GS (UK/US) 1: Written evidence from Mr Lee Bruce

 

Mr. Bruce is an expert on political negotiations, defence and military strategy having completed a research thesis at the University of Leeds. He has subsequently published a book on British political and military strategy in Northern Ireland.

 

Summary of Points

 

· The UK-US relationship is based on shared historic, cultural, religious and economic assumptions. Endurance is the relationship's most impressive feature with evidence of its continued relevance being found in the close co-operation in the Iraq and Afghan wars, the maintenance of NATO and the permanence of extended deterrence as a defence doctrine.[1]

· Washington is the senior partner in the relationship and the UK should continue efforts to influence the formulation and execution of American foreign policy. However the notion that British interests are marginalised because of military and economic inferiority is absurd.

· UK-US priorities align in a number of separate theatres. Shared priorities include containing resurgent Russian nationalism, interdicting terrorist capabilities in Afghanistan and curtailing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

· Evidence for the continued existence of the special relationship can be found in the important role of NATO in defence postures and the US subvention to secure UK foreign policy priorities. However the special relationship is not guaranteed in perpetuity and the UK government should make greater effort to nurture US co-operation and investment.

· The UK government faces a perilous and potentially catastrophic financial black hole should there be a revision to the special relationship and subsequent end to US assistance. Calls for the UK to jettison its transatlantic policy and adopt a closer relationship with other 'fashionable' allies should be considered within this context.

 

 

The basis of the bilateral relationship between the UK and US

1. Transatlantic relations are predicated on a shared historic, cultural, religious and economic vision. One of the founding ideals of American political thought was, as Robert Kagan has demonstrated, a belief that America should be a new vanguard of the Glorious Revolution.[2] This Protestantism manufactured in American politics a form of 'exceptionalism' that contrasted to the Catholic notion of 'divine' right in continental Europe. Britain, as the epicentre of the reformation, helped shape these beliefs in individual freedom, property ownership and the separation between church and state.

 

2. Both the UK and US governments view each other as reliable bilateral partners. In Iraq and Afghanistan the two shared - and continue to share - experience, intelligence and equipment. By comparison other international allies with the notable exception of the Dutch have been less co-operative and use the conflict as an opportunity for political posturing. Such recklessness should surprise analysts as the European Union is set to increase its importation of oil supplies by 29 per cent by 2012 and this gap, it is assumed, will be filled by oil secured by the US in the Middle East.[3]

 

3. Moreover the collapse in the sub-prime market shows the symbiotic relationship between the American and British economies and the interdependence of international markets.[4] However the importance of the present financial crisis to the UK-US relationship is not simply its global impacts. What should invite investigation is the similarity between the UK and US economies. This is a product of the Thatcher and Reagan belief in fiscal prudence demonstrated through the removal of subventions to inefficient industries. Certain European states were by comparison less rigorous in implementing fiscal reforms and continue to prefer policies that involve expansive government intervention and spending.

 

4. Endurance is an impressive feature in any relationship. The UK-US alliance has proved resistant to conflict between the two partners, the fall of the British Empire and rise of an American replacement, and the expanding boundaries of pan-European federalism. Given the stability between the partners it is hard to conceive of any other bilateral relationship in the world that is more likely to survive the coming challenges of terrorism, nuclear proliferation and state competition. In Afghanistan - and the wider fight against global terrorism - the two partners continue to share intelligence, equipment and utilise combined command structures to maximise operational effectiveness.

 

UK and US views on the nature and value of the bilateral relationship and the contribution of the UK-US foreign policy relationship to global security

5. Washington is the senior partner in the transatlantic relationship. The UK can influence policy formulation and implementation, and has a role in aiding the legitimacy of US action by galvanising support for intervention and neutering charges of American unilateralism. However if a US administration was determined upon a certain course of action there is little that a British government could do except criticise from the sidelines. In comparison the failure of the Suez expedition in 1956 and the successful recapture of the Falkland Islands in 1982 exhibit the reliance of the UK government on its American ally.

 

6. Lawrence Freedom provided a precise and succinct definition of how the UK should perceive its role: 'the United Kingdom should nurture a special relationship with the United States in the hope of shaping the exercise of US power'.[5] However the military inferiority of the UK has allowed for confusion and misrepresentation to infect the public debate on both the character and achievements of transatlantic relationship. Characterisations of the UK as a 'poodle' duped into supporting its nefarious ally are wildly inaccurate. Rational analysis shows that the UK has its territorial integrity guaranteed, its interests in Europe protected, and its geopolitical position protected by the projection of US power across the globe. This has allowed the UK to reap a 'peace dividend' and therefore reduce its defence spending as a proportion of total government expenditure, protect its energy supply and ameliorate regional antagonisms such as those present in the Balkans and Africa.

 

7. For Washington it is less clear cut as to what partnership with the UK achieves for the US national interest. This could explain why there has been an apparent cooling - apart from the Bush-Blair hiatus - in transatlantic relations since the end of the Cold War. Frustration in America at UK shortcomings is evident across the political divide. Britain stands accused of allowing its territory to become a breeding ground for Islamic militancy, of reducing its defence budget irrespective of consequence and bending its policies to suit the pan-Arabism of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.[6]

 

8. However the sheer historical resilience of the transatlantic relationship enables the US to ignore the often egregious failings of its ally. Neither is there a credible alternative European partner as France and Germany missed the opportunity in 2003 and none of the other EU Member states invest heavily enough in defence assets to viably support US power projection. Kagan used the memorable phrase 'post modern paradise' to describe European diplomacy and presciently warned against the dangers of Europe debilitating the US: 'since they have no intention of supplementing American power with their own, the net result will be a diminution of the total amount of power that the liberal democratic world can bring to bear in its defence'.[7] The US in contradiction to the European position has a less sanguine reading of international relations and the UK should adopt the paradigm set by its transatlantic partner.

 

The extent to which UK and US interests align in key foreign policy related areas including security, defence, and intelligence co-operation

9. The interests of the UK and US should continue to converge across a broad spectrum of foreign policy areas. In Europe both partners should aim to curtail recalcitrant Russian nationalism and with it the bellicose foreign policy implemented by Vladimir Putin, and subsequently continued by Dmitry Medvedev, that includes tormenting former Soviet satellites. Russian attempts to control energy supply and prices will affect the posturing of European states - notably Germany and France - meaning that the UK could become ever more reliant on US assistance when deterring Russian irredentism. Clear indication of this was given during the Georgian crisis when the EU diplomacy lead by Nicolas Saroksy focused on placating Russian demands and not safeguarding the viability of a democratic state.

 

10. A belief in the merits of European integrationism remains one of the cornerstones to British and American foreign policy. For the UK this is manifested by faith in a shared common European defence policy which, it is argued, will enable the EU to guarantee political stability both within its own border and where necessary abroad. Certain commentators will no doubt welcome a return to European liberal interventionism. The US for its part recognises that an independent European defence force could precipitate a reduction in the American military commitment in Europe.

 

11. However the potential success of a shared European defence policy is limited by the deplorable track record of EU Member States in armed conflict - the Balkan conflagration of the mid-nineteen nineties is a stain on European collectivism - and the lack of appetite across Europe to treat the issue of national security with the degree of serious thought and financial investment it deserves. There is little reflection on how an integrated European command structure could operate, or what a combined European defence force is there to achieve, or how procurement policy should be decided - for example which state purchases what pieces of equipment. Likewise the brittle commitment of European allies in Afghanistan sets another unenviable precedent.

 

12. Consequently it is in the UK and US national interest that a strong American military presence is retained in Europe to guarantee the territorial integrity of key allies. Moreover, it is prudent for UK and US to continue with the post second world war policy of ensuring French geopolitical impotence and containing German aspirations to re-establish continental hegemony.

 

13. Afghanistan is presently the stage on which the War on Terror is being fought. However, the battle could legitimately be extended to the border regions of Pakistan, the Pakistani mainland should the country fall to the Taliban, and Iran should the regime of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad succeed in acquiring nuclear weapons. The UK and US have a shared interest in rigorously pursuing the campaign in Helmand, and must continue to monitor the situation in neighbouring states closely with the intention of acting should there be a sudden deterioration in the security climate. Bargaining with regimes in command of nuclear weapons and propagating nothing less than the destruction of Western civilisation is a dangerous game. It will be under these dire circumstances that the UK and US governments might have to consider the value of nuclear pre-emption: indeed an action potentially necessary for survival.

The extent to which the UK is able to influence US foreign policy and UK policy is influenced by the US under the Obama administration

14. Dwindling military prowess, rising national debt and failure to invest in its defence forces could render the UK a less worthwhile partner. Yet the government in London continues to wield remarkable influence on US foreign policy: projection of US power guarantees the status quo in Europe, stabilises energy supply, underwrites nuclear non-proliferation and negates the operational capacity of non-state terrorist organisations. All of these aspects of US foreign policy serve the UK national interest and show palpable British influence in the State Department. In fact it could be argued that certain aspirations of US foreign policy are of greater advantage to the Prime Minister than they are to the President.

 

15. In contrast to popular mythology the Bush administration was keen to engage with the UK as a crucial bilateral ally. Most notably in 2003 effort was made to elicit a resolution from the UN Security Council, an edict that would have little benefit for President Bush, but was seen as a powerful political weapon by Prime Minister Tony Blair. The pursuit of a UN resolution tarnished Washington's public image by opening the invasion to endless debates which then allowed those states intent on protecting oil agreements with the Saddam regime to build a coalition of support against the US and UK governments. In the context of this investigation it is appropriate to remember that even though there were clear limitations to multilateralism, the US dutifully pursued a resolution out of respect for the domestic political calculations made by the British government.

 

16. Since the inauguration of the Obama presidency the US has distanced itself - at least rhetorically - from the UK as evidenced by the tepid summit held between Prime Minister Brown and President Obama earlier in 2009. The irony of such a demarche is noteworthy when considered against the backdrop of the wild populism that greeted the Democrat's electoral success in the UK. However even in the context of a reduced congeniality in transatlantic relations there is still no sign that the US will divest itself of the responsibility for delivering UK foreign policy objectives.

 

17. Meanwhile Europe as an entity benefits from the security dividend created by the forward projection of American military power. Profit is not reaped by the US taxpayer as the Defence Department continues to invest heavily in its military capabilities. Instead it is American allies like the UK who are able to reduce military expenditure in real terms and focus on domestic priorities. The result of this situation for the transatlantic relationship is intriguing. In effect the US bears the cost for guaranteeing the most pressing British security priority: European continental stability. By comparison, the European theatre could be thought a peripheral concern in the US and one that if jettisoned would not lead to a collapse in Washington's security position. Considered along these lines it is difficult to discern how a rational evaluation of UK-US relations could fail to conclude that the British government is anything but the benefactor of the alliance.

 

The extent to which "the special relationship" still exists and the factors which determine this

18. There has in recent months been a chill in the special relationship. Abdication of its position in Iraq, vacillations over Afghanistan, the Megrahi affair and a general failure to articulate the importance of transatlantic relations are signs that the UK government is either intent on a rift with Washington or guilty of disastrous incompetence in the conduct of its foreign policy.

 

19. In recognition of the new priorities facing the US, and the failure of its ally, President Obama could implement a radical realignment of his international priorities. Such a shift in American foreign policy cannot be dismissed lightly - the US Defense Strategy[8] neglects to mention Britain - and has far reaching strategic and tactical ramifications. British desire to renege on its commitments in Afghanistan, along the lines of the withdrawal from Iraq, and the failure of other European partners, could potentially lead the Obama White House to question whether it is worth buttressing continental stability in Europe. US military bases in the UK, Germany and Kosovo might instead be redeployed to augment other priorities across the globe. Moreover, these geopolitical arguments could support a new isolationism in US foreign policy and enable the federal deficit to be ameliorated.[9]

 

20. In the meantime if the UK provokes the US into removing intelligence co-operation it will atrophy the capacity of MI5 and MI6 to defend British interests. Renewed efforts should now be made to restore the special relationship.

 

21. Whilst there is rightly concern about the prospect of the special relationship no longer being a permanent feature of international diplomacy it should nevertheless be recognised that the vital factor determining the alliance is US preparedness to invest in securing the UK's defence posture. The existence of NATO, access to missile defence, and the doctrine of US extended deterrence - the US nuclear umbrella - is evidence the special relationship remains a marked feature of the international scene. Crucially, President Obama has kept these projects and is not arguing for their cancellation or removal. The continuing US commitment to British objectives should imbue a sense of optimism across the UK government.

 

The implications of any changes in the nature of the bilateral relationship for British foreign policy

22. Radical revisions to the UK-US bilateral relationship could leave the British Exchequer with a crippling financial black hole. The collapse of NATO, removal of US bases in Europe, and the end of extended deterrence will open a gaping hole in the UK's defence portfolio. Any loss of US patronage raises difficult questions over how the UK can defend its interests abroad, threatens the continued existence of European pan-federalism - with Washington no longer able to mediate the EU could fall into factional strife - requires a slashing of expenditure across all government departments at Whitehall - except defence which would require stifling increases - in order that the security of the UK can be maintained. The final and most ominous consequence of a substantial change in the nature of the bilateral relationship is the potential for a re-emergence of the disastrous geopolitical competition that last afflicted Europe in the 1930s.

 

23. Neither will removing US influence from UK foreign policy lead to a period of mutual co-operation with other European partners. The historic record should caution against believing in the viability of a collective European defence posture or political identity. Reckless calls for US withdrawal from Europe and an end to the special relationship should be considered against this backdrop. Those who rail against US influence on the UK must prepare for - but notably do not accept - a precipitate increase in the UK defence budget. In the tumultuous economic climate additional increases in expenditure may not be a viable option to the British Exchequer and therefore the transatlantic relationship should remain ensconced as a permanent feature of UK foreign policy.

 

13 September 2009

 

 

 

 

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[1] Extended deterrence was developed by the US in the Cold War. Under this doctrine the US deterred attack on itself with strategic nuclear forces whilst extending a guarantee to its Cold War allies that it would retaliate if the Soviet Union threatened invasion. Even though the Cold War has finished extended deterrence remains a component of the UK-US relationship. For a further examination of deterrence theories see: Naval Studies Board, National Research Council, Post Cold War Conflict Deterrence (1997) at http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=5464#orgs

[2] Robert Kagan, Dangerous Nation: America and the World 1600-1898 (London, 2006).

[3] Discussions about Energy and our future at http://europe.theoildrum.com/story/2006/9/22/95855/4850

[4] For a more detailed examination of financial history see: Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World (Penguin, 2009).

[5] Lawrence Freedman, From the Falklands to Iraq, Foreign Affairs (May/June 2006).

[6] Robin Harris, 'State of the Special Relationship', Policy Review, no - 113, (June/July 2002) at www.hover.org

[7] Robert Kagan, Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (London, 2^nd edition 2004), p. 158.

[8] US Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy (2008) at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf

[9] There is a tradition of isolationism in US strategic doctrine. For examples of this argument see: America's Strategic Choices (The Mit Press, 2000).