Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20-39)
RT HON.
DAVID MILIBAND
MP AND MATTHEW
RYCROFT
10 DECEMBER 2008
Q20 Mr. Keetch: Foreign Secretary,
may I ask you about something that affects the life and death
of people in Europethe conflict between Russia and Georgia?
That was the first war on European soil since the end of the Yugoslavia
crisis. On 7 August, Georgia launched its attack. That was followed
by a much larger Russian attack on South Ossetia and on Georgia
proper, if you like, as well. We know that Sarkozy got involved,
and there have been continued deployments of EU, OSCE, Commonwealth
of Independent States and now UN monitors. You were in Kiev a
few weeks ago and made an important speech. For the avoidance
of doubt, where do you see the blame lying for those events? Is
it easy to blame one side or the other, or is it a more difficult
and complex situation?
David Miliband: It is certainly complex. Clearly
there was what I previously described as "a reckless reaction"
by the Georgians to the provocations of the South Ossetians. I
know that you put "Georgia proper" in quotes, but it
is worth saying that this is a sovereign country whose territorial
integrity has been recognised by successive UN Security Council
resolutions. Those resolutions were supported by Russia, most
recently in April.
Mr. Keetch: It is all Georgia proper.
David Miliband: I know that you agree with that,
but it was important to say it. There was a tit for tat between
South Ossetian and Georgian forces, and then there was a very
large, disproportionate Russian reactionan invasion of
a neighbouring countrywhich I think was very alarming for
people in Europe given that, as I said in the House today, continental
Europe has had its longest period of peace since the Roman era.
None the less, the Caucasus region has a long and complicated
history, and the break-up of the Soviet Union is still very recent
and raw. The relationship between what were previously different
Soviet republics and are now independent countries is tricky and
difficult. If we get to talk about Ukraineyou mentioned
Kievit is especially difficult given the Khrushchev decision
of 1954. It is a complex situation.
Q21 Mr. Keetch: What about the position
of OSCE and EU monitors? Are you confident that they are secure
individually? In the past, I have done OSCE monitoring in places
such as AlbaniaI have been shot at and so on. Are you confident
that the people who the OSCE, the EU and the UN have on the ground
are safe in what they are doing?
David Miliband: We had a report last week at
the OSCE meeting in Helsinki from the OSCE chairman-in-office,
the Finnish Foreign Minister, Alexander Stubb. He reported some
dismay at the fact that OSCE monitors have not been allowed into
South Ossetia, beyond the two that have been there since before
7 August. However, he also said that one can hope for a degree
of safety in what is a reasonably dangerous part of the world,
so I do not think that there is any immediate physical danger
to the monitors. Similarly, the EU monitoring missionEUMMis
in place in Georgia, and that is a good thing.
We still have concerns about the freedom of
access that monitors have and how things will proceed. In that
context, it is worth saying that the Geneva talks have now had
two rounds, and the second round was much better than the firstwe
seem to be getting to grips with the agenda. Although that will
not resolve the fundamental issue quickly, it might at least improve
the atmosphere for the monitors to play their role.
Q22 Mr. Keetch: Colleagues want to
ask questions, but let me conclude by asking you one more. There
was a sense in the British and American press that this was Russia
trying to exercise herself over issues such as missile defence
in Poland. Do you think that it was a flexing of Russian muscle,
or was it simply a localised issue that Russia felt it had to
respond to?
David Miliband: I do not think that it was about
missile defence. If you look at what then President Putin said
at the Munich security conference last year, ballistic missile
defence was an issue, but it was not one that he raised in respect
of the Abkhazia-South Ossetia issues. Some people believed, partly
because of Mr. Putin's speech, that it might have been a Kosovo-related
help, although if you look at the statements of the Russian Government,
they have been utterly consistent since 7 August in alleging that
the reason for their action was to "protect Russian citizens,"
whom they allege were under threat in South Ossetia, so we should
take them at their word on that.
Q23 Mr. Horam: The Government are
now supporting the re-start of talks on the European Union-Russia
agreement. I support that and think that it is sensible, but it
is a volte-face from two months ago, when you opposed those talks.
What has changed?
David Miliband: I am not a world specialist
in U-turns, but I have done some in my time and I do not think
that this is one of the most egregious ones. On 1 September we
set a range of measures in train, including the suspension of
the partnership and co-operation agreement negotiations, but also
the audit of EU-Russia relations. We set a range of criteria and
one of those, so that we are absolutely clear, was full compliance
with the August and September Medvedev-Sarkozy agreements.
Sir Menzies Campbell: But that has not happened.
David Miliband: I will come to that. They have
carried out the majority of the tasks set by those agreements,
but not all of them. We therefore had to balance that picture
with the progress that had been made on the EU-Russia audit and
other areas, and the point that the partnership and co-operation
agreement to negotiate with Russia is in our interest, not least
because the preamble to that PCA includes the issue of Georgian
sovereignty for discussion with the Russians. The PCA discussions
will be a forum where we can put our strong view about the importance
of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, so I
do not think that this qualifies in the way that you have described.
I think that it is an appropriate thing to do, which allows us
to pursue our interests, having registered our point, and we can
continue to register our point under the discussions.
Q24 Mr. Horam: You do not think that
it looks like weakness?
David Miliband: I know that that is what has
been alleged by the shadow Foreign Secretary, but I do not think
that it does, because we were holding hostage somethingthe
PCAthat we want.
Mr. Horam: So we had got ourselves into a very
difficult situation.
David Miliband: No. On 1 September, before the
EU-Russia audit had happened and in the midst of still waiting
for President Sarkozy to go to Moscow to finalise the agreements,
it was right for the European Union to hold in abeyance the PCA
discussions.
Q25 Mr. Horam: You say that this
is not a return to business as usual, so what precisely are we
not doing now?
David Miliband: It is not business as usual
partly, on a rather minor league point, because the issues of
Georgia and sovereignty that will be discussed are now written
into the preamble. More significantly, if you look at energy,
there has been a distinct shift of business. There is a renewed
European commitment to diversification of energy supplies and
efforts on the southern corridor and elsewhere, which is important.
On the range of areas that were raised by the EU-Russia audit
we are now considering the next steps, so I do not think that
anyone would say that we are back to the status quo ante.
Q26 Mr. Horam: Does the mandate for
the EU's negotiating position include anything about the rules
of the game for the common neighbourhood between the European
Union and Russia?
David Miliband: We may come on to the question
of the eastern partnership later. In a way, that is the flipside
of the coin. Perhaps I should have said that, in thinking about
our relations with Russia, we must not neglect the fact that there
are independent states between the European Union and Russia.
It is sensible to build up their ability, and capacity, to function
and forge their own relationships and make their own choices about
their relationship with the European Union as well as with Russia.
We will have to see how we go.
Q27 Mr. Horam: But is that idea of
common rules included in the mandate?
David Miliband: I am happy to send the mandate
to youI think it has been sent to you already. I am not
sure whether we have a copy of it here.
Mr. Horam: It would be useful to have it in
the room.
David Miliband: It is certainly broadly drawn
and I am very happy to send it over.
Q28 Mr. Horam: According to The Economist,
in the wake of the Russia-Georgia war, you started "Project
Russia" to look at the whole relationship between the UK
and Russia. This report is allegedly secret
David Miliband: Not very secret if it has been
in The Economist.
Mr. Horam: I would be grateful to know what
you have concluded about Russia's motivations. I am thinking about
not just Georgia, but about Russia's motivation as its foreign
policy stands, and how you think the UK should respond. It is
very interesting that, on the whole, Russians and British people
get on very well but somehow or other, we seem to be making a
mess of it at the diplomatic level. Has the Foreign Office lost
its touch?
David Miliband: I am glad to have the chance
to address that. If you look back over the past 18 months, I have
probably spent as much time on Russian questions in the House
as I have on many other issues. From the beginning, we have tried
to draw a very sharp distinction between three different facets
of our relationship. The first is the bilateral relationship,
which is affected by the Litvinenko and the British Council affairs.
The second is the trade and economic relationship, which we have
always said is an important and positive influence in both countries
in support of understanding and co-operation between them. The
third is the multilateral agenda: Iran, Afghanistan, and nuclear
non-proliferation. These are areas where we continue to work together.
I met Foreign Minister Lavrov last week in Helsinki,
to talk about precisely these multilateral issues. It is often
difficult in politics to say, "Look, we're having a row about
this but we are trying to preserve our trade relations and we
have got to co-operate in other areas." Part of the art of
diplomacy is to keep those three different channels separate.
To that extent, I think that we have succeeded. That does not
mean that we have always agreed with Russia on the multilateral
agenda. We have just been debating Zimbabwe in the House and how
we have not been in the same place on the UN Security Council
on that.
Q29 Mr. Moss: In answer to my colleague
on the forthcoming PCA discussions, you said that one of the positives
would be that the territorial integrity of Georgia could be on
the agenda. Do the UK Government have any ideas or proposals for
those negotiations on that integrity?
David Miliband: We are fully supportive of the
European role under the chairmanship of Mr. Morel, who is chairing
the Geneva talks. The details of the South Ossetia, Abkhazia and
Georgia relationship will be discussed at those talks. Under the
PCA, we would first talk about our commitment to the territorial
integrity of Georgia and insist on that. Secondly, we would talk
about what we believe is the right way to resolve disputes, which
is political and not the use of force. It is interesting to read
President Medvedev's speeches in that context. He made great emphasis
on the rule of law in what was otherwise quite a bellicose speech
the day after President-elect Obama's election on 4 November,
with his announcement of missiles going to Kaliningrad. In that
speech he talked quite a lot about the rule of law and not the
rule of force being the foundation of a new European security
architecture. We will definitely try to discuss that in some detail.
Thirdly, we will point out to Russia that it
has isolated itself through its recognition of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. In August and September, I was urged by the Leader of
the Opposition to kick Russia out of the G8 and other international
forums. I do not think that that is sensible. It is not sensible
for us to isolate Russia, but sometimes Russia isolates itself.
When it recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia, I do not think
that it believed that only Nicaragua and Hamas would join it in
that recognition decision, but that is what has happened. I do
not celebrate the fact that Russia has ended up with thatI
obviously think that in this case it is better that fewer rather
than more nations have recognised them, but it would have been
better if Russia had not recognised them in the first place. That
was a bad mistake, which has isolated Russia and that is not where
Russia wants to be or where we should hope that it is.
Q30 Mr. Moss: Will you tell us, what
are the differences between South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the
one hand and Kosovo on the other? Why do the Government recognise
independence for the latter, but not for the former?
David Miliband: Kosovo is a very different case.
Kosovo is a case, first of all, where there was mass slaughter
in the 1990s, secondly where a UN protectorate was established,
thirdly where a UN political process was established, fourthly
where both sidesBelgrade and Pristinawere re-engaged
through the so-called troika process in the second half of last
year, and finally and most importantly, where resolution 1244
of the UN Security Council set up the final status issues. The
resolution is status-neutral in itself; it does not decide in
advance what the conclusion should be, but it sets up the resolution
of the Kosovo issues. I think that none of those five criteria
or facets of the Kosovo question applies in the South Ossetia
or Abkhazia case. In fact, you can make the opposite argument,
because South Ossetia and Abkhazia are part of Georgia, whose
territorial integrity was asserted in UN Security Council resolutions
supported by the Russians. So there is quite a big difference
between Kosovo, and South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Q31 Mr. Moss: Do the Government support
the convening of an EU conference next summer with Russia on pan-European
security architecture?
David Miliband: We discussed that last week
at the OSCE. I think that the prior question is whether we want
to engage with President Medvedev's sometimes-called "new
proposal" for a new European security architecture. Do we
want to engage with it? Yes. Is it new? No, it is quite old. Is
it a proposal? Well, it is still a bit vague. However, we want
to engage with it. That is one of the reasons that we spent the
lunchtime discussion at the OSCE last Thursday with Foreign Minister
Lavrov discussing it and asking what it means.
President Medvedev says that he has five principles
to his foreign policy. His fourth principle is that Russia has
a right to defend the interests of Russian passport holders, wherever
they live. We have asked what that means, not least given that
there are 250,000 Russian passport holders in London and the south-east
of England. The fifth principle relates to the legitimate interests
of Russia in its near abroad. We have to probe that very carefully,
because the world of spheres of influence was something at the
Congress of Vienna and does not really belong in modern Europe.
We should engage with and probe what this European security architecture
should mean.
It is also worth sayingI want to say
something about this at the Munich conference in Februarythat
we are in a position where this country has never been safer.
If you think back through British history, the territorial integrity
of this country is safer today, I would argue, than at any other
time. So at some level we have developed a security architectureI
do not particularly like the phrase, but it is one that President
Medvedev has usedthat is working pretty well for us. So
the burden of proof is on those who want to change our security
architecture, not on those who want to keep it as it is.
As I said at the OSCE last week, there are other
countries in central and eastern Europe that do not feel secure
at the momentone of the reasons that they do not feel secure
is because of what happened in Georgia. I think that we have to
be ready to address that. It is very important that, from a British
perspective, we proceed from the basis that we have got a security
architecturefor all its difficulties and the messy compromises
that are part of itthat is delivering unprecedented levels
of territorial security for the United Kingdom. That is true for
all the western European countries. Before we meddle with that,
we should be careful.
Q32 Mr. Moss: In answer to an earlier
question from my colleague Paul Keetch, Foreign Secretary, you
seemed to indicate that, in terms of the Russian intervention
in South Ossetia, it was legitimate for them to intervene on the
basis of protecting Russian citizens. My question, obviously,
is whether the UK Government adhere to the doctrine that protecting
Russian passport holders in other places in the world is a legitimate
Russian interest.
David Miliband: No, I do not. God forbid that
what I said earlier should be understood in that way; I do not
think that Paul Keetch understood it in that way. I said that
the Russians asserted that the reason for their invasion was that
they were defending Russian passport holders. I do not consider
the use of force and the invasion of a neighbouring country to
be a legitimate way to resolve disputes; in fact, frozen or unfrozen
conflicts need political processes to resolve them. If I had said
that, I think that the Russians would have heard of it and would
be throwing their hats in the air, but I certainly have not said
it.
Q33 Andrew Mackinlay: I think that
you are rewriting history to some extent. Going back to the period
immediately after the opening of the conflict in South Ossetia,
the spin of the British Government was that it was an unprovoked
initiative by Russia into Georgia, which was not a Russian enclave.
It was only because of the television there and of overwhelming
evidence that the British Government and other Governments have
had to acknowledge that the first strike came from the Georgian
Government.
David Miliband: With respect, Andrew, if you
go back to my statements of 8, 9 and 10 August and beyond, we
were absolutely clear, first that there was a tit for tat between
South Ossetia and Georgia. In other words, they were shelling
each other, and I said that right from the beginning. Secondly,
what we said about the Russian invasion was that it was completely
disproportionate, which I think it was. The Russians invaded a
neighbouring country and violated their own Security Council resolutions,
to which they signed up. Whatever the wrongdoings of the Georgians,
they did not merit that. Remember that at the time, the Russians
alleged that the most grotesque and vile human rights abuses had
killed thousands of people. No evidence of that has been produced.
Under any estimate, there were not thousands of people killed
on 7 August in South Ossetia.
The other thing is that the history is important.
You look at it very carefully, but remember that in the 1990s
the populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were very largethey
had not been ethnically cleansed. Since then, the population of
Abkhazia has gone down to 30,000 or so; it was 300,000 in the
early 1990s, before the Georgian civil war and a series of expulsions.
They have become enclaves, but they were rather more mixed before
the early 1990s than they are today.
Q34 Andrew Mackinlay: You are compounding
your error. If you look at the official report of what you said
about 20 minutes ago,[1]
you will see that you acknowledged that the first action was taken
by the Georgian Government.
David Miliband: With respect, what I said was
that there was a tit for tat between the South Ossetians and
Andrew Mackinlay: I will send you a copy of
it.
David Miliband: I promise you that if you look
at the record, you will see that it is a tit for tat. In other
words, the South Ossetians were hitting the Georgians and the
Georgians were hitting back.
Q35 Andrew Mackinlay: In the weeks
before that conflict, the permanent representatives of the OSCE
were counselling Georgia to restrain itself. The Georgian Government
chose to ignore that; I think that that is agreed ground. However,
even after the opening of that conflict, you were still advocating
Georgia's entry into NATO. I can understand that as an aspirationI
understand about the right of free peoples to join free clubsbut
the whole cornerstone of half a century of NATO effectiveness
is article 5. You are familiar with that; it says that the invasion
of one is an invasion of the whole.
It struck me that Georgia's Government chose
recklessly to ignore the requests of permanent representativesprobably
yourselves, as Ministersto exercise restraint. If Georgia
had been in NATO, it would either have bounced us into a conflict,
ormore likelyarticle 5 would never again have had
any clout, because frankly, we would not have gone to war over
Georgia. That is the big foreign policy issue, is it not? Georgia
has spurned its remote chances of coming into NATO, because it
has blown article 5.
David Miliband: I think we are actually in greater
agreement than you suggest. I defend, in your words, the right
of free peoples to join free associations. That is what I have
stood up forthat NATO should have clear criteria for membership;
it does. It should have clear obligations and responsibilities,
if countries enter into membership, which it does and it should.
Countries should be free to apply to join and should do so only
if they meet the right criteria and get the unanimous support
of all NATO members. That is your position, I think, and it is
also mine.
What I think that we were standing up for in
August and September was that there should be no Russian veto
of a Georgia-NATO discussion about whether or not Georgia should
be allowed to join NATO. You are right that the fact that there
are Russian troops in Georgia puts off the prospect of Georgian
membership. I do not think it renders useless the NATO-Georgia
Commission, which is going to help the Georgians to develop their
own security structures.
Q36Andrew Mackinlay: Sure, but even if
we had not had that conflict, there was something that was no
fault of the Georgians or anybody else: almighty God had put Georgia
where Georgia is. It is not joined upcoterminouswith
any other NATO state, whereas the Baltic states are a different
matter altogether. There might have been Russian objections, but
extending article 5 was the logical thing to do. How could you
extend article 5 to what is basically an island?
David Miliband: Well, Cyprus is an island.
Andrew Mackinlay: Come on. An island surrounded
by Russia.
David Miliband: It is a good point. The way
I would answer it is to say that first you mentioned the Baltics.
They are different in a way, but 10 years ago many people argued
whether we were serious about the Baltics. One can make a reasonably
compelling case that the entry of the Baltic countries into NATO,
as well as into the EU, has helped to embed and institutionalise
democratic norms and other virtues and values in those Baltic
states and helped to stabilise that part of the world. Their membership
of these clubs has helped them and helped to establish rules of
the game. Georgia should be a member of NATO only if it meets
the criteria, and if we are ready to stand up for article 5. Is
that something that is going to happen today, tomorrow or the
day after tomorrow? No. Is it something that we should a priori
rule out because of its geographical location? I do not think
so. It is also worth sayingI know you are not advancing
thisthat I do not buy the encirclement theory that is put
forward by the Russians about their fears of NATO expansion. After
all, part of the NATO expansion in the 1990s involved the NATO-Russia
Council and other mechanisms for NATO and Russia to work together.
I do not believe that NATO is an expansionist power, and I do
not believe that Russian security is threatened by its neighbours.
Q37Sir Menzies Campbell: There is visible
evidence of our determination to support the Baltics in that NATO
fast-jet fighter aircraft now patrol the borders of the Baltic,
deployed by NATO.
I want to take you back to what is described
as pan-European security architecture. This has more than a hint
of Gorbachev about it, does it not? Instead of from the Atlantic
to the Urals, it is now from Vancouver to Vladivostok. At one
time the OSCE was the Russian-favoured vehicle for this pan-European
structure, but behind it have always lain two policies: first,
the sidelining of NATO, and secondly, as a consequence of the
first, the gradual detachment of North Americathe United
States and Canada, but more particularly the United States. I
am sure I am going to get an affirmative answer to this, but I
want to get it on the record. Any discussion that may be held
in relation to a different kind of security architecture for Europe
must surely always contain provision for the continued role of
the United States and Canada in that architecture.
David Miliband: Yes, I agree with that. I have
said that publicly and privately. The European security architecture
proposal is pre-Gorbachev. There is some suggestion that it goes
back to Brezhnev or even before. That is why I do not think it
is a particularly new proposal. It is worth discussing and it
is worth engaging with Russia about it, but hard-headed engagement
means that we say that we have absolute red lines and that this
cannot be about splitting off the US and Canada. It is not about
wedge driving or dividing NATO, and it is not about sidelining
the OSCE. The truth is that Russian enthusiasm for the OSCE waxes
and wanes. I was struck last week by the fact that the OSCE is
a very unusual body: it has 56 countries in itcentral Asian
republics, western European countries, Russia and Americaand
unusual discussions are had around that table. It was created
after the Helsinki conference of 1975, and I think that we should
defend it and say that it is a good place to debate European security
architecture proposals. One good thing that came out of last week
was hearing Mr. Lavrov say that he thinks that the OSCE is a good
place for those discussions. It cannot be the easiest place for
him, since he is outnumbered in many ways, but it is a good forum
for these sorts of discussions.
Q38 Ms Stuart: A quick question:
did I pick up from an earlier answer that you intend to go to
the security conference in Munich in February?
David Miliband: Yes, I am on the speakers' list.
I hope that does not put you off going.
Ms Stuart: I am very glad to hear it, because
in previous years there was not sufficient British representation,
so that is very good.
Sir Menzies Campbell: It has been an embarrassment
for the British participants that there has not been high-level
ministerial involvement.
David Miliband: Will you help me write my speech?
Ms Stuart: Indeed, I will even translate it
for you.
Q39 Sir John Stanley: On a different
subject, I think President-elect Obama did not commit to the European
ballistic missile defence project. Do the British Government still
believe that it should go ahead? If there is a radical shift in
American policy from January onwards and it is abandoned by the
US, will the British Government be happy to go along with that
change of policy?
David Miliband: If it is abandoned by the US,
obviously it will be abandonedto state the obvious. I think
that there was a period earlier this year when the United States
was saying to Russia that this could be a shared defence system.
Some people said at the time that the proposal might have got
a different reception if, at origin, they had offered it on a
more shared basis with Russia and it was seen less as "offensive".
I do not think that it is offensive; it is, by definition, a defensive
system, but some of the controversy around it might have been
assuaged if it had been done on a more co-operative basis. I think
that that is reasonable. There was a period when the current US
Administration were talking about a shared facility with Russia.
We should wait until President-elect Obama takes office, but if
he decides that he is going to abandon it, then it will be abandoned.
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