Examination of Witnesses (Questions 220-233)
RT HON
LORD MALLOCH-BROWN
AND ADAM
THOMSON
14 MAY 2009
Q220 Mr. Horam: So you would support
negotiation on those terms?
Lord Malloch-Brown: On those terms,
yes.
Q221 Sir John Stanley: A quick,
final question on Afghanistan. Just continuing on this crucial
area of "talking with the Taliban", on past historical
performance there has always been one guaranteed loser coming
out of deals with the Taliban, and that has been women and girls.
That is what happened with Musharraf's deal with the Taliban in
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. That is what
has come out of the present Pakistan Government's deal with the
Taliban in relation to Swat valley. Minister, I would say to you
that it is an almost certain likelihood that in any deal done
with the Taliban inside Afghanistan, the real losers are going
to be women and girls. It was put to us by some very brave individuals—women
who literally walk with the threat of death each day—that
there needs to be women's representation in any negotiation with
the Taliban, otherwise women are going to get sold out.
Lord Malloch-Brown: First, I acknowledge
the risk. They have a terrible reputation on these issues and
there is no reason to believe that their spots have changed when
it comes to the treatment of women. That is, I suppose, another
reason why it is so important to understand the nature of the
dialogue that we would support in the reconciliation process.
While "talking with the Taliban", as you put it by sticking
the inverted commas in it, is a glib soundbite, in two ways it
does not clarify what is intended here. One, it is talking with
those who have supported the Taliban, and maybe ultimately with
elements who might even be described as Taliban, but it is not
arriving at an agreement with the hardcore traditional Taliban
leadership and their hardcore, hard-line allies. That is not what
is in President Karzai's mind, or ours. It is about winning back
groups who have gone over.
The second point is that it is about winning
those groups back into a system of governance based on elections
and the democratic rule of law which is being established. It
is not delegating a province to them, and so I would hope that
the system and the checks and balances it would provide mean that
the rights of women would be protected, but I acknowledge that
this is going to be a very difficult area.
Q222 Chairman: Now I am going
to ask you some questions about the Pakistan-Taliban relationship.
We were there two weeks ago when the Pakistani establishment politically
was reassessing the relationship and the deal that had been worked
out in the Swat valley. Since then, there has been a major military
offensive going on and there are a lot of internally displaced
people and big humanitarian consequences. What is your assessment
of how serious the Pakistani Government is in tackling the extremist
threat? How serious are the Pakistani military, and how serious
are the intelligence and security services in Pakistan—the
ISI, principally?
Lord Malloch-Brown: Let me first
say that I think the Pakistani Government found that the deal
that had been made in the Swat enjoyed support nowhere in Pakistan.
The efforts that the Government and military have now made to
recover control of Swat is, in the statements of politicians in
Pakistan and in the polling and everything else that is available
in terms of evidence, overwhelmingly supported. Pakistanis were
as shocked as much as outsiders that there could be an al-Qaeda/Taliban
presence that close to Islamabad. That analogy can be overdrawn
because it may be close as the crow flies, but it is a long way
in terms of the terrain between the two. Nevertheless, it was
a shock to the system. In that sense, that shock was felt not
only in public opinion but in the civilian Government, which realised
that it was a test of their authority—a profound political
test. Also, in the army, and I imagine, the ISI, everybody felt
on the spot by this, and needed to turn the thing back.
I think that there are some real concerns about
how the Pakistanis have gone about the matter, as so often is
the case: largely aerial attacks or long-distance attacks, which
are a lot harder to manage in terms of limiting civilian displacement
and casualties. Ultimately, they are a lot less effective than
using ground troops against these kinds of elements. The Government,
the army and others have got their work cut out. We support wholly
what they are doing, with this one big caveat of the need to try
to look after civilians and protect them from displacement.
I was visited yesterday by a delegation of British
citizens who have family in the Swat valley. While they were worried
about their welfare and concerned with the tactics that are being
used—the aerial bombardments, for example—they, too,
felt that it was vital that the Government recover control of
the Swat valley, because their relatives have already come under
incredible abuses in the few short weeks of Taliban control.
Q223 Chairman: What about the
Pakistani ISI? It has been reported that it has been funding and
supporting militant extremist groups in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.
There are also allegations of a relationship—at least at
arm's length—with Lashkar-e-Taiba, who did the bombing in
Mumbai. Are we convinced that it is on board on the strategy that
the Zardari Government have?
Lord Malloch-Brown: We are convinced
that it is on board institutionally, and that the leaderships
of both the army and the ISI are supportive of the president and
his strategy, which is reflected through the meetings that we
have had with General Kayani. There is a difficulty, that within
the ISI, there may remain individuals who have some sympathy with
these groups. Do you want to add to that?
Adam Thomson: That's fair. It
is the case that, historically—at our behest, in part—the
ISI developed relations with Islamic groups.
Q224 Chairman: This is about Afghanistan
in the 1970s and '80s?
Adam Thomson: Yes, I am talking
about Afghanistan. It has not proved that easy for it, as an institution,
to turn that off and to turn it around quickly, but I think that
it is working on it. To address the Lashkar-e-Taiba that you referred
to, the fact that the Pakistani Government have been able to put
a number of individuals on trial for responsibility for aspects
of the Mumbai attacks suggests that the Government have support
across the Pakistani establishment.
Q225 Chairman: What about the
recent concern expressed forcefully? You referred earlier on to
Secretary of State Clinton. There are also reported remarks—I
don't know if they were public ones—by General Petraeus,
who was wearied of Pakistan's excuses for failing to take on the
Taliban. How much do you think the Pakistani Government are acting
now because of domestic public opinion? Or is it more that they
realise that the US will put much tougher conditions on assistance
and support in the future if they do not take the threats seriously?
Lord Malloch-Brown: As you know,
President Zardari was in the United States last week and here
in London yesterday. I think that he has been left in no doubt
about the American view. The United States is giving massive support
to his Government and to Pakistan, as are we. We are doing it
on the premise that there is going to be clear Pakistani action
against these groups. Having said that, both we and the Americans
equally are cognisant of the extremely difficult situation in
Pakistan. The Government are weak, and they came to power through
an election that was a cathartic event in some ways, but was marred
by the assassination of Mrs. Bhutto. President Zardari himself
did not have a direct personal mandate; he was elected by the
Parliament. The coalition between himself and the main opposition,
under Nawaz Sharif, has broken apart, and the pressure from the
lawyers, and from civil society more broadly, has continued, although
it was happily resolved, in part, by the restoration of the Chief
Justice.
Pakistan is a country where the military has
traditionally had a mind of its own and an independence from civilian
control. There are major obstacles here that do not make it straightforward
that London or Washington can say, "We are giving you a lot
of support, we demand that you crack down." We all recognise
that the politics are complicated, but the fact is that it has
become absolutely critical to Britain's national security that
the strategy succeeds in Pakistan and that a democratic Government
are established who impose law and order and security, and suppress
the terrorist groups. It is harder to think of a more important
foreign policy priority at the moment for the UK than success
in Pakistan.
Chairman: I think that that view would
be shared—it is not just the Government—by the 800,00
British people of Pakistani heritage.
Q226 Sir John Stanley: Minister,
I referred earlier to the 250-km porous border in mountainous
country between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which, I suppose, is
about as favourable a bit of topography as al-Qaeda and the Taliban
could ever hope to have. This is all in the public domain. As
you know, an up-and-running Afghanistan-Pakistan joint operational
cell dealing with cross-border co-operation has now been established
successfully along the eastern border. NATO is very anxious to
get that extended further down the eastern border and along the
southern border as well. Can you assure us that the British Government
will do all that they can, with whatever resources they have,
to support NATO to get the extensions required around the border
of the Afghanistan-Pakistan joint operational cross-border co-operation
activities?
Lord Malloch-Brown: Yes, and let
me add that we make it clear in our new strategy that we will
support a comprehensive approach. That covers development, governance,
trade, military assistance and training, and support to that operational
unit. We consider it to be an absolute key pivot of the policy
to get the cross-border stuff right.
Q227 Mr. Horam: An important part
of that co-operation is intelligence co-operation between our
intelligence services and the ISI, which we obviously want. The
Committee has had evidence that that is not going very well. People
have said to us that the ISI is not pro-active in making its intelligence
available to the West, that it has been unhelpful in relation
to investigations into the 7/7 and 21/7 attacks, and that it has
misdirected UK and US intelligence services. Is that a problem?
Lord Malloch-Brown: I think it
has historically been a problem with two sides to it, with the
ISI complaining that we have been reluctant to share operational
intelligence because we have been worried about its security;
both sides bring an argument to the table about this. Improved
intelligence sharing and co-ordination was one of the outcomes
of yesterday's meeting between President Zardari and the Prime
Minister. It is not a new outcome; it is something that came up
in the Prime Minister's recent trip to Pakistan, and it is continually
debated at the official level. Obviously, it was, in a sense,
a key issue in the aftermath of the Mumbai bombings when Pakistan
was essentially saying, "Show us the intelligence—show
us why you believe that people operating from here were involved
in the attacks and why you believe it was Lashkar-e-Taiba."
We did share, but there were many issues surrounding how much
we were willing to share and demands were made for us to share
more.
I suppose that our strategic issue is that,
given the number of terrorist incidents and averted incidents
in the UK that are sourced from Pakistan in one way or another,
it has become absolutely incumbent on us that we build a more
trusting intelligence relationship between the two countries.
We need that for our security. The fact is that it has not been
perfect, there have been problems and we are working to try to
raise it to a new level. It is so important that we do that.
Q228 Mr. Pope: We are currently
trying to deport some Pakistani nationals who were arrested in
Operation Pathway last month. One of the obstacles to deportation
in such instances, where we have enough intelligence to believe
that these people are a threat to us, but not enough evidence
to go before a court of law so we therefore look to deport, is
whether their human rights will be infringed if they are deported.
Have we considered memorandums of understanding with Pakistan,
as we have with other countries, to ensure that their human rights
will be protected if they are deported?
Lord Malloch-Brown: Yes. Assurances,
as they are called, are very much part of the discussion.
Q229 Mr. Pope: One of the problems
with this case, and I suspect with other cases as well, is that
Pakistani nationals have come to the UK on student visas. In this
particular case, they were not students—they were no more
students than you or I—and we have heard unsubstantiated
allegations that the visa section of our high commission in Islamabad
has been compromised by people who are corrupt or criminal in
some way. Are you satisfied that the system is rigorous and free
from abuse?
Lord Malloch-Brown: I have to
tell you that that was one of my first questions, because I had
heard of another embassy in Pakistan that had had those problems
and basically had to close down and start again. I have received
very reassuring answers that we are convinced that we have complete
control over the integrity of that operation. It is the largest
British embassy in the world precisely because of the size of
the visa operation. As we have post-mortemed on this, I think
that the issue has been more a case of making sure that we are
doing a better job of checking the academic institutions at this
end to which these students are purportedly going. I think that
it is fair to say that that was probably the weak link, Adam,
more than the screening process in Pakistan, although we clearly
got it wrong.
Chairman: Still on visas, Sir John.
Q230 Sir John Stanley: Minister,
we had a very helpful and extensive briefing inside the visa section
in the high commission in Islamabad. We are very fortunate to
have so many very dedicated staff working at very intensive levels
there, dealing with a staggering amount of applications. We were
shown illustrations of the sophistication of the forged documents
that get submitted. There is clearly a forgery industry on a huge
scale that is designed to get people into this country on the
basis of forged documents. The scale of the forgeries, all of
which hopefully our staff in Islamabad have intercepted, brings
out the inescapable fact that people out there will be willing
to pay substantial sums in order to corrupt the process. I hope
that you can assure us that the FCO back in London will not fall
into the same trap that it fell into in Tel Aviv, for example,
where a serious scandal went undetected for a long period and
was subject to a National Audit Office report that came before
this Committee.
Lord Malloch-Brown: I think that
the UK Border Agency has built in an awful lot of checks.[5]
You saw them for yourselves: the way in which there is screening
and then secondary screening, checking and all the rest. The other
piece to observe is that the biometrics technology is fundamentally
changing a lot of this. One of our most senior spies complained
to me that biometrics were making the whole spying industry redundant
because nowadays you could travel only on one passport because
your biometrics are attached to you; you have a human genetic
passport from which you cannot separate yourself. We have controls
that were not there before. But I completely agree with you, Sir
John, that vigilance is the order of the day. Like you, I have
toured that operation and have been impressed by the controls
and the quality of our people, but you just know that it is almost
impossible to get a 100% success rate with it.
Q231 Mr. Pope: On the different
issue of India and Kashmir, the most recent Government strategy
document on Pakistan does not mention India or Kashmir at all.
As an old Kashmir hand, I fully understand the sensitivities of
the Indian Government when the British Government raise Kashmir.
But in terms of having a stable Pakistan, it is vastly in India's
own interests at least to have a period of calm in relation to
Kashmir. It was interesting that that was not mentioned in the
strategy document. I realise that we are very short of time, but
I would appreciate your saying something about the importance
that the UK Government place on at least having a period of stability
in relation to India and Pakistan, and to Kashmir, in particular.
Lord Malloch-Brown: You are very
well aware, Mr. Pope, of the sensitivities. It was interesting
that, when the American envoy was appointed, there was an immediate
flurry when it was suggested that his remit also covered India.
The Indians jumped to the conclusion that that meant Kashmir,
and he had to clarify rapidly that that was not the case because
there is sensitivity. The reason why Hillary Clinton and President
Obama wanted him to have an Indian dimension to what he was doing
was exactly your point—a point that I share 100% with you.
While you have a Pakistan which considers that its first military
purpose in life is to maintain 800,000[6]
troops on the Indian border and to be ready to fight a conventional
war with India and maybe a nuclear war with India, it is very
hard to get it to focus, let alone train for, equip for and organise
for an insurgency in the Swat valley, or for insurgencies in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas. I agree that, until we can
de-escalate the tension between the two countries and allow Pakistan
to detach and demobilise itself from the Indian dimension and
re-engage around its internal security problems, we shall never
get an optimal outcome. That is not just an overnight strategic
decision. It is all about trust building and all the rest, and
it has a Kashmir component to it. Secondly, not only do you have
to do it to get Pakistan engaged where it needs to be engaged,
but ultimately, for Afghanistan's sake, until you can have the
neighbours, which include India and Pakistan, sensibly sitting
down and mutually guaranteeing Afghanistan's independence and
security, you have not reached where you need to get to in terms
of an enduring solution for Afghanistan.
Chairman: In our visit two weeks ago
it was made very clear to us that there is a very strong perception
among a large number of Pakistanis that somehow the problems in
Pakistan were being imported from Afghanistan and encouraged by
the Indians. Clearly that complicates the debate. At the same
time, as you said, the focus militarily and politically on the
Kashmir question means that the real threat, which is coming as
we have seen from the Swat valley and elsewhere, is perhaps underplayed
when, in fact, Pakistan focuses so much on the other side. What
Mr. Pope said is absolutely my assessment of it.
We have time for two quick questions: Mr. Mackinlay
first and then Sir John Stanley.
Q232 Andrew Mackinlay: You touched,
in your dialogue with the Chairman, on the whole question of aid—the
United States' big growth in aid, and that of the United Kingdom.
Between 2005 and 2011 our aid to Pakistan is doubling. That raises
the question of conditionality. Many people in Congress are arguing
that they want some reassurances on nuclear. There is a suggestion
that A. Q. Khan should be handed over, or that there should be
access to Khan to find out what he has been doing. As a legislator,
to some extent I think that's not unreasonable. I listened carefully
to what you said. You said that we—also the Administration
in the US—have to buttress this fragile democracy. However,
it seems to me that we who vote the money should be saying that
we want some strict conditionality. We want some reassurance about
at least the safety of nuclear. I think that there is a case for
our access to Khan. What say you on that kind of thing?
Lord Malloch-Brown: Look, as so
often in these things, you have to balance two apparently contradictory
objectives. First, Pakistan is potentially a very dangerous nuclear
state, and people forget how close we came to a nuclear war between
India and Pakistan not that many years ago. If the responsible
military establishment were to lose control of Pakistan's nuclear
arsenal, it could be devastating to world security. At the moment
we believe that there is no immediate risk of that happening,
but it remains a threat while it is there, and we have to deal
with it. The problem is really twofold. One is that Pakistan's
nuclear programme is designed to combat India's nuclear programme,
and therefore it is very hard to see how you are going to solve
it without solving the India-Pakistan relationship. It is a consequence
of that, and therefore you have to get to that root cause. But
we have to bring Pakistan properly into the international community
on nuclear issues, and nuclear management and security, because
it is an undeclared nuclear weapons state. It is one of those
that has nuclear weapons in defiance of the non-proliferation
treaty. In a way, what happened with India—the deal that
we supported was very good in handling India—has merely
exacerbated Pakistan's sense of grievance about its nuclear status
vis-a"-vis India. There are real issues to be dealt with
there. So, yes, we need to bring pressure, but we also have to
remember—I am sorry, I shall be quick and leave time for
the other question—that the relevant programme, which is
now £665 million over the 2009 to 2013 period, which makes
that the second biggest earner, is going through what is in its
way a sophisticated Government, with a lot of smart people. What
we have demanded from them is that they continue to meet their
commitments to poverty reduction, good financial management and
respect for human rights and other international obligations,
including in this area. But we have to find the right balance,
because if we do this wrong and make it too conditional and too
political, it will backfire and not achieve the objectives that
we want.
Q233 Sir John Stanley: We have
referred again and again in this evidence session this afternoon
to the critical importance of trying to establish co-operative
relations with the Pakistan Government in dealing with the terrorist
threat that they face inside Pakistan. Do you agree that almost
nothing could be more damaging to those efforts to get alongside
the Pakistan Government than the fact that from time to time—it
will be true in the future—civilian casualties will be caused
by US drones operating over Pakistan, killing women and children
and innocent Pakistani nationals?
Lord Malloch-Brown: Look, we are
obviously concerned about it. Civilian casualties are a very inflammatory
issue—they are also a desperate issue of unnecessary loss
of life—but we have been very clear that this is an issue
between the Pakistanis and the US. They have had an opportunity
just this last week to discuss it at length. They need to work
out between themselves how they want to handle it. We are observers,
not participants, in this issue.
Adam Thomson: Could I just plead
that we do not believe all the propaganda about civilian casualties?
My impression—but it is only an impression and you will
have to check, Sir John—is that the targeting of drone strikes
is very carefully done.
Chairman: Lord Malloch-Brown, Mr. Thomson,
we have had a very good session and covered a huge amount of ground,
not just relevant for our Afghanistan-Pakistan inquiry. We shall
also be shortly producing a report on proliferation issues, which
will no doubt touch on some of the nuclear matters that you have
alluded to. We are very grateful to you. Thank you very much.
5 Ev 188 Back
6
Note by witness: This figure should read c.300,000. Back
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