Examination of Witnesses (Questions 160-173)
SAJJAN GOHEL,
DR STUART
GORDON AND
DANIEL KORSKI
21 APRIL 2009
Q160 Ms Stuart: Do you think that
we have got the balance of conditionality right?
Sajjan Gohel: It is a starting
point. It will take time to see whether it produces positive results.
The language is right. The US Administration have understood that
more needs to be done. If the country is going to receive $1.5
billion a year as has been proposed, more needs to be done in
terms of tackling the Taliban, al-Qaeda and domestic terrorism.
Daniel Korski: This weekend saw
the first major donors' conference, which was held in Tokyo. The
US tried to whip up support for Pakistan's civilian development.
I think that that is part and parcel of the strategy of trying
to get everybody to focus on shoring up support for the civilian
Government. We must be careful not to say, "There is the
civilian Government and then there is the military. Then, of course,
there is the ISI and the security forces." Many of these
entities are also riven with factions. The ISI is estimated to
number some 10,000 different people. In any organisation such
as that there will be different factions with different sentiments
and allegiances to various different erstwhile friends and allies.
We have seen ISI change leadership over the years. Every time
there is a new general in charge, we say that we think that we
can do business with him. We then find that even he struggles
to implement change. Therefore, there is a lot of complexity at
different levels.
Q161 Ms Stuart: The American strategy
is silent on a number of issues. Mr. Gohel, in written evidence
to us you mentioned the Durand line. I am wondering what our view
is on that. Is there any chance of us talking about Pakistan and
a coherence as long as 80% of its borders are so contentious?
What is the likelihood of getting a deal on that?
Sajjan Gohel: The Durand line
is a very important and sensitive issue, especially within the
Pashtun community in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is one of our
colonial legacies that has literally split the Pashtun nation
in half. It not based on any conceivable logic, but on geographical
realities. If we want to try and defeat the Taliban, which is
an ideological movement, you have to have a counter-ideology,
one that can appeal to the masses and specifically to the Pashtun
community, such as promoting the assertion of a Pashtun identity.
Give something to both sides that they can believe in. I am not
saying that we dismantle the border and allow there to be further
problems. It can be done with Pakistan and Afghanistan together,
with them believing that there can be this identity in which they
can believe. Create an academic institution for them to be able
to use as an outlet for their identity because, unfortunately,
we have the Taliban ideology that has been used to indoctrinate
and foment its ideas within the Pashtun communities on both sides,
but there is nothing to counter that. The best challenge is to
promote a more tolerant belief that is in fact indigenous to the
Pashtuns. They are perhaps conservative, but they are not fundamentalist
by nature. The Taliban is an artificial creation that has actually
turned into a Frankenstein's monster. The Durand line issue is
important. It has to be addressed in conjunction with all these
reforms and has to get the Pashtun communities on board, because
by and large they represent the majority of the people in Afghanistan
and a sizeable portion in Pakistan.
Q162 Ms Stuart: What is your assessment
of whether anyone will actually tackle this? It is sensitive and
important.
Sajjan Gohel: I just want to conclude
on this. It is a battle of ideas, and you need to tackle that.
Unfortunately, no one is talking about that. Perhaps, because
I am a bit of an historian, I look at these issues. This is what
people on the ground want to believe. If you talk to Afghans here,
you will realise that their Pashtun identity is very important
to them. We should play a role in encouraging that, rather than
sponsoring it, which would have a negative connotation implying
that it is a western concept coming from outside. You can start
grass-roots support on both sides where the Pashtun identity can
be promoted and encouraged and can play a role in countering the
Taliban ideology. It has to be started, because the military concept
is one strategy, but you have to have the battle of ideas and
for hearts and minds. I think that this is one process that needs
to be started, or talked about at the very least.
Daniel Korski: To answer your
question directly, I see no chance that this will be high on anyone's
agenda. Unlike my colleague, I am deeply sceptical that we as
outsiders have the wit, the ability, the flexibility, the smarts
or the ground truth to make a serious go at this, however important
it could be theoretically. I just do not think that we can do
it. We have not been able to do many simpler things in that region,
so trying to create a kind of counter narrative would be a real
struggle for us.
Q163 Ms Stuart: Finally, if you
sit in Pakistan and look on the one side to instability in Afghanistan
and on the other to a perceived threat from India, what is your
assessment of which side Pakistan will come down on, and what
is more important, stability in Afghanistan or the perceived threat
from India?
Sajjan Gohel: Relations have deteriorated
somewhat between India and Pakistan, especially in the light of
the attacks in Mumbai in November last year. The situation seems
to have become more stable since the Pakistani Government, through
the de facto interior Minister, Rehman Malik, publicly announced
that the Mumbai gunmen were indeed from Pakistan and that the
Government were apparently going to co-operate in the investigation.
I do not think that the situation can deteriorate right now. What
is interesting is that India is going through its national elections
right now in a phased process. If there was an attack or some
terrorist-related activity that created huge economic, political
and social consequences and was again linked back to Pakistan,
that would create a lot of turmoil and a lot of problems. It may
not happen, but it is perhaps something to be aware of. At the
moment, Pakistan's priority is its own domestic problemnot
even Afghanistanand the fact that the Taliban is proliferating,
growing and expanding its activities. The Swat valley is only
a few hours away from Islamabad, and there is talk about the fact
that militant activity is being seen in southern Punjab in Multan,
and even in the northern part of Sindh. If that problem continues
to expand, that will be the biggest challenge Pakistan faces,
rather than looking eastward or westward to Afghanistan or India.
Daniel Korski: Let us be clear
that Pakistan is an ally of ours out of necessity, not choice,
and as a result we have to appreciate the different kind of objectives,
shall we say, that various powers in Pakistan have. I think that
the dominant strategic narrative is one that accepts turmoil in
Afghanistan as being in the interests of the Pakistani state.
It may be a short-sighted objective and it may now be coming back
to bite them, but I still think that that is the dominant strategic
narrative. They do see India's behaviour in Afghanistan as an
attempt by the Indians to try to go around them and come through
at the backside, and I think that we will have to work with this
very troublesome and difficult ally.
Q164 Chairman: May I ask a direct
question about the American policy? Is there not a contradiction
between the more nuanced approach that President Obama has set
out for relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan and the continuing
use of drones, which leads to outrage in Pakistani society and
undermines support for the democratic Government?
Daniel Korski: There is no doubt
that there is a tension here. A third element that adds to the
tension is the US stake in ensuring that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal
is somehow kept secured, especially should developments take a
turn for the worse. The fact that the US has continued to authorise
these drone attacks after Obama's inauguration means that it clearly
believes that it is hitting important people and that it is important
for its Afghan strategy. The US was getting into a problem in
discussions with the Afghan Government, who were saying, "Hang
on, you are saying that the big problem is Pakistan, but all the
bombing is taking place on our side of the border."
Q165 Chairman: So you have to bomb
Pakistan as well just to keep the Afghans happy.
Daniel Korski: I do not think
that it is a direct thing, but there was clear pressure from the
Kabul Government for the US to step up its activities in Pakistan.
I think that that was a factor that they contended with. I do
not think that the US would have gone ahead exclusively on that
basis, but it was a factor. The fact remains that the US believes
that these bombings are effective and that they are somehow decimating
the capabilities of various different networks.
Q166 Chairman: So you disagree with
what was said in the previous session then.
Daniel Korski: No, I am saying
that the US believes that the capacities of these networks are
being decimated. I think that there is a wider strategic consequence
that is turning the population against Pakistan's alliance with
the US. What I am saying is that Washington knows that too, yet
is still proceeding. The US must believe, based on its analysis
of the intelligence that it still makes sense to do so. The really
interesting question us academics and yourselves should also be
exploring is the pattern of these bombing raids. Why do they take
place in certain places and not others? Are there certain deals
that mean that nobody has gone after various networks that are
in Quetta as opposed to other places? These are interesting questions
that it is worth asking.
Sajjan Gohel: To build on what
Mr. Korski is saying, the Obama Administration have made it clear
that they will do things differently to the Bush Administration,
whether it is on Guantanamo Bay, Iraq or even climate change.
The one thing that has remained consistent is the Predator drone
strikes. You have to look at what is collaterally acceptable.
On the one hand, innocent people have unfortunately been killed
in these Predator drone strikes. On the other hand, senior members
of al-Qaeda have been eliminated. Midhat Mursi was the one who
directed al-Qaeda's CBRN programme. You may have seen the video
on television after 9/11 of dogs going into convulsions after
being exposed to liquid. He was the one who was creating all that.
He was a very important person and he is gone. Very senior people
in al-Qaeda's hierarchy such as Abu Hamza Rabia and Abu Laith
al-Libi have been eliminated by Predator drones. As I said, innocent
people have unfortunately been caught up. The problem is that
the US has lost faith and trust with the ISI in rounding up these
people on the ground. It felt that there was a leakage of information.
Actionable intelligence was sometimes being passed to the terrorists.
The solution that the Bush Administration came up with was Predator
drone strikes, which are quick and decisive. The fact that the
Obama Administration are continuing with that, as Mr. Korski mentioned,
shows that it is having tangible results, albeitfor the
third timethat lots of innocent people are unfortunately
being killed as well.
Chairman: Thank you.
Q167 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: Turning
to Afghanistan, but staying on the theme of identity and borders,
do you think that Afghanistan is realistically a nation state
that is or can be made to be self-governing with a central Government
whose laws are recognised and obeyed throughout the country or
will it always be a complete mess? Is our only hope to make it
relatively safe for us?
Daniel Korski: I think that Afghanistan
can develop into a state. It may not be the kind of state that
we sitting here would recognise. It may not be the kind of state
that you talk about when you conjure up images of a central Government
with the ability to run their writ throughout the territory. It
may never be that kind of state. If it ever becomes that kind
of state, it will be in 100 years. That is not necessarily the
objective. It is probably beyond our means to create that anyway.
Is it, however, possible to create a different kind of state,
where there is some kind of negotiation between the centre and
the provinces, there is some kind of agreement about centrally
provided services, there is some kind of trust in the governance,
albeit in very limited areas, even at provincial level? Yes, I
believe that that is possible. If you speak to a lot of Afghans
in many parts of the country, they will tell you that they believe
it is possible. We focus a lot on the south and east, correctly,
but vast swathes of the country are doing rather well. We might
not want to live there if we had the choice, but that does not
mean that it cannot be a functioning state for the people of that
country.
Sajjan Gohel: I very much agree.
Afghanistan is a state of different nationalities, different ethnicities,
whether you are talking about Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras
or even Sikhs. The interesting thing about Afghanistan, which
I have always found fascinating, is that despite all the different
ethnicities, none of those groups has ever wanted its own separate
homeland. They have always wanted Afghanistan as the unitas
the complete collection of different ethnicitieseven under
the Taliban. That shows that there is the prospect of creating
a nation state that can work. In fact, before the Soviet occupation,
before the country became a Marxist state, Afghanistan was relatively
peaceful. There was stability. The King was the unifying factor,
not just within the Pashtuns, but within all the different ethnicities.
The problem has been outside influence. If you could cull that
outside influence, especially from the Pakistan military's own
strategic interest, you could create the potential of a state
that can govern itself. It may not be perfect. It will have its
problems. Some of it will be conservative. Some of it will not
necessarily appreciate the way things are done, but it can work.
It can be a country that is successful and a potential stabilising
force in the region, but it all depends on what happens in relation
to Pakistan, which again is very strategically linked to what
happens to Afghanistan. If Pakistan's stability can be there,
Afghanistan's stability will also be there.
Dr. Gordon: The Afghans I have
spoken to in Helmand have highlighted that their experience of
the state is not a happy onethat their experience is of
a state that fails to deliver. There are contrasts with the Taliban's
ability to deliver, particularly justice, which is a huge sticking
point for many Afghans. I am referring to the idea that justice
is something that you pay forthat it depends on your connections
in society as to whether or not you get access to any form of
justice. That is the other part of the face of the Afghan state.
For manythis applies even to Helmandisdeeply conservative
Pashtun nationalists, many of whom are terribly unsupportive of
the presence of the international security assistance forcesome
of the ones I have spoken tothere is a sense of Afghan
identity that transcends Pashtun identity. There is a sense that
they have an expectation and an appetite for what the state can
deliver, but the state has a significant track record of failing
to deliver it and of delivering corruption and predatory behaviour.
The trickthis is the interesting part about the Obama strategyis
a twofold strategy: one is containing the Taliban and the other
is reforming the Afghan state's capacity to deliver against popular
expectations. The trick is to identity the minimum level of popular
expectations and to support that state to deliver it. I think
that will be the benchmark for judging the success of the Obama
strategy.
Q168 Mr. Horam: Do you think that
the other part of the Obama strategy, whereby we can talk to the
moderate Taliban, makes sense?
Daniel Korski: I know of no insurgency
in history that has ever been vanquished or curtailed without
some form of political engagement, so it makes absolute sense
to seek to engage those who want to be engaged. Looking at Northern
Ireland, we now know that it takes a long time. You have to speak
to a lot of people for a long, long time before any kind of solution
materialises. At the same time, we have to acknowledge that there
will be people who are irreconcilable. They will not want to come
to the negotiating table. For those, only kinetic effect will
do, but I do think it is important to have the strategy. There
is, though, the interesting question of how we proceed. The truth
is that until now, the Afghan Government's approach to this has
been incredibly muddled. It has been tied up in Hamid Karzai's
re-election strategy. It has been hijacked by various different
powerful figures inside the Government, so it is unclear who is
running it and what the consequences are. What we have seen in
the past is that people who have been supposedly reconciled and
given parlay, if you will, have then been attacked by the security
forces and so on, meaning that the attractiveness of engaging
in conversation with us and the Afghan Government has decreased.
To answer your question directly, I think that it is a very important
part of the strategy. It has to be done in very close collaboration
with the Afghan Government.
Q169 Mr. Horam: Can it be done before
the presidential elections, or will it have to wait until after
that?
Daniel Korski: I think that it
now has to wait until the presidential elections. They are now
going to happen in August. Who knows what will happen, but most
analysts agree that it will be very difficult for Hamid Karzai
to lose those elections, so probably from August onwards, there
will have to be a new beginning to this. Indeed, the election
of a new President provides that opportunity to sit down, look
at the whole swathe of issues and say, "Right, how are we
going to handle this?"
Q170 Mr. Horam: You said that it
would take a long time, which it obviously will. How far is western
opinion able to take the long view, or are we reaching the point
at which we should disengage from this terrible mess?
Daniel Korski: These are the questions
that I was hoping you would have a finer feel for than I do.
Mr. Horam: We are interested in your
view as well. We have views too.
Daniel Korski: I think that the
truth is that if you look at the alliance of 28 states, many of
these will struggle in two or three years' time to maintain even
the level of commitment that we have now. If you add to that the
financial crisis and the pressures on budgets, I think that we
can add an unwillingness to spend the kind of money that we are
spending now, even though the Canadians and the Dutch may hope
that the politics will change over the next couple of years, allowing
them to stay on a bit longer in the south than they had originally
imagined.
I think that the truth is that the Americans
have appreciated all this, and that is why I think we are seeing
an Americanisation of the southern and eastern effort. In many
ways, I do not think that we can maintain even the support that
exists today, but it may not be as disappointing to the Americans
as it would have been two years ago.
Q171 Mr. Horam: That puts the onus,
again, on the Americans. Even some of Obama's people have said,
"Well, we're talking about re-election in four years' time;
that means out of Afghanistan in two or three years' time."
Daniel Korski: The mid-term elections
are in two years, and I think that the US Administration would
like to show something for their efforts, whether it is a regionalnot
settlement, but processthat Ambassador Holbrooke can instigate,
or something else. They will want to show something after that
two-year time frame. There is a clear sense in the Obama strategy
that, if there is not an exit, they keenly understand that the
American people are only so interested in staying for so long.
Mr. Horam: Do you agree with that?
Sajjan Gohel: Can I address the
issue of the presence of the Taliban? It is a very important issue.
We had been talking to the Taliban even before September 11, when
the west tried to play a role in preventing them from blowing
up the Buddhist statues. The Taliban were talked to in the aftermath
of 9/11 in terms of handing over Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Negotiations and talking are still going on, but nothing has been
achieved. I would say that there is no such thing as moderate
Taliban or extremist Taliban. Moderate Taliban is somebody who
will kill you with a knife or a pistol and not with an RPG or
by blowing himself up. What we have is the ideological Taliban
and those who join the Taliban for monetary purposes. If we can
clinically extract those members of the Talibanthe different
dimensions and the different types of Talibanand remove
them by offering them jobs, employment and economic opportunities,
then that is possible. You cannot talk to the ideological Taliban.
Their view and their agenda are totally different from ours. There
have been deals with the Taliban, in North Waziristan. It lasted
a week. In Musa Kala, in Afghanistan, the Taliban then burnt down
the schools afterwards. This is not Northern Ireland. They are
not the IRA. There is not a table that you can sit at and have
a mutual point of discussion, not with the ideological Taliban.
They are far too committed, far too ingrained in their own agenda,
to have any discussion. I think that what President Obama was
discussing was talking to those whom you can pull away from the
ideologues, those who will react positively to financial inducements
and the prospect of a better future. Let us be in no doubt that
you cannot discuss anything positively with the ideological Taliban,
other than to hand them back Afghanistan and say that the Afghanistan
project has failed. This issue I am very fundamental on, because
I find it very frustrating when we somehow want to use conventional
logic with an entity that is very mediaeval with its intentions.
The ideological Taliban, by the way, are those who want to subjugate
women, prevent them from being educated, and assert a form of
their religion that is not something that most Muslims would adhere
to. It is an issue of huge concern, and we have been talking for
a very long time, and nothing has been achieved. Let us pull the
ones that we can for monetary reasons; the ideological Taliban,
we will never be able to talk to.
Dr. Gordon: I think there is probably
a slightly different way of looking at it. If you are in a society
where there is one political party which is dominant and has the
power of life and death over you, there will be a whole series
of marriages of convenience. Certainly, many of my Afghan friends
in Helmand have described their support for the Taliban in those
terms. That might, clearly, be something that I would wish, as
a westerner, to hear, but there is a model of taking reconcilable
elements of the Taliban and negotiating with them. Arguably, Mullah
Salam in Musa Qala is an example of that. There is a sense that
there is a middle ground somewhere between economic opportunists
and the ideologues, where you have a group of Pashtun nationalists
with conservative religious ideas, who, if they could be offered
some form of alternative to the Taliban ideology and the promise
of Taliban dominancethere were real commitments to security
and stabilityare able to be bought off into another political
process. There are dangers with some of the models that are held
by some of the west and the idea that development will simply
buy you. The hearts and minds model is that pumping more cash
in and providing more troops will provide you with stability and
success. The evidence suggests that the political process needs
to be at the heart of that, and that without the political processhaving
a strategic narrative which resonates in the south and the south-east
of the countrydevelopment and a degree of externally imposed
security will not work. I think the trick is to get that strategic
narrative right, whether it is political outreach from a reforming
Government in Kabul, or whether it is attention to Pashtun nationalism
and the Durand line, the trick is to find that strategic narrative.
A strategy without that narrative is unlikely to succeed.
Chairman: Thank you. Finally, John Stanley.
Q172 Sir John Stanley: Back to the
British Government, who are ultimately the concern of the Committee.
We will deal with Afghanistan, and then come to Pakistan. May
I ask each of you, as far as Afghanistan is concerned, what you
consider should be the British Government's top priorities in
policy towards Afghanistan?
Daniel Korski: Perhaps there are
two elements to this. There is a sort of Kabul level and a southern
level. Perhaps I should start with the southern level. We have
found ourselves, now, in a position, finally, in terms of civilian
staff in Lashkar Gah, in terms of development assistance, to do
all the things we all dreamt about. Unfortunately, the security
situation has made most of that very difficult, and the new, American-led
context needs to lead to changes in the way that we operate. I
think there is going to have to be a much sharper focus on security
and elements of governance, and probably leaving aside many of
the areas that we would like to work on if the environment becomes
a little more benign. I think at the strategic level, if you will,
at the Kabul level, we have to help to secure the elections. It
is going to be absolutely crucial that these elections take place
in secure conditions and that they are perceived as reasonably
fair. That is a very important short-term priority. Then, subsequent
to that, is the development of a governance strategy that works
for Afghanistanthat does not necessarily create that centralised
state, but at least allows the delivery of some basic services.
We have created Potemkin institutions, if you will, in Kabul,
and I think we have to be much clearer about what our priorities
are.
Sajjan Gohel: To build on that,
the focus has been, and needs to continue to be, economic, social
and political and to assist in the background in terms of providing
security for the central Government in continuing to engage directly
and fight with the Taliban in the south. They need to prevent
them from gaining ground and enhancing their position. The economic
scenario is to continue with the investment and training to help
build a civilian infrastructure and to educate people to be teachers
and farmers and in the agricultural sector. We can play a positive
role in all those different facets that Afghanis want. As Mr.
Korski mentioned, the elections will be absolutely pivotal. The
eyes of the world will be on what happens there. Groups such as
al-Qaeda and the Taliban will want to try to exploit the situation
by trying to carry out attacks and creating chaos and disruption.
In the short term at least, it is important that there is enough
security on the ground to ensure that these different facets can
go ahead successfully and peacefully, and can develop and grow
in a grass-roots movement. It is also important to keep the ethnic
compositions in a way that does not create tensions. The Tajiks
traditionally dominated the Ministry of Defence or the Interior
Ministry. They must not be seen to be favoured over the Pashtuns.
Likewise, helping the Pashtuns should not be seen as a negative
thing for, say, the Hazaras. We have a history and track record
of a very positive role in nation building, not just in Afghanistan,
but elsewhere. What we are doing is good and positive, but it
needs to continue to be done perhaps at a greater level.
Dr. Gordon: The difficulty is
knowing where to begin. With the creation of the Helmand road
map, we were faced with exactly the same problem. Where do you
begin? What are the key policy priorities? There are a number
and without a number of them being addressed, you will not make
progress. The key point that we got from most of the Helmandis
who we spoke to was that they need a space in which they can collaborate
with their own political authorities, which means a different
form of security. That was the key element, which is why we focused
much more on a paramilitary policing capability based not on vehicle
checkpointsor taxation points as they are often describedroad
blocks and physical security, but on intelligence-led policing
and being able to co-ordinate with the Afghan national intelligence
service. Creating the space for political and economic collaboration
between individuals and district authorities in key population
centres would be an objective. The Government need to develop
their legitimacy, and that means at the national level a narrative
that resonates with the Pashtun and in particular the sense that
the Pashtun place in the Government has not been eclipsed by the
northern groups. However, it is deeper than that. It is also a
sense that Kabul is able to deliver key public servicesnot
every public service, but people need to see something tangible
delivered. Certainly the international development approach is
quite long term. It has been about capacity building and sustainability.
Those are all laudable aims, but what is often required is a sense
that the Government are doing something now. If they do not do
something now, that hearts and minds strategy is doomed to failure.
The next key point is that it is all very well using international
development money to build capacity in Government and to do infrastructure-based
projectsthey have their placebut what a lot of Afghans,
in Lashkar Gah, for example, want is mass employment. They often
talk in terms of what the Soviets did and the Americans before
them, which was to create structures that employed people. There
was a sense that the state could provide some form of economic
opportunity, apart from simply building highly visible infrastructure
elements. The United States Agency for International Development
is engaged in trying to create a demand-led economic recovery
in Lashkar Gah and Gereshk through contract buying of agriculture.
Providing some form of tangible stake in the economy is key. When
you look at parts of eastern Afghanistan, you will see that the
place where the Americans have argued that they have had success
is where there has been domestic economic recoveries of some sort.
Often that is in the illicit economy, but also often in the licit
one too. It is a raft of measures, not one simple focus. It is
about creating space for collaboration, a Government who are capable
of developing their legitimacy through some form of public services,
which are prioritised, and an immediate and demand-led economic
recovery as well.
Q173 Sir John Stanley: Finally,
let us turn to Pakistan. Again, what are the British Government's
policy priorities in your view?
Daniel Korski: Let me be brief.
I think that we need to support the civilian Government, strengthening
relations between the Government and the military. We need to
invest far more in police and judicial reform, especially in some
of the border areas, and we need to have a new look at how we
deliver assistance, in particular in some of these troubled areas,
perhaps with non-traditional partnersit could be China,
or Turkey. We need to find a way to help to provide development
in these areas, much in the way that my colleague here has spoken
about with regard to Afghanistan. Similarly, on the other side
of the border, we need to help to provide an alternative to the
kind of offers that are provided by the different insurgency groups
to disaffected and impoverished youths.
Sajjan Gohel: We need to get more
co-operation on the Pakistani side in terms of counter-terrorism,
specifically information as to where British citizens go, where
they end up being trained to take part in acts of terrorism against
the UK. The ammonium nitrate plotters who had half a tonne of
ammonium nitrate were convicted a couple of years ago, I believe.
We know that they went to places such as Malakand and Kohat in
the North West Frontier province. What is disturbing about that
is that in Malakand there is a very large army presence and they
would have been trained around the same area. So, one has to wonder
where these individuals go, where they are trained and who is
training them. We know that the ISI is a very powerful institution.
It may have problems from within, but it is the most feared security
institution in Pakistan. If it wanted to, it could certainly co-operate
a lot more in providing the information that we need for our authorities
here to be able to carry out their investigations successfully
and disrupt and foil plots. At the same time, we need to help
to shore up the civilian Government and prevent the military from
interfering in the domestic scene. Unfortunately, far too often
we have taken a back seat. We assumed that Musharraf would do
the right thing, as I mentioned earlier, and unfortunately he
did not. They say that General Ashfaq Kiyani, the chief of army
staff, is not interested in politics. During the problems over
the past couple of months in Punjab it looked as if he was playing
all the civilian politicians against each other. The other thing
that we have to bear in mind is that there is this reluctance
to talk to leaders of the Opposition, such as Nawaz Sharif. Nawaz
Sharif is seen sometimes by some as a fundamentalist. He is not
a fundamentalist, he is a conservative and there is a difference.
In the next four to six years, if the post of Prime Minister or
President exists in Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif will be one of them.
He will come back to power and will be a very powerful force.
I think that the UK has to consider talking to all the different
leaders in that country, because if we do not, others will. Nawaz
Sharif's biggest complaint, when he was in the UK a couple of
years ago, was that he was ignored. The Saudis stepped in. They
gave him armour-plated cars and support, and they have now got
a lot of influence with him. We lost an opportunity there. So,
we should be talking to the civilian politicians and helping them,
shoring them up against any threat from terrorism and the military,
but we should not be talking to the Pakistani Taliban and assuming
somehow that they will come to the negotiating table.
Sir John Stanley: Thank you. That is
very interesting.
Dr. Gordon: I have only one small
thing to add. Clearly development assistance will play a key part
in the future of Pakistan, particularly in the border areas, but
it raises some interesting questions as to what type of development
work will work and will achieve some sort of political or stabilising
effect. It raises real questions about whether we have instruments
that will work to that effect or whether we are expecting far
too much of development assistance and financial aid. There are
going to be significant difficulties in terms of channelling that
funding. Who is going to be delivering this and what political
message will it send? It raises real questions about which instruments
work and under what conditions, whether they can be tied to political
objectives in that way, and whether that is appropriate.
Chairman: Thank you, Dr. Gordon, Mr.
Gohel and Mr. Korski. This has been very valuable and we are very
grateful to you.
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