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GS (UK/UK) 15:
Written evidence from Dr. David H. Dunn
Summary:
What is the basis of the
bilateral relationship between the UK
and the US?
· The UK and
US share an internationalist world view and work diplomatically to advance a
shared view of the global order.
· UK-US collaboration
on defence policy within NATO and bilaterally is more integrated than with any
other state.
· UK-UK collaboration
on intelligence is similarly unprecedented in its scale and its trust.
· When British and
American political leaders hit it off the level of intimacy in the decision
making process that can follow is also unprecedented.
· UK-US relations also
matter in the context of wider Euro-Atlantic relations in that the UK is most valuable to the US when Britain
is working at the heart of Europe and the US
is most successful in Europe when its efforts are endorsed by US support.
UK and US views on the
nature and value of the bilateral relationship and the contribution of the
UK-US foreign policy relationship to global security; the extent to which
" the special relationship" still exists and the factors which
determine this; and the implications of any changes in the nature of the
bilateral relationship for British foreign policy.
· Due to a variety of
inter-related factors the nature of the UK-US bilateral relationship is under
threat.
· The most significant
of these challenges are structural changes in the distribution of power in the
international system, symbolised by the growth of the G20 and the rise of the
BRIC countries.
· These changes are
augmented by the changing international issue agenda such as the growth of
terrorism, climate change and proliferation of WMD.
· Financial pressures
on the UK and its defence
and international budgets in particular (including their effect on the Iraq and
Afghan wars), may have a fundamental affect on the functional nature of the
UK-US bilateral relationship. Great care must be taken to assess the impact of
budget cuts in Britain's
international and security budgets.
· In an age of summits
and leadership diplomacy the disposition of political leaders towards each
other matters. When private advice and public support are replaced by public
criticism this has an impact on the overall relationship.
· The legacy of the
Blair-Bush years was such that many people in the UK began to question the intrinsic
value of the UK-US relationship.
· Gordon Brown's
reaction to this period did further damage to UK-US relations without
apparently building an alternative foreign policy model.
About the Author
Dr David
Hastings Dunn is Reader in International
Politics in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at
the University of Birmingham, Edgbaston,
UK. His main
research interests are US
foreign policy, British and European defence policy, security studies and
diplomacy. He is the author of The
Politics of Threat: Minuteman Vulnerability in American National Security
Policy, co-author of American
National Security Policy in the 1990s and editor of Diplomacy at the Highest Level: The Evolution of International Summitry.
He is the former holder of both a NATO Fellowship and an EU-US Fulbright
Fellowship; the latter was spent at the National Defense University, Washington
DC. He has written many scholarly book chapters and articles in International Affairs, The Review of
International Studies, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Contemporary Security Policy, Defence
Studies and the Irish Journal of
International Affairs. He is currently writing a book on US-European
relations entitled Rethinking Transatlanticism.
What is the basis of the bilateral
relationship between the UK
and the US?
1) The UK-US bilateral relationship is
multifaceted and multi layered and operates at many levels. For example there
are 155,000 Americans living and working in the UK,
and a large number of Britons live in the US. Many of formats for new TV
programmes shown across America
originate in the UK
while American popular culture from TV, music, film and fashion permeates
British cultural life imperceptibly due to the common language and shared cultural
heritage. One in seven chief executives of the FTSE 100 companies are American,
and in 2006 4.2 million Britons visited the US.[1]
Over 40% of British adults have visited the United States. Public opinion
research show that cultural similarities mean that Britain's and Americans hold each
other in higher regard than any other close ally.[2]At
a state to state level, however, the basis of the strong bilateral relationship
is manifested in several distinct elements which include; a similarity of world
view and consequent world role; defence; intelligence; leadership; role within
Europe.
2) World
view and world role
At its most
fundamental level the UK and
the US
share a common interest in and commitment to issues of world order and global
governance - or in Winston Churchill's phrase "to freedom and the rights of
man." While other European states have largely eschewed such an approach in
favour of a more limited or regionally focused approach to international
relations the UK
has continued to look outward with an internationalist perspective. Due to Britain's historical role in the world,
continued international obligations and permanent membership of the United
Nations Security Council Britain
has maintained an active role on the world stage more commensurate with its
former status than its present situation. In performing this role the UK
believes that it acts in the interest of the collective good of the
international community in order to promote peace, security, good governance
and development. In fulfilling this role it seeks to advance its core values
and approaches to the world many of which it shares with Washington in a way
which is often mutually reinforcing of the other's diplomatic endeavours. Thus
at the UN and elsewhere the UK
is often in a position to advance common interests with the US and as such is greatly valued in Washington. To have
another great power sponsor or co-sponsor a resolution in the Security Council,
or to state on the record, for example, that the Iranian breaches of the non-proliferation
regime are unacceptable, reinforces the international quality of the position
adopted by Washington and gives multilateral form to such a diplomatic
initiative. In such situations it also allows the UK
to have a magnified influence in that the resolution or demarche is written by
the UK rather than by the US.
One of the key assets that makes this role and influence possible is the high
quality of the British diplomatic service which enhances the influence that the
UK has on US foreign policy as a result.
Although relatively small in number the extremely high quality of the British
Diplomatic Service ensures that its analysis and London's perspective are given more
considerations than practically any other state on many areas of policy. This
is not to say that these perspectives always prevail, however.
3) Defence
Policy
The UK is the only European power apart from France
with the continued ability to project military force on a global scale. It is
the only European power that has maintained the range and sophistication of
military systems to be able to operate along side the technologically advanced US
military in a number of military roles. Operating alongside the US
military gives an international multilateral character to operations which might
otherwise lack it. Thus in 1999 when a UN Security Council resolution was not
possible in the Kosovo conflict due to the threat of a Russian veto, Operation
Allied Force was conducted as an alliance operation, gaining its legitimacy
from its nature as a NATO sanctioned operation. The fact that the UK was
able to play a large military role in this operation gave credibility to the
multilateral character of the mission. When hostilities commenced against Iraq in both 1991 and 2003 British cruise
missiles were fired at targets in Baghdad
and elsewhere making the operation an overtly multilateral undertaking. In Bosnia, Iraq
and Afghanistan
the British armed forces have played a military role second only to those of US
forces. In doing so Britain
has claimed a larger influence in the decision making processes on the future
developments of those conflicts than any other coalition member. Britain typically has sought to send forces at
least 15% the size of the US
contingent. In so doing it has tried to ensure that British officers are
appointed second in command positions, as is currently the case in Afghanistan,
thus ensuring British influence at an operational level in such operations. By
doing so the UK
has then sought to claim political influence at the strategic level of
political decision making.
4) Intelligence
Britain has an
intelligence sharing relationship with the US which is second to none. This
has a number of mutual benefits for both parties. By agreeing to share
intelligence gathered from different parts of the world both parties get access
to better intelligence without the cost of duplicating each other's assets and
efforts. This is particularly the case with regard to signals intelligence
where a degree of geographic work distribution is in operation. Each country,
however, has its own unique assets and approaches giving the other access to
material and perspective that it would not otherwise have. For example some
foreign assets are more willing to talk to British intelligence rather than to
the Americans for a variety of historical or other reasons. Thus it was the
British intelligence service that brought an end to Libya's
programme of weapons of mass destruction and it was British intelligence for
example who recently brought to light the recent Iranian facilities near Qum. While there is obvious value in discovering things
that the Americans have not there is also added benefit in no-Americans bringing
intelligence to the world's attention. As well as intelligence collection there
is also mutual benefit in shared analysis. The UK
role here is prized second to none by the US. An example of this is the fact
that on September 12th 2001 when US airspace was closed to all
traffic an exception was made to allow the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and the
three chiefs of MI6, MI5 and GCHQ to fly in to Washington for a conference
meeting of their opposite counterparts. No other ally was treated in this way
as no other ally was valued as much as the UK intelligence agencies are. Like
the diplomatic service the very high quality of the intelligence services
together with the world view that underpins their global role ensure that they
have a disproportionate role with the US (and elsewhere) to both their size and
budget, and to their counterpart operations.
5) Leadership
In part due to
the historical nature of the bilateral relationship and in part due to the commonality
of the English language British Prime Ministers have over time had the
opportunity to have an unusual amount of influence in Washington by virtue of
the relationship they developed with the US President of the day. This aspect
of the relationship is as apparent when the leadership role is in operation -
MacMillan- Kennedy, Thatcher-Reagan, Blair-Clinton, Blair-Bush, as when it was
not Wilson-Johnson, Heath-Nixon, Major-Clinton, Brown-Bush. The role and
influence of a British Prime Minister in Washington
is in large part a product of the way that she or he has related to the US
President. What the US
has historically valued in the relationship is private candour and public
support. Public criticism by the British Prime Minister or his cabinet ensures
a less intimate and influential relationship. Relations with the hegemon are
highly sought after and there are many states which would wish to fulfil the
close role that the UK has
traditionally sought with Washington if that
role was no longer valued by London.
6) Britain Within Europe
With the end of
the Cold War Europe is no longer the major focus of US
foreign policy and as a result Washington
of necessity needs to focus its diplomatic attentions elsewhere. The growth of
the European Union and the process of European integration also means that on
many issues relations with Washington
are conducted on a EU-US basis. Collectively this means that Washington
increasingly looks to Europe to speak with one
voice on matters affecting both Euro-Atlantic issues and international security
issues more broadly. Given the similarity of world views between Washington and
London the US has made it clear for a number of years that it would prefer the
UK to be an enthusiastic member of the European project, shaping it and guiding
its development along a path that reflects that world view rather than to be a
semi-detached critic from the side-lines. Part of Blair's popularity in Washington and access to the White House was due to his
attempt to act as a bridge between Washington
and Brussels,
to relate one to the other in an attempt to smooth out differences and create
consensus. In Blair's words to the Labour party conference in 2000: "standing
up for Britain means knowing we are stronger with the US if we are stronger in
Europe, and stronger in Europe if we are stronger with the US".[3]
How successful Blair was in this role will be returned to below. A large and
increasing part of the value of the relationship as far as the US is concerned, however, is Britain's role in taming what are seen to be
anti-American instincts and attitudes in Europe rather than just being a
staunch bilateral ally such as Poland.
In thinking about the bilateral relationship it is important to remember this
wider context not just in terms of what Washington
regards as most useful but in terms of what it regards as being in the
interests of both Britain
and the EU too. In this respect Dean Acheson's words from 1961 still have
relevance. While everyone remembers the first line of his famous quip, the full
quote is much more revealing - "Great
Britain has lost an Empire and not yet found
a role. The attempt to play a separate power role - that is a role apart from
Europe, a role based on a 'special relationship' with the United States, a role
based on being the head of a Commonwealth which has no political structure, or
unity or strength and enjoys a fragile and precarious economic relationship by
means of the sterling area and preferences in the British market - this role is
about played out". His point was that the UK's
relations with Washington can't be a
substitute for integration within Europe because the US
needs to deal with Europe as a global actor
and that geopolitical weight of the latter ultimately means that
intercontinental relations take priority. A more recent quotation from Lord
Patten reinforces why the US
wants Britain to play a more
active role in Europe. "American wanted Britain in Europe, first, because she thought
this would help Europe to work better; second, because she genuinely wanted
Europe to share the burden of maintaining the world's economic and political
stability; and third, because understandably she believed Britain would
be a useful friend inside the European stockade".[4]
The European dimension then works two ways if it works at all. London's
influence in Paris, Berlin
and elsewhere is greater when it has and is perceived to have influence in Washington and at the same time Britain's status in the US depends in part on whether it is seen in Washington as being capable and willing to shape events
in Brussels.[5]
UK and US views on the nature and value of the
bilateral relationship and the contribution of the UK-US foreign policy
relationship to global security; the extent to which "the special relationship"
still exists and the factors which determine this; and the implications of any
changes in the nature of the bilateral relationship for British foreign policy.
7) Speaking in Washington in March 2003 Gordon Brown
described the "special relationship" as "a partnership of purpose, renewed by
every generation to reflect the challenges we face". Brown sought to portray
the relationship as timeless and the evolution of the role as seamless. In
reality, however, at this point in time there are a number of pressures on the
relationship which bring into question whether or not it will continue in its
previous form. These reasons include structural changes in the distribution of power
in the international system, the changing international issue agenda, financial
pressures on the UK and its defence and international budgets in particular
(including those on the Iraq and Afghan wars), personalities and the
relationship between private advice and public criticism, the legacy of the
Blair-Bush years.
8) Structural
changes in the distribution of power in the international system
The most obvious
affect on the UK-US relationship is the structural impact of the end of the
Cold War. Given the nature of the special bond between London
and Washington
in defence and intelligence cooperation this led many to speculate at the time
that the importance of the bilateral relationship would diminish as other
issues came to dominate the international political agenda. As it happened of
course the 1991 Gulf War, the wars of the Yugoslav succession in Bosnia and Kosovo and other conflicts around the
world ensured that the security relationship between the UK and the US
remained strong and the US
remained engaged in questions of European security. Focus on the enlargement of
NATO and the EU also kept European issues on Washington's agenda even though their
importance in global terms was diminishing. In the post 9/11 period the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq also kept
the intelligence and defence aspect of the bilateral relationship to the fore.
In doing so, however, these events masked just how much was changing and has
changed in the international political system since 1989. The growth in
geopolitical power of the rising economies such as Brazil, Russia, India and
China and Russia (the so called BRICs) means both that US influence is waning
in relative terms and the importance of the UK and Europe to America's wider
diplomacy is diminishing in some spheres. This was symbolised at the United
Nation's General Assembly special session in New York
in September 2009 when President Obama's priorities were bilateral and
multilateral meetings with powers other than the traditional US allies. Europe is at peace, secure,
prosperous, has a remarkably similar view of the world, its problems and their
resolution, there is much less need for US political attention compared to many
other states on many other issue areas. This does not mean that the US and UK are less
close, but the relationship is less important than it was during the Cold War,
or even the 1990s.
9) The
changing international issue agenda
While America's traditional allies such as the UK
still play an important role in dealing with the rise of the terrorist threat,
its role in relation to other powers is diminishing. This was most obvious in
the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 where the US
invested heavily in its bilateral relationships with Pakistan,
Russia and India in response to the need to
address the terrorist threat. On the issue of global climate change too, US
relations with China and India now of necessity take centre stage within US
diplomacy. The rise of the BRICs more generally means that the focus of
international engagement is shifting away from Cold War East West security
dominated axis towards a North South economic, developmental and environmental
axis.
10) Financial
pressures on the UK and its
defence and international budgets in particular (including those on the Iraq and Afghan
wars)
The impact of
the economic downturn on the UK
economy has had an impact on the UK's
standing in both the world in general and in the US. The fact that the British economy
has suffered an economic slump that will be deeper and longer than another
advanced economy has raised questions about the UK's ability to portray itself as a
first division power. Rumour in cuts in its public spending which may impact
upon its international role are already the subject of speculation in
Washington and elsewhere as to what this will mean for its foreign policy role.
Much of the reaction to the release of the Lockerbie bomber by the UK, apparently in response to attempt to win
favour for British oil and gas contracts with Libya was seen in this light. To
some observers Britain
now appeared too poor to be principled and was willing to release a mass
murdering terrorist on the vague promise of foreign contracts.
11) Britain's
efforts to play an influential role on the world stage in the post Cold War
world have meant that it has taken an active part in NATO and coalition
missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan,
Iraq
and elsewhere. It has also maintained a defence posture and military
capabilities second only to the US
within NATO. As part of this the UK has maintained a fleet of Trident ballistic
missile firing submarines, an ocean going navy with its own organic airpower,
nuclear powered submarines and a fleet of destroyers and frigates; an air force
with global reach and the latest fast jet technology; and a professional and
capable army able to be deployed independently in large numbers in mechanised
units for sustained periods. Through these capabilities the US has maintained close relations with the US military and
won the latter's respect and trust. During this period, however, real defence
spending has not increased in line with either these defence commitments or the
operation tempo which has been asked of these forces, with the result that the British
armed forces have been increasingly asked to do more and more with less and
less resources. This has had an impact on UK-US relations in a number of ways.
Firstly, the US military has
become critical of the ability of the UK
to undertake successfully the missions it has undertaken in Basra
Province Iraq,
and Helmand Province
in Afghanistan.
In Basra the criticism levelled is that the US was deployed
in insufficient strength to impose security on the province and instead cut
deals with the local militia effectively abandoning the area to their writ.
Only once the Iraqi government, with the support of the US Army, confronted
this militia, this argument goes, was security restored to Basra. In this analysis Basra was a strategic defeat for the British
Army. A similar argument has been advanced with regard to Helmand.
That the British Army has been deployed in such a way and on such a scale that
it stands on the verge of strategic defeat, and that only with the surge of US
combat troops to fight in Helmand and elsewhere will the situation be saved.
American criticism of this nature is not of the fighting skills of the British
Army but of the way that they have been deployed, the resources they have had
to do the job with and the subsequent limitations of role that this has
implied.
12) It is Afghanistan
and Iraq that the issue of funding
of the UK
defence budget is most obviously apparent to the Americans but they are only
the most visible manifestation of a wider structural problem, the attempt to
fulfil many roles and missions without the apparent political willingness to
devote the resources to commitments to make them work successfully. American
think tanker Gary Schmitt captured the concern eloquently in a recent article
in the Financial Times, under the headline "Defence cuts reduce Britain's
value as an ally".[6] Commenting
on the debate about the "sad state of Britain's
defences" and reflecting on the fact that within that debate the consensus is
that "the UK
government is facing a fundamental choice. Should it build a military that can
handle today's unconventional wars or attempt to sustain an increasingly thin
semblance of a "do-everything" force?" he concluded by arguing that "if those
are the alternatives and a choice must be made, we should be clear: the
"special relationship" that binds Washington and London will not remain the
same" because "Although there are many reasons for the existence of the
"special relationship" - shared history, language, principles - the cornerstone
of that relationship from its first days has been shared "hard power" in the
areas of intelligence and defence. As such, will the US
be as interested in hearing from Whitehall
if British forces are only capable of working side-by-side with Americans in a
narrower defence arena? And, in turn, will Whitehall
continue to share a common strategic vision with Washington if its own interests are
constrained by increasingly limited military capabilities?"
13) The lack of an increase in defence
spending and the delays this has caused to their procurement has meant that
many large acquisition programmes are now needing to be funded at the same time
- the so called procurement "bow wave", which means that new money will need to
be found from outside the defence budget to pay for all these defence needs - the
two new aircraft carriers, the Typhoon procurement, the new A400M RAF Transport
aircraft, new destroyers and submarines for the navy, and new armed personnel
carriers for the Army and the replacement of the Vanguard class of Trident
submarines - if they are all to be afforded. Rather than this increase, however,
it is much more likely that the Armed Forces will be asked to make savings of
between 10-15% of its overall budget, perhaps more if health and education are
spared their share of the cuts.[7]
The result will be that something has to give. Whichever cuts are made will likely
amount to a dramatic reduction in Britain's traditional defence role,
with wider foreign policy implications. The naval procurement plans are
designed to give the UK the
capacity to operate far from Europe and to partner the US on a global
scale. Without the ships this will not be credible. The Royal Navy is already
overstretched in its roles and missions and undermanned. It now has the
smallest fleet in living memory. The Trident fleet is similarly designed to
assert Britain's
place at the forefront of the nuclear club. With the Trident missile system the
UK has the capacity to
target any target that Washington
might also want to target. During the Cold War the UK
sought the capacity to target Moscow - the so
called "Moscow criteria" - so that the USSR would be deterred from attacking the UK homeland. In
the post Cold War world the UK
seeks to maintain influence in Washington
and around the world with a nuclear system of global reach. In part this gives
the UK
the capacity to take part in a multilateral retaliation should one be
necessary. This "Pyongyang
criteria" is one of the reasons why a fleet based, and therefore mobile,
ballistic missile system is desirable. Any alternative system would lack this
capacity and would itself be vulnerable to pre-emptive attack. The RAF (and
European militaries in general) lack strategic lift capacity, without a new
replacement fleet of transport aircraft the UK armed forces lack independent
reach. Without the Typhoon in sufficient quantities the RAF would lack the
capacity for either independent or allies air operations. The Army is too small
for its present commitments and operational tempo - which is one of the reasons
why so many Royal Navy personnel are engaged in operations in Afghanistan.
Without an expansion of the Army and proper equipment including more
helicopters, the UK will continue
to be viewed as a failing force of diminishing value to Washington. According to some commentators
the UK faces a crisis in
defence policy akin to the one that precipitated the British withdrawal from
east of Suez in
1967. The result of this decision was calamitous for London's
international standing and its relations with Washington. What impact the cuts in defence
spending and military role have on UK-US relations are difficult to predict
accurately, but they are likely to diminish British influence in Washington bilaterally.
Given that the UK
is the most capable and engaged European ally within NATO, it is also difficult
to see how any such diminution of role would not also be damaging to
transatlantic defence relations in general.
14) Personalities
As
indicated above in bi-lateral UK-US relations personalities matter especially
so in an age of summit diplomacy. This much is also evident in the tenure of
Gordon Brown as Prime Minister. While some observers predicted that Brown would
be an "instinctive Atlanticist" in practice he moved to distance himself from
the Bush administration in particular and has been less supportive of the US in
general.[8]
Speaking in 2003 he asserted that, "by standing up for British values and with
our outward-looking internationalism, Britain
can be more than a bridge between Europe and America. Our British values should
make us a beacon for Europe, America
and the rest of the world, building a pro-Atlantic, pro-European consensus".[9]
What Brown may have been trying to communicate in this statement is a desire to
set his own foreign policy agenda. The symbolism is telling, a Beacon not a
Bridge - something to stand up and shine, not something to lie down and be
walked over. It was clear from the outset that Brown wanted to distance himself
in foreign policy from both Blair and Bush. Brown's most obvious and immediate
effort to signal divergence from Blair in relations with the US came with his new cabinet
appointments. He appointed and elevated prominent critics of the invasion of Iraq such as John Denham (who resigned from
Blair's cabinet over Iraq)
and David Miliband (a critic of UK
policy in both Iraq and Lebanon) - the
latter to Foreign Secretary. Most controversially, however, he appointed former
UN Deputy Secretary General and outspoken Bush administration critic Mark
Malloch Brown to a position as Minister for Foreign Affairs, a move which was
particularly annoying to both the White House and American commentators. Nor
did Malloch Brown's appointment temper his penchant for being outspoken -
calling for the US
to negotiate directly with Hamas and Hezbollah. In a series of speeches Brown
also allowed his ministers scope to criticise US foreign policy as practised
under Bush. Thus Margaret Becket, as outgoing Foreign Secretary, was sanctioned
to make a speech in Washington
calling for the complete abolition of nuclear weapons.[10]
Douglas Alexander, Secretary of State for International
Development, attacked US
policy in a number of veiled ways in a speech at the Council of Foreign
Relations. "In the 20th century a country's might was too often measured in
what they could destroy." Mr Alexander asserted, "In the 21st century strength
should be measured by what we can build together. And so we must form new
alliances, based on common values, ones not just to protect us from the world,
but ones which reach out to the world." He described this as "a new
alliance of opportunity" adding "We need to demonstrate by our deeds,
words and our actions that we are internationalist, not isolationist,
multilateralist, not unilateralist, active and not passive, and driven by core
values, consistently applied, not special interests".[11]
According to the Guardian a British source in Washington said that the Brown team was
asserting its independence "one policy speech at a time", adding: "It's a
smarter way of doing it than have a knockdown argument".[12]
15) In his own major
foreign policy address in November 2007, at the Lord Major's Banquet in London, the Prime
Minister's speech was altered between release and delivery. While the original
talked about America being "Britain's most important ally" in the delivered
version this had changed to read that America was "our most important
bilateral relationship". Since relations with the EU or any of its 27 members
aren't strictly bilateral relationships this is not saying that much. It was a
slight of hand and a slight not lost in Washington.
It was language very different to that of "the special relationship". Similarly
Brown talked broadly of the world being a more dangerous place when "Europe and
America are distant from one
another", no hint of a separate role for the UK, special, bridge or otherwise.[13]
In a line perhaps intended to chide at both Europe and the US, Brown also argued that "Europe and America
[can] achieve historic progress [by] working ever more closely together".
Whatever the intention the signals were seen by Washington as an attempt to create distance.
16) Brown's clearest
attempt to differentiate his approach to Bush from that of his predecessor was
on display at his first meeting with the US
President at Camp David in July 2007. Here
there was very obviously no "Colgate moment" - the ice breaker of the
Blair-Bush encounter where Bush joked about their common brand of toothpaste. Brown
was stiff, insisted on wearing a suit and tie and, according to one American
official present, "went out of his way to be unhelpful".[14]
The meeting itself was only conducted after Brown had first met his French and
German counterparts Angel Merkel and Nicholas Sarkozy, thus symbolically
downplaying the transatlantic tie. None of this amounted to direct criticism;
it was instead a form of indirect signalling, dog whistles, to his political
supporters that things had changed since Blair's tenure. When asked, the
British Embassy in Washington
was briefed to deny that any offense or policy difference was being signalled.
On policy the foundations of the relationship remained the same. Close military
and intelligence cooperation continued and the harmony of outlook on many
international questions remained constant. Only on Iraq was a substantial change of
policy evident. In contrast to America's
surge in troop numbers the UK
government announced its intension to half the British presence in Basra province and to
withdraw the forces there to the air station in an "oversight" role. The
politics of this announcement were obvious, that Brown was distancing himself
from the operation in Iraq.
Unlike the policy of the then new Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi, however,
who withdrew his forces from Iraq
on coming to office in 2006, the British effort was muted in both scale and
purpose. Indeed Brown sought to compensate for it by announcing an increase of
British troop numbers in Afghanistan
to bring the total to 7,800. This appeared calculated to signal the
government's political ambiguity in its support for Iraq
in contrast to the "good war" in Afghanistan;
to demonstrate simultaneously that Britain is a good and loyal ally
but that it doesn't support this president in this war.
17) In other areas of
policy however, Brown stressed the substantive support for American policy
which the British government extended. And so in that same Guildhall speech
Brown announced that the UK "will lead in seeking tougher sanctions both at the
UN and in the European Union, including on oil and gas investment and the
financial sector," and that Iran, "should be in no doubt about the
seriousness of our purpose".[15]
Britain remains the largest
aid donor to both Iraq and Afghanistan, after the United States, and in many other areas of policy
is America's
closest ally and supporter. Thus the steps taken to signal distance were more
presentational than substantive. In adopting this policy the Brown government
remained a long way from satisfying its more radical constituents. Brown was
criticised from the left for not going further in repudiating the Blair
position of support for Bush. The Institute of Public Policy Research, for
instance, has urged Brown to reject "core elements of the Blair approach to
international affairs" and to "engage seriously with either Damascus or Tehran
over Iraq", seek to lift the economic boycott of the West Bank and Gaza and
apply "serious international pressure on Israel" and to achieve such a "values
based" foreign policy by working more closely with European partners.[16]
Clearly such an agenda is incompatible with the substantive policy positions of
the Brown government towards the United States. Brown's position
thus amounted to a precarious half-way-house, a situation not unlike the
anomalous position of the British forces at Basra Air Station at the time: a
cut-back and partly withdrawn continuation of the previous policy. In Iraq,
but with a reduced mandate and role; there but not there; neither fully
withdrawn nor fully engaged; marooned at the airport amid the detritus of a
policy of indecision and dither. Likewise, in its broader policy towards the United States
the government found itself isolated between two poles. It attempted to be
simultaneously anti-Bush and pro-American, managing in the process to
achieve neither.
18) What was particularly
odd about this position was its temporal context. The Bush administration had
moved on since the invasion of Iraq
in 2003, in part precisely because of the policy failures that followed. It had
moved on with regard to Iraq: where it has incorporated local Sunni support in
its security strategy for the country; with regard to Iran, where it had
largely followed the EU-led diplomatic path sending its own senior diplomatic
envoy to the EU led talks with Iran in 2008; and with regard to North Korea,
where it had reversed course to pursue intense diplomacy through the six party
talks, with a reasonable measure of success.[17]
As a result, in his trip to London
in June 2008 Bush was able to argue, with only a touch of irony, that: "One of
the things I will leave behind is a multilateralism to deal with tyrants so
problems can be solved diplomatically."[18]
The makeup of the administration had also changed: Rumsfeld is gone from the
Pentagon, Vice President Cheney is more isolated and Secretary of State Rice is
energetically engaged in the Middle East peace
process. Yet despite all this change, Brown made policy from 2007 as if it were
still 2003, reacting to the events of Bush's first term in the middle of his
second.
19) This led to the
oddity that Britain, which
supported Bush in his war, was in danger of being supplanted in America's affections by Germany and France, which publicly condemned
it. By mid-2007, Germany and
France had moved into their
post-reaction phase with regard to Iraq. They were, in a sense, "over"
the arguments sparked by that conflict, and having elected new leaders to
replace Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder were engaged in rebuilding their
relations with Washington.
Hence Brown found himself engaging with a new set of principal international
interlocutors, most of whom were not in power during the 2003 Iraq crisis. Angela Merkel of
Germany has replaced the more outspoken and undiplomatic Schroder, while
President Chirac has been succeeded by Nicolas Sarkozy who has pursued a more
pragmatic and Atlanticist form of international politics, including plans to
return France to the integrated military structure of NATO.[19]
As a result, the UK's
belated negative reaction under Brown to Bush and his Iraq policy seemed out of sync with the rest of Europe, unable to grasp that time had moved on. To many
American observers, Brown's apparent desire to re-run the Blair years and do
things differently seems futile and as a consequence somewhat petty. To many
Europeans it seems too little, too late and unhelpful to the new mood of
reconciliation. Brown's actions seemed to presuppose prematurely that the Bush
administration was over. His policies seemed to be designed to send signals to
the Democratic Party opposition in the US, expecting and awaiting their
victory in the presidential and congressional elections in November 2008. In
playing this long game, however, Brown undercut his relationship with the then
present administration even though it was to remain in office until January
2009.
20) A related and not
insignificant further potential consequence of the current financial crisis is
the prospect of funding cuts to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the
Intelligence services, particularly the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6).
Since 2004 the FCO has closed 19 out of 300 overseas missions and reduced
others to local staff only. Since then the FCO has cut staff from 6000 to 4000
and its £2 billion budget is rumoured to be under threat of being cut back to
£1.6 billion. Given the need for savings in Whitehall it is also unlikely that the
intelligence services will be spared financial hardship. Such small saving will
have a large impact on the influence the UK
has in Washington
and elsewhere.
21) Perhaps more
interesting than the particular effects of the Brown strategy on current
relations between London and Washington is the question of what this episode
tells us about UK-US relations in general and transatlantic relations more
broadly. Certainly the absence of a close and cordial relationship between the
British Prime Minister and the American President has been a gap the new French
President, Nicholas Sarkozy has proven quick to fill. With his easy bonhomie
and accommodating rhetoric Sarkozy has quickly become the "new Blair" in
American affections. As a result, in his farewell tour of Europe Bush spent two
nights in Paris compared to one in London, and used the French capital to deliver the
centrepiece speech of the tour - calling France "America's first friend" - a
historical fact, but one rarely mentioned recently.[20]
Remarkably, given the depth of the crisis between the US and France resulting
from the Iraq crisis in 2003, Bush was also able to state that "When the time
comes to welcome the new American President next January, I will be pleased to
report that the relationship between the United States and Europe is the most
vibrant it has ever been".[21]
For Washington, according to a US diplomat, Sarkozy is now "the axis on which
our relations with Europe will turn".[22]
This is all rather different from the "axis of weasel" of five years ago. For France too "the frost is over" according to an Elysee Palace
spokesman, "We want to show the warmth that now exists between the two
countries after the friction of the recent past".[23]
22) Sarkozy's
transformation of Franco-American relations is also a remarkable illustration
of the impact that a change in leadership can make. This is especially true
given the nature of those changes, for Paris has
not improved relations with Washington by
focusing on that bi-lateral relationship, but by re-conceptualising France's
entire approach towards its international role. Unlike Brown, Sarkozy has
adopted an ambitious internationalist foreign policy agenda which has seen him
adopt a number of policy initiatives on behalf of both France and Europe.
The Mediterranean Union summit in Paris
in July 2008 was successful in bringing together the Palestinian, Syrian and
Israeli leaders and in injecting European energy into the Middle East Peace
process.[24]
Similarly Sarkozy's announcement on his tour of the gulf
states in January 2008 that France
plans to establish a permanent military base in the United
Arab Emirates in 2009 was an effort to raise France's
international and diplomatic role and convince Washington of Paris's global
outlook.[25]
Sarkozy has learned a lesson from the Iraq
debacle which seems to have been lost on the Brown government that you can't
hope to build a united Europe that is divided towards the United States.
Sarkozy realises that the opposite can also be true, that by being pro-American
he has actually aided EU cohesiveness and given Europe
a larger role as result. [26] While
it may not always be in agreement on every nuance of French led EU diplomacy, Washington has shown a remarkable propensity to allow Paris to take the
diplomatic initiative on a number of issues. Most notably it was Sarkozy under
the French Presidency of the European Council who took the lead in negotiating
a cease fire agreement over the clash between Russian and Georgian forces in
August 2008. While Gordon Brown and British Foreign Secretary David Miliband
were echoing some of the more exited commentaries on these events in Washington
demanding that Russia pay a price for its over reaction to events, it was
France who brokered the terms of a deal that was acceptable to all parties in
the region, Europe and internationally. Most interestingly Washington was happy to acquiesce in this
leadership role and in the peace deal secured. Washington
also announcing that it had no plans of its own to impose unilateral punitive
action against Russia in an
apparent abdication of policy leadership to Paris on this issue.[27]
Moscow too was happier to deal with Paris than to listen to the diplomatic protests of Washington and London
which it regarded as hypocritical in the wake of the invasion of Iraq
in 2003. Thus in several substantive policy areas France
has replaced the UK as America's leading partner in Europe
in the wake of British foreign policy under Brown.
23) So what does this
tell us about UK-US relations? It would seem that the more substantive aspects
of British American defence and intelligence cooperation exist in a different
dimension to the personal relationship of the political leaders and by
themselves deliver no automatic position of favour at the personal level. It
also seems to indicate that it is not possible to successfully separate
relations with an individual leader from relations with a state as a whole:
from the recent experience it would seem that the UK can be unparalleled in its
commitment to Iraq, Afghanistan, the Middle East Peace Process and building a
sanctions regime against Iran and still be downgraded in presidential
diplomacy. From this it would seem, contrary to what realist theorists would
tell us, that what matters in international intercourse is less about the
absolutes of substantial policy and more about personal relations and the
atmospherics of summit meetings and political rhetoric. Or perhaps more
substantively - as in Sarkozy's case, the return of the prodigal son is more
readily greeted with the fattened calf than his more constant brother. The fact
that Sarkozy offered to return France
to NATO's integrated Military Command Structure was enough for Bush to accept
his case for a distinct role for the EU in relations with the Alliance. Similarly, the fact that the UK pledged significantly more money than any other
country (apart from the US)
to the reconstruction of Afghanistan
seemed to matter less to Bush than Sarkozy's rhetoric that "We cannot give in
to tortures".[28] This
raises the question of whether US relations with Europe are less influenced by
structure than by agency, and to what extent they are influenced by substantive
issues or personal relationships. It also directs us to wonder about the
relative influence of personalities as a dynamic in transatlantic politics. Is
what we are witnessing the result of comparisons between Blair and Brown, or
even Blair versus Brown compared to Chirac versus Sarkozy and thereafter Brown
versus Sarkozy? Of course, separating style and charisma from policy
differences is not always possible. The Brown government has sought to signal
difference and was critical of the Bush administration, however mildly, while
the new French president oozed charm, offered more troops for Afghanistan and
talked of rejoining NATO.
24) Another question prompted by this
anomalous situation is the role of timing in transatlantic relations, or more
precisely the relative tenures of office of the principal protagonists. The
Brown government seemed to approach the Bush White House as if it was an
interregnum administration, counting down to its expiry date, without properly
calculating that it must deal effectively with it until January 2009. In
adopting this approach it over estimated its own position vis à vis America and inadvertently invited the Americas
to take a similar approach to the increasingly isolated and unpopular Brown
government. So what started off as Brown trying to wait out Bush has turned
into the Americans waiting out Brown. It was an odd double interregnum, two
lame ducks competing to out quack the other. Certainly the way that Sarkozy and
Merkel have behaved has demonstrated that the White House, even with George W
Bush as its incumbent, has no shortage of suitors for the role of loyal ally. What
is interesting with this approach, however, is that it was predicated on
winning favour with an incoming Democratic President in 2009. In practice,
however, the frost in the UK-US bilateral relationship together with the
opportunism of Merkel and Sarkozy mean that the UK
under Brown has lost out to other European suitors of the United States.
The legacy of the Blair-Bush years
25) Blair was driven from office because of
dissatisfaction with his government's relationship with Washington in two ways. First, there was
frustration that Blair apparently had little influence over the Washington
decision-making process yet continued to support its policies. Second, there
was widespread rejection, especially in the ranks of the Labour Party, of
American foreign policy's direction after 9/11. The oft-repeated insult that
Blair was Bush's poodle - dependant, subservient, obedient and uncritical - is
a conflation of these criticisms in the form of caricature. The fact that Blair
was an advocate and exponent - in Kosovo and Sierra Leone - of the use of force
in pursuit of humanitarian intervention before George W Bush was even elected
is an inconvenient fact conveniently ignored.[29]
And while Blair may not have pushed for the invasion of Iraq without Bush he supported the
need to address the perceived threat which Saddam Hussein presented. The fact that
Blair was pilloried for this support, however, illustrates that the rejection
of his foreign policy is more about his particular approach to Transatlanticism
than about liberal interventionism as such. Blair's foreign policy was
predicated both on being the "bridge" between America and Europe, and about
developing a role within Europe "believing that by becoming more European,
London could strengthen its role in the special relationship with Washington".[30]
What the Iraq crisis
demonstrated for many observers, however, was that Britain
was incapable of either delivering Europe to America
or America to Europe. While Blair's relationship with Bush might well
have displayed a unity of values and beliefs regarding the conduct of
international politics, the same could not be said of the wider relationship
between Britain and America,
or, wider still, between European opinion and American policy. In Europe,
public support for the Iraq
war was weak or absent.
26) The value of the "special relationship"
as a means of containing and curtailing the worst excesses of American foreign
policy was also seen to have failed during the Iraq crisis. The result was to
bring into question the whole thrust of British relations with Washington in the
post-9/11, post Iraq War world. The "special relationship" with Washington was premised on public support for America
on the part of the British Prime Minister in return for private influence on
policy. In the run-up to the war Blair sought to persuade the Bush
administration to pursue a more multilateral and diplomatic path. Once this
failed and war became inevitable, Blair sought assurances from Bush in return
for British support, - that the reconstruction of Iraq would be taken seriously
and handled responsibly; that post war Iraq would involve the UN; and that Bush
would address the Israel-Palestine issue.[31]
In both these sets of goals Blair's influence and thus his strategy were widely
judged to have failed. The critical consensus on his policy was that it had
failed to deliver any demonstrable influence or advantage for Britain while at the same time damaging the UK's relationships and position within Europe.
27) Blair's foreign policy was a political
balancing act wherein he sought to be America's
best friend and a committed European through his attempt to deliver Europe as a
constructive partner to the United
States. In Blair's words to the Labour party
conference in 2000: "standing up for Britain means knowing we are stronger with
the US if we are stronger in Europe, and stronger in Europe if we are stronger
with the US".[32]
The failure of this policy in the Iraq crisis was bad enough. When
Blair gave unconditional support for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006 this was enough for
his tenure and his particular vision of foreign policy to be brought to an end.
Given the nature of his political demise there was necessarily much speculation
as to policies his successor would pursue across the Atlantic
and Brown did not disappoint those who sought change - as demonstrated above.
But in reacting to the Bush administration in the way it did has this brought
more influence for British foreign policy in Washington,
Paris, Berlin
or Brussels?
The answer is an obvious no. Instead it created a vacuum in relations with Washington which France
and Germany
filled. Other than the moral satisfaction of being able to adopt a line
independent from Washington
it is difficult to see what benefit this foreign policy approach brings.
Conclusions
28) This piece has argued that the UK-US
bilateral relationship has historically been unusually close and that it has
served both parties interests over the post war period. Given that the UK has largely viewed the US as heir to its former role in global
governance London has sought to direct US
power towards British interests and values. This has been possible over a
sustained period by virtue of the fact that those interests and values have
often been viewed largely in common. Defence, intelligence and security actors
from both states have worked hand in hand, therefore, in interests mutually
conceived as being beyond purely national interest and instead as serving the
wider purposes of collective public goods. Due to a variety of reasons
including structural changes in the distribution of power in the international
system, the changing international issue agenda, financial pressures on the UK
and its defence and international budgets in particular (including their affect
on the Iraq and Afghan wars), personalities and the relationship between
private advice and public criticism, and the legacy of the Blair-Bush years
after which the very value of the relationship began to be questioned within
the UK, there are reasons to question whether this bilateral relationship will
continue to function on the same basis in the near future. For a relationship to
be regarded in high worth - in some degree as special - requires both parties
to treat it as such. The Blair-Bush period led some to conclude that during
this period the UK
gave slavish support in return for nothing of tangible value save the knowledge
that the support was given. Where that support was seen to be for the actor and
not the particular action, the very value of that support was brought into
question. Reacting to that period, however, the Brown administration appears to
have gained little from its attempt to distance itself from Washington
except perhaps to be relegated to a less intimate position of influence in both
the US and Europe.
Taken together with the other pressures on the relationship it is less than
clear either that this was intentional or beneficial. Without a clear
alternative foreign policy strategy for promoting British interests and values
in the world it is less clear that having less influence in Washington when other European powers are
seeking it, would be considered desirable.
29) At a time of great and rapid change in
the international system and in the issue agendas which dominate it the contest
for influence on the world stage is becoming more and more competitive. While Britain must realise that it cannot always
command top billing with the US
at every forum and on every issue it must also take care not to squander the
value of a relationship of trust and cooperation built up over many years.
While UK-US relations cannot be seen as an alternative foreign policy to an
active leadership role in Europe nor should
the latter be seen as in any way incompatible with the former. The resource
challenge and its implication for the UK's overseas role is potentially
the most significant threat to the functional closeness of the two states in
defence, intelligence and diplomatic relations. Care and consultation are
therefore needed as to where cuts would be lease damaging to UK relations with the US
and within Europe. One obvious recommendation
from the above would be to counterbalance defence budget cuts with increases in
funding for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Intelligence Services to
buttress those elements of influence at a time while other areas are in
decline. Pound for pound this money could not be better spent elsewhere. Another
recommendation might be that if the need for a defence review hastens the
development of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDP) then this must
done in concert with Washington
and not in opposition to it. Although the US's position within the
international system is one which is in relative decline, it remains the
dominant power in that system and seems likely to occupy that position for the
foreseeable future. Learning how best to relate to that power position in order
to extract the maximum value possible for both the UK and the international system as
a whole should be the guiding principle for policy.
13
October 2009
[1] See "The Ties that bind", The
Economist, p. 26, 26/7/08.
and www.usembassy.org.uk/rctour.html.
Unless otherwise stated all websites were accessed in October 2009.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Tony Blair's speech to the 2000 Labour Party Conference, see www.guardian.co.uk/labour2000/story/0,,373638,00.html#article_continue
accessed February 2007. Cited by William Wallace and Tim Oliver, "A Bridge Too
Far: The United Kingdom and the Transatlantic Relationship", in David M.
Andrews, (eds) The Transatlantic Alliance
Under Stress: US-European Relations after Iraq, (Cambridge;
Cambridge
university press; 2005) p. 166.
[4] Lord Chris Patten, "Britain's
role: Has Dean Acheson's question been answered yet?", www.ditchley.co.uk/page/157/ditchley-lecture-xli.htm.
Accessed 0ctober 2009.
[5] See Stephen Philips, "Little Englanders are of little use to America", FT, 5/10/09. www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a7a1e2a6-b1e6-11de-a271-00144feab49a.html
[6] Gary Schmitt, "Defence cuts reduce Britain's value as an ally", FT, 19/7/09, www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5dd45c64-748b-11de-8ad5-00144feabdc0.html
[7] See Malcolm Charmers, "Preparing for the Lean Years", Royal United
Services Institute, July 2009, www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/FDR_Working_Paper_1.pdf
[8]C. O'Donnell and Richard Whitman, "European policy Under Gordon
Brown", International Affairs, Vol. 83:1, 2007
[9] Paul Waugh, "US
relationship challenged by Gorgon Brown", The
Independent, 29
September 2003. see www.news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/article88947.ece
[10] Patrick Wintour and Julian Borger, "Brown message to US: it's time
to build, not destroy: Minister signals foreign policy shift ahead of PM's Washington trip", The Guardian, Friday July 13 2007.
[11] Patrick Wintour and Julian Borger, "Brown message to US: it's time
to build, not destroy: Minister signals foreign policy shift ahead of PM's Washington trip", The Guardian, Friday July 13 2007
[12] Ibid.
[13] Irwin Stelzer, "The Special Relationship is between Washington and Brussels",
The Spectator, 21/11/07.
[14] Irwin Stelzer, "The Special Relationship is between Washington and Brussels",
The Spectator, 21/11/07
[15] Patrick Wintour and Julian Borger, "Brown message to US: it's time
to build, not destroy: Minister signals foreign policy shift ahead of PM's Washington trip", The Guardian, Friday July 13 2007.
[16] See David Held and David Metham, "Gordon Brown's foreign policy
challenges", 8/10/2007.
www.opendemocracy.net
[17] On the evolution of US Iranian policy see David Hastings Dunn, "Real
Men want to go to Tehran:
Bush, Pre-emption and the Iranian Nuclear Challenge", International Affairs, Volume 83, Number 1. January
2007. pp. 19- 38.
[18] Ann Treneman, "George Bush goes unplugged for the final elg of his
farewell tour". The Times, June 17, 2008.
[19] John Kampfner, "Brown plans foreign policy shock: to put UK
first", Daily Telegraph, 07/01/07.
[20] See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7455156.stm
[21] Tom Baldwin and Charles Bremmer, "After years of the special
relationship, is France America's new best friend?", The Times, 14/6/08.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Eric Pape, "Mediterranean
Bridge Building",
Newsweek, 8/7/08.
[25] Molly Moore, "France
Announces Base in Persian Gulf", Washington Post, Jan 16, 2008.
[26] See Roger Cohn, "France
on Amphetamines" The New York Times, 17/7/08.
[27] Thom Shanker and Steven Lee Myers, "US Rules Out Unilateral Steps
Against Russia",
The New York Times, 9/9/08.
[28] Ibid.
[29] As Matthew Jamison writes, "In reality the ideas that animate
current Anglo-American foreign policy were first posited by Mr Blair in his
Doctrine of the International Community
speech of 1999, long before Mr Bush entered the White House. Indeed, the latter
was an acknowledged sceptic about the merits of 'nation building' until 11th
of September focused his attention". "Liberal interventionist or the return of
Realism? The Curious case of Mr Cameron. 21st September 2006 see the Henry
Jackson Society website, http://zope06.v.servelocity.net/hjs
Accessed 11/2/07.
[30] Steven Philip Kramer, "Blair's Britain
after Iraq",
Foreign Affairs, July/August 2005.
volume 82, Issue 4, p.90
[31] See William Wallace and Tim Oliver, "A Bridge Too Far: The United
Kingdom and the Transatlantic Relationship", in David M. Andrews, (eds) The Transatlantic Alliance Under Stress:
US-European Relations after Iraq, (Cambridge;
Cambridge
university press; 2005) p. 172.
[32] Tony Blair's speech to the 2000 Labour Party Conference, see www.guardian.co.uk/labour2000/story/0,,373638,00.html#article_continue
accessed February 2007. Cited by William Wallace and Tim Oliver, "A Bridge Too
Far: The United Kingdom and the Transatlantic Relationship", in David M.
Andrews, (eds) The Transatlantic Alliance
Under Stress: US-European Relations after Iraq, (Cambridge;
Cambridge
university press; 2005) p. 166.
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