2 Home Office
6. Our starting point was the reasons why the
police were requested to investigate the suspected disclosure
of government information. We wished to discover the number of
disclosures, the type of information that had been leakedin
particular, whether any of it was relevant to national security
or was otherwise classifiedand the efforts that had been
made to discover the source of the leaks before the police were
called in. We also wished to disentangle the roles of the Home
Office and the Cabinet Office in the investigation process.
Reaction
of the Home Office
7. We asked Sir David Normington, Permanent Secretary
of the Home Office, to explain the background to the police investigation.
He said that he and Ministers had become increasingly concerned
by a succession of unauthorised disclosures to the press of sensitive
government information held in the Home Office over a period of
about two years. The frequency of such disclosures caused him
to suspect that a Home Office official might be "deliberately
and maliciously leaking material for political purposes".[5]
He emphasised that even now he does not know for sure what has
been leaked, only what has appeared in the press, but his department
had identified "just over 20 leaks of documents, e-mails
or information over 2007-8".[6]
These leaks were damaging trust within and confidence in the Home
Office, and particularly harming the relationship between Ministers
and officials.[7] Moreover,
there were concerns that "since it was clear that the leaker
or leakers was close to the heart of the Home Office there was
a potential risk to national security".[8]
8. The Cabinet Secretary set out the procedures
for dealing with leaks by officials and other breaches of the
Civil Service Code in a Memorandum to our sister committee, the
Public Administration Committee.[9]
Responsibility for pursuing investigations into leaks normally
lies with the relevant Permanent Secretary, to whom the official
investigators will report. However,
"Occasionally it may be appropriate to involve
the police in an investigation. Departmental Permanent Secretaries
are responsible for taking the decision to do so. Normally, before
any decision is made to involve the police, Departments will discuss
the matter with the Cabinet Office. By definition such cases will
always involve a serious and damaging impact on the functioning
of a Department and will involve suspicion of leaking sensitive
information. Given this, it is not unusual for the Cabinet Office
to take the lead in such investigations."[10]
9. The Department's inquiries into the individual
leaks (and Sir David confirmed that almost all of them had been
subject to an internal inquiry) had failed to identify the perpetrator(s).
In the summer of 2008, the Home Office conducted a review to try
to discover whether there was a pattern to the disclosures; this,
too, failed to give a clear lead. Therefore, Sir David met the
Cabinet Secretary to discuss bringing in "more expert help".
We asked whether any particular disclosure had triggered the decision
to seek help from outside the department but Sir David emphasised
that no single document had caused this: it was the cumulative
nature of the leaking, and the fear that something more damaging
to the national interest might be disclosed.[11]
Cabinet
Office
10. The leaks continued in September 2008. The
Home Office continued to hold inquiries into them, in parallel
with the discussions between Sir David and the Cabinet Office.[12]
These discussions highlighted the fact that, in addition to the
damage to confidence and a potential threat to national security
from the 20 or so leaks about which the Home Office was concerned,
the Cabinet Office was worried about other leaks "not of
Home Office documents, but of a series of other material across
Government, which did have a national security classification",
copies of which had been held by the Home Office.[13]
As a result of all these considerations, the Cabinet Office advised
that the matter should be referred to the police.[14]
Sir David agreed, and on 8 October 2008 the Director of Security
and Intelligence at the Cabinet Office wrote to the Assistant
Commissioner Specialist Operations at the Metropolitan Police,
asking whether the police would consider agreeing to an investigation
into a series of leaks "probably originating in the Home
Office", which were causing considerable concern to the Cabinet
Secretary.[15]
11. The letter to the police said:
"A number of recent leak investigations, including
some conducted by your officers, have raised questions about the
security of sensitive information in the Home Office. Whilst not
all the leaks that concern us merit, taken individually, investigation
by the police, we are concerned that there is an individual or
individuals in the Home Office with access to sensitive material
who is (are) prepared to leak that information. We are in no
doubt that there has been considerable damage to national security
already as a result of some of these leaks and we are concerned
that the potential for future damage is significant [our italics].
The risk of leaking is having an impact on the efficient and effective
conduct of Government business, affecting the ability of Ministers
and senior officials to have full and frank discussions on sensitive
matters and undermining necessary trust. You will not be surprised
to hear that we are also concerned that there must be risk to
information about sensitive operations which, if leaked, could
give rise to grave damage."
As a result of this letter and a subsequent meeting
with Cabinet Office officials to discuss the potential for a police
inquiry, Assistant Commissioner Quick agreed that a senior officer
from the Metropolitan Police Special Operations unit should conduct
a scoping exercise to determine whether a criminal investigation
was appropriate.[16]
12. We asked Sir David for clarification about
the sensitivity of the information known to have been leaked from
the Home Office. Sir David told us that "at least one"
of the 20 or so leaks had raised issues of national security,
though most had not.[17]
On further inquiry, Sir David stated that, in his view, the one
item relating to national security "falls in a different
category from the rest. It was, for example, information known
not just in the Home Office, but elsewhere in Government; and
because it related to national security it was investigated in
a different way from the other investigated leaks."[18]
He added: "I hope it was also clear from my evidence that
this particular leak was not the significant factor in seeking
the Cabinet Office (and police's) help."[19]
13. We do not condone the unauthorised
disclosure of departmental information; this is an abuse by officials
of their positions of trust, and we support the use of disciplinary
action in such instances. We also understand the corrosive effect
that persistent leaking of information has on the efficient working
of departments, not least as it sows mistrust between Ministers
and officials. The Home Secretary made plain to us her anger at
the leaks.[20]
In this case the Home Office appears to have followed best practice
for investigating leaks, as set out in the Cabinet Office's Memorandum
to our sister Committee. Nevertheless, we are concerned that growing
frustration in both the Home Office and the Cabinet Office may
have led officials to give an exaggerated impression of the damage
done by the leaks that could reasonably be presumed to have emanated
from the Home Office.
14. There is a clear mismatch
between Sir David's description of the sort of material that he
suspected had been leaked from the Home Office and the Cabinet
Office's letter to the police stating "there has been considerable
damage to national security already as a result of some of these
leaks". Sir David suggested that this phrase reflected the
concerns not about the 20-plus items he had identified but about
the other material that had been leaked from somewhere in Government.[21]
However, the Cabinet Office letter did not refer to other departments:
only to the Home Office.
15. We recognise that the Metropolitan
Police might still have decided to pursue an investigation on
the basis of the damage done to confidence between Ministers and
officials and the fear that the leaker(s) might have access to
more sensitive information that had not yet been disclosed. We
also do not know whether the oral briefing given to the police
was less hyperbolic than the letter. However, we think it was
unhelpful to give the police the impression that the Home Office
leaker(s) had already caused considerable damage to national security.
16. When Parliament revised
the Official Secrets Act in 1989, it narrowed the scope of the
section on unauthorised disclosure of government information,
focusing on specific types of damaging informationrelating
to security and intelligence, defence, international relations
and crime and special investigation powers.[22]
Unauthorised disclosure of these types of information remained
subject to criminal proceedings. This was in line with what the
then Home Secretary told the House in December 1988 when introducing
second reading of the bill, namely that it would "remove
the protection of the criminal law from the great bulk of sensitive
and important information", none of which would "any
longer have the protection of the criminal law".[23]
17. The Cabinet Office's guidance
to departments says that it is appropriate to involve the police
in leak investigations when they involve "a serious and damaging
impact on the functioning of a Department and
suspicion
of leaking sensitive information". However, it is easy to
imagine circumstances in which a leak of sensitive information
could lead to a damaging impact on the functioning of a Department
without falling within the categories laid down in statute. The
Cabinet Office's guidance therefore seems to leave open the possibility
of involving the police in an investigation without any suspicionlet
alone evidencethat a criminal offence under the Act has
taken place. We recommend that the Cabinet Office revise its guidance
to preclude this possibility.
18. We note that the only person
arrested for leaking information from the Home Office, Mr Galley,
was in fact a junior official providing administrative support,
who had security clearance up to the level of 'secret'.[24]
At this stage of the police investigation, it is impossible to
say exactly what information Mr Galley did disclose: he has, by
a statement through his solicitor, admitted to disclosing some
information. He may not have been responsible for all the 20-plus
leaks identified by Sir Davidand, indeed, Sir David suggested
to us "it would be wrong to conclude
that all the
leaks emanated from the Home Officethat is not proven."[25]
This, together with
the fact that there has been no indication so far that Mr Galley
is linked to the "other" national security-related leaks
that have caused such concern to the Cabinet Office over the last
few years, leaves the possibility (to put it no higher) that there
are other officials within government leaking more sensitive information.
We are unable to judge whether the controversy over the investigation
into Mr Galley and Mr Green makes it less likely that those who
have disclosed information damaging to national security will
ever be discovered.
5 Q 14; see also Qq 5 and 21 Back
6
Qq 5, 9 and 10 Back
7
Q 5 Back
8
Q 5 Back
9
In connection with its current inquiry into Leaks and Whistleblowing
in Whitehall. The Memorandum will be published with the Public
Administration Committee's Report shortly. Back
10
Ibid., para 3 Back
11
Qq 16 and 17 Back
12
Q 22 Back
13
Q 20 Back
14
Qq 24-26 Back
15
A copy of this letter was appended to the Cabinet Office's Memorandum
submitted to the Public Administration Committee. Back
16
Q 220 Back
17
Qq 34-35 Back
18
Letter of Sir David Normington to the Chairman, dated 2 March
2009 Back
19
Ibid. Back
20
Qq 11-16 Back
21
Q 20 See also the Home Secretary's Statement to the House of 4
December 2008: "A full list of relevant leaks, including
those involving highly classified material, was passed to the
police force for their consideration." (HC Deb, 4 December
2008, col 134) Back
22
Sections 1-4 Back
23
HC Deb, 21 December 1988, col 462 Back
24
Qq 6-8 and 18-19 Back
25
Letter of Sir David Normington to the Chairman dated 2 March 2009 Back
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