Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40-59)
RT HON.
DAVID MILIBAND
MP AND MATTHEW
RYCROFT
10 DECEMBER 2008
Q40 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: We have
the draft conclusions of the Council, which we had to obtain from
another member state because—bizarrely—the British
Government seem to regard them as secret. That document lays out,
in considerable detail, the decisions about to be taken, so to
that extent the negotiations are rather fake. The exception is
energy and climate change on which there are big gaps in the draft
conclusions. That is the responsibility of your Department and
was a priority in the departmental report. I want to ask you about
it because the German, Polish and Italian Governments have all
been lobbying rather vigorously for changes to the implementation
of the climate change package. They are worried about their manufacturing
industries and a recession; they are worried about extra energy
costs that create fuel poverty. What have the British Government
been doing along a similar line, or are you happy with the way
the flow is going?
David Miliband: You know our position, because
you were in the House yesterday when I set it out. We support
an ambitious climate change package along the lines of the 2020
agreement of March 2007, which means a 20% reduction in greenhouse
gas emissions by 2020 or 30% if there is a global deal at Copenhagen.
You will also know from what I said yesterday that we place particular
emphasis on the carbon capture and storage proposals—12
demonstration plants by 2015—and that we recognise that
there are particular issues in some of the eastern European states.
Yesterday, we talked in detail about Poland, which is 95% dependent
on coal, so "solidarity" measures must be discussed.
We believe that such measures are best taken through the European
budget rather than the environmental programme, but there will
be detailed discussions.
As you have the confidential document from the
Danish Government, you also know that it is not only the climate
change and energy part that is blank; the Lisbon treaty section
has not yet been divulged to you, thus showing that I was telling
the truth when I said that the Irish Government have not yet revealed
what they propose to do about that. I am sorry to disappoint you,
but the draft is an early one, so you should not pay too much
attention to it.
Q41 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: We know
about the CO2 reduction target, which is referred to, but the
draft conclusions refer to issues raised by the implementation
of the package and some questions still outstanding. I want you
to be a little more candid about that, because the matter is serious,
and has been treated seriously by other member states with big
manufacturing concerns and rising energy poverty. Mr. Mittal,
chief executive of the biggest steelmaker in the world, said:
"Why are we—European steel producers—the only
ones to be subjected to stringent CO2 limits"? He continued:
"If we continue to follow those stringent requirements, there
could be a displacement of jobs in the future because European
industry wouldn't be as competitive".
The European Metalworkers Federation said of
the emissions proposal that it "endangers production and
jobs in the steel and non-ferrous metal sectors." We are
going into a recession, and the Prime Minister said a lot about
that at Prime Minister's questions today. He is apparently concerned
about that, but I do not pick up much concern in the Foreign Office
where you are in charge of the negotiations. Other member states
have made vigorous lobbying noises. What are you doing about the
outstanding questions? We should know.
David Miliband: Let us go into this in detail.
I look forward to it. Let us have a detailed discussion about
energy-intensive industries, especially internationally competitive
industries. Let us start with the European emissions trading scheme,
which, as you know, covers 50 or 60% of UK carbon emissions, and
ditto around the rest of Europe. You will know the detailed arrangements
that are in place for nation states to decide how they allocate
allowances under the emissions trading scheme. The British Government
have been doing that for some years, and the price of carbon is
about €25 a tonne. Because of that and our concern about
the position of internationally competitive parts of the British
economy, we give free allowances to those parts of the UK economy
that are covered by the emissions trading scheme and will face
extra costs. Flexibility has been built into the scheme from the
beginning for different sectors to be given particular attention.
That is the first point.
The second point is about internationally mobile
industries, as well as internationally competitive industries.
The carbon leakage issue was discussed at the October European
Council, and the Government and the Council have published the
minutes, so they do not have to be obtained from the Danish website.
Those minutes show that carbon leakage issues, which involve the
definition of certain sectors for which special measures need
to be taken, will also be discussed in Brussels during the next
two days to ensure that proper attention is paid to different
needs in Europe.
The third point, which is under discussion,
is how to finance the carbon capture and storage measures that
will be vital for coal-fired power plants. Difficult issues arise,
and the European Parliament has produced an innovative proposal
to take the new entrant reserve from the emissions trading scheme
and to allocate 500 million allowances to the building of carbon
capture and storage facilities—[Interruption.] You asked
for the detailed negotiating position on the environmental issues
under discussion, which I am giving you. I am happy to go through
them in more detail. They are precisely the issues that are being
discussed at the moment throughout Europe.
Q42 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: Frankly,
it is a rather feeble response compared with the known and announced
positions of at least three other large member states that are
fighting in a competitive world and during a recession to retain
their manufacturing capacity, which is under threat from announced
CO2 measures. What you have said so far does not begin to measure
up to the scale of the problem. We are already facing the collapse
of certain sectors of the manufacturing industry. My constituency
cannot be unique in that. Big lay-offs are happening. I think
that people will be rather disappointed with your remarks so far.
David Miliband: I am only just getting going.
I am only on point three and have a long way to go on the details
of the proposals. I do not see why insults should be chucked around
about this. I am giving a detailed answer about how manufacturing
and other industries will be given free allowances and be protected
from extra costs. We have not even got on to aspects of energy
efficiency.
Chairman: Foreign Secretary, much as I would
like to have a 20-minute or half-hour discussion on climate change,
hopefully we can move on to other areas now that Mr. Heathcoat-Amory
has raised the issue.
Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: Very illuminating, thank
you.
David Miliband: I cede to your impatience.
Q43 Chairman: May I take you back
to what you said on the eastern partnership? As you are aware,
initially it was an initiative from the Polish and Swedish Governments
almost in response to President Sarkozy's Mediterranean initiatives.
The Commission has made proposals that, as I understand it, are
being accelerated from where they were known to be originally.
Because of what has happened in Georgia, those proposals have
come out in the last few days. What is the Government's attitude
to those proposals?
David Miliband: We are very positive about them.
They originated as Polish and Swedish proposals to try to support
the countries east of the European border. They are about politics,
economics and people-to-people contact. We think that they are
a good thing and applaud them.
Q44 Chairman: Is there not a danger
in grouping several countries together that have differences?
You have referred to the Ukraine-Crimea question, and there is
also the question of Moldova-Transnistria, which is a frozen conflict,
to use an old term that we probably should not use any more. It
also includes Belarus, which has just had an election and moved
forward. How do you see the differences, as opposed to grouping
those countries together?
David Miliband: That is a really good point,
and there is obviously a danger. You do not want to have a different
partnership body for every country, but equally, there are dangers
because you do not want to lose the granularity. You mentioned
Moldova and Transnistria. Those are frozen conflicts where the
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe is engaged.
It is important that that does not undermine the eastern partnership.
The countries can see the interdependence between themselves and
it is therefore worth engaging as a group. We have to guard against
a one-size-fits-all approach, but I think we can do that.
I am happy to be corrected, but I think that
those countries have welcomed the eastern partnership as a way
of getting critical mass. Otherwise, there is a relatively small
country of a few million people on one side of the table and the
European Union of 500 million people on the other side. The eastern
partnership is a way of trying to scale things up a bit.
Q45 Chairman: Is it, to use a crude
term, a conveyor belt towards membership of the European Union,
or is it an alternative to it?
David Miliband: No, it is not a conveyor belt
to membership, nor is it a permanent waiting room for membership.
It must have integrity in and of itself. It is separate from questions
of membership. It is part of the European "neighbourhood
policy". It must have integrity and be seen as a proper,
credible set of relationships. Towards the south there are relations
between Europe, North Africa and the Middle East through the Union
for the Mediterranean. To the east, the eastern partnership is
being spurred on by the UMED development. It is worth giving it
a go.
Q46 Chairman: May I ask a specific
question on the Moldova-Transnistria question? In answer to Mr.
Mackinlay's question on Georgia, you referred to the history.
One thing that has not been touched on is that the Georgian Government
in 1991-92 cancelled a level of autonomy that existed in the previous
Georgian republic as it came out of the Soviet Union. That is
a factor in the perceptions of the South Ossetians and Abkhazians
in not trusting the Georgian Government. Is there a danger that
we will have the same mistakes with regard to the Moldova- Transnistria
question, and that that so-called frozen conflict might erupt
dangerously? Is there then a danger of Russia, using what President
Medvedev has talked about, asserting a similar attitude towards
Transnistria as it has towards South Ossetia and Abkhazia?
David Miliband: In the light of events in August,
one has to admit that there is a danger. There are very strong
reasons for Russia to believe that it should not repeat what it
has done, and there is a very strong incentive for us to ensure
that the political processes to tackle these conflicts are live
and vibrant. Part of the reason why I went to the OSCE ministerial
last week was to make the case that we need active work there.
On the first part of your question, I do not
know whether the Committee has had a chance to look at the most
recent human rights report of the Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights. That is part of the OSCE, and perhaps a part
that deserves more recognition.
Chairman: It is an excellent organisation.
David Miliband: The report, part of which I
read out at the OSCE ministerial last week, contains some chilling
stuff about human rights in South Ossetia and about what is effectively
ethnic cleansing going on outside. It contains some criticisms
of the Georgian Government but much greater criticisms of the
other side. It brings home the inherent dangers not just to lines
in the turf but to basic human rights. There is talk of villages
being looted and people being driven out. The situation is still
very tricky, and that rather reinforces the point about the monitors
and the role that they can play, which Paul Keetch was asking
about earlier.
Q47 Chairman: Are we doing anything
to help the Moldovans resolve their issue with Transnistria? You
said that it is in the OSCE, but are we as the UK—
David Miliband: I do not know the answer to
that. Do you?
Matthew Rycroft: I know that the answer is yes,
but we can provide more detail.[2]
Chairman: Perhaps you could send us a note,
because it clearly has the potential to become the next South
Ossetia.
Q48 Andrew Mackinlay: For what it
is worth, I welcome the changed stance on Belarus, and I would
like to know how we can further it. I understand the history—the
European Union attitude, the freezing out, the prevention from
travelling of key people, the elections last year that were deemed
to be flawed but nevertheless progress and the ending of political
imprisonment. It seems to me that there is a now a window of opportunity
that should be seized. I should like to be reassured that there
is a programme and an initiative. Some of us met the Belarusian
Prime Minister here. I do not know whether he met you, but I think
that he met your colleague the Minister for Europe. We have to
seize the opportunity of this window, and I wonder what the UK
Government and the EU are doing.
David Miliband: You make a good point, if I
may say so. The European General Affairs Council took a decision
the month before last to upgrade EU-Belarus relations. We did
so not because we think that it suddenly has a perfect record
on human rights and democratic governance but because there had
been important improvements and we wanted to incentivise further
improvements. That was what the upgrade in relations was intended
to achieve.
Q49 Andrew Mackinlay: But is there
a game plan? I am not asking you to share details.
David Miliband: The game plan has a clear goal,
which is to improve living conditions and human rights in Belarus,
to promote economic development there and to promote relations
between the EU and Belarus. I am very happy to write with more
details of that, but the carrot of European engagement can be
used to help improve the domestic situation.
Chairman: We are going to switch focus
now. Ken Purchase.
Q50 Mr. Purchase: The EU has a strategic
partnership with China, and we meet annually to try to progress
our aims and objectives for that. Regrettably, of course, the
latest meeting has just been cancelled, due mainly, it appears,
to the antagonism of the Chinese towards the Dalai Lama and his
meeting with Sarkozy. There are a raft of issues related to China,
not least human rights within the country and the need to work
out trade relations properly. There are many other such matters,
given that China will be a very big player in world politics in
not-too-distant future. We in the west, however, have put a great
deal of time into advancing the so-called Tibetan cause. The Dalai
Lama has gained almost pop-star status in relation to that problem.
Are we putting too much into that at the expense of not developing
the very important relationships between China and the European
Union and from a bilateral point of view?
David Miliband: I do not think so, no. I think
it is right to insist that human rights in Tibet, the autonomy
of Tibet and the cultural rights of the people of Tibet are very
important issues. It is right to say that both publicly and privately.
I do not think that is an argument for breaking down relations
with China; it is an argument for building them up.
I deeply regret that the Chinese Government
decided to pull out of, postpone or cancel the EU-China summit,
because it had a range of important issues to address, not least
the climate change question that we have just been discussing.
The proximate cause or reason cited was that President Sarkozy
was attending an event in Gdansk that the Dalai Lama would also
attend, but I do not think that is a good reason to cancel the
summit, and I hope that it can be restored. The Dalai Lama argues
not for the independence of Tibet but for the autonomy of Tibet
in China.
Q51Mr. Purchase: Clearly, the Chinese
thought that was a good reason to do it, and they are a bit closer
to the situation than you and me. They are clearly aggravated
by this whole matter, and they make some sensible points regarding
foreign intervention in that matter. We have seen what has happened
in Europe, in Kosovo and other places, in relation to independence.
Despite the Dalai Lama saying that it is just about having an
autonomous region, the actions do not seem to match the words.
It seems to me, still, that we need to advance relations with
China. We need to attend to the issues that we have been rehearsing,
but we seem to spend an awful lot of time on the issue of Tibet
to the disadvantage of advancing the relationship that you want
to build on with China generally.
David Miliband: I have been to China twice—for
an extended visit in February and for a couple of days in October—and
Tibet featured in my discussions, but it could not, on any reckoning,
be said to have obscured other aspects of the UK-China or EU-China
relationships. It would be very unfortunate if we, qua the UK,
or we, qua the EU, were put in the position of somehow having
to abandon the concerns of our citizens about human rights in
Tibet to get a productive relationship with China. We, as the
UK, and we, as the EU, have an awful lot to gain from our relationship
with China, but China also has a lot to gain from its relationship
with the EU and us. Part of having a grown-up relationship is
being able to address issues of common concern in an honest, open
and transparent way, which is what we have always tried to do,
and in a predictable way—that is important in international
relations.
I believe that we can and should continue to
say to the Chinese Government that we want the most productive
and engaged relations with them. That involves issues of mutual
concern, where we both have gains, and issues that are bilateral
with different countries. It also involves issues of political,
economic and human rights developments in China. That is important.
That is the sort of grown-up conversation that one can have.
Q52 Sir John Stanley: Foreign Secretary,
in your detailed and extensive written ministerial statement quite
recently, you announced a significant shift in the British Government's
public position vis-a"-vis Tibet. That would certainly be
treated as being significant in China by way of concession to
its position. What did you get in return?
David Miliband: That decision was not made as
part of any kind of "deal", if that is what you are
suggesting. It was made because we thought that it was in the
interests of our own country and its ability to forge, or to argue
for, human rights in Tibet and good relations with China. I say
that because our previous policy, which had existed for about
100 years, was getting in the way of a serious discussion about
human rights in Tibet and good relations and engagement with China.
The concept of suzerainty is not accepted or understood by anyone
in the diplomatic world. Every country in Europe, the United States
and many other countries recognise that Tibet is part of China
and agree with the Dalai Lama that Tibetan autonomy, not independence,
is the goal.
Our position on suzerainty was a relic—it
was the product of Raj-day control of India and issues relating
to the India-China border. In my written ministerial statement,
I think—I do not have it in front of me—that I described
it as an anachronism. We have had that policy since Indian independence,
but it has never been put into practice, and we have never actually
argued for Tibetan independence. However, we never addressed this
running sore of having a policy questioning whether Tibet was
part of China, even though we did not argue for Tibetan independence.
I am sorry for all that detail, but we thought that it was the
right thing to do.
Q53 Sir John Stanley: Foreign Secretary,
you referred to the desirability of a serious discussion on human
rights with the Chinese authorities, which I endorse. Reports
this morning, which you might not have heard, stated that Chinese
citizens who had exercised their right of petitioning, which is
also a very important right in this country, had been arrested
and subjected to enforced treatment in mental health institutions.
That has a very unattractive resonance going back to the time
of the Soviet regime. Will you investigate those allegations and
report to the Committee on whether they have any substance?
David Miliband: I certainly shall. I am afraid
that I did not hear that report this morning, but there will be
added strength to our queries and questions when I say that it
has been raised in this Committee and that I want to report back
to it with the answers. I shall certainly do that; it is a very
distressing story. When I have been in China, I have obviously
celebrated, and tried to improve, the growing cultural, educational
and trade links between Britain and China. I have also raised
generic and individual human rights issues—generic in the
obvious sense and specific regions in China and cases. It is important
that I do that, and I am happy to take up the issues raised.[3]
Sir John Stanley: For the record, this Committee
has done the same.
Q54 Sandra Osborne: Foreign Secretary,
may I ask you about EU-US relations? Prior to the presidential
election, EU Foreign Ministers put forward their priorities for
EU-US engagement, which included the reform of international institutions,
the Middle East peace process, Afghanistan and Russia. How do
you expect the relationship to turn out? For example, do you expect
the new President to prioritise the Middle East peace process
at the beginning of his presidency, rather than at the end? Do
you anticipate areas of disagreement, such as Iran? What do you
hope that the EU will do to improve trans-Atlantic relationships?
David Miliband: That is a very big question.
European Foreign Ministers have had two long discussions about
a more concerted and prioritised approach towards the new Administration.
It is fair to say that there are unanimously high hopes for engagement
with Mrs. Clinton and President-elect Obama. Let me start at the
end, because you made a really important point. This has to be
about what Europe gives, not just what it asks for, so in all
the areas where we are asking America to do something, whether
it be on the Middle East peace process or on international institutions,
we need to be saying, "This is what Europe wants to do."
I think that that message has got home within the EU. Afghanistan
and Pakistan would also fit into that category. On Iran, America
is part of a multilateral process that includes three European
countries, and I look forward to its continuing.
There is a clear set of priorities, which is
helpful. We started off with 12 or 15 priorities but are now down
to four or five, and that is good. There is only one President
and one Secretary of State at a time, so the new team has not
started, but I think that from 20 January there will be good prospects
for real engagement.
Q55 Sandra Osborne: May I ask about
climate change, which you discussed earlier with David, in respect
of the EU? Do you think that progress in the US will be impeded
because of the economic situation?
David Miliband: That question is certainly being
asked, but all the evidence is that President-elect Obama sees
the economic crisis as a reason to advance climate change goals
rather than to go back on them. He has announced massive investment
in public sector energy efficiency and a very large drive on electric
and low-carbon cars. He has committed the United States to an
80% emissions reduction by 2050. That is very significant, given
that its emissions are 17% higher than they were in 1990, which
is the Kyoto baseline. There is a real example being set in the
United States, and one reason that I am confident that the EU
will come up with the right answer tomorrow and Friday is that
President-elect Obama has shown that if we do not offer global
leadership, he will. That is a significant change.
Q56 Chairman: May I take you to the
potential for enlargement of the EU? We touched on Kosovo, on
which there will be more questions in a moment, but there have
been some difficulties in Bosnia and Herzegovina internally in
recent weeks. Clearly, it is not a normal country in terms of
its structure, the different entities and difficult relationships.
You spoke about sharpening the incentive of EU accession. How
do you see that happening in that country, particularly as there
is disagreement about the role of the Office of the High Representative
and the future of that post?
David Miliband: I think that everyone is rightly
worried about Bosnia at the moment. Both the shadow Foreign Secretary
and I have been there. In July, the Czech Foreign Minister and
I wrote to all our EU colleagues to flag up Bosnia as a big issue.
I think that that was before it was realised around Europe quite
how significant the situation is.
My trip to Bosnia revealed the depth of continuing
disagreement, to put it politely, that exists between the leading
political parties. The history of bloodshed and division is really
potent the minute you sit down to talk to anybody. Our position
is clearly that the Office of the High Representative should not
be wound up until its objectives have been met, and that is the
right way to proceed; otherwise, it would be weakened.
EU membership is a fair way off, but the EU
is probably one of the things that can be a uniting force in that
country, which, if it is to succeed, will have to have a stronger
relationship with the EU.
Chairman: But at the moment the situation is
difficult.
David Miliband: The situation is extremely fragile,
I would say.
Q57 Chairman: There is no danger
of a return to violence, is there?
David Miliband: There is always the danger of
a return to violence. Matthew was our man in Sarajevo until July,
so he should come in.
There is always that danger. Some of the fears
about what was happening in Republika Srpska were a bit overdone—I
do not think that it is about to secede from the Federation—but,
equally, there are real strains and stresses there. You spent
three years there, Matthew, so you should come in.
Matthew Rycroft: Just in a sentence or two,
it would be premature to close the Office of the High Representative
now, and it would be premature to draw down the peacekeeping force,
EUFOR, which is there to guarantee security and stability. We
need to continue to do that.
Q58 Chairman: I touch next on another
country that came out of the former Yugoslavia—Macedonia,
or FYROM. Is there any prospect of the dialogue that has been
going on between Greece and Macedonia resulting in agreement?
Are they going to agree on a form of words? I know that the Greek
Government have other problems at the moment, but the question
is about the name—perhaps New Macedonia.
David Miliband: I am not going to suggest a
name. However, I suggest that it must be possible to find a name
that satisfies honour on all sides. I very much hope that the
Greeks and the Macedonians will realise how much they have to
lose from this continuing. It is obviously an issue in NATO. It
is an issue for the EU. It is desperately important that it is
resolved. We refer to FYROM, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
in international dealings at the moment, but they need to find
a way of resolving the issue with their Greek counterparts.
Q59 Chairman: I was in discussions
on the subject months ago, and it is quite clear that feelings
are very high. Greek Members of the European Parliament point
out that they are Macedonians, that they come from Thessaloniki
and so on. That is what they want to talk about. Is there any
prospect of a breakthrough?
David Miliband: There are discussions under
way. At the time of the NATO summit they got closer than they
had been. It would be very bad for me to send the message that
I think that there is any reason why they should not conclude
them. They should. It is in the interests of them both. It is
easy for us to say but, really—I mean, they must be able
to find a way around it. Actually, some of the names that I have
seen circulating do satisfy both sides; and, privately, people
might accept that they do.
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