Submission from
Scottish CND
1. The Scottish Campaign
for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) has worked for the global elimination of nuclear
weapons for 50 years. Scottish CND Coordinator John Ainslie has a BA in International Relations and has produced several
detailed reports on the UK Trident system.[1]
Summary
2. (i) Progress
in tackling proliferation will be influenced by success in moving towards
nuclear disarmament.
(ii) Procuring
nuclear technology from the US
undermines efforts to tackle proliferation.
(iii) The
Government should not modernise or replace Trident because this would reinforce
the value of nuclear weapons and undermine non-proliferation
(iv) UK
policy should be framed in accordance with the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ.
(v) The UK
should take measures to implement the 13 steps including taking Trident off
patrol.
Disarmament and Proliferation
3. Disarmament and proliferation could only be
separated if it could be established that states make decisions about their
possession of nuclear weapons in isolation. In practice the opposite is the
case. Factors which influence whether a state acquires and retains nuclear
weapons include:
(i) Perception of potential threats from nuclear-armed competitors; (ii)Status
relative to nuclear-armed partners;
(iii) International opinion on
the acceptability of the possession, threat and use of nuclear weapons
4. Examples of the first are the nuclear
triangle of China, India and Pakistan
and Iran's relationship with
Israel.
France and Britain provide
an illustration of the second factor. International opinion has been a factor
when countries have renounced their nuclear programmes and capabilities and in
the many nations who have decided that they do not need a nuclear weapons'
programme.
5. The Chair's factual summary of the 2008
Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference said: "Emphasis was placed on
the mutually reinforcing nature of disarmament and non-proliferation".[2]
6. A recent report on the Abolition of Nuclear
Weapons, part-funded by the Foreign Office, points out: "Double standards on
matters as materially and psychologically important as nuclear weapons will
produce instability and non-compliance, creating enforcement crises that
increase the risk of conflict and nuclear anarchy."[3]
7. General Lee Butler, a former Commander of US
nuclear forces, said:
"It is untenable that a handful of nations should forever arrogate to
themselves the right to nuclear weapons, while denying it to others".[4]
8. If the spread of nuclear technology is to be
addressed it is essential that there is real progress towards disarmament and
the devaluing of nuclear weapons.
US support for the UK nuclear
programme
9. The success of
efforts to stop the spread of nuclear technology will require widespread
agreement on measures to prevent the type of exchanges which take place every
month under the Mutual Defence Agreement and Polaris Sales Agreement. The
Anglo-American nuclear black market creates the impression that the UK ignores the
principle that nuclear technology should not cross international boundaries and
is not serious about non-proliferation.
10. Every thermonuclear weapon deployed by the UK has included essential components from the US. Although Britain tested
a hydrogen bomb in 1958 this design was never transformed into an operational weapon.
Red Snow, WE177, Polaris and Chevaline warheads all used a US design for
the secondary stage.[5]
The UK Trident warhead is of Anglo-American origin. It contains vital parts
purchased off-the-shelf from the US.[6]
The US
supplies not only Trident missiles but also the targeting software. In the past
nuclear material for warheads has been exchanged between Britain and America. There has been no guarantee that this
practice has ceased.[7]
Modernisation and replacement of UK nuclear
forces
11. The National Security
Strategy says that the Government's approach to proliferation includes
defending our strategic interests by maintaining nuclear forces, based on the
2006 assessment that a nuclear threat might emerge over the next 50 years. This
is an oblique reference to the plan to develop, with American help, a new
nuclear capability which could remain in service until 2055.[8]
The plan to replace Trident signals to other nations that nuclear weapons are
of value even where these weapons have no relevance to any current security
threats.
12. At the 2008
Preparatory Committee for the NPT Review Conference "concern and disappointment were raised about
plans of some nuclear weapon States to replace or modernize nuclear weapons and
their means of delivery or platforms".[9]
13. Two current UK
modernisation projects are the acquisition over the next decade of a new fusing
system, which will increase the destructive capability of the current warheads,
and the purchase of new computer systems in 2010, which will increase targeting
flexibility.[10]
14. With regard to Trident
Replacement David Gould, Chief Operating Officer at Defence Equipment and
Support, revealed that the programme goes well beyond the construction of a new
submarine. In June 2007 he said: "The
intention is to replace the entire Vanguard class submarine system. Including
the warhead and missile."[11]
15. Under the Nuclear
Warhead Capability Sustainment Programme the MoD are rebuilding the Atomic
Weapons Establishment (AWE). If completed this expensive project would give AWE
the capability to design and manufacture a new warhead, with assistance from
the US.[12]
16. The US Department of
Defence are developing a new missile, the Underwater Launched Missile System
(ULMS), to replace Trident. ULMS was discussed at 3 meetings of the Joint (US/UK)
Steering Group in 2007.[13]
In due course the UK
would be expected to opt for ULMS, so that they were not left supporting the
Trident system on their own.[14]
17. Annual spending on
nuclear weapons is set to double from £1.1 billion in 2003/04 to £2.1 billion
in 2010/11 and then to rise further.[15]
Continuing with this project as we enter a recession would send a powerful
message that the UK
is determined to keep its nuclear weapons for 50 years.
Advisory
Opinion of the International Court of Justice
18. A critical part of the rules-based system is
the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1996. The
Advisory Opinion said that the threat or use of nuclear weapons was generally
contrary to the rules and principles of International Law. The Court left open
a hypothetical window where the survival of the state was at risk. The UK has failed
to adopt the language of the Opinion. UK policy would appear to permit
the use of nuclear weapons in circumstance which were extreme but when the
survival of the state was not at risk.[16]
19. The Advisory Opinion and the comments by the
President of the Court seriously question whether there are any circumstances
where nuclear weapons could be legally used or deployed as a threat. Lord
Murray, a former Lord Advocate, has argued that it is not only the threat or
use of nuclear weapons that would be illegal but that the current deployment of
the British Trident system is probably contrary to international law.[17]
20. The failure to take account of the full
Advisory Opinion and its implications for British nuclear weapons undermines
the potential for international law to regulate nuclear weapons and their
proliferation.
Implementing the
13 Steps
21. At the 2010 Conference the UK Government should
stress the importance of the 13 Steps to implementing Article VI, which were
agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. The Government should also take practical
measures to implement these steps. This should include the following measures
outlined in Step 9:
22. "Further efforts by the nuclear weapon
States to reduce their arsenals unilaterally".
In 2007 the
Government reduced the number of operationally available warheads by around 40.
This could have been achieved without altering the number of weapons deployed
on submarines.[18] The
Government should be encouraged to make further unilateral reductions and
should abandon plans for modernising and replacing Trident.
23. "Increased transparency by the
nuclear-weapon States"
The MoD has
scheduled a major milestone in the Trident Replacement programme, the Initial
Gate of the Future Submarine Programme, for August 2008. This will be only
months before the review Conference. At or before the Initial Gate the
Government should be urged to explain in full their plans for Trident
Replacement along with a full justification and detailed costs.
24. "The further reduction of non-strategic
nuclear weapons based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the
nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process"
The Government
should encourage the US to
withdraw all its B61 nuclear bombs from Europe.
They should also state whether or not there are US nuclear weapons at RAF
Lakenheath.
25. "Concrete agreed measures to further reduce
the operational status of nuclear weapons systems."
The P5
Disarmament Conference in the UK
will provide an opportunity to address the difficult issue of reducing the
readiness of nuclear submarines. The Government should announce that it will
take Trident submarines off patrol, store the warheads on shore and increase
the alert notice to one month or more.[19]
If there is no
current threat, only a concern about long-term uncertainty, then there is no
need for the nuclear force to be invulnerable. The theoretical risk from the
revised posture would be more than offset by the contribution such a move would
make to the devaluing of nuclear weapons.
The MoD has
stated that the submarine on patrol is on an alert state of several days. But
this cannot be verified. Ending patrols and storing warheads on stores could be
verified. This would provide a model for other countries, including China and Russia, and so contribute to wider
moves to reduce nuclear risks.
Taking Trident
submarines off patrol and storing the warheads on shore would increase the
potential life of the submarine hulls and the warheads. No case could be made
for replacing the submarine or warhead at this time and the current replacement
proposals could be shelved, saving over £1 billion per year.
26. These limited measures are only a starting
point. Britain
is in a good position to make progress towards nuclear disarmament. This would
enable the Foreign Office to use our diplomatic influence to effectively
promote both non-proliferation and disarmament.
29th
September 2008
[1] The
Safety of Trident, SCND, 1994; Trident: Britain's Weapon of Mass
Destruction, SCND 1999; The Future of the British Bomb, WMD Awareness
Programme, 2005.
[2] Factual
Summary of the NPT Preparatory Committee 28 April - 9 May 2008.
[3] George
Perkovich & James Acton, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, Adelphi Paper 396, IISS,
August 2008.
[4] General
Lee Butler, former Commander STRATCOM, interviewed in Jonathan Schell, The Gift
of Time, Granta, 1998, p188
[5]
Information from The National Archives
[6] The US
have provided the Neutron Generators and most of the Arming, Fuzing and Firing
System for UK Trident warheads.
[7] When
asked when the last transfer of nuclear material had taken place the Defence
Secretary, Geoff Hoon, said "Precise details of such transfers are being
withheld in order to safeguard national security". Written Answers 8 February
2005 Column 1379W, Hansard.
[8] The
Future of the United Kingdom's
Nuclear Deterent, MoD and FCO, December 2006, Cm 6994
[9] Factual
Summary of the NPT Preparatory Committee 28 April - 9 May 2008.
[10] Over
the next decade the warheads will incorporate the new US Mk4A Arming, Fuzing
and Firing system. Written Answers, 9 May 2006, Hansard. The submarines will be
fitted with the Mk98 Mod 7 fire control system and the targeting computers at
the Corsham Computer Centre will be upgraded to match this. Written Answers, 28
March 2007, Hansard.
[11] Papers
from the Future Deterrent Industry Day, Abbey Wood, 29 June 2007. The phrase
"including the missile and warhead" was redacted from the version of the speech
initially released to Scottish CND under the Freedom of Information Act. The
full statement was only issued after an internal review under the Act. Reported
in the Guardian 25 July 2008.
[12] A
series of PQs have been asked but only a limited amount of financial
information has been disclosed.
[13] Written
Answer 3 December 2007, Column 843W, Hansard
[14]
Professor John Simpson pointed out that the MoD would not want to repeat the
situation where they were left supporting Polaris after it had been withdrawn
from the US Navy. Defence Committee inquiry into The Future of the UK's
Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: The Strategic Context, June 2006, HC 986, Ev 29.
[15] Written
answers 30 October 2007 Column 1358W & 3 June 2008, Hansard
[16] "we
would only consider using our nuclear weapons in self defence (including the
defence of our NATO allies), and even then only in extreme circumstances" - The
Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterent, MoD & FCO, December 2006,
Cm 6994.
[17] Paper
submitted by Lord Ronald King Murray to the Scottish Government Summit on
Nuclear Weapons, October 2007 and Sunday Herald 20 September 2008
[18] In 1998
36 warheads were removed from submarines into storage. These warheads remained
part of the operational stockpile until 2007.
[19] NATO's
air-based nuclear forces in Europe are on an
alert state measured in months. NATO's Nuclear Forces in the new security
environment, www.nato.int
