurgency
first.
Dr. Goodhand: One of the problems
with intervention since 2002 has been the idea that all good things
come together and that we can pursue the war on terror, reinvent
the NATO alliance, address drugs and bring democracy and development
to Afghanistan, but we cannot do so. We have to make some priorities
here.
Q96 Mr. Horam: So what are your priorities?
Dr. Goodhand: Security is the
first priority, and that is clear, but the proviso is that you
cannot address security without looking at the political dimensions
of insecurity. That brings us to the question of renegotiating
a grand bargain for Afghanistan which is more inclusive.
Q97 Mr. Horam: So security and politics
are more important than governance, as it were?
Dr. Goodhand: It is a question
of sequencing. I am not saying that it is more important.
Q98 Chairman: Do you agree with that,
Ms Winter?
Elizabeth Winter: I think it is
very complicated. You cannot do everything at once and at the
same speed; it is a question of sequencing. But I certainly think
there are things that we could have done, and could still do,
to help sustainability. One of those is to improve the way in
which we develop the capacity of Afghans. For example, another
Afghan Ministry that was not supportive in the way it should have
been was the Ministry of Agriculture, which is now responsible
for irrigation and livelihoods. That Ministry now has a good Minister
who may well retain his post if Hamid Karzai is re-elected. Although
we need to concentrate on the rule of law and security, I certainly
think that we could at the same time assist the Ministry of Agriculture
and others. In other words, I do not think that we have to stop
what we are already doing—and can do—and say, "Okay,
we're going to concentrate on politics and security." That
would mean everybody else having to go to the wall.
Dr. Goodhand: I am not saying
that development has to be put on hold until the insurgency is
addressed. There are many parts of the country where development
can take place. The point about agriculture, which has been one
of the failures of the new construction effort, is absolutely
fundamental. Investing in, and supplying aid to, the rural economy
to create jobs and invest in value-added activities in the rural
sector are things that can still be done in particular parts of
the country. More can be done in such areas.
Elizabeth Winter: And providing
employment for people so that they generate income that then gets
spread around a bit. At the moment, people at all levels, not
just the senior one, are using foreign contractors by bringing
in workers from China and so on, instead of using Afghans for
public work programmes and so on.
Q99 Chairman: Thank you. We are conscious
of the time, as we are expecting a vote in the House at 4 o'clock
and need to begin to question another group of witnesses before
then. Our final questions for you are about domestic politics.
How democratic is Afghanistan, given the assessment by the Economist
Intelligence Unit, in which it is ranked 134th out of 167 countries
in the world? How much power do the warlords and regional strongmen
still have within the system?
Elizabeth Winter: I will answer
that by first saying that Afghans are democratic. The system in
place at the moment is relatively democratic, and I think the
international community needs to concentrate on supporting free
and fair elections in Afghanistan as far as possible. I am with
Jonathan in saying it is very difficult to interpret or necessarily
agree with rankings in such situations. But Afghans are certainly
democratic; the fact is that they turned out in droves for elections
in the first place and stood waiting for hours, and the hope that
they had in the democratic system was enormous. That hope is still
just about there in, I would say, just over half the population,
and I think that they would still vote.
Q100 Chairman: You referred to forthcoming
elections. What are the prospects for credible presidential and
provincial elections in August?
Elizabeth Winter: Credible in
the sense of credible candidates or in the sense of how the elections
are conducted?
Chairman: Both.
Elizabeth Winter: In all the discussions
that I have had and the reports that I read, it seems fairly clear
that at the moment there is no credible alternative to Hamid Karzai.
There are candidates who are credible in some senses, but they
are not necessarily going to get the same volume of votes as he
is expected to get. There has been talk of coalitions of candidates—two
or three of them—but the prospects of them subsequently
being able to work together, or even being able to decide which
of them is going to be President, are fraught with difficulty.
I say to people, "Cometh the hour, cometh the man,"—and
of course in Afghanistan it would be a man—but that man
has not yet come. Hamid Karzai still retains his popular appeal;
he is weak on many things, but his popular appeal means that he
is a past master at talking to people.
Q101 Chairman: Dr. Goodhand, do you
agree with that view?
Dr. Goodhand: I wanted to answer
the question on how democratic Afghanistan is. There is a question
more broadly in the assessment of peace building since the 1990s
about sequencing, and whether democratisation can take place in
those contexts. If you look at the case of Afghanistan, democratisation
has accentuated conflict and power battles. There is a view—someone
called Roland Paris has written about it—that you need institutionalisation
before liberalisation and democratisation. I think that there
is a strong argument to be made on the Afghan case. Many Afghans
you talk to outside Kabul would not be asking that question. They
would be asking more fundamental questions, such as, "Can
I get from A to B, without going through roadblocks?", or
"Can I get my goods to market?" These are basic issues
about security and welfare, which I think are really important.
On the Afghan elections, I think that the jury is out about what
the result may be, so I will leave it at that.
Chairman: Thank you very much. We could
have gone into some other areas, but unfortunately we do not have
time. I am grateful to you both, Ms Winter and Dr. Goodhand, for
coming. Thank you very much for your time.
Elizabeth Winter: Thank you for
the opportunity.
Dr. Goodhand: Thank you.
1 <ep<nh Note by witness: It was not "mentioned
in relation to the death penalty that it is supported because
of the absence of the rule of law". On the contrary, while
there is popular support for the death penalty in certain cases
of murder, kidnapping and child abuse, it is also understood that
the current absence of the rule of law, fair judicial process
etc, means that convictions would be unsafe. Back
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