Submission
from Mr Lee Bruce and Dr Robert Crowcroft
Mr
Bruce is an expert on political negotiations, defence and military strategy
having completed a research thesis at the University
of Leeds on British policy in Northern Ireland. Dr Crowcroft is an expert on British
political parties and transatlantic security. He recently received a doctorate
from the University
of Leeds on British
politics and statesmanship during the Second World War. He has published
articles in learned journals.
Summary
· The
possibility of achieving international agreement as a means to successfully
counter the proliferation of dangerous materials and ballistic missile
technology is limited. Only export controls negotiated between a small number
of countries are likely to be effective, and even then only in the short term.
Wider ranging agreement is impractical and the UK Government should focus its
efforts in alternative directions.
· Proliferation
is inevitable, and consequently a much tougher foreign policy stance should be
adopted by the UK
and its partners. Negotiation with proliferators is unlikely to produce
long-term success. Some states and certain non-state actors are committed to
the overthrow of the present international system, and consequently cannot be
bought off. The UK
should lead the way in arguing the case for a firmer line on combating this
threat. There is a serious danger that controversies over the 2003 invasion of Iraq
risk obscuring the merits of that approach as a means to enhance security.
· The UK
Government should question the precise value of arms control treaties and
disarmament. Adversarial regimes are almost certain to ignore them, while
benevolent states such as the UK
are not aggressive anyway. The historical precedents for seeking successful
dialogue on these issues are not encouraging, and it is difficult to see how
this will change.
· Rather
than attempting to establish international frameworks that are likely to be
ineffective, the UK
and its partners should take vigorous action against individual proliferators
on a case-by-case basis. This should involve more extensive sanctions and the
setting out of clear military 'red lines'. Given the gravity of the threat, the
UK
and its allies should be more willing to take military action on this issue
than they seem at present.
The merit of diplomatic initiatives in
combating proliferation
1.
The UK
Government must adopt a hard-headed view of the feasibility of impeding the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles
technology. Proliferation is unfortunately inevitable and thus it must be
questioned as to how useful future diplomatic initiatives to address this
threat are likely to be. Furthermore it must be doubted whether certain
polities and non-state actors are likely to be restrained by such initiatives.
2.
This is not to rule out the potential value of export controls and similar
measures intended to restrict the follow of certain targeted materials to
'rogue' regimes and other proliferators. For instance the 2003 Proliferation
Security Initiative, making provision for the interdiction of WMD and delivery
systems, is worthwhile, as is the April 2004 United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1540, placing obligations on states to physically control
WMD-related materials. Yet while the international mechanisms for conducting
this should be strengthened, a great deal of scepticism is warranted as to the
possibility of success. It is almost inevitable that given time a sufficiently
determined regime will be able to acquire specific materials via illicit trade.
And the feasibilities of international consensus are too remote to warrant
optimism. Advanced states such as Russia,
China and Pakistan, for
instance, will prove particularly difficult to tie into international
diplomatic efforts on a consistent basis. Moreover, none of this takes into
account the fact that nations might seek to supply Islamic extremist groups
with WMD capabilities. In a sense, within many countries, WMD and ballistic
missiles will be pursued for reasons that cannot be easily signed away - or
owned up to - in a treaty.
3.
The idea of successfully linking UK foreign policy on proliferation
to international mechanisms is therefore implausible. Diplomatic initiatives to
construct anti-proliferation frameworks are likely to prove a failure in an
international community of 195 states due to the sheer impossibility of a
workable agreement. The practicalities of agreeing materials to be controlled,
ways to monitor them and methods of punishing proliferators are too difficult
for the international community to reach a consensus on. Even states such as Britain, France
and Germany
would have difficulty agreeing on a framework for non-proliferation, as events
of recent years have demonstrated. Nation states have different interests. The notion
that proliferation should be countered is not enough in itself; agreement is
also necessary on precisely how to
counter it. The ineffective attempts over the last five years by the European
Union to deal with Iran's
nuclear programme have demonstrated that if no red lines are clearly laid out the
endeavour will simply lead to a weakened geopolitical position, as well as
increased demands by proliferators. Diplomacy cannot be, and is not, an end in
itself. Bilateral agreements, or arrangements between a small number of
countries, may be useful, but larger agreements are problematic and if
enforcement mechanisms are not clear the potential for disagreement means the
arrangements will likely prove useless when violation occurs.
Arms control in theory and practice
4.
Arms control and disarmament have historically been unproductive in their
objectives of preventing proliferation, in improving the stability of the
international environment, and modifying the behaviour of other states. Arms treaties
do not work if one of the signatories is a rogue state, i.e. the type of
regimes that anti-proliferation efforts are directed against. Entering into
negotiations with such actors is likely to prove dangerous. The value of any agreements
reached with regimes of this sort is questionable due to the innate character
of that regime. The fact is that authoritarian states cheat. Peaceful states on
the other hand do not act aggressively because of the fundamental nature of
their polity, regardless of their military-industrial power. Frequently, debate
over arms control becomes trapped in technical details, while the soundness of
the notion itself escapes attention. In a sense, the question that must be
asked is precisely what can a treaty achieve?
5.
The basic logic of arms control is that states enter into agreement, on either
a bilateral or multilateral basis, in order to co-operate, even if they are
enemies, because of the awful damage to their nation and interests that might
occur should conflict erupt. But is it tenable to see the above logic being
applicable to cases such as Iran,
North Korea, Libya, Syria,
Pakistan and potentially Saudi Arabia?
Why would states such as Iran
and Syria
be sufficiently anxious of the 'awful damage' that might occur through usage of
certain weapons, particularly nuclear forces, when they are faced with powerful
adversaries that, in their view, threaten their security? The imperative acting
upon Iran
and others is therefore to seek to develop the weapons themselves. The logical
direction of current international trends is towards a more heavily nuclearised
world.
6.
We must be careful not to confuse the act
of diplomacy, i.e. negotiating with states, for actual progress in the art of diplomacy, i.e. concrete
achievements. The reality is that proliferators are simply not likely to
respond to calls for reasonableness. The sooner the UK absorbs this and impresses it
upon its allies the better.
7.
The key issue in international relations is not armaments but the motives of
those who seek to possess them. As Professor Colin Gray has noted, 'arms
control theory postulates a cause-and-effect nexus between armaments and
conflicts that does not stands up well under either historical inquiry or
theoretical challenge'.[1] Lethal
instruments only become so in the hands of those inclined to use them. The
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and similar initiatives represent an
inconvenience and nothing more for those determined to acquire WMD and
ballistic missile technology.
8.
Arms control has little precedent for success. The most striking example is, of
course, post-1987 US-Soviet relations - but this occurred only after the Reagan administration had
'won' the Cold War and forced changes in Soviet behaviour through a strategy of
pressure not accommodation; arms control agreements became something to be
sought only after the political paradigm was changed. Once it had been, for some
years it seemed that almost any measure of arms control seemed possible (and
much good work was achieved as a result). But it is difficult to see how this
could be replicated with, for instance, Iran. Beyond the Reagan-Bush era
successful examples are few. Even the relative successes of the 1920s were
easily reversed - and the fallacies underpinning them brutally exposed - in the
1930s. Moreover, the treaties that were
made in the thirties - for instance the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935 -
did nothing to prevent Europe's slide into
war. As Gray argued, 'Arms control glitters attractively only when its ideas are
viewed in isolation as ideas. Adhering generally to pleasing concepts,
spokesmen for arms control have not had to suffer a rigorous audit or to
contend with fundamental theoretical challenges'.[2]
9.
Arms treaties are therefore only useful if negotiated from a position of strength
and as a means to specific foreign policy goals. The initiatives taken by the Reagan
administration, particularly the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty,
as a means of managing the ongoing collapse of the USSR in the late 1980s and guiding
it to a 'soft-landing' are one isolated example of the utility of armament-centred
diplomacy. Such treaties are dangerous, however, if negotiated from a position
of weakness. For instance, the SALT process of the 1970s begun by the Nixon
Administration helped the Soviet Union avoid expending resources it could not
afford, thus considerably strengthening the USSR. The pre-eminent historical
lesson of arms control treaties is that they allowed the lifespan of the Soviet
empire to be prolonged. They also permitted the USSR to divert resources elsewhere,
principally to sponsoring Communist forces across the globe. The treaties did
not secure any significant change in Soviet behaviour. Moreover, the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty had virtually no impact on the rise of strategic
offensive weapons, while the rather more modest content of arms talks between
1983-90 - relating principally to theatre deployment and command-and-control
arrangements for nuclear arms rather than reductions in numbers - achieved far
greater success in the way of verifiable results than earlier efforts to
address the overall size of arsenals. It only became possible to properly
address the number of nuclear weapons once the USSR had yielded and it broke up
post-1991. In the same vein, North Korea extorted concessions from the Clinton
administration and still built nuclear weaponry despite a number of 'agreed
frameworks'; prior to 2003, Iraq used these tactics effectively while Iran and
Syria are replicating this at present. On the other hand, Libya gave up its WMD programme because of fear
of US
power, not because of the 'awful damage' that spiralling possession of WMD could
bring about.
10.
It might be thought offensive to question the idea of arms control, but that
should not deter analysis of what it can actually achieve. Would-be controllers
need to bear in mind that arms control agreements have never successfully shaped the political dynamic between
governments. Hoping that a nebulous agreement will reshape antagonistic
relations for the better is naïve.
Implications and recommendations
11.
The UK
Government should not expend diplomatic energy on arms control agreements as a
strategy for countering proliferation. Such treaties will embolden recalcitrant
actors and tie the hands of the UK
and its partners. A tougher approach to foreign policy is more likely to
achieve results than consensus-dependent international arrangements. As noted
earlier, proliferation is inevitable. In this respect the effort to stop it is
doomed to long-term failure. However, two points flow from this: firstly, that
it can be slowed through the robust
application of economic and diplomatic pressure - if this is likely to be
effective - and the employment of military power where necessary. Secondly,
that it should be countered through
the build-up of military strength sufficient to defend the UK and its
partners, deter an adversary or prevail should war come.
12.
In this respect, the rationale for the invasion of Iraq was strategically sound, and
the model could be duplicated as a basis for action elsewhere. The
international community faces a series of challenges from proliferators and
those attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.
Efforts to counter this should not centre upon offering incentives for
non-proliferation, currently being tried with no success in Iran, but
instead upon the application of pressure sufficient to persuade proliferators
to desist. For instance, far more aggressive pursuit than is undertaken at
present of those countries' financial portfolios abroad would be one worthwhile
measure. So too would stringent economic sanctions and political isolation. Military
action, escalating from blockades to targeted air strikes to regime-change interventions
should also be policy options clearly 'on the table'. Red lines must be marked
out, the crossing of which entail serious consequences. Signalling weakness to
proliferators, as UK Government policy has done since 2003, is a fatal error;
more positive results would flow from an alternative stance.
13.
The UK should work with its
partners, particularly the US,
to achieve this. The EU and its other member states should only be co-operated
with on this issue where those countries take a stand sufficiently firm to be
compatible with UK national interests, which, to date, they have not. French
attempts to mend fences with the Saddam Hussein regime from 1991-2003, and the
weak response to Iranian belligerence, are not encouraging precedents. Given
the inevitability of proliferation, it is probable that the UK will face
attack from WMD and ballistic missiles. The UK must not compromise its foreign
policy for fear of breaking with EU partners who favour 'mediation' to firm
action.
The possibility of disarmament
14.
The strategic errors in the case mounted by proponents of disarmament are
replete. For instance, the authors of one recent publication by the International Institute for Strategic Studies
asserted that it is illegitimate to use concerns over the strategic intentions
of adversarial states as a reason to avoid disarmament, while arguing that 'the
size, roles and political-strategic significance' of US and Russian nuclear
arsenals should be reduced.[3]
How security is thought attainable minus the traditional constituents of power
is unclear, while judgments about the intentions and capabilities of other
states represent the fundamental starting-point of external policy since the
time of Thucydides. Moreover, considering the success of the size of the US and Russian
arsenals in preserving international peace, the value of such a reduction is
debatable. The advocates of disarmament outline no alternative authority that
can plausibly assume responsibility for providing states with their security,
nor explain precisely why states should give up the right to take their own
decisions to a nebulous body. Finally, the proponents of disarmament demand
robust enforcement mechanisms but seek to deprive the UK and its
partners of the means to defend global security. A world without nuclear
weapons in the hands of the UK,
US and other unofficial guarantors of security is an unsafe world.
15.
In addition, there is a risk in constructing an elaborate international
framework that would entail stigmatising nuclear weaponry when it might
feasibly become necessary to use nuclear forces to attack Hard and Deeply
Buried Targets (HDBT) - such as bunkers containing weapons, laboratories,
assembly facilities and C³ - resistant to conventional attack. This is a real
possibility, as recognised in both the 2001 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and
subsequent, if vague, comment by the UK Government. The US believes
there to be 10,000 HDBTs worldwide. Conventional weapons may lack the
destructive capability necessary for attacks on such locations and stigmatising
nuclear weaponry without an understanding of how foreign policy would operate
in practice without them is dangerous.
16.
Disarmament advocates ignore the fact that the type of states that pose the
biggest risk are not likely to be responsive to the type of solutions that they
outline. The UK
has less than 200 operationally available warheads and the December 2006 White
Paper announced a further twenty per cent reduction. This is quite sufficient
as a measure of disarmament. It may be enticing to seize the moral high ground
with the argument that UK
disarmament could set an example for others, but this is not borne out by the
historical record or the probable reactions of others. States will make
security decisions based upon their own perceived needs. Advocates of this
position have yet to demonstrate that UK disarmament would influence
others.
Conclusion
17.
The UK
Government should base a key part of its foreign policy around combating the
problem of proliferation. Paradoxically, however, this must include acceptance
of the fact that proliferation is inevitable and a robust foreign policy posture
consequently necessary. The UK
should take the lead in forging consensus for such a posture with its partners.
The feasibility of constructing effective arrangements between the
international community is limited and likely to prove unworkable, as well as
providing proliferators with the scope to exploit divisions, avoid punishment
and play for time - precisely as Iran has done since 2004. Moreover,
non-adversarial actors such as Taiwan,
South Korea and Japan could
also enter a race for nuclear weaponry. The Government should recognise this and shift
its efforts accordingly.
18.
Moreover, the utility of arms control treaties has historically been
questionable. The same is true of disarmament. The very fact that proliferators
are willing to defy the international community suggests that attempts to
conciliate them will fail. The current preference in European foreign policy
circles for a role as 'mediator' should not divert UK policy from the necessity of
demanding concrete results from its diplomacy. The utility of this as a foreign
policy strategy should thus be seriously questioned. A tougher approach to
those proliferating WMD and missile technology could be adopted, including much
firmer economic, political and military sanctions. The controversy over Iraq should not deter the UK and its
allies from using decisive force where necessary to remove threats.
25 September 2008
[1] Colin Gray, 'Arms Control
Does Not Control Arms', in Gray, Strategy
and History (London,
2006), p. 121.
[2] Gray, p. 125.
[3] G. Perkovich and J. M.
Acton, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons
(London 2008), pp. 113-5.
