GS (UK/US) 2: Written evidence from Ambassador Robert E. Hunter,

Senior Advisor, RAND Corporation

 

Summary:

 

· The "special relationship" still exists as between the United States and the United Kingdom, and is regularly honored by US leaders, but it has changed - and diminished - significantly over time;

 

· Language, history, and culture still matter - even as the US population becomes progressively less "European";

 

· The overall appeal of President Obama can ease any difficulties the UK government could have domestically in supporting US foreign policies; his emphasis on multilateralism may not, in fact, represent a sea-change on many specific issues; however, the change in tone can be productive in promoting US-UK relations;

 

· US administrations always assume they will get a "fair hearing" in London, more than in any other capital;

 

· The US still expects that the UK will help it with the EU, and it remains ambivalent about how deeply engaged it would like the UK role to be in the EU, if that would be at the expense of US policies and preferences;

 

· HMG always gets a "fair hearing" in Washington, including on Capitol Hill, but this does not always translate into influence;

 

· The strongest area of practical cooperation is in intelligence; the second is in defence. Defence industry relations-cooperation-interpenetration are also important;

 

· Britain's role in defence promotes influence in Washington. By contrast, the British nuclear deterrent is largely ignored by the US;

 

· London's role as the #2 global financial centre promotes the overall US-UK relationship - and is particularly important as repair of the global financial system assumes a "global security" importance in the broadest sense of the term;

 

· Economically, by contrast, UK importance/influence with the US is dwindling compared with the Continent and East Asia, except for the current short-term value of similar approaches to global recovery - another "global security" issue;

 

· The US particularly values UK engagement "beyond Europe" and in difficult security situations when other allies stand aloof or are reluctant - notably in Iraq and Afghanistan; the US will continue to look to the UK as its number one partner in foreign policy, generally, outside of East Asia, Francophone Africa, and Latin America;

 

· The US and UK have opportunities for close cooperation on issues such as arms control, non-proliferation, and relations with Russia;

 

· As the US increasingly looks to the integration of instruments of power and influence (military and non-military) to meet security requirements in many parts of the world, Britain's experience and perspective (including in counter-insurgency) will be highly useful to the US and to the Special Relationship;

 

· The US will increasingly look to the UK for its role, domestically and internationally, in helping to meet a host of global issues, notably climate change, energy, and the like, which increasingly have a "global security" dimension;

 

· Sharing of experience and approaches on homeland security will be increasingly important to the security of both societies; and

 

· On balance, the Special Relationship favours the US more than the UK, in terms of "who influences whom"; whether this matters to the UK is for it to decide, and should preferably be determined issue by issue. At the same time, there are few British security issues where the United States is likely to be unsympathetic.

 

 

Ambassador Robert E. Hunter

 

Senior Advisor, the RAND Corporation (Arlington, Va).

 

Formerly US Ambassador to NATO (1993-1998); Member, US Defense Policy Board (1998-2001); President, Atlantic Treaty Association (1993-1998); Director of European Affairs, the White House (1977-79).

 

Currently Member, Commander US European Command's Senior Advisory Group (EUCOM/SAG); Senior Concept Developer, Supreme Allied Command Transformation (SACT); Senior International Consultant, Lockheed-Martin Overseas Corporation; Chairman, Council for a Community of Democracies. PhD - International Relations, LSE (1969).

 

 

Background Information

 

1. The UK is, along with France, the only major NATO ally that consistently exceeds more than 2% of GDP in defence spending (and lags - 2008 NATO estimates - only slightly behind France in total expenditures). Of course, in absolute terms, this is far below that of the United States (which accounts for a majority of global defence spending, at a rate one and a half times that of the UK in percentage of GDP - 2.4% to 3.8% in 2008 NATO estimates);

 

2. The United Kingdom has a closer intelligence-sharing relationship with the United States than does any other country (Canada and Australia rank next);

 

3. The United Kingdom also has greater access to US defence high technology than any other country (although, as with the disagreement over sharing code for the F-35, it is not complete; and UK personnel still do not have unrestricted access to all UK-owned defence firms in the US);

 

4. The interpenetration of US and UK defence firms (ownership and doing business in one another's country) is the closest for the US with any country. BAE Systems has generally been the 5th largest supplier to the US Defense Department;

 

5. Interoperability of US and UK defence equipments is not exceeded by any other US defence partner;

 

6. The UK remains the "partner of first resort" in US defence cooperation. Early UK support for the F-35 was instrumental to the US going forward with this weapons system;

 

7. Since the time of US-UK disagreement over Bosnia (2003-mid-2005), Britain has been the most consistent major European NATO ally in supporting US military interventions, including in Iraq and Afghanistan. British support for the US-led coalition invasion of Iraq (2003) provided critical domestic political support in the US (as one element of political compensation, the US administration pledged accelerated efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict). UK continuing support in Iraq was of major importance to the success of the post-invasion phase. UK military engagement in Afghanistan from 2001 onward has been instrumental to US policy and will continue to be so as the US debates its own future in Afghanistan. A UK withdrawal would have a major impact in the US;

 

8. Under the current UK government, the US has received increased support for its policies toward Iran; and it will continue to look for that support. It also looks to the UK for staunch support of US policies at the United Nations and usually reciprocates; cooperation at the UN is close;

 

9. In most areas, US and UK foreign policies have been compatible, to a consistency the US finds with no other major European country. Despite the improvement of Franco-American relations (and France's renewed full integration in NATO's integrated military structure), the US still looks to the UK as its "first partner", at least in security terms, even though - at least outside of the current global economic downturn - the US look more to Germany as a leading economic partner and to the EU overall in economic relations;

 

10. Effective management of the global financial and economic systems has clearly become a major factor in "global security", writ large; and the US and UK have close working relationships in the former and see many policies in similar fashion in the latter, even though the UK economy is losing relative importance for the US;

 

11. The US and UK look at management of Russia in similar ways (more so than with many European countries); they also have similar approaches to arms control and proliferation issues - creating a solid base for joint leadership in these areas;

 

12. The US still looks to the UK to "take its part" in the EU, and the two countries have consistently supported the primacy of NATO over ESDP (a competition that has now been muted), even though St. Mālo (1998) for a time seemed to place the UK more on the French side in the debate;

 

13. Since about the time of the "Good Friday Accord," the US has been less motivated to oppose UK policy in Ireland, and this has almost entirely ended this issue as an irritant in US-UK relations;

 

14. Active US involvement in Arab-Israeli peacemaking is more derivative of other requirements (dealing with security issues with Arab states and NATO allies) than a free-standing interest, and, among the Europeans, securing UK support for US Middle East policies is most important for Washington; and

 

15. Personal interaction of government officials, along with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and foreign policy/security "think tanks" are as close as between the UK and US as for any other US partner. Influence thus gained for the UK cannot be quantified but it remains substantial. The British Embassy in Washington has consistently had excellent access throughout the US government, as well as having one of the best information operations on Capitol Hill (it is one of the few foreign embassies whose role in managing relations with the US rivals that of the US embassy in the opposite capital).

 

 

Recommendations

 

1. An admonition of President Ronald Reagan is apposite to much if not most of the US-UK relationship, especially in security terms: "if it ain't broke, don't fix it";

 

2. Continued significant UK defence spending, interpenetration of defence markets and corporations, close ties between the key financial markets of New York and London, maintenance of the unique US-UK intelligence-sharing relationship, and regular, frequent consultations at various levels of the two governments are obvious courses;

 

3. Closer relations should be forged between Parliament and Congress, including at the staff level (the continued relative lack of foreign policy interest on the part of too many Members of Congress should not be underestimated). This should include joint hearings on integrated security policy-making, alternately in Washington and London;

 

4. Educational exchanges, as well as attention paid to the "successor generation" (which hardly if at all remembers the Cold War), will be highly important. This should include revival of a systematic effort at British tutelage on methodology of strategic thinking (akin to the Institute for Strategic Studies at its inception - "speaking truth to [US] power");

 

5. Close, bilateral coordination on security issues, including for NATO, should be intensified; reinvigorating "quad" consultations at NATO is particularly important. US-UK "strategic dialogue" should be intensified, including shared experience of efforts to promote military/civilian integration of tools of power and influence;

 

6. The US and UK should cooperate in trying to break down barriers between NATO and the EU. They should also coordinate in developing policies and approaches to Afghanistan, at a difficult time in the evolution of this issue;

 

7. The UK should explore, with the US, development of a new security system for the Persian Gulf and environs, and the integration of policy toward the entire region ("holistically") from the Levant to Pakistan.

 

8. There should be close US-UK coordination on the development of the new NATO Strategic Concept; the UK should take the lead - with France and Germany - in developing a parallel document for the EU, with the goal of a joint NATO-EU summit at the time of the NATO summit in Lisbon in 2010.

 

 

21 September 2009