Conclusions and recommendations
The structure of the FCO report
1. We
conclude that the FCO's inclusion in its report of extensive sections
on what steps it is taking to promote equality and democracy,
including women's and children's rights, is welcome. We recommend
that next year's report includes what the FCO is doing both to
extend the right of freedom of association, and to achieve progress
amongst Commonwealth countries in implementing the human rights
provisions of the Harare Declaration. (Paragraph 10)
US policy on extraordinary rendition
2. We
conclude that the shift in attitude of the new US Administration
on the definition of torture and in its approach to extraordinary
rendition is to be welcomed. We recommend that, in its response
to this Report, the Government supplies us with a full assessment
of whether, in its opinion, the present US policy in relation
to secret and transitory detention and permitted interrogation
techniques fully conforms to international human rights standards
as interpreted by the UK. (Paragraph 20)
Rendition
3. We
conclude that it is unacceptable that the Government has not taken
steps to obtain the full details of the two individuals who were
rendered through Diego Garcia. We recommend that the Government
presses the new US Administration to provide these details, and
that it should then either publish them, or explain the reasons
why it considers it would not be in the public interest to publish
them. (Paragraph 28)
4. We
conclude that the use of Diego Garcia for US rendition flights
without the knowledge or consent of the British Government raises
disquieting questions about the effectiveness of the Government's
exercise of its responsibilities in relation to this territory.
We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government
indicates whether it considers that UK law has effect in British
Indian Ocean Territory, and whether it considers that either UK
law or the agreements between the US and UK over the use of BIOT
were broken by the admitted US rendition flights in 2002. (Paragraph
30)
5. We
conclude that, in the light of the controversy over the use of
British Indian Ocean Territory for purposes of rendition by the
US, it is important that full records of flights through the territory
are kept, and retained for an indefinite period. We conclude that
it is to be welcomed that the British representative on Diego
Garcia now keeps flight records. We recommend that the Government
discloses how, why and by whom the records relating to flights
through Diego Garcia since the start of 2002 were destroyed. We
further recommend that the Government provides, in its response
to this Report, full details of its record-keeping and record-disposal
policy in relation to flights through British territory, particularly
BIOT, and state for how long it now retains such records. We recommend
that, in its response, the Government addresses the question of
whether it considers that current aviation law and aircraft identification
procedures are sufficient to identify flights which may be carrying
out rendition both through Diego Garcia or elsewhere through UK
airspace. (Paragraph 33)
6. We
conclude that it is a matter of concern that many allegations
continue to be made that the two acknowledged instances of rendition
through British Indian Ocean Territory in 2002 do not represent
the limit of the territory's use for this purpose. We further
conclude that it is extremely difficult for the British Government
to assess the veracity of these allegations without active and
candid co-operation from the US Administration. We recommend that
the Government requests the Obama Administration to carry out
a further, comprehensive check on its records relating to the
use of BIOT with a view to testing the truth of the specific allegations
(including those set out in paragraph 34 above) relating to rendition
through the territory. We conclude that it is unsatisfactory that
the Government is not able to give us a categorical assurance
that re-victualling of ships anchored outside BIOT's territorial
waters by any vessel from BIOT, for purpose of assisting rendition,
has not occurred. We further conclude that it is unsatisfactory
that the US has only undertaken to inform the UK of the movement
of ships in Diego Garcia's territorial waters in normal circumstances
but not in all cases. We recommend that the Government requests
the US Administration to supply details of any movement of ships
in Diego Garcia's waters since January 2002 that were not notified
at the time to the UK authorities, and seek assurances that at
no point were these or other vessels used for re-victualling of
vessels outside Diego Garcia's territorial waters which were being
used for purposes of rendition. (Paragraph 37)
7. We
reiterate our previous conclusion that it is deplorable that previous
US assurances about rendition flights through Diego Garcia have
turned out to be false. We further conclude that the basis of
trust in subsequent US assurances about the use of BIOT has been
undermined. We recommend that the Government outline what practical
action it is taking to ensure that it has full sources of information
about US rendition activity on BIOT. (Paragraph 41)
8. We
reiterate our earlier conclusion that the Government has a moral
and legal obligation to ensure that flights that enter UK airspace
or land at UK airports are not part of the rendition circuit.
We acknowledge the practical difficulties in the way of monitoring
all empty flights transiting UK territory or airspace. We recommend
that the Government, in its response to this Report, sets out
options for more effectively establishing whether flights, including
those by civilian aircraft, are on their way to or from a rendition
operation. (Paragraph 43)
9. We
recommend that the Government complete its analysis of practicalities
of signing the UN Convention on Enforced Disappearances as soon
as possible. We further recommend that, having been supportive
of the Convention at the drafting stage, the Government should
declare its intention, in principle, to sign. (Paragraph 46)
Allegations of UK complicity in torture
10. We
conclude that the practices of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI) Agency continue to give cause for great concern, in the
light of the allegations we have received that the Agency subjects
detainees to mistreatment and torture. We further conclude that
while the UK must, by necessity, maintain its relationship with
Pakistani intelligence, we are very concerned by allegations that
the nature of the relationship UK officials have with the ISI
may have led them to be complicit in torture. We recommend that,
in its response to this Report, the Government supplies us with
details of the investigations it has carried out into the specific
allegations of UK complicity in torture in Pakistan brought to
public attention by Reprieve and Human Rights Watch, and the grounds
it has for supposing those allegations to be baseless. We further
recommend that the Government make an explicit statement that
in future co-operation with the Pakistani authorities, UK officials
should in no circumstances be uncritical of, or complicit in,
abuses of human rights. We recommend that, in its response to
this Report, the Government confirms that it is its policy, in
respect of every case where allegations of torture in Pakistan
are drawn to its attention, for such allegations to be passed
to the Pakistani authorities and every available step taken to
ensure that they are investigated and responded to fully. (Paragraph
54)
11. We
conclude that the Government's intention to establish the same
standards for dual and mono British nationals in relation to consular
access is to be welcomed. We recommend that this change should
be brought into effect as soon as possible, and that in its response
to this Report the Government sets out a timetable for this to
be achieved. We further recommend that all British nationals should
be offered consular advice as soon as the Government is aware
of their detention, and certainly before they are interrogated
by any foreign intelligence service. (Paragraph 57)
12. We
conclude that, notwithstanding the recent changes to House of
Commons standing orders, the Intelligence and Security Committee
(ISC) remains a creature of the Government, not a committee of
Parliament, and that consequently there continues to be a deficit
in the parliamentary scrutiny of intelligence and security matters.
We reiterate our previous recommendation that the ISC should be
reconstituted as a select committee of the House of Commons. (Paragraph
63)
13. We
conclude that if the Investigatory Powers Tribunal is to be an
effective safeguard it should be able to investigate allegations
made by third parties. We recommend that the Government brings
forward proposals to make this change. (Paragraph 64)
14. We
conclude that, while we understand the Government's caution about
publishing historical guidance to intelligence officers whilst
current court cases are in progress, we are not convinced that
the release of material that would be available to a court on
request is likely to prejudice a case. We therefore recommend
that such historical guidance should be placed in the public domain
as soon as possible. (Paragraph 68)
15. We
conclude that it is essential that there is a robust system of
accountability to ensure that the Foreign Secretary uses section
7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994 in a responsible fashion.
We recommend that, in is response to this Report, the Government
informs us whether the Intelligence Services Commissioner has
ever expressed any concern regarding the use of powers given to
the Foreign Secretary under section 7 of the Act. (Paragraph
71)
16. We
conclude that it is essential that the UK maintains effective
intelligence relationships with other countries, and we note that
these countries may include ones, such as Pakistan, where there
are most serious concerns about human rights abuses of detainees.
We further conclude that the Government is correct to base decisions
about intelligence co-operation on an assessment of the risk of
mistreatment of detainees, and we are heartened to learn that
there have been cases in which on this basis co-operation had
not taken place. We further conclude that it is essential that
the Government emphasise to its foreign counterparts that torture
is unacceptable, and that it should work pro-actively to persuade
other states to renounce the use of torture against all detainees,
whatever their nationality. (Paragraph 74)
17. We
conclude that the use by the UK Government of intelligence information
which may serve to avert a potentially catastrophic terrorist
attack, but which is supplied by foreign states and which may
have been obtained through torture, raises profoundly difficult
moral questions. We further conclude that the Government has a
duty to use information that comes into its possession, from whatever
source and however obtained, if it believes this will avert the
loss of life. At the same time, we strongly recommend that the
Government should continue to exert as much persuasion and pressure
as possible to try to ensure world-wide that torture is not employed
as a method of interrogation. (Paragraph 79)
18. We
conclude that it is imperative that the UK fulfils its legal obligations
in respect of the prevention of torture, including any duty to
act positively to prevent it, investigate allegations that it
has taken place, and expose it. We further conclude that there
is a risk that use of evidence which may have been obtained under
torture on a regular basis, especially where it is not clear that
protestations about mistreatment have elicited any change in behaviour
by foreign intelligence services, could be construed as complicity
in such behaviour. (Paragraph 83)
19. We
conclude that it is essential to maintain secrecy in relation
to intelligence work. We further conclude that allegations presented
to us of UK complicity in torture are a matter of concern. However,
both owing to the operation of the House's sub judice rule
and because we are not in a position to subject these allegations
to the necessary forensic scrutiny (involving examination and
cross-examination) available to a court of law, we are not in
a position to pronounce on the truth or otherwise of these allegations.
We further conclude that any decision by the Government on whether
to institute an independent judicial inquiry should await the
conclusion of the current court cases. (Paragraph 85)
Transfers of detainees
20. We
conclude that it is a matter of concern that the Government has
not provided details of the fate of individuals detained by US
forces in Iraq as a result of operations by UK forces, or those
captured by UK forces and detained by US forces. We recommend
that, in its response to this Report, the Government informs us
of the number of such detainees, relevant details of the circumstances
of their capture and the degree of involvement of UK forces, and
any assurances it has received from the US authorities about their
treatment and whereabouts, on an individual basis. We further
recommend that the Government, in its response, provides us with
a full statement of its record-keeping practice in respect of
persons captured by UK forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, whether
or not UK forces make the eventual detention. (Paragraph 90)
21. We
conclude that the Government should have waited for the European
Court of Human Rights to rule on whether the transfer of Faisal
Attiyah Nassar Al-Saadoon and Khalaf Hussain Mufdhi to the Iraqi
authorities in December 2008 was consistent with its obligations
under the European Convention on Human Rights before proceeding
with the transfer. We further conclude that explicit assurances
that the death penalty would not be used in the event of a conviction
in these cases should have been obtained in writing from the Iraqi
authorities at the highest level. We recommend that in future
the Government obtains such explicit assurances in writing from
any national authority to which it transfers a detainee. (Paragraph
95)
22. We
conclude that the onward transfer to Afghanistan of two Pakistani
men transferred from UK to US custody in Iraq in 2004 is of great
concern. We do not regard the stated reason for this transfer,
that US forces did not have sufficient linguists available in
Iraq, as being convincing. We further conclude that it is not
acceptable that the Government is unable to identify these detainees,
or to provide assurances about their subsequent treatment. We
recommend that the Government, in its response to this Report,
identifies these men, and inform us of what steps it has taken
to discover whether they have been treated in an acceptable way
since being transferred to US forces. We conclude that the allegation
by Reprieve that these two cases were not, as the Government asserts,
isolated ones, gives cause for concern. We recommend that the
Government investigates in detail any specific allegations put
before it by Reprieve and reports to us the outcome of those investigations.
(Paragraph 101)
23. We
conclude that the potential treatment of detainees transferred
by UK forces to the Afghan authorities gives cause for concern,
given that there is credible evidence that torture and other abuses
occur within the Afghan criminal justice system. We recommend
that the Government institutes a more rigorous system for checking
on the welfare of tranferees in Afghanistan, on an individual
basis, and that in its response to this Report, it informs us
of the steps proposes to take to achieve this end. (Paragraph
105)
24. We
conclude that although there may be scope for argument about the
extent of the legal obligation on the UK to monitor the welfare
of individual detainees after it has transferred them to another
country, there is no doubt in our view that the UK is under a
moral obligation to do so. Such monitoring is desirable not only
to enable the Government to intervene if it receives information
that an individual is being ill-treated, but also because any
evidence thus revealed of systematic ill-treatment will call into
question whether future transfers to that country should take
place. We recommend that the Government takes the necessary action
to ensure that it has mechanisms in place to allow it effectively
to monitor the welfare of individuals transferred, and in its
response to this Report sets out what specific steps it is taking.
(Paragraph 113)
Oversight of private military security companies
and contractors
25. We
reiterate our previous conclusion that in cases like that of the
allegations of abuse concerning the British Embassy in Baghdad,
it is not appropriate for investigation of complaints against
contractors' staff to be entrusted solely to the contractors.
We conclude that the proper treatment of staff working for FCO-employed
contractors overseas should be considered to be an FCO responsibility.
Therefore we conclude that the inclusion of FCO officials in the
team that investigated the latest allegations of abuse by KBR
staff at the Baghdad Embassy is to be welcomed. We recommend that
in order for the FCO reliably to monitor the compliance of its
contractors with its own employment practices and standards, all
similar allegations of serious misconduct by or against contracted
staff should be investigated by a team that includes FCO representation.
We further recommend that provision for this to happen should
be explicitly made in future contracts. We conclude that it remains
disappointing that the FCO is unwilling to reopen the investigation
into the allegations in 2007 that female staff at the British
Embassy in Baghdad had been abused by managers working for KBR,
given the doubts that remain about the fairness and independence
of the investigation. We recommend that the Government reconsider
its position on this matter. (Paragraph 125)
26. We
conclude that it is regrettable and disappointing that after such
a long delay the Government has proposed a system of regulation
for private military and security companies (PMSCs) based on a
voluntary code of self-regulation. We remain unconvinced that
anything other than a legislative solution can provide suitably
strict regulation of PMSCs operating from the UK or employed overseas
by the Government. We do not believe that a potential loss of
business constitutes a sufficient sanction to control PMSCs' behaviour.
We recommend that that when the Government issues its response
to the recent consultation exercise, it commits itself to pursuing
a legislative solution to the regulation of PMSCs at an EU or
international level. (Paragraph 136)
27. We
recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government
gives us full particulars of the individual members of staff who
enjoy diplomatic immunity, and the grounds on which this has been
justified, and that it supplies us with a full statement of its
policy on the provision of diplomatic immunity to staff who are
not directly employed by the Government.(Paragraph 138)
UN Human Rights Council
28. We
conclude that the UN Human Rights Council's May 2009 resolution
rejecting calls for investigation of human rights violations in
Sri Lanka is deeply regrettable, and has damaged the credibility
of the Council. We recommend that the Government continues to
promote the view that significant transgressions of human rights
committed by parties to internal political conflicts should not
be regarded as being solely the "domestic business"
of the state concerned. We conclude that the international community
has both a right and a responsibility to express concern about,
and where appropriate to launch investigations into, situations
where major abuses have been alleged. (Paragraph 152)
29. We
conclude that other aspects of the work of the Human Rights Council
are to be applauded, in particular the developing system of Universal
Periodic Reviews, and the decision to continue the international
investigation of human rights abuses in Sudan. We further conclude
that the increase in 2008 in the number of Council resolutions
which the Government was able to support is to be welcomed, and
that it is to be hoped that the participation of the United States
will lead to a strengthening of the positive work of the Council.
(Paragraph 153)
The Durban Review Conference
30. We
conclude that the UK's handling of the issue of participation
in the "Durban Review Conference" held in Geneva in
April 2009 was well-judged. The UK delegation left the conference
hall in protest at President Ahmadinejad's offensive and anti-Semitic
remarks, but did not allow his calculated provocation to derail
the wider work of the conference, in which the UK played a full
part. We recommend that the Government continues to support the
positive work of the Durban review process in combating racism
worldwide, while at the same time maintaining the right of freedom
of expression in relation to ideologies and beliefs, and defending
the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people. (Paragraph
160)
International Criminal Law
31. We
conclude that there is mounting hostility to the International
Criminal Court in Africa and elsewhere, manifested most dramatically
in Sudan's refusal to co-operate with the Court. This reflects
a deepening division between Western countries and some other
countries, particularly those from the developing world, over
issues of state sovereignty in relation to human rights—exemplified
also in the UN Human Rights Council's recent rejection of international
"interference" in the investigation of alleged human
rights abuses in Sri Lanka. We further conclude that such attitudes,
if they continue to spread, may have the effect of undermining
the promotion of universal human rights worldwide. We recommend
that the Government works to strengthen international support
for the ICC, and for the principle of bringing to justice those
who commit war crimes or crimes against humanity. We further recommend
that it encourages the new Administration in the United States
to accede to the Rome Statute of the ICC, which would mean that
a majority of the Permanent Members of the Security Council would
have acceded, marking a significant step towards the long-term
aim of achieving universality of the Rome Statute. (Paragraph
168)
Countries of concern
Burma
32. We
conclude that the scale of human rights abuses in Burma, and the
extent of suffering caused to the Burmese people by their government's
economic and political mismanagement, is intolerable. The Burmese
government's indifference to the welfare of its own people was
demonstrated by its handling of Cyclone Nargis in 2008. We recommend
that the British Government continues to exercise the strictest
vigilance in ensuring that aid supplied to Burma is not misused
by the authorities. We further recommend that the UK encourages
Burma's regional neighbours, in particular China, India and Thailand,
to bring pressure on the regime to improve its human rights record.
(Paragraph 176)
China
33. We
conclude that there remains little evidence that the British Government's
policy of constructive dialogue with China has led to any significant
improvements in the human rights situation. We recommend that
the Government sets benchmarks and specific targets for making
progress in this dialogue; these should take account of but not
be restricted to the time-specific commitments given by China
itself during its Universal Periodic Review process. We further
recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government
informs us of what action it is proposing to take in this regard.
(Paragraph 183)
34. We
reiterate the conclusions of our 2008 Report on Global Security:
Japan and Korea that China is in breach of its obligations
under the 1951 Refugee Convention as regards its treatment of
North Korean migrants. We remain particularly exercised by China's
continuing failure to allow the UN High Commission on Refugees
access to its border region with North Korea, and by its practice
of forcible repatriation of North Koreans who have not had access
to a determination-of-status process. We recommend that the Government
should urge the UN High Commissioner on Refugees to give a high
priority to the issue of the treatment of North Korean migrants
in China. We further recommend that the Government works internationally
and more actively to encourage China to find ways of fulfilling
its international obligations on this issue as part of the process
of becoming a responsible global power. (Paragraph 184)
35. We
conclude that the absence of any momentum towards resolving the
dispute over Tibet is a matter of grave concern. We recommend
that the Government continues to press its Chinese counterparts
to lift restrictions on access to Tibet, to allow an independent
assessment of the human rights situation there to be carried out
by representatives of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
(Paragraph 190)
36. We
conclude that the developing situation in Xinjiang, with significant
violence arising from long-standing ethnic tensions between Uighurs
and Han Chinese, gives cause for concern. We recommend that the
Government, acting in conjunction with its EU partners, should
monitor the situation and urge restraint upon the Chinese government.
We further conclude that what appears to be a change in Chinese
policy towards foreign media, allowing journalists free access
to Xinjiang, is—if confirmed as events develop—to
be welcomed. (Paragraph 193)
Columbia
37. We
conclude that, despite some recent improvements, human rights
abuses in Colombia remain systemic and widespread, with considerable
evidence of complicity by the Colombia authorities, police and
armed forces. We note that, in particular, it is an extremely
dangerous place to be a trade unionist. We recommend that, in
its response to this Report, the Government supplies us with a
detailed breakdown of its current and planned future aid to Colombia,
with full costings, and information as to how this spending will
be used to exert leverage on the Colombian government to improve
its human rights record. We further recommend that the Government
at the same time supplies us with any internal assessment that
has been carried out of the effectiveness of its human rights
training programme for the Colombian army; and that it informs
us whether that programme was scheduled to finish when it did,
or whether it was abandoned because of concerns about the scale
of the army's continuing participation in abuses. (Paragraph
204)
Iran
38. We
conclude that the events of June and July 2009 in Iran have revealed
the extent of the desire amongst millions of Iranians for a fairer
electoral process, as well as for greater personal freedoms and
a normalisation of relations between Iran and the wider world,
and that those events have also demonstrated the capacity of the
present Iranian regime to respond with ruthless force in suppressing
expressions of dissent. We further conclude that Iran's overall
human rights record remains appalling. We recommend that the Government
continues to act with firmness, in conjunction with its European
partners and the wider international community, in pressing for
the Iranian regime to respect the human rights obligations it
has entered into, and in actively encouraging Iran to adopt a
more civilised approach to the rights of its own citizens. (Paragraph
210)
39. We
conclude that the detention of British Embassy staff by the Iranian
authorities is deplorable, and we recommend that the FCO should
keep us informed as this situation develops. We propose to return
to the issues of the safety of Embassy staff and the extent to
which they are protected by diplomatic immunity as part of our
forthcoming inquiry into the FCO's Annual Report for 2008-09.
(Paragraph 211)
Iraq
40. We
conclude that with the departure of most British troops from southern
Iraq, and the withdrawal of US troops from Iraqi towns and cities,
the responsibility for creating security, which is an essential
precondition of human rights, has passed decisively to the Iraqi
government. We further conclude that many grave human rights concerns
remain in a country which is, as the FCO puts it, making a "difficult
transition". The plight of Iraqi refugees, both within Iraq
and beyond its borders, and the discrimination suffered by women,
contrary to the Iraqi constitution, are of particular concern.
We recommend that the British Government continues to discharge
its responsibility to the Iraqi people by offering their government
and Parliament full and effective assistance, both practical and
financial, in creating the institutions and attitudes necessary
to underpin the effective upholding of human rights. (Paragraph
217)
North Korea
41. We
reiterate the conclusions of our 2008 Report on Global Security:
Japan and Korea as regards North Korean human rights and British
Government policy on the issue, including our conclusions that
the North Korean regime is one of the worst human rights abusers
in the world and that the Universal Periodic Review which North
Korea is to undergo at the UN Human Rights Council in December
2009 offers a major opportunity to advance the international effort
to secure improvements in human rights in the country. We recommend
that in its response to this Report the FCO sets out what steps
it is taking to achieve this advance. We further recommend that
the Government provides an assessment of any ways in which its
work on North Korean human rights issues is being affected by
the deterioration of North Korea's relations with the West and
with the other participants in the Six-Party Talks. (Paragraph
224)
Pakistan
42. We
conclude that human rights abuses in Pakistan continue to be widespread.
In particular, women and girls continue to be subjected to violence
and discrimination. (Paragraph 233)
43. We
conclude that the work of the Forced Marriages and Child Abduction
Unit at the British High Commission in Islamabad is to be commended.
We recommend that in its response to this Report, the FCO should
supply us with an update on the work of the Unit, and on the implementation
of the UK/Pakistan Judicial Protocol on Child Abduction, and
detail its plans for supporting and promoting the work of the
Unit in future. (Paragraph 234)
Russia
44. We
conclude that President Medvedev's commitment to promoting the
rule of law in Russia is undermined by continuing human rights
violations. The extent of the threat to press freedom arising
from intimidation and even murder of journalists is particularly
worrying, as is the rise in xenophobia and racism. We further
conclude that there is substantial evidence of major human rights
abuses in the republics of the Russian Federation in the North
Caucasus. We recommend that the British Government continues to
work with its international partners to maintain a constructive
relationship with Russia, whilst at the same time taking effective
steps to encourage that country to develop a human rights culture
which reflects more closely the international norms and commitments
to which Russia has voluntarily signed up. (Paragraph 241)
Saudi Arabia
45. We
conclude that human rights continue to be violated on a massive
scale in Saudi Arabia. We consider that the FCO's latest report
pulls its punches on this matter. Although it lists Saudi Arabia
as a "country of concern", it lays emphasis on the degree
of cultural acceptance of severe punishments and of discrimination
against women. Whilst we agree with the Government that "sustainable
reform cannot be imposed on a country", we conclude that
the current policy of "assisting with gradual reform"
has borne very little fruit. The fact that Saudi Arabia is a strategic
ally of the UK should not lead to an official policy of turning
a blind eye to its human rights failings. We repeat our recommendation
in last year's Report that the UK's ongoing dialogue with Saudi
Arabia should have measurable and time-limited objectives in relation
to human rights, and specifically in relation to women's rights,
and that the Government informs us of these objectives in its
response to this Report. (Paragraph 247)
Somalia
46. We
conclude that the FCO is to be commended for including Somalia
as a "country of concern" in its latest report, following
our previous recommendation. We further conclude that serious
human rights abuses, including violence against women, are continuing
across much of Somalia, particularly in Mogadishu and in central
and southern Somalia. We conclude that the Government's support
for a UN commission of inquiry into abuses in Somalia is to be
welcomed, though we do not accept its view that the time is not
yet right for such a commission to be established. We recommend
that, in its response to this Report, the FCO states what conditions
must be satisfied before the time is deemed to be right for a
commission to be set up. We further recommend that, in that response,
the FCO indicates what steps it is taking to ensure that UK aid
is not supplied to Somali police forces where there is reason
to suppose that those forces have been complicit in human rights
abuses. (Paragraph 256)
Sri Lanka
47. We
conclude that the FCO's decision to include Sri Lanka as a "country
of concern" in next year's human rights report is amply justified
by recent events in that country, and is to be welcomed. We recommend
that, notwithstanding the regrettable vote in the UN Human Rights
Council on 27 May, the Government should press for the setting
up of an international war crimes inquiry, to investigate allegations
of atrocities carried out by both sides in the Sri Lankan civil
war. We further recommend that the Government uses such leverage
as it has at its disposal to encourage the Sri Lankan government
to tackle what the FCO refers to as "the prevalent culture
of impunity". (Paragraph 274)
Sudan
48. We
conclude that continuing widespread abuses of human rights in
Sudan are a matter of great concern. We further conclude that
the recent decision of the UN Human Rights Council, by a narrow
majority, to continue the investigation of human rights abuses
in Sudan is to be welcomed. We recommend that the British Government
continues to be pro-active in offering support for the Darfur
peace process and for UN peacekeeping forces. We further recommend
that the Government works closely with its international partners
in an effort to ensure that the writ of the International Criminal
Court operates in Sudan. (Paragraph 283)
Zimbabwe
49. We
conclude that the human rights and humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe
continues to be appalling, although the participation of the opposition
in a transitional coalition government, and the recent measure
of economic stabilisation, offer glimmers of hope. We further
conclude that it is difficult to see how fundamental reforms in
governance, the rule of law, and ending human rights abuses can
be achieved as long as Robert Mugabe and his supporters are still
in power and control the security apparatus. We recommend that
the Government should provide immediate aid to Zimbabwe's suffering
people, subject to safeguards against its falling into the hands
of Mr Mugabe and his supporters, of encouraging progress towards
the early holding of fair and free elections, and of making preparations
for a long-term reconstruction package to be delivered when a
genuinely democratic and representative government is finally
in place. We further recommend that the FCO should continue to
raise the gross violations of human rights in Zimbabwe at the
UN Security Council. (Paragraph 294)
Overseas Territories
50. We
conclude that the deliberate omission of reference to sexual
orientation as a prohibited ground for discrimination in the Cayman
Islands draft constitution is deplorable. The possibility cannot
be ruled out that the drafting of the constitution in this regard
may result in Cayman Islands courts affording to citizens of those
islands less than the full protection which they are entitled
to under the European Convention on Human Rights. (Paragraph 302)
51. We
recommend that in all future discussions with Overseas Territories
about revisions to their constitutions, the FCO insists that no
specific religion or faith community be singled out for privileged
mention, and that anti-discrimination provisions make explicit
mention of sexual orientation. (Paragraph 303)
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