Examination of Witnesses (Questions 220-239)
RT HON.
DAVID MILIBAND
MP AND MATTHEW
RYCROFT CMG
17 JUNE 2009
Q220 Sir John Stanley: Could you
give us, Foreign Secretary, your assessment as to how well or
not the EU is doing in Kosovo?
David Miliband: You mean through
the European Rule of Law Mission?
Sir John Stanley: Yes.
David Miliband: I think that compared
with the discussion we had in this Committee about a year or 18
months ago—when we met a year ago we were meeting three
months after the declaration of independence—while there
are clearly some warning signs in Kosovo, the EU performance under
Pieter Feith, the Special Representative, has been an important
stabilising factor. I think it is important to recognise that
there are dangers, but the EU's performance—which I think
is the word you used—is mitigating those dangers.
Q221 Chairman: May I go back to
your reference to the EU position and the UK position being different?
You referred to "some countries". Is it not a fact that
the big problem is the Netherlands and that there will never be
progress on this issue unless there is a change of political approach
in the Netherlands, because there is a view there about Serbia
that goes back to conflict in the break-up of the former Yugoslavia?
Therefore, we have a fundamental problem and this is going to
cause great difficulties for Serbia because, even if they do comply
with what we and others want them to do, there is a big political
blockage in the Netherlands.
David Miliband: There is no hiding
that the Netherlands has very strong views on this. One has to
be slightly careful, in deference to our Dutch colleagues, about
saying the Dutch "problem", which I think you said.
For obvious reasons, Holland has very strong views on this. I
believe that we should implement the interim agreement. That is
the right recognition of what Serbia has done. For the Netherlands,
there is a lot of focus on Mladic and what happens to him. We've
got to keep discussing with them. I believe there are very strong
reasons, which Sir John Stanley referred to, for encouraging progressive
forces in Serbia. I feel that very strongly, and we argue for
that very strongly. Equally, we are people who defend the intergovernmentalism
of the foreign policy aspects of the European Union. So when a
country or two countries feel very strongly about an issue we
should engage with them, we should persuade them, but I don't
think we should say they are the problem. We have to be slightly
careful about how we do that.
Q222 Andrew Mackinlay: On the
business of Serbia and Kosovo, I am enthusiastic about Serbian
membership if they can reach the criteria that you discussed in
terms of the tribunal and other factors, but surely you have to
make it quite clear that if there is accession, there must be
written in the treaty of accession a caveat saying, "You
cannot veto Kosovo's membership of the European Union." If
you remember, I disagree with you. I was not for Kosovan independence,
but it is a reality. I assume that you also believe that you need
to bring the whole of the western Balkans into the European Union,
as I do, but once a country has membership, it has the right to
veto accession. We need to spell it out quite clearly now so that
they approach it as Spain did as regards Gibraltar, or the Irish
Republic as regards Northern Ireland: you agree to disagree, but
clearly, you're not going to block membership. Do you not agree
with me? Do we not need to make this abundantly clear? Serbia
cannot have a right of veto over Kosovan membership, ultimately.
David Miliband: Membership is
not designed for particular cases. There are generic conditions
for membership, and one of those generic conditions is good neighbourly
relations. That is a generic principle that has to be applied
in individual cases. I think that it is important in this area
to recognise that we are dealing with an extremely fragile and
sui generis situation. That is why I don't think now is the time
for going beyond that commitment to good neighbourly relations.
What we should say is that we welcome Serbia's commitment to a
European vocation, we want to work with them to achieve it, we
want to implement the IA, and we know that in due course we will
have to address the need for good neighbourly relations with Serbia
just as we will for others. Sometimes peering into the crystal
ball is a good thing, and sometimes it is better to allow a degree
of occlusion.
Q223 Mr. Illsley: A moment ago,
you used the phrase "focus on Mladic", which I think
was pretty apt, given that last week videos were released of Ratko
Mladic celebrating his daughter's wedding in Serbia and were posted
all over the press. Does that not tend to negate the idea of Serbian
co-operation in trying to find him?
David Miliband: Matthew might
want to come in on this, but my understanding is that they were
rather old videos. I think people are wary of adding them to the
case for the prosecution when it comes to Serbian engagement,
so I want to be slightly careful about that. As I said, I asked
Brammertz about this on Monday. I think it is right to say that
Serbia has responded appropriately to all the operational requests
that have been made of it by the ICTY.
Chairman: We move on to Turkey.
Fabian?
Q224 Mr. Hamilton: Foreign Secretary,
you said earlier that it was good news that all three political
parties, with the exception of Thurrock, were in favour of Turkey's
accession to the European Union. I would certainly agree with
that—I am a strong supporter myself—but are you not
concerned that the newly elected European Parliament now contains
perhaps a majority of Members who are opposed to Turkish accession?
How is that going to affect the negotiations and the view that
Turkey should in fact join?
David Miliband: There is a simple
choice here. Either we are locked in a vicious circle where the
EU becomes more anti-Turk and the Turks become more anti-EU, or
we end up with the alternative, which is where we build confidence—business
and citizens, but also political confidence—about the long-term
vocation for Turkey. The chapter opening doesn't actually depend
on the European Parliament, but rhetoric depends on individual
politicians. I was in Turkey two or three weeks ago. It pays a
lot of attention to what European politicians say—it doesn't
discount much for what politicians say in election campaigns.
I think that there are good reasons for the European Union to
be concerned that it doesn't deal itself out of the Turkish game.
Equally, Turkey has responsibilities itself. It is not the passive
victim of circumstance; it is an active player, and it needs to
pursue its process of reform. It also has a lot riding on a Cyprus
settlement, which I think is very strongly in our interest.
Q225 Mr. Hamilton: To come back
to Cyprus, the Ankara protocol was all about Turkey's relations
with the EU vis-a"-vis Cyprus and the north and south. We
still have a serious problem there. I don't know whether you would
acknowledge—we won't go back into history—that maybe
we should have resolved this before Cyprus joined the EU, but
we can't do anything about that now. What impact will Turkey's
accession process have if it doesn't adhere to the Ankara protocol?
David Miliband: I think it is
very important that the Ankara protocol is implemented, and we
are at an absolutely key moment in the Cyprus talks. The UN special
envoy reported to the Security Council on 31 April. This is a
once-in-a-generation opportunity to sort out this Cyprus problem,
with the election of President Christofias and the relationship
he has with Mr. Talat—after all, they are both from the
same party. This is the opportunity and it is once in a generation.
If it does not get done, it is not going to get done quickly afterwards.
We are now at a point where, basically, everyone needs to have
maximum push to get this done—above all the people on the
island.
Q226 Mr. Hamilton: What impact do
you think the election of the Northern Cypriot Turkish nationalists
will have had?
David Miliband: Fairly limited,
because Mr. Talat has made it clear that he is the negotiator
and he is carrying on. But he has elections next April, so time
is now urgently pointing towards action. That is the UN's view,
that is our view, and frankly there are costs of inaction, because
the status quo is not sustainable; it is not sustainable for anybody.
My very strong message for all the players is that now is the
time to get on with this. We have got into the second round of
talks. It has got to be real give and take and it has got to get
to a conclusion.
Q227 Mr. Hamilton: Finally, what
evidence do you have so far that the accession negotiations, that
the chapters of acquis communautaire, have actually had a positive
impact on things like the rule of law in Turkey; some of the problems
that we have had with, for example, the Kurdish population and
Kurdish language; and some of the allegations in the past about
alleged torture in police cells? Have we seen evidence that those
things are beginning to change and that Turkey is moving towards
Europe in terms of its constitution and the rule of law?
David Miliband: In respect of
the Kurdish issue, the Government of Prime Minister Erdogan would
point to changes on TV, some school changes and some other opening
up—it needs to go further to fully respect minority rights.
It is significant that there are better relations between Turkey
and Northern Iraq—the Kurdish Regional Government in Northern
Iraq. There is a serious attempt to isolate the PKK, which I think
is good and helps contribute to the overall situation, but I think
there are big reforms internally that Turkey needs to take forward.
I think they are best done as part of the modernisation of Turkey;
that is in Turkey's interests, which are integrally linked to
its European vocation. I am conscious that there are two minutes
left, so I won't give a longer answer.
Q228 Chairman: Foreign Secretary,
is it possible to have a few more minutes?
David Miliband: A few.
Q229 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: Just
a quick question on Turkish accession. This has become a kind
of ideology; we are all in favour of it, but have we really thought
out the consequences, because there a lot of pitfalls in accession?
Romania and Bulgaria plainly joined too quickly. The Cyprus problem
was not solved by EU entry. Further back, Spain came in with a
quarrel over Gibraltar. In the case of Turkey, are we certain
that Turkish membership will not actually undermine the great
achievement of Turkey, which is the division of state from religion?
For instance, the Islamic parties could appeal to the European
Court of Justice over the wearing of the veil and all the rest
of it. In a curious way we could set Turkey back. We could undermine
the position of the army, which, for all its faults, has been
a guardian of a secular Muslim state. Are we clear that this is
in the best interests of Turkey and the EU? In other words, have
we really thought it through in detail, rather than simply being
in favour of enlargement at all costs?
David Miliband: I think there
has been an awful lot work on the strategic benefits of Turkish
entry, but also the whole point of the chapter-opening process
is to go through the details. I am trying to think why the ECJ
would threaten the AKP in respect of the veil. I don't see that,
but it's important that all the details are gone through. I don't
think it's a matter of religion to support Turkish entry into
the EU, or a matter of theology. It is a matter of strategic vision
and a matter of what the EU is for. In the modern world the European
Union would benefit greatly from Turkish accession. That is not
to say that there are no difficult issues to channel through,
but precisely the balance that Turkey has achieved between its
Muslim majority and its secular state is at the heart of the way
the European Union tries to reconcile the public and private spheres.
That is one of the things that makes Turkey attractive as a member.
It needs to bolster individual rights, notably for its minorities,
but I feel that Turkey is a European country. It may be of interest
to the Committee that the British Council has launched rather
an interesting cultural project with five Turkish cities, including
two or three which are major Kurdish cities, to use European art
as a way of engaging Turkish and European citizens together. The
ECJ may have all sorts of dangers in mind, but I don't think it's
the arrow at the heart of Turkish EU aspirations.
Q230 Chairman: In 10 minutes we
have several things to cover. I apologise to some of my colleagues
as I shall have to conflate some questions. We have already covered
the European security treaty and Russia. In the context of your
previous answer, can you quickly give us your assessment of the
Eastern Partnership that was launched in May. Has it made any
progress?
David Miliband: I was there at
the launch. Five weeks is a long time in politics, but it is not
a long time in the life of the Eastern Partnership. I would not
want to make grandiose claims for what it has achieved so far,
but it has launched.
Q231 Chairman: The Russian Partnership
and Co-operation agreement—what is happening with the negotiations?
David Miliband: The initial courtship
has started, but I don't think that we are yet in a passionate
embrace.
Q232 Chairman: Okay. And the Mediterranean
Union, what is the progress there?
David Miliband: I think the courtship
is blocked at the moment.
Q233 Chairman: Issues around Gaza,
Israel and Palestine?
David Miliband: I think they are
having trouble agreeing on the office space, never mind getting
the courtship going.
Q234 Mr. Illsley: On the Eastern
Partnership issues, have we got any concerns regarding human rights
in Georgia—in terms of media ownership and so on?
David Miliband: Obviously we are
very concerned about the conflict and post-conflict situation
and the human rights of those who have been driven out of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. I don't have a particular view on the media.
Mr. Illsley: I am thinking about
crackdowns within Georgia itself.
David Miliband: There is pretty
vibrant opposition at the moment. I can look into the media question,
I haven't picked up on that.
Chairman: Can we now quickly move
to questions on Iran?
Q235 Sir John Stanley: Foreign
Secretary, can you tell us what position you are going to seek
to get from your fellow members of the Council on the present
situation in Iran?
David Miliband: It depends on
what happens even in the next 24 hours. We have to watch carefully,
keep insisting that is for the Iranian people to choose their
own Government, deplore violence against those people and reiterate
that Iran can have its rights in the international community as
long as it lives up to its responsibilities. I think it's important
to have those quite principled positions because those who mean
us no good want to use what we say against people in Iran.
Q236 Sir John Stanley: Foreign
Secretary, you will have heard Dr. el-Baradei this morning saying
that his "gut feeling"—the expression that he
used—was that the Iranian Government have banked on acquiring
nuclear weapons. Is the British Government's judgment that that
is indeed the policy that the present Iranian regime is seeking
to deliver?
David Miliband: Yes, basically.
I haven't heard the interview with Dr. el-Baradei and I will get
a transcript of it, but we have always said that the Iranian insistence
that it was building uranium enrichment plants with no military
intent was belied by the fact that there are no civilian nuclear
power plants for that enriched uranium to go to; the Bushehr plant
is supplied from Russia. The fact that the Iranians haven't even
bothered with the pretence of constructing civilian nuclear power
plants for their enriched uranium from Natanz to go to belies
the suggestion that there's nothing to worry about on this programme.
Secondly, you have the history from the pre-2003 secret programme,
which the IAEA have been exposing. I think I'm right in saying
that I haven't heard Director General el-Baradei say before that
he is convinced that they are intent on a nuclear weapons programme.
That is a significant thing for him to have said. I don't know
if it's on the basis of new information or on the basis of his
frustration at their refusal to engage on the so-called alleged
studies of the pre-2003 period. It sounds like it was rather a
significant interview.
Q237 Sir John Stanley: The expression
that I heard this morning was that it was his "gut feeling",
but he has a wealth of experience in watching the present regime
in operation. May I ask this final question? If that is the direction
that they are following, and you said that the British Government
take the view that that is so, do you think that this process
is stoppable or unstoppable?
David Miliband: I think it is
stoppable. It depends on political decisions by the Government
of Iran. We are in a new ball game because of the fact that for
the first time in 30 years an American Government have broken
the taboo on reaching out to Iran. They have never been tested,
because for 30 years the Iranians have been able to live off the
proposition that America means them ill. Admittedly late in the
day, in terms of their programme, the current American Administration
are challenging that demonisation of America and forcing the Iranian
Government to ask some hard questions of itself. One of the responsibilities
that we have is to make sure that other countries recognise that
hard questions need to be asked of Iran, because the Iranians
have lived off their alleged victimisation by the US for a long
time and they have found parts of the world rather tolerant of
their previously secret and now exposed pre-2003 activities. I
hope that there is still time—I believe that there is still
time—for the Iranians to take a different view. However,
they need to be clear what will happen if they don't respond positively
to this outreach that now has American support. The E3 plus 3
proposed an offer under my chairmanship last May in London which
the previous American Administration allowed their man to go to
but which the new Administration are supporting much more strongly.
If the Iranians don't respond positively, then we have no choice
but to pursue the sanctions track with greater vigour.
Q238 Sir John Stanley: So you
are saying that you believe that, even with the present Iranian
regime, the progress towards a nuclear weapon capability is still
stoppable by negotiation?
David Miliband: Yes. There is
nothing inevitable or ineluctable; there is a political choice
that the Iranian authorities need to make.
Q239 Chairman: Finally, Foreign
Secretary, the Government recently announced a reduction in UK
participation in EU civilian missions. At the same time, we have
been advocating the strengthening of those EU civilian capabilities.
Isn't there a contradiction between those two positions? I know
it's not your fault or the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's fault;
it is because the FCO is not being adequately funded to do the
necessary work. Would you not accept that there is a contradiction
between those two positions?
David Miliband: To be fair, Chairman,
I yield to no one in my enthusiasm for EU civilian missions, but
to be absolutely clear, the money that the Government spend, which
I think is some £650 million, is split between compulsory
contributions and discretionary contributions. The compulsory
contributions are to UN-EU; the discretionary contributions are
across those organisations as well. What has happened is that
the compulsory contributions have gone up because there is more
UN peacekeeping. That means that there is less money for the discretionary.
That is why this has happened—it is a shift. That's one
of those things. It's probably a good thing that the UN is doing
more peacekeeping, but obviously the Government's ambitions—I
am glad you share them—for an EU civilian presence sit alongside
the fact that we have got less resources for it, because of the
increase in compulsory contributions. That's the origins of this.
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