Submission from Peter Nicholls,
Chair, Abolition 2000 UK
Background - our organization
Abolition 2000 UK is part of the wider Abolition 2000 - a global
coalition working for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Abolition 2000 internationally
was founded in the wake of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's
Review Conference in 1995,
which made that treaty permanent. We welcomed the 13-point
programme for nuclear disarmament contained in paragraph 15 of the gloss on NPT article VI in the final
report of the 2000 Review
Conference. We advocate negotiations to bring about a nuclear weapons
convention (designed along the lines of the chemical and biological weapons
conventions) and we distribute the published model convention text together
with an analysis of the problems to be overcome.
Abolition 2000 UK was
founded in October 1996 and is a coordinating body for over 100 groups in Scotland, Wales
and England
that have signed the Abolition 2000 statement. Abolition 2000 UK exchanges information, organizes
cooperative actions, produces discussion papers on the problems of nuclear
weaponry, and lobbies for nuclear disarmament at the national and international
levels.
Referring to: National
Security Strategy (Cabinet Office
paper Cm. 7291, March 2008)
A.
General comments on Cm. 7291.
1. We found the
general style and approach of Cm. 7291 rather simplistic. It fails to answer or
sometimes even analyse key problems in attaining 'security' for the U.K. and
elsewhere in the world. We believe that true security for the U.K. will
depend upon security for other nations, states and cultures, including those
that are substantially socially and politically different from our own.
2. Cm. 7291 conflates
a number of very different security issues, including nuclear weapons, other
WMD, terrorism, global warming, threats of pandemics, flooding, and economic
problems. We do not believe that all these issues, although some are linked,
can be addressed in similar ways. Each is unique and demands specific and
detailed focussed attention.
3. Cm. 7291 also
treats as similar or analogous some different geopolitical problem areas, most
obviously including Iraq and
Afghanistan. The recent history of these two states, and
the historical roles of the peoples of the two states, their own governments,
the UN, NATO, the 'coalition of the willing'(in Iraq), and other military
agencies that have intervened in their administration and governance, requires
a detailed analysis and conclusions that are specific to each case.
4. Cm. 7291 also
does not distinguish clearly the roles of the different alliances of which UK is
a member, especially the primarily military alliance NATO and the primarily
economic and political alliance represented by the EU.
B.
Specific comments on security aspects of U.K. nuclear weapons policy.
1. We have
welcomed the UK's
government's support for progress under the NPT (including the 13 points agreed
in 2000), for the ratification of the CTBT by all the named states, and for
negotiations leading to an FMCT. But we note that each of these treaties and
potential treaties is only a partial step in the direction of nuclear weapons
abolition. We would therefore urge that government acknowledge the eventual
need for an over-arching treaty or convention that would ban the possession,
use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in the same way that the Chemical
Weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Conventions ban those WMD. Such a
treaty would represent the logical culmination of all the relevant partial
treaties such as the NPT and not conflict with it.
2. The UK's commendable
support for a cluster weapons ban shows that we can promote measures of
disarmament involving weapons otherwise seen as of substantial value by the
military. The moral arguments against cluster bombs are equally cogent when
applied to nuclear weapons (NW). Banning the latter would therefore seem to be
a logical further step in the progress towards a world in conformity with both
morality and the relevant Geneva Conventions on the conduct of war.
3. Securing the non-proliferation
of NW is essential to preserve a safe world. But nuclear non-proliferation is
inevitably linked with nuclear disarmament. The contrast between the '50 more
years' of UK NW anticipated both by Cm. 7291 and by the governmental white
paper last year on the question of Trident renewal, and the official support
for disarmament initiatives, is a stark one. H.M. Government must acknowledge the
need to put UK NW on a disarmament negotiating table. The decision to continue
in possession of the U.K.'s
nuclear weapons must be seen as tentative, potentially reversible, and
certainly dependent upon progress with disarmament involving all the nuclear
weapons states, both those acknowledged by the NPT and others.
4. NATO is primarily
a military alliance. Although it has a modest political dimension, as
illustrated by the Partnership for Peace, it is clearly distinct in style and
governance from a moderately democratic alliance such as the European Union. The role of NATO in the post cold war world
and its involvement in 'out of area' actions such as that in Afghanistan
needs to be carefully examined and if necessary deconstructed. All such alliances
have problems which need to be addressed; indefinite extension of NATO membership,
even involving democratic states, is not a necessary 'good'. NATO's nuclear
doctrine, including its continued acceptance and sometime advocacy of a
possible 'first strike' role for nuclear weapons, is a cold war legacy which
requires discussion and revision. The political role of NATO needs to be
emphasized over the military role. Its military role, if actively used at all,
must be consistent with the U.N. charter and conducted with continuous
oversight by the Security Council.
5. We wish to
emphasize the need to find non-military solutions to security problems,
including especially the problems of terrorism. The government must acknowledge
the different security problems represented by the existence of different
militant groups and the different forms taken by such groups - as in the modest
Cm. 7291 statement distinguishing Hamas and Hizbullah from other groups
creating security concerns..
6. We point out
that deterrence theory, both nuclear and non-nuclear, is intrinsically
problematic. But in particular deterrence of any kind is unlikely to work
against non-state actors, and nuclear deterrence cannot be effective against
such groups; its use only encourages small states to think of NW as an
insurance option and hence weakens the effectiveness of the NPT.
7. Any discussion of security needs must
acknowledge the political and economic roots of conflict. It is arguable that some
UK
policies may exacerbate or have exacerbated such conflict roots rather than
ameliorated them and that government has been slow to acknowledge the
possibility of policy mistakes.
8. We wish to
point out the possibility of various disarmament actions that fall short of
complete nuclear disarmament but which can represent gradual steps toward a world
without nuclear weapons. These include: decreasing the numbers of NW;
dealerting; abandoning continuous NW patrols; separating missiles and warheads;
formally abandoning the 'first use' option (both for NATO and UK); and transparency re the location and existence
of NW in the UK
(thus we should acknowledge the removal of US NW from Lakenheath). The UK
should also support all treaty structures that limit any role for NW, including
the recognition of all the currently agreed Nuclear Weapons Free Zones and
agreeing formally to provide negative security assurances (NSAs) both by the UK
individually and by NATO as an alliance currently depending on nuclear weapons.
It should press for similar actions by the other NWS. The success of the 2010
review conference of the NPT will depend upon such unilateral or multilateral
actions as well as upon progress within the Conference on Disarmament in
negotiations for an FMCT and for PAROS.
9. We believe
that it should be but perhaps is not unnecessary to point out that a 'rules
based' world means that no actions prohibited by the UN charter or not
specifically authorised by the Security Council should be undertaken. It is
hard to see how any use or threat of use of NW would be consistent with the
charter or ever authorized by the Security Council. Continued possession of NW, and all that implies, may thus be
inherently inconsistent with the establishment of a 'rules based' world.
10. The security of the UK, and of other states, is thus
linked with the need for progress in nuclear disarmament. Failure to secure
concrete proposals either within the CD beforehand or at the 2010 NPT Review Conference
itself will mean a reversion to a less secure world.
26 September 2008
