Submitted by Jonathan Granoff, Esq. President, Global Security Institute
In 1965, I met Robert Kennedy
while working in
Nearly every country in the world
has accepted the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a necessary legal
instrument to address this threat. While simultaneously condemning the spread
of nuclear weapons, this treaty sets forth a related obligation to obtain their
universal elimination. In 1995, in order to obtain the indefinite extension of
the NPT, now with 188 states parties,
commitments to nuclear elimination were confirmed and strengthened by the five
declared nuclear weapon states - China, United States, France, Russia, and the
United Kingdom. However, the nuclear weapon states with over 96% of the
This incoherence in policies leads to instability in cooperation. Nothing could be more hazardous in today's world. In order to ensure that nuclear weapons do not proliferate to more states and to dangerous sub-state actors, confidence in the restraint of the exercise of power by the most powerful is needed. The trust and cooperation needed for a global assault against such threats will not be effective if some states flaunt their disarmament obligations yet display a passion for non-proliferation.
I will highlight some of the incoherencies that are creating instability in the non-proliferation regime, and a path to coherence that simultaneously reduces threat and strengthens non-proliferation efforts. The path to stability and security is a return to promoting the pursuit of collective security through the rule of law. In the field of nuclear weapons, this translates - among other things - into fulfilling the existing legally mandated disarmament responsibilities that remain unaddressed by the nuclear weapon states. It is simply impractical and hypocritical for some to say that nuclear weapons are morally acceptable for them to possess and even threaten to use, and evil for others to attempt to acquire.
With this in mind, allow me to address
the perception, common in
In contrast to these three, other
states have changed their policies over time, renounced nuclear weapons and
joined the treaty. For example,
With a negotiated settlement to
the North Korean situation, the area of immediate concern relating to the
spread of nuclear weapons is
The NPT Bargain: Recent Developments
The NPT has a remarkable record of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, but is now facing multiple challenges, such as:
1- Iran's defiance of Security Council sanctions and its claims to rights to a fuel cycle pursuant to Article IV of the Treaty;
encouragement of proliferation by awarding Nuclear Suppliers' Group exemptions
3- The failure of the nuclear weapon states to unambiguously affirm and act upon their disarmament commitments.
The first issue is addressed in
Appendix C. The nuclear trade arrangement with
A good understanding of the
mechanisms of the Treaty is needed to explicate its disarmament commitments.
The basic bargain underlying the text completed in 1968 was this: In exchange
for a commitment from the non-nuclear weapons states not to acquire nuclear
weapons and to submit their peaceful nuclear activities to monitoring to verify
compliance with the non-acquisition commitment (Article II), the NPT nuclear
weapon states pledged to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the
elimination of their nuclear arsenals (Article VI)
and promised the non-nuclear-weapon parties unfettered access to peaceful
nuclear technologies (e.g. nuclear power reactors and nuclear medicine; Article
IV). During the negotiations at its
creation, several prominent non-nuclear weapons states - Germany, Italy and
Sweden, for example - would not permit the treaty to be permanent and ensured
that it would be reviewed after 25 years and either be extended for a fixed
period, be indefinitely extended (Article X), or lapse. At the 1995 Review and
Extension Conference, many states were extremely dissatisfied with the progress
on disarmament of the nuclear weapons states - US,
· complete a Comprehensive nuclear Test-Ban Treaty by the end of 1996
· reaffirm the commitment to pursue nuclear disarmament
· commence negotiations on a treaty to stop production of nuclear bomb materials
· encourage the creation of nuclear weapons free zones
· vigorously work to make the treaty universal by bringing
· enhance IAEA safeguards and verification capacity
· reinforce negative security assurances already given to non-weapons states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them
The bargain to extend the treaty centered on a strengthened review process with near yearly preparatory conferences and a rigorous review every five years to ensure the promise as set forth in the Principle and Objectives:
"The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon states of systematic and
progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate
goal of eliminating those weapons."
The 1995 re-commitment to and
elaboration of the NPT nuclear disarmament obligation was reinforced by the
1996 advisory opinion of the
The 2000 Review Conference successfully reached a consensus on 13 Practical Steps to advance the commitments to lower the salience of nuclear weapons in policies, reinforce non-proliferation measures, and move toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. All 187 States Parties agreed on the following measures:
1. Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT): The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the CTBT.
2. Holding the Line Against Testing: A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of the CTBT.
3. Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT): The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a program of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion
within five years.
4. Negotiations on Nuclear Disarmament: The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a program of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.
5. Irreversibility: The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.
6. Commitment to Elimination: An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.
7. Verified Reductions: The early entry into force and full implementation of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.
8. Control of US/Russian Excess Fissile Materials: The completion
and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the
9. Progress by Nuclear Weapons States: Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:
• Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.
• Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.
• The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.
• Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapon systems.
• A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.
• The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.
10. Excess fissile materials under IAEA control: Arrangements by
all nuclear weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material
designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under
11. General and Complete Disarmament: Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
12. Reporting: Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT
strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of
Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and
Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the
Advisory Opinion of the
13. Verifying: The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.
On this last point, the UK
Government should be commended for its work to examine and experiment with
potential methodologies in a future disarmament verification regime. This type of leadership by the British
Government is all the more important and useful at this time, since,
unfortunately, the United States, since 2000, has backtracked on key commitments
made in the Practical Steps, notably the CTBT; negotiation of a verified FMCT; the START process and the
ABM Treaty. The 2002 bilateral Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)
absence of active
institutional deadlock has poisoned most of our other existing multilateral
disarmament machinery, beyond just the NPT review process. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) has failed
to make any substantive progress in over a decade. Other fora spawned from the General Assembly
First Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, such as the annual Disarmament
Commission, has been unable to contribute substantively to the global regime.
This institutional deadlock has arisen from a profound failure of political
will to work cooperatively, wherein substantive disagreements are callously
masked by procedural wrangling and arcane squabbling over agendas and
asterisks. This diminution of utilization of diplomacy and law renders the
reliance on force and war more likely. Proliferation is unacceptable, indeed.
Yet we now know that counter-proliferation efforts, such as the war in
failed review process with the recent
With the next Review Conference less than two years away, our task now is to ascertain the achievable steps that can be taken now to ensure that we do not squander another important opportunity. The steps that I advocate here meet key criteria: they do not diminish the security of any state; they reinforce the NPT and enhance the rule of law; they make the world safer now; and they move the world towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.
These steps, inter alia, were derived from and advocated by a process called The Article VI Forum, an ongoing series of consultations between like-minded governments and non-governmental experts. The priorities identified by the Article VI Forum are contained in the briefing paper, Towards 2010: Priorities for NPT Consensus. The Article VI Forum is a project of the Middle Powers Initiative, a program of the Global Security Institute.
Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty
FMCT would permanently end production of fissile materials, primarily separated
plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), for use in weapons. It would
affect most directly the countries possessing nuclear weapons; NPT non-weapon
states already are subject to a verified ban on diverting materials to weapons.
Achievement of an FMCT would restrain arms racing involving
The two major
hurdles to an effective FMCT are: the 2004 reversal by the
Verification of reduction and elimination of nuclear arsenals
President Reagan repeatedly invoked the Russian dictum, "trust but verify." The
principle of verification follows from the truth that none of us can be secure
in an insecure world. Verification is
needed to bring greater security to the rest of the world because the rest of
the world is properly concerned with the efficacy of the disarmament and arms
reduction efforts of the
Reduction of the operational status of nuclear forces
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
a signatory to the CTBT, the
A diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security policies and strengthened assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-weapon states
2007 White Paper extending the life of the Trident system was a step backwards
for diminishing the role of nuclear weapons.
Both the Trident system and its predecessor Polaris were designed to
deter aggressive action by the now defunct
The package of
decisions adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT
contained non-binding negative security assurances that nuclear weapons will
not be used against non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT. However, these
assurances, and similar ones issued via Security Council resolution 984, remain
insufficient. The NPT would be strengthened greatly by the codification of
these assurances to non-nuclear weapon states parties. The
Prevent the Weaponization of Outer Space
Therefore, serious efforts to move towards the total
abolition of nuclear weapons must also address efforts to prevent, through a
legally-binding, verifiable treaty, the weaponization of outer space. The
Conclusion: Disarmament as the compass point
Implementation of the above-outlined priority measures and the regime-management reforms outlined in the Appendix I should take place in the context of a visible intent to achieve a nuclear weapons-free world. The priority measures are valuable in and of themselves. They decrease risks of use, diminish the access of terrorists to catastrophic weapons and materials to build them, raise barriers to acquisition by additional states, and generate support for strengthening the non-proliferation side of the regime and resolving regional crises. Moreover, the measures pass key tests: they enhance security generally; they do not diminish the security of any state; they reinforce the NPT and enhance the rule of law; they make the world safer now; they move the world towards elimination of nuclear weapons.
To conclude: Building an effective non-proliferation/disarmament regime is complex and challenging. The underlying principle, however, is simple, and serves as a guide to the work. Nuclear weapons are morally, legally, and practically unacceptable. As my mentor, the late Senator Alan Cranston, used to say, "Nuclear weapons are unworthy of civilization." Perpetual nuclear apartheid - some countries have the weapons, others are forbidden to have them - is unsustainable. Both practical and moral coherence requires application of a universal standard, a golden rule: no country may possess weapons capable of inflicting catastrophic, city-destroying or even civilization-ending, damage. If we meet the challenge of implementing this rule, we will pass down to our children and grandchildren and all succeeding generations a world preserving the advances made by hundreds of previous generations, including our own.
I gratefully acknowledge the
assistance in preparing this testimony of Dr.
Appendix A: Needed Non-proliferation Reforms
the Cold War with preventing proliferation, in particular with regard to
First, material and ongoing violations of safeguards reporting requirements
should result in forfeiture of the right to acquire nuclear fuel production
technology under Article IV of the NPT. The
reform is needed to create effective compliance assessment mechanisms. There is no body empowered to assess whether
a state is breaching its NPT obligation by seeking to acquire nuclear weapons
nor by failing to comply with the commitment to good faith negotiations on
disarmament. Under its Statute, the IAEA has the important but limited task of
ascertaining whether nuclear materials have been diverted to a weapons program,
which it has not found to be the case
Third, policy tools work best when
integrated into the global system. Effective non-proliferation and
disarmament requires a robust multilateralism based upon global norms. This is
not to say that policy tools involving international cooperation short of a
global regime have no place. The tools include export control arrangements; the
network of states (the Proliferation Security Initiative) prepared to interdict
illicit shipments of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapon-related equipment,
materials, and delivery systems; and the G-8 program building on the
Cooperative Threat Reduction program aimed at securing NBC weapons and
materials in Russia and other countries. But their effectiveness can be
optimized by finding ways to link them to the global regime. An example of
movement towards such integration is Security Council resolution 1540, which
requires all states to take steps to prevent acquisition of and trafficking in
NBC weapon-related items by states, terrorists and other non-state actors.
Among other things, the resolution requires all states to appropriately
regulate exports. It is a step toward universalizing nuclear weapons control by
means of law established by the Security Council. The Bush administration is to
be commended for its leadership in the solidification of global law through
resolution 1540. But I must register two cautions. The first is that, as with
other non-proliferation measures, the extent of compliance will depend
crucially on how well the states possessing nuclear arsenals do in fulfilling
their side of the bargain. The second is that given the limited membership of
the Security Council and its control by the
Appendix B: Underlying Practical and Moral Concerns
"The unleashing of power of the atom bomb has changed everything except our mode of thinking, and thus we head toward unparalleled catastrophes." Albert Einstein
"If men can develop weapons that are so terrifying as to make the thought of global war include almost a sentence of suicide, you would think that man's intelligence and his comprehension ... would include also his ability to find a peaceful solution." President Dwight D. Eisenhower
We must and we can change our course for life is precious.
General George Lee Butler, former Commander-in-Chief of US Strategic Air Command (1991-92) and US Strategic Command (1992-94), was responsible for all nuclear forces of the American Air Force and Navy. His insights should be of paramount concern to all Members of Congress:
'Despite all the evidence, we have yet to fully grasp the monstrous effect of these weapons, that the consequences of their use defy reason, transcending time and space, poisoning the Earth and deforming its inhabitants.' Nuclear weapons are 'inherently dangerous, hugely expensive and militarily inefficient.'
General Butler stated that "accepting nuclear weapons as the ultimate arbiter of conflict condemns the world to live under a dark cloud of perpetual anxiety. Worse, it codifies mankind's most murderous instincts as an acceptable resort when other options for resolving conflict fail." He added, 'I have spent years studying nuclear weapons effects...have investigated a distressing array of accidents and incidents involving strategic weapons and forces... I came away from that experience deeply troubled by what I see as the burden of building and maintaining nuclear arsenals ... the grotesquely destructive war plans, the daily operational risks, and the constant prospect of a crisis that would hold the fate of entire societies at risk"
He stated his profound concern regarding how little high-level scrutiny (the US nuclear war plan) had received over the years, and by how readily his military colleagues threw up their hands and rolled their eyes at the grim challenge of converting mathematical estimates of the destructiveness of nuclear arms and the resilience of Soviet structures into dry statistical formulas for nuclear war. (reprinted from R. Jeffrey Smith, Ex-Commander of Nukes Wants to Scrap Them, A Believer No More, The Sacramento Bee, Mar. 29, 1998. See also R. Jeffrey Smith, The Dissenter, The Washington Post, Dec. 7, 1997, at Magazine, W18.)
General Butler had a unique comprehension of how little the matter has been understood in the chambers of decision making:
"'It was all
We remain in a state of incomplete comprehension largely because the magnitude of the destructive capacity of a nuclear bomb is simply too great to imagine. Moreover, the illogic of this improved means to an unimproved end challenges our fundamental concepts of what we are willing to do to millions of innocent people to protect our own creation, the State.
The UN in its 1991 report found the '(n)uclear weapons represent a historically new form of weaponry with unparalleled destructive potential. A single large nuclear weapon could release explosive power comparable to all the energy released from the conventional weapons used in all past wars.'
Experts have estimated that the total conventional bombs dropped by United States Air Force amounted to only two megatons for the entirety of WWII, the yield of one or two ordinary nuclear bombs today. 
What exactly does one nuclear bomb do? Former Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner offers his brief description:
The fireball created by a nuclear explosion will be much hotter than the surface of the sun for fractions of a second and will radiate light and heat, as do all objects of very high temperature. Because the fireball is so hot and close to the earth, it will deliver enormous amounts of heat and light to the terrain surrounding the detonation point, and it will be hundreds or thousands of times brighter than the sun at noon. If the fireball is created by the detonation of a 1-MT (megaton) nuclear weapon, for example, within roughly eight- to nine-tenths of a second each section of its surface will be radiating about three times as much heat and light as a comparable area of the sun itself. The intense flash of light and heat from the explosion of a 550-KT weapon can carbonize exposed skin and cause clothing to ignite. At a range of three miles surfaces would fulminate and recoil as they emanate flames. Particles of sand would explode like pieces of popcorn from the rapid heating of the fireball. At 3.5 miles, where the blast pressure would be 5psi, the fireball could ignite clothing on people, curtains and upholstery in homes and offices, and rubber tires on cars. At four miles, it could blister aluminum surfaces, and at six to seven miles it could still set fire to dry leaves and grass. This flash of incredibly intense, nuclear-driven sunlight could simultaneously set an uncountable number of fires over an area of close to 100 square miles.
What is the destructive effect of this blast? In his landmark opinion for the International Court of Justice, Judge Christopher Weeramantry made a short list:
1. cause death and destruction; induced cancers, leukemia, keloids and related afflictions;
2. cause gastrointestinal, cardiovascular and related afflictions; continued for decades after their use to induce the health related problems mentioned above;
3. damage the environmental rights of future generations;
4. cause congenital deformities, mental retardation and genetic damage;
5. carry the potential to cause a nuclear winter;
6. contaminate and destroy the food chain;
7. imperil the eco-system;
8. produce lethal levels of heat and blast;
9. produce radiation and radioactive fallout;
10. produce a disruptive electromagnetic pulse;
11. produce social disintegration;
12. imperil all civilizations;
13. threaten human survival;
14. wreak cultural devastation;
15. span a time range of thousands of years;
16. threaten all life on the planet;
17. irreversibly damage the rights of future generations;
18. exterminate civilian population;
19. damage neighboring states;
20. produce psychological stress and fear syndromes--as no other weapons do.
What does this mean in terms of human
experience? Please read this bearing in mind that the current arsenals represent
nearly one million times the horror that overtook
'The atomic bombs dropped on
The dropping of the nuclear weapons is a
problem that must be addressed globally.
History is written by the victors.
Thus, the heinous massacre that was
As a result, for over 50 years we have never directly confronted the full implications of this horrifying act for the future of the human race. Hence, we are still forced to live under the enormous threat of nuclear weapons...
Beneath the atomic bomb's monstrous mushroom cloud, human skin was burned raw. Crying for water, human beings died in desperate agony. With thoughts of these victims as the starting point, it is incumbent upon us to think about the nuclear age and the relationship between human beings and nuclear weapons...
The unique characteristic of the atomic bombing was that the enormous destruction as instantaneous and universal. Old, young, male, female, soldier, civilian - the killing was utterly indiscriminate. The entire city was exposed to the compound and devastating effects of thermal rays, shock wave blast, and radiation...
Above all, we must focus on the fact that the human misery caused by the atomic bomb is different from that caused by conventional weapons. (H)uman bodies were burned by the thermal rays and high-temperature fires, broken and lacerated by the blast, and insidiously attacked by radiation. These forms of damage compounded and amplified each other, and the name given to the combination was "A-bomb disease..."
(T)he bomb reduced
It is clear that the use of nuclear weapons, which cause indiscriminate mass murder that leaves survivors to suffer for decades, is a violation of international law." 
During the Cold War the deployment of the
arsenals of the Soviet Union and the
"The readiness to use nuclear weapons against other human beings - against people we do not know, whom we have never seen, and whose guilt or innocence is not for us to establish - and, in doing so, to place in jeopardy the natural structure upon which all civilization rests, as though the safety and perceived interests of our own generation were more important than everything that has taken place or could take place in civilization: this is nothing less than a presumption, a blasphemy, an indignity - an indignity of monstrous dimensions - offered to God!"
The perverse logic of the Cold War based
on having enough destructive capacity at the ready to make a use unthinkable
makes no sense at all today. The hair trigger deployments of thousands of
I would now like to offer a simple legal test that the National Academy has given to these devices followed by the relevant excerpts from statements of recent years of the Nobel Peace Laureates who have gathered at a Summit in Rome, Italy and then close with the entire most recent Nobel Peace Laureates Statement from Gwangju, Korea of June 2006.
My hope is to instill a greater sense of the moral aspect of this issue into our public discourse. At root we are addressing whether this use of the gift of science and technology solves any problem as great as the problem this use has created. I would contend that practically, legally, morally, and militarily it has not. Thus the argument to set the compass point toward abolition is well founded.
The Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the US National Academy of Sciences succinctly summed up the legal analysis of the current posture of international law:
"(T)he International Court of Justice agreed that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is strictly limited by generally accepted laws and humanitarian principles that restrict the use of force. Accordingly, any threat or use of nuclear weapons must be limited to , and necessary for, self-defense; it must not be targeted at civilians, and be capable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets; and it must not cause unnecessary suffering to combatants, or harm greater than that unavoidable to achieve military objectives. In the Committee's view, the inherent destructiveness of nuclear weapons, combined with the unavoidable risk that even the most restricted use of such weapons would escalate to broader attacks, makes it extremely unlikely that any contemplated threat or use of nuclear weapons would meet such criteria." 
Judge Ranjeva, of the ICJ, stated what should be axiomatic in addressing world threats, and by that I mean, threats that impact on not just United States' interests but the entire planet and generations yet unborn:
"On the great issues of mankind the requirements of positive law and ethics make common cause, and nuclear weapons, because of their destructive effects, are one such issue." 
In a world with many different religions and cultures there are few places where we can look for an expression of global ethical principles and norms. Many would agree that the Nobel Peace Laureates are a sufficiently distinguished group whose opinions should not be lightly ignored. Below are several quotes from Summits of this distinguished group on the subject of nuclear weapons.
From the 2005
While expressing regret that some African nations spend too much on conventional weapons, we commend the entire African continent for becoming a nuclear weapons free zone. It is absurd that the nations with nuclear weapons refuse even to pledge not to use nuclear weapons against all nuclear weapons free nations.
Preserving and strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We reject double standards and emphasize the legal responsibility of nuclear weapons states to work to eliminate nuclear weapons. We call for continuation of the moratorium on nuclear testing pending entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and for accelerating the process of verifiable and irreversible nuclear arms reduction. We are gravely alarmed by the creation of new, usable nuclear weapons and call for rejection of doctrines that view nuclear weapons as legitimate means of war-fighting and threat pre-emption.
For a list of the Nobel Peace Laureates who have endorsed these strong statements, please go to http://www.nobelforpeace-summit.org/index-en.asp
Appendix C: A Sensible Policy on
by Jonathan Granoff, President, with Rhianna Tyson, Senior Officer,
Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to new states is
The goal of
The most effective route to achieving our goal is to
strengthen the global non-proliferation regime based on the rule of law, and
simultaneously take steps to ensure that no more countries, regardless of the
vicissitudes of political leadership, can develop nuclear weapons. This route
is dramatically enhanced to the extent that the
A responsible Iran policy must: understand the role that
national pride plays in Iran's pursuit of a nuclear program; highlight and
exploit the incompatibility of nuclear weapons with Islam, as stated by the
highest Shi'a clerics including Ayatollah Khamenei;
and enable Iran to feel it is taking a leadership role in strengthening a
global non-proliferation norm. Based on
these understandings, an effective policy can successfully advance a
"win-win-win" approach, satisfying the core concerns of
This article is premised on the political legitimacy of
the sovereign state of the Islamic Republic of Iran, recognized by the
international system. This recognition is a fact, regardless of whether one likes
or dislikes the government of
In 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Domestically, the Iranian leaders will have to reconcile their nuclear weapons capability against the statements by the highest Islamic clerics which declare nuclear weapons to be fundamentally against the principles of Islam. (See Appendix A) These statements have been reiterated in multilateral fora, such as the Security Council, and reverberated in mosques and universities throughout the country.
What is to be done now? The cost of using force to
With these considerations in mind, the
Under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, all non-nuclear weapon States are granted an "inalienable right to develop, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination." Under the NPT, there are no limits to uranium enrichment and thus far no stipulations over reprocessing.
The NPT is law. In order to avoid further erosion of
international law, there must be an explicit acknowledgement of
2. The creation with the IAEA and Iranian leadership of much more intrusive verification and monitoring measures to be applied universally to enhance non-proliferation efforts and lead to a nuclear weapons free world.
Currently the only safeguards on nuclear facilities required
by the NPT are inadequate to fully ensure that no materials or resources
from a civilian nuclear program have been diverted for weapons purposes. This was demonstrated by
International leaders like Gareth Evans, former Australian Foreign Minister and the President of the International Crisis Group as well as one of the driving visionaries of the prestigious Canberra Commission on the elimination of nuclear weapons, are championing an idea called "Additional Protocol Plus," a system of verification and monitoring, going well beyond even the snap inspections and environmental sampling of the Additional Protocol. Such strengthened verification mechanisms is needed to upgrade confidence in preventing the production of materials for weapons purposes. Heightened levels of confidence are a requirement to move toward a nuclear weapons free world.
3. Multinationalization of
4. Security assurances
In 1995, the Permanent Five members of the Security Council each offered assurances that non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT would not be threatened by use of nuclear weapons. This was part of the negotiations to persuade countries to support the indefinite extension of the NPT. These so called Negative Security Assurances were referenced in Security Council Resolution 984 and were referenced by countries as part of their reason for supporting US led efforts in obtaining the indefinite extension of the NPT. These assurances must be embodied in positive international law through a formal, legally-binding instrument. Additionally all talk about regime change must cease and be replaced by efforts to change minds and policies through ongoing civil dialogue and diplomacy.
5. Implementation of Security Council resolutions
Three sets of Security Council resolutions calling on
In order to restore the credibility, viability and
primacy of international law, part of the diplomatic package must include
These are but a few of the many positive steps that can
be taken which meet important principles. They must enhance respect for
international law, constrain universally the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
and reinforce efforts leading to the abolition of nuclear weapons. These steps
will help encourage
(Appendices to this brief were omitted for inclusion in this testimony. Please visit www.gsinstitute.org or contact us to receive this brief in full.)
24 September 2008
 In the case of
 See Thomas Graham, Jr., Commonsense on Weapons of Mass Destruction (2004) 10.
 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Decision 2, "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament," Final Document, Part I, NPT/CONF.1995/32, Annex: Access at http://disarmament2.un.org/wmd/npt/1995nptrevconfdocs.html.
 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Vol. I, NPT/CONF.2000/28, Part I: 14-15. Access at http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/finaldoc.html.
 The full text of Towards 2010 can be downloaded at: http://www.gsinstitute.org/mpi/docs/Towards_2010.pdf
 Read the report of the
 Weapons of Terror at 63-66.
 See Jayantha Dhanapala with Randy Rydell, Multilateral Diplomacy and the NPT: An Insider's Account (UNIDIR, 2005) 129-132.
 CHARLES J. MOXLEY JR., NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE POST COLD WAR WORLD, 535 (footnote omitted) (reprinted from Otto Kreisher, Retired Generals Urge End to Nuclear Arsenal, The San Diego Union-Trib., Dec.5, 1996, at A-1.); See, Jonathan Granoff, Nuclear Weapons, Ethics, Morals, and Law, Volume 2000 Number 4, Bringham Young University Law Review, 1417 (2000)
 See id. at n 27 (quoting R. Jeffery Smith, Ex-Commander of Nukes Wants to Scrap Them, A Believer No More, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 9, 1998; see also R. Jeffrey Smith, The Dissenter, WASH. POST MAG., Dec. 7, 1997, at W18).
 MOXLEY, supra note 1, at 398 ( quoting WOLRD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS, EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR ON HEALTH AND HEALTH SERVICES 7 (2d ed. 1987); see also, UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, Nuclear Weapons: A Comprehensive Study 6, at 7, (1991).
 STANSFIELD TURNER, CAGING THE NUCLEAR GENIE , app. A 127-128 (1997).
 Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 454 (separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry)
 JOHN BURROUGHS, THE (IL)LEGALITY OF THE THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, 90-91(1997); see also, DOUGLAS ROCHE, THE ULTIMATE EVIL and AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK (1995) for thorough expositions of the relationship between the threat of nuclear weapons and international legal and diplomatic affairs.
 GEORGE F. KENNAN, THE NUCLEAR DELUSION 206-207 (1982).
 Report on Nobel Laureate organization
 JOHN BURROUGHS, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR NON-USE AND ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, quoted at p. 6 (2006), <http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/Gpeacebrfpaper.pdf>
 Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 1996 ICJ 296 (separate opinion of Judge Ranjeva).
 187 states are party to the 1975 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was indefinitely extended in 1995 and reaffirmed and strengthened again in 2000. Under the NPT, the five nuclear weapon states-the US, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China-agreed to negotiate in good faith nuclear disarmament, in exchange for the promise of the non-nuclear weapon states to never acquire them. Additionally, non-nuclear weapon states are granted the "inalienable right" to the technology and materials needed for nuclear energy. The full text of the treaty can be found at: http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/npttreaty.html
 See Appendix A.
 See, in particular, p7 of the report of the Director-General: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf.
 "In light of the serious unresolved
issues posed by
 The first resolution on
 The Model Additional Protocol is a voluntary
bilateral agreement between an NPT state party and the IAEA to serve as a
supplement to the safeguards agreement required under the NPT to further
prevent diversion of nuclear material and technology for weapons purposes. The
need for an additional protocol developed after
 "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." The full text of the Charter can be found at: http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/
 "The establishment of a Nuclear Weapons
Free Zone in the
 See footnote 52.
 See "
 SC/Res/984 was adopted on 11 April 1995: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/106/06/PDF/N9510606.pdf?OpenElement