Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan - Foreign Affairs Committee Contents


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 160-173)

SAJJAN GOHEL, DR STUART GORDON AND DANIEL KORSKI

21 APRIL 2009

  Q160  Ms Stuart: Do you think that we have got the balance of conditionality right?

  Sajjan Gohel: It is a starting point. It will take time to see whether it produces positive results. The language is right. The US Administration have understood that more needs to be done. If the country is going to receive $1.5 billion a year as has been proposed, more needs to be done in terms of tackling the Taliban, al-Qaeda and domestic terrorism.

  Daniel Korski: This weekend saw the first major donors' conference, which was held in Tokyo. The US tried to whip up support for Pakistan's civilian development. I think that that is part and parcel of the strategy of trying to get everybody to focus on shoring up support for the civilian Government. We must be careful not to say, "There is the civilian Government and then there is the military. Then, of course, there is the ISI and the security forces." Many of these entities are also riven with factions. The ISI is estimated to number some 10,000 different people. In any organisation such as that there will be different factions with different sentiments and allegiances to various different erstwhile friends and allies. We have seen ISI change leadership over the years. Every time there is a new general in charge, we say that we think that we can do business with him. We then find that even he struggles to implement change. Therefore, there is a lot of complexity at different levels.

  Q161  Ms Stuart: The American strategy is silent on a number of issues. Mr. Gohel, in written evidence to us you mentioned the Durand line. I am wondering what our view is on that. Is there any chance of us talking about Pakistan and a coherence as long as 80% of its borders are so contentious? What is the likelihood of getting a deal on that?

  Sajjan Gohel: The Durand line is a very important and sensitive issue, especially within the Pashtun community in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is one of our colonial legacies that has literally split the Pashtun nation in half. It not based on any conceivable logic, but on geographical realities. If we want to try and defeat the Taliban, which is an ideological movement, you have to have a counter-ideology, one that can appeal to the masses and specifically to the Pashtun community, such as promoting the assertion of a Pashtun identity. Give something to both sides that they can believe in. I am not saying that we dismantle the border and allow there to be further problems. It can be done with Pakistan and Afghanistan together, with them believing that there can be this identity in which they can believe. Create an academic institution for them to be able to use as an outlet for their identity because, unfortunately, we have the Taliban ideology that has been used to indoctrinate and foment its ideas within the Pashtun communities on both sides, but there is nothing to counter that. The best challenge is to promote a more tolerant belief that is in fact indigenous to the Pashtuns. They are perhaps conservative, but they are not fundamentalist by nature. The Taliban is an artificial creation that has actually turned into a Frankenstein's monster. The Durand line issue is important. It has to be addressed in conjunction with all these reforms and has to get the Pashtun communities on board, because by and large they represent the majority of the people in Afghanistan and a sizeable portion in Pakistan.

  Q162 Ms Stuart: What is your assessment of whether anyone will actually tackle this? It is sensitive and important.

  Sajjan Gohel: I just want to conclude on this. It is a battle of ideas, and you need to tackle that. Unfortunately, no one is talking about that. Perhaps, because I am a bit of an historian, I look at these issues. This is what people on the ground want to believe. If you talk to Afghans here, you will realise that their Pashtun identity is very important to them. We should play a role in encouraging that, rather than sponsoring it, which would have a negative connotation implying that it is a western concept coming from outside. You can start grass-roots support on both sides where the Pashtun identity can be promoted and encouraged and can play a role in countering the Taliban ideology. It has to be started, because the military concept is one strategy, but you have to have the battle of ideas and for hearts and minds. I think that this is one process that needs to be started, or talked about at the very least.

  Daniel Korski: To answer your question directly, I see no chance that this will be high on anyone's agenda. Unlike my colleague, I am deeply sceptical that we as outsiders have the wit, the ability, the flexibility, the smarts or the ground truth to make a serious go at this, however important it could be theoretically. I just do not think that we can do it. We have not been able to do many simpler things in that region, so trying to create a kind of counter narrative would be a real struggle for us.

  Q163 Ms Stuart: Finally, if you sit in Pakistan and look on the one side to instability in Afghanistan and on the other to a perceived threat from India, what is your assessment of which side Pakistan will come down on, and what is more important, stability in Afghanistan or the perceived threat from India?

  Sajjan Gohel: Relations have deteriorated somewhat between India and Pakistan, especially in the light of the attacks in Mumbai in November last year. The situation seems to have become more stable since the Pakistani Government, through the de facto interior Minister, Rehman Malik, publicly announced that the Mumbai gunmen were indeed from Pakistan and that the Government were apparently going to co-operate in the investigation. I do not think that the situation can deteriorate right now. What is interesting is that India is going through its national elections right now in a phased process. If there was an attack or some terrorist-related activity that created huge economic, political and social consequences and was again linked back to Pakistan, that would create a lot of turmoil and a lot of problems. It may not happen, but it is perhaps something to be aware of. At the moment, Pakistan's priority is its own domestic problem—not even Afghanistan—and the fact that the Taliban is proliferating, growing and expanding its activities. The Swat valley is only a few hours away from Islamabad, and there is talk about the fact that militant activity is being seen in southern Punjab in Multan, and even in the northern part of Sindh. If that problem continues to expand, that will be the biggest challenge Pakistan faces, rather than looking eastward or westward to Afghanistan or India.

  Daniel Korski: Let us be clear that Pakistan is an ally of ours out of necessity, not choice, and as a result we have to appreciate the different kind of objectives, shall we say, that various powers in Pakistan have. I think that the dominant strategic narrative is one that accepts turmoil in Afghanistan as being in the interests of the Pakistani state. It may be a short-sighted objective and it may now be coming back to bite them, but I still think that that is the dominant strategic narrative. They do see India's behaviour in Afghanistan as an attempt by the Indians to try to go around them and come through at the backside, and I think that we will have to work with this very troublesome and difficult ally.

  Q164  Chairman: May I ask a direct question about the American policy? Is there not a contradiction between the more nuanced approach that President Obama has set out for relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan and the continuing use of drones, which leads to outrage in Pakistani society and undermines support for the democratic Government?

  Daniel Korski: There is no doubt that there is a tension here. A third element that adds to the tension is the US stake in ensuring that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is somehow kept secured, especially should developments take a turn for the worse. The fact that the US has continued to authorise these drone attacks after Obama's inauguration means that it clearly believes that it is hitting important people and that it is important for its Afghan strategy. The US was getting into a problem in discussions with the Afghan Government, who were saying, "Hang on, you are saying that the big problem is Pakistan, but all the bombing is taking place on our side of the border."

  Q165  Chairman: So you have to bomb Pakistan as well just to keep the Afghans happy.

  Daniel Korski: I do not think that it is a direct thing, but there was clear pressure from the Kabul Government for the US to step up its activities in Pakistan. I think that that was a factor that they contended with. I do not think that the US would have gone ahead exclusively on that basis, but it was a factor. The fact remains that the US believes that these bombings are effective and that they are somehow decimating the capabilities of various different networks.

  Q166  Chairman: So you disagree with what was said in the previous session then.

  Daniel Korski: No, I am saying that the US believes that the capacities of these networks are being decimated. I think that there is a wider strategic consequence that is turning the population against Pakistan's alliance with the US. What I am saying is that Washington knows that too, yet is still proceeding. The US must believe, based on its analysis of the intelligence that it still makes sense to do so. The really interesting question us academics and yourselves should also be exploring is the pattern of these bombing raids. Why do they take place in certain places and not others? Are there certain deals that mean that nobody has gone after various networks that are in Quetta as opposed to other places? These are interesting questions that it is worth asking.

  Sajjan Gohel: To build on what Mr. Korski is saying, the Obama Administration have made it clear that they will do things differently to the Bush Administration, whether it is on Guantanamo Bay, Iraq or even climate change. The one thing that has remained consistent is the Predator drone strikes. You have to look at what is collaterally acceptable. On the one hand, innocent people have unfortunately been killed in these Predator drone strikes. On the other hand, senior members of al-Qaeda have been eliminated. Midhat Mursi was the one who directed al-Qaeda's CBRN programme. You may have seen the video on television after 9/11 of dogs going into convulsions after being exposed to liquid. He was the one who was creating all that. He was a very important person and he is gone. Very senior people in al-Qaeda's hierarchy such as Abu Hamza Rabia and Abu Laith al-Libi have been eliminated by Predator drones. As I said, innocent people have unfortunately been caught up. The problem is that the US has lost faith and trust with the ISI in rounding up these people on the ground. It felt that there was a leakage of information. Actionable intelligence was sometimes being passed to the terrorists. The solution that the Bush Administration came up with was Predator drone strikes, which are quick and decisive. The fact that the Obama Administration are continuing with that, as Mr. Korski mentioned, shows that it is having tangible results, albeit—for the third time—that lots of innocent people are unfortunately being killed as well.

  Chairman: Thank you.

  Q167  Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: Turning to Afghanistan, but staying on the theme of identity and borders, do you think that Afghanistan is realistically a nation state that is or can be made to be self-governing with a central Government whose laws are recognised and obeyed throughout the country or will it always be a complete mess? Is our only hope to make it relatively safe for us?

  Daniel Korski: I think that Afghanistan can develop into a state. It may not be the kind of state that we sitting here would recognise. It may not be the kind of state that you talk about when you conjure up images of a central Government with the ability to run their writ throughout the territory. It may never be that kind of state. If it ever becomes that kind of state, it will be in 100 years. That is not necessarily the objective. It is probably beyond our means to create that anyway. Is it, however, possible to create a different kind of state, where there is some kind of negotiation between the centre and the provinces, there is some kind of agreement about centrally provided services, there is some kind of trust in the governance, albeit in very limited areas, even at provincial level? Yes, I believe that that is possible. If you speak to a lot of Afghans in many parts of the country, they will tell you that they believe it is possible. We focus a lot on the south and east, correctly, but vast swathes of the country are doing rather well. We might not want to live there if we had the choice, but that does not mean that it cannot be a functioning state for the people of that country.

  Sajjan Gohel: I very much agree. Afghanistan is a state of different nationalities, different ethnicities, whether you are talking about Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras or even Sikhs. The interesting thing about Afghanistan, which I have always found fascinating, is that despite all the different ethnicities, none of those groups has ever wanted its own separate homeland. They have always wanted Afghanistan as the unit—as the complete collection of different ethnicities—even under the Taliban. That shows that there is the prospect of creating a nation state that can work. In fact, before the Soviet occupation, before the country became a Marxist state, Afghanistan was relatively peaceful. There was stability. The King was the unifying factor, not just within the Pashtuns, but within all the different ethnicities. The problem has been outside influence. If you could cull that outside influence, especially from the Pakistan military's own strategic interest, you could create the potential of a state that can govern itself. It may not be perfect. It will have its problems. Some of it will be conservative. Some of it will not necessarily appreciate the way things are done, but it can work. It can be a country that is successful and a potential stabilising force in the region, but it all depends on what happens in relation to Pakistan, which again is very strategically linked to what happens to Afghanistan. If Pakistan's stability can be there, Afghanistan's stability will also be there.

  Dr. Gordon: The Afghans I have spoken to in Helmand have highlighted that their experience of the state is not a happy one—that their experience is of a state that fails to deliver. There are contrasts with the Taliban's ability to deliver, particularly justice, which is a huge sticking point for many Afghans. I am referring to the idea that justice is something that you pay for—that it depends on your connections in society as to whether or not you get access to any form of justice. That is the other part of the face of the Afghan state. For many—this applies even to Helmandis—deeply conservative Pashtun nationalists, many of whom are terribly unsupportive of the presence of the international security assistance force—some of the ones I have spoken to—there is a sense of Afghan identity that transcends Pashtun identity. There is a sense that they have an expectation and an appetite for what the state can deliver, but the state has a significant track record of failing to deliver it and of delivering corruption and predatory behaviour. The trick—this is the interesting part about the Obama strategy—is a twofold strategy: one is containing the Taliban and the other is reforming the Afghan state's capacity to deliver against popular expectations. The trick is to identity the minimum level of popular expectations and to support that state to deliver it. I think that will be the benchmark for judging the success of the Obama strategy.

  Q168  Mr. Horam: Do you think that the other part of the Obama strategy, whereby we can talk to the moderate Taliban, makes sense?

  Daniel Korski: I know of no insurgency in history that has ever been vanquished or curtailed without some form of political engagement, so it makes absolute sense to seek to engage those who want to be engaged. Looking at Northern Ireland, we now know that it takes a long time. You have to speak to a lot of people for a long, long time before any kind of solution materialises. At the same time, we have to acknowledge that there will be people who are irreconcilable. They will not want to come to the negotiating table. For those, only kinetic effect will do, but I do think it is important to have the strategy. There is, though, the interesting question of how we proceed. The truth is that until now, the Afghan Government's approach to this has been incredibly muddled. It has been tied up in Hamid Karzai's re-election strategy. It has been hijacked by various different powerful figures inside the Government, so it is unclear who is running it and what the consequences are. What we have seen in the past is that people who have been supposedly reconciled and given parlay, if you will, have then been attacked by the security forces and so on, meaning that the attractiveness of engaging in conversation with us and the Afghan Government has decreased. To answer your question directly, I think that it is a very important part of the strategy. It has to be done in very close collaboration with the Afghan Government.

  Q169  Mr. Horam: Can it be done before the presidential elections, or will it have to wait until after that?

  Daniel Korski: I think that it now has to wait until the presidential elections. They are now going to happen in August. Who knows what will happen, but most analysts agree that it will be very difficult for Hamid Karzai to lose those elections, so probably from August onwards, there will have to be a new beginning to this. Indeed, the election of a new President provides that opportunity to sit down, look at the whole swathe of issues and say, "Right, how are we going to handle this?"

  Q170  Mr. Horam: You said that it would take a long time, which it obviously will. How far is western opinion able to take the long view, or are we reaching the point at which we should disengage from this terrible mess?

  Daniel Korski: These are the questions that I was hoping you would have a finer feel for than I do.

  Mr. Horam: We are interested in your view as well. We have views too.

  Daniel Korski: I think that the truth is that if you look at the alliance of 28 states, many of these will struggle in two or three years' time to maintain even the level of commitment that we have now. If you add to that the financial crisis and the pressures on budgets, I think that we can add an unwillingness to spend the kind of money that we are spending now, even though the Canadians and the Dutch may hope that the politics will change over the next couple of years, allowing them to stay on a bit longer in the south than they had originally imagined.

  I think that the truth is that the Americans have appreciated all this, and that is why I think we are seeing an Americanisation of the southern and eastern effort. In many ways, I do not think that we can maintain even the support that exists today, but it may not be as disappointing to the Americans as it would have been two years ago.

  Q171  Mr. Horam: That puts the onus, again, on the Americans. Even some of Obama's people have said, "Well, we're talking about re-election in four years' time; that means out of Afghanistan in two or three years' time."

  Daniel Korski: The mid-term elections are in two years, and I think that the US Administration would like to show something for their efforts, whether it is a regional—not settlement, but process—that Ambassador Holbrooke can instigate, or something else. They will want to show something after that two-year time frame. There is a clear sense in the Obama strategy that, if there is not an exit, they keenly understand that the American people are only so interested in staying for so long.

  Mr. Horam: Do you agree with that?

  Sajjan Gohel: Can I address the issue of the presence of the Taliban? It is a very important issue. We had been talking to the Taliban even before September 11, when the west tried to play a role in preventing them from blowing up the Buddhist statues. The Taliban were talked to in the aftermath of 9/11 in terms of handing over Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Negotiations and talking are still going on, but nothing has been achieved. I would say that there is no such thing as moderate Taliban or extremist Taliban. Moderate Taliban is somebody who will kill you with a knife or a pistol and not with an RPG or by blowing himself up. What we have is the ideological Taliban and those who join the Taliban for monetary purposes. If we can clinically extract those members of the Taliban—the different dimensions and the different types of Taliban—and remove them by offering them jobs, employment and economic opportunities, then that is possible. You cannot talk to the ideological Taliban. Their view and their agenda are totally different from ours. There have been deals with the Taliban, in North Waziristan. It lasted a week. In Musa Kala, in Afghanistan, the Taliban then burnt down the schools afterwards. This is not Northern Ireland. They are not the IRA. There is not a table that you can sit at and have a mutual point of discussion, not with the ideological Taliban. They are far too committed, far too ingrained in their own agenda, to have any discussion. I think that what President Obama was discussing was talking to those whom you can pull away from the ideologues, those who will react positively to financial inducements and the prospect of a better future. Let us be in no doubt that you cannot discuss anything positively with the ideological Taliban, other than to hand them back Afghanistan and say that the Afghanistan project has failed. This issue I am very fundamental on, because I find it very frustrating when we somehow want to use conventional logic with an entity that is very mediaeval with its intentions. The ideological Taliban, by the way, are those who want to subjugate women, prevent them from being educated, and assert a form of their religion that is not something that most Muslims would adhere to. It is an issue of huge concern, and we have been talking for a very long time, and nothing has been achieved. Let us pull the ones that we can for monetary reasons; the ideological Taliban, we will never be able to talk to.

  Dr. Gordon: I think there is probably a slightly different way of looking at it. If you are in a society where there is one political party which is dominant and has the power of life and death over you, there will be a whole series of marriages of convenience. Certainly, many of my Afghan friends in Helmand have described their support for the Taliban in those terms. That might, clearly, be something that I would wish, as a westerner, to hear, but there is a model of taking reconcilable elements of the Taliban and negotiating with them. Arguably, Mullah Salam in Musa Qala is an example of that. There is a sense that there is a middle ground somewhere between economic opportunists and the ideologues, where you have a group of Pashtun nationalists with conservative religious ideas, who, if they could be offered some form of alternative to the Taliban ideology and the promise of Taliban dominance—there were real commitments to security and stability—are able to be bought off into another political process. There are dangers with some of the models that are held by some of the west and the idea that development will simply buy you. The hearts and minds model is that pumping more cash in and providing more troops will provide you with stability and success. The evidence suggests that the political process needs to be at the heart of that, and that without the political process—having a strategic narrative which resonates in the south and the south-east of the country—development and a degree of externally imposed security will not work. I think the trick is to get that strategic narrative right, whether it is political outreach from a reforming Government in Kabul, or whether it is attention to Pashtun nationalism and the Durand line, the trick is to find that strategic narrative. A strategy without that narrative is unlikely to succeed.

  Chairman: Thank you. Finally, John Stanley.

  Q172  Sir John Stanley: Back to the British Government, who are ultimately the concern of the Committee. We will deal with Afghanistan, and then come to Pakistan. May I ask each of you, as far as Afghanistan is concerned, what you consider should be the British Government's top priorities in policy towards Afghanistan?

  Daniel Korski: Perhaps there are two elements to this. There is a sort of Kabul level and a southern level. Perhaps I should start with the southern level. We have found ourselves, now, in a position, finally, in terms of civilian staff in Lashkar Gah, in terms of development assistance, to do all the things we all dreamt about. Unfortunately, the security situation has made most of that very difficult, and the new, American-led context needs to lead to changes in the way that we operate. I think there is going to have to be a much sharper focus on security and elements of governance, and probably leaving aside many of the areas that we would like to work on if the environment becomes a little more benign. I think at the strategic level, if you will, at the Kabul level, we have to help to secure the elections. It is going to be absolutely crucial that these elections take place in secure conditions and that they are perceived as reasonably fair. That is a very important short-term priority. Then, subsequent to that, is the development of a governance strategy that works for Afghanistan—that does not necessarily create that centralised state, but at least allows the delivery of some basic services. We have created Potemkin institutions, if you will, in Kabul, and I think we have to be much clearer about what our priorities are.

  Sajjan Gohel: To build on that, the focus has been, and needs to continue to be, economic, social and political and to assist in the background in terms of providing security for the central Government in continuing to engage directly and fight with the Taliban in the south. They need to prevent them from gaining ground and enhancing their position. The economic scenario is to continue with the investment and training to help build a civilian infrastructure and to educate people to be teachers and farmers and in the agricultural sector. We can play a positive role in all those different facets that Afghanis want. As Mr. Korski mentioned, the elections will be absolutely pivotal. The eyes of the world will be on what happens there. Groups such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban will want to try to exploit the situation by trying to carry out attacks and creating chaos and disruption. In the short term at least, it is important that there is enough security on the ground to ensure that these different facets can go ahead successfully and peacefully, and can develop and grow in a grass-roots movement. It is also important to keep the ethnic compositions in a way that does not create tensions. The Tajiks traditionally dominated the Ministry of Defence or the Interior Ministry. They must not be seen to be favoured over the Pashtuns. Likewise, helping the Pashtuns should not be seen as a negative thing for, say, the Hazaras. We have a history and track record of a very positive role in nation building, not just in Afghanistan, but elsewhere. What we are doing is good and positive, but it needs to continue to be done perhaps at a greater level.

  Dr. Gordon: The difficulty is knowing where to begin. With the creation of the Helmand road map, we were faced with exactly the same problem. Where do you begin? What are the key policy priorities? There are a number and without a number of them being addressed, you will not make progress. The key point that we got from most of the Helmandis who we spoke to was that they need a space in which they can collaborate with their own political authorities, which means a different form of security. That was the key element, which is why we focused much more on a paramilitary policing capability based not on vehicle checkpoints—or taxation points as they are often described—road blocks and physical security, but on intelligence-led policing and being able to co-ordinate with the Afghan national intelligence service. Creating the space for political and economic collaboration between individuals and district authorities in key population centres would be an objective. The Government need to develop their legitimacy, and that means at the national level a narrative that resonates with the Pashtun and in particular the sense that the Pashtun place in the Government has not been eclipsed by the northern groups. However, it is deeper than that. It is also a sense that Kabul is able to deliver key public services—not every public service, but people need to see something tangible delivered. Certainly the international development approach is quite long term. It has been about capacity building and sustainability. Those are all laudable aims, but what is often required is a sense that the Government are doing something now. If they do not do something now, that hearts and minds strategy is doomed to failure. The next key point is that it is all very well using international development money to build capacity in Government and to do infrastructure-based projects—they have their place—but what a lot of Afghans, in Lashkar Gah, for example, want is mass employment. They often talk in terms of what the Soviets did and the Americans before them, which was to create structures that employed people. There was a sense that the state could provide some form of economic opportunity, apart from simply building highly visible infrastructure elements. The United States Agency for International Development is engaged in trying to create a demand-led economic recovery in Lashkar Gah and Gereshk through contract buying of agriculture. Providing some form of tangible stake in the economy is key. When you look at parts of eastern Afghanistan, you will see that the place where the Americans have argued that they have had success is where there has been domestic economic recoveries of some sort. Often that is in the illicit economy, but also often in the licit one too. It is a raft of measures, not one simple focus. It is about creating space for collaboration, a Government who are capable of developing their legitimacy through some form of public services, which are prioritised, and an immediate and demand-led economic recovery as well.

  Q173 Sir John Stanley: Finally, let us turn to Pakistan. Again, what are the British Government's policy priorities in your view?

  Daniel Korski: Let me be brief. I think that we need to support the civilian Government, strengthening relations between the Government and the military. We need to invest far more in police and judicial reform, especially in some of the border areas, and we need to have a new look at how we deliver assistance, in particular in some of these troubled areas, perhaps with non-traditional partners—it could be China, or Turkey. We need to find a way to help to provide development in these areas, much in the way that my colleague here has spoken about with regard to Afghanistan. Similarly, on the other side of the border, we need to help to provide an alternative to the kind of offers that are provided by the different insurgency groups to disaffected and impoverished youths.

  Sajjan Gohel: We need to get more co-operation on the Pakistani side in terms of counter-terrorism, specifically information as to where British citizens go, where they end up being trained to take part in acts of terrorism against the UK. The ammonium nitrate plotters who had half a tonne of ammonium nitrate were convicted a couple of years ago, I believe. We know that they went to places such as Malakand and Kohat in the North West Frontier province. What is disturbing about that is that in Malakand there is a very large army presence and they would have been trained around the same area. So, one has to wonder where these individuals go, where they are trained and who is training them. We know that the ISI is a very powerful institution. It may have problems from within, but it is the most feared security institution in Pakistan. If it wanted to, it could certainly co-operate a lot more in providing the information that we need for our authorities here to be able to carry out their investigations successfully and disrupt and foil plots. At the same time, we need to help to shore up the civilian Government and prevent the military from interfering in the domestic scene. Unfortunately, far too often we have taken a back seat. We assumed that Musharraf would do the right thing, as I mentioned earlier, and unfortunately he did not. They say that General Ashfaq Kiyani, the chief of army staff, is not interested in politics. During the problems over the past couple of months in Punjab it looked as if he was playing all the civilian politicians against each other. The other thing that we have to bear in mind is that there is this reluctance to talk to leaders of the Opposition, such as Nawaz Sharif. Nawaz Sharif is seen sometimes by some as a fundamentalist. He is not a fundamentalist, he is a conservative and there is a difference. In the next four to six years, if the post of Prime Minister or President exists in Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif will be one of them. He will come back to power and will be a very powerful force. I think that the UK has to consider talking to all the different leaders in that country, because if we do not, others will. Nawaz Sharif's biggest complaint, when he was in the UK a couple of years ago, was that he was ignored. The Saudis stepped in. They gave him armour-plated cars and support, and they have now got a lot of influence with him. We lost an opportunity there. So, we should be talking to the civilian politicians and helping them, shoring them up against any threat from terrorism and the military, but we should not be talking to the Pakistani Taliban and assuming somehow that they will come to the negotiating table.

  Sir John Stanley: Thank you. That is very interesting.

  Dr. Gordon: I have only one small thing to add. Clearly development assistance will play a key part in the future of Pakistan, particularly in the border areas, but it raises some interesting questions as to what type of development work will work and will achieve some sort of political or stabilising effect. It raises real questions about whether we have instruments that will work to that effect or whether we are expecting far too much of development assistance and financial aid. There are going to be significant difficulties in terms of channelling that funding. Who is going to be delivering this and what political message will it send? It raises real questions about which instruments work and under what conditions, whether they can be tied to political objectives in that way, and whether that is appropriate.

  Chairman: Thank you, Dr. Gordon, Mr. Gohel and Mr. Korski. This has been very valuable and we are very grateful to you.






 
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